 Think Tech Hawaii, civil engagement lives here. We're back, we're live, it's two o'clock and I'm giving Friday a good Friday afternoon. With Jim Cochran, he is a professor of Asian affairs and relations and HPU down the block. We love to have HPU come around and tell us about their academic adventures and seeing Jim at the China seminar and seeing him all around town, including last week at the Pacific Forum, Board of Governors Meeting, he's there. He's all about China and Asia and US relations with the same. So welcome to the show, Jim. Thanks, Jay, thanks. Thank you for inviting me and I should just really like to start out by acknowledging the important role you play here in our community and over these years, all of the great work you have done and that you are doing now. Thank you, Jim. And I consider it to really be important so I'm flattered to be able to be here today. Don't be flattered. It's, you know, you're here because we're creating content together. That's the important thing. We wanna create content that people don't know about and should know about and that's the bottom line. And we like working with HPU always. So let's first qualify the witnesses, they say. You're a professor at HPU. Tell us the scope of what you teach. Right, I teach history and international studies, Asia. And I'm also beginning teaching Homeland Security, Homeland Defense and Security. I just have been going to the faculty development courses and Monterey Naval Postgraduate School for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security. So we're starting a new program, Masters in Public Administration. It's quite criminal justice oriented but I do the part, Homeland 6000 on Homeland Defense and Security. So I do that, but my courses really, when I teach history I teach six or seven different courses in history and about the same number in studies on Asia. So I teach both contemporary China which I'm teaching right now. And also history of modern China which is the end of the Ming dynasty 1500s to the present. So I combine those two so the student gets a complete picture both of the history and of contemporary China. And I also do that with Hong Kong, Taiwan, the 11 nations of Southeast Asia, South China Sea, India and its neighbors. Wow, that's a pretty wide beat. Because I'm a retired US Army full colonel and had two tours on the faculty at the US Army War College, West Point Graduate. I also teach US military history and US diplomatic history because I'm a graduate of a number of state department schools and have served in a number of embassies in Asia also. So that's kind of like my... That wasn't enough. My two languages are Mandarin and Indonesian. I've been through the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California for both of those. And then of course, state department schools and also University of Hawaii, Manoa, which is where my master's degree, my PhD, from University of Hawaii, Manoa History Department. Ni hao ma. Koi, koi, ni na. I knew you'd say that. Let's talk about some news, Jim. The last time I saw you was at the Pacific Forum with Richard Armatage who appeared from Washington. He was a deputy secretary of state for a while and he's been, Armatage's been coming out here to the Pacific Forum Board of Governors meetings now for some years. He followed Joseph S. Nye, who was from the Kennedy School at Harvard and he speaks about his national relations. I'm sure you were there. Very interested in what he had to say. Can you give us a pre-see of his remarks that evening? It was only last week. Yeah, well, one thing I have known in, had different dealings with Richard Armatage for some three decades now. And he was over at the Department of Defense as the Undersecretary for International Affairs. And he's the one who sent me to Dhaka Bangladesh as a defense and army attaché and security assistance officer. So I did that tour. And then later in the late 80s, he was at the State Department and he's also the guy, and when I say he sent me, you have to do an out briefing with whoever is in the position and he happened to be in both positions. So he sent me to Indonesia where I was chief of the officer military attaché for defense programs, handling all defense sales in Indonesia. Paul Wolfowitz at that time was the ambassador during that whole period. Later had trouble with the World Bank. Yeah, he did have trouble with the World Bank and other problems also. But what I'm saying is I've known Rich for this long and my mind is in sync with Rich's mind. And he heavily, heavily influenced me. And so I thought that his presentation at last week's Pacific Forum, I thought really covered things well, didn't get down too much into detail, but covered all of the bases. The idea of our need to keep our security presence in Asia, especially at this time, when we're under heavy pressure from China, nudging this out of Asia. And of course the importance of our alliances there, Japan and Korea especially, okay? And we have the Taiwan Relations Act, which doesn't commit us to action in the case that Taiwan is threatened by some sort of security risk. But it gives us the option, the Taiwan Relations Act to do that. And so our close relations with Taiwan, even now very, very important. Which of course Beijing greatly objects to. So we have to deal with those things. Yeah, and he's the perfect guy to talk about that. There's so many nuances in dealing with Asia. United States diplomatic policies really gotta be sophisticated to deal with all those countries. Everybody jockeying for position and everything changing all the time. Yes, yes. And I do wanna talk to you on this show about that. But some people thought that Richard Amitage was pulling his punches last Wednesday. Do you agree? No, I don't think so. You know, Richard is a really politically savvy guy. He's also very candid. Let us say he's prudent, he's prudent. You know, there's a difference. World of diplomacy, you have to be prudent. You have to be prudent. Not just in the world of diplomacy. I mean, you know, as Colin Powell's deputy secretary, he really did some Yulman work there, navigating the tricky straits as it were of the W administration. And of course, they didn't make out well because they were kind of kept on the outside by the neocons in the White House. And that didn't turn out well. We still have that hangover of the Iraq war and the Afghanistan war. And so, you know, none of that went well. In geopolitical policy, you have to be able to look way into the future and see the long-term effect of every move you make. That's not the American way. We Americans, we want it in time for the commercial. Get it done by the commercial, right? Am I right? You are right. And so we're dealing with China. China has the oldest continuously recorded history, of any civilization on the planet. There were others that were older, but they don't publish in hieroglyphics or in cuneiform anymore, right? And so, China, and the other thing is the Chinese live and love their history and they refer back to that even when they talk, they have what they call Cheng Yu, which is a saying that will be pulled out of history somewhere to make a point, okay? So they have all of that to bank on. And like I tell my students, we only have 241 years of history. And sometimes we forget that. Yeah, and the thing is it's not our culture either. It's their culture. They started it and they grew it and they're living it. In our case, we're kind of like the pigeon. We're using from different cultures. That's why I got like you was so important. Give us a window on their thought process and many questions I have for you. Now you spoke in the China seminar last year, which the China seminar, if you don't know, is a special kind of elite group under the East West Center. They meet on a monthly basis in Moili, and they talk about, they have speakers who are very sophisticated on points to appreciate the history, the arts, the culture, and the current events and diplomacy in China. And so Jim was speaking to them last year. Can you talk about what you said? Yeah, they asked me to talk on the China's One Belt One Road, this massive infrastructure project that basically is Xi Jinping's baby. And the idea here is it's a $5 trillion with a T, a $5 trillion multi-decade program involving over 60 nations. And the idea is especially for some of the lesser developed nations to move in there and to provide them with infrastructure, which will increase the living standards and the quality of life of the people there. For example, you're Kazakhstan. You really are pretty dirt poor. And I, China, come in and I offer to build you a railway that will connect your capital with other cities. And while I'm building it, I'll put in fiber optics to give you communications. And at the same time as we go through some of the smaller towns, I'll build a sanitation plant here in the power plant there in the city all there. And I'll do all of that for you. And that will increase your quality of life, your standard of living, your capability to govern. And if you're Kazakhstan, you love that, right? And so what's the price? Well, we Chinese will loan the money to you to get that done. And then you will pay it back in certain required. And they say, well, we're Kazakhstan, so we don't have the resources. Chinese are coming into those countries saying we will provide the resources. We will provide the design engineers, the construction engineers. And we will even provide the construction personnel. And we'll build your economy so you can afford to pay it back. That's part of the idea. That's part of the idea. So this is wonderful. This is like, is this the Marshall Plan over again? I was just going to say that's what it is. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Of course, China is interested in helping people, I suppose, with a certain degree. But that's not their primary purpose here. Their primary purpose is to exert influence and to expand influence. And that means political power influence all over the world. This is the Marshall Plan brought current in the 21st century. And it's going to give them huge dividends. And PS, we aren't there. We're not there at all. We're entirely excluded. Just like we are excluded from TPP, we pulled ourselves out of TPP. Japan has moved into our place. Japan is organizing 13 nations. And they account for something like 15% of the world's gross domestic product and trade, 15%, 20% of the world's population in the 13 nations of TPP. And we're the guys who thought it up, but we're not participating anymore. So exactly, it's problematic. Have to watch it. And I think we're already behind the curve. They're way out ahead of us. It's a wonderful, brilliant initiative for them. Yeah. So let me just talk a little bit about it now. They have what they call a one belt. And it's called Yi Dai in Chinese, Yi Dai Lu, one belt, one road, Yi Dai Lu. And that one belt actually is six economic quarters that stretch from China clear on to the Atlantic coast in Amsterdam, I mean, and even down in the Spain. And then across Central Asia, which is of prime importance to China, because any continuing restlessness of Muslims will come out of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, bordering China and China's Muslims in Xinjiang province, where the Muslim population there is. Chinese are deathly afraid of it. It's like a virus and they're afraid that virus of Muslim activism is going to sneak in and get away. It should be right about that. Well, it already has. And they're already having to deal with it. And in dealing with it, they are engaged in heavy repression. And in any case, if you employ heavy repression, you are going to get a heavy backlash. And this is what's going on. China's having a really terrible problem with that right now. So they're very interested in settling things out in Central Asia, those countries and others that I just mentioned. And so this old war is one of the ways to do that, you see? And the other thing is when they enter into any of these countries to do all of these infrastructure projects, now they have access and influence. This is something I don't think we do well at, but they do very well at. What is access? I can get in the leader's door when something comes up, the president or the dictator. I can get in the door and talk to him when something big is coming up or happening. Especially when he owes you billions. Exactly. And that's access. And then what is influence? I can get that dictator or president or whoever he is, the leader of the place, to go along with what I want him to do. Don't give us any gas. Don't make any waves. Go along with our program here. That's access and influence. So the first time we looked under DUN, we had an economic expansion. Under Hu Jintao, we had let's do consumer. Let's not just export. Let's make a better economy for everybody in the place. And now under Xi Jinping, we have control inside, which clearly that's happening. That was also a subject of discussion with Richard Hornick. I think I saw you there. I did see you for a discussion of mind control in China. And also influence just like one belt, one road around the world, geopolitical domination, if you will, of so many places and so many things. And after this break, Jim, I'd like to bring all of those together and see where it fits between China and North Korea and the US and South Korea. Not an easy question, but we'll have that discussion right after this break. Jim Cochran. Jim Cochran. Jim Cochran. Cochran, yeah. Aloha Kakao. I am Andrea. I am from Italy. And I've been studying and working here in Hawaii for more than three years for my PhD. Hawaii is home to a truly fantastic community of middle and high school students. And did you know some of them are currently out there right now using their free time to invent new quantum computers? And did you know some of them are exploring cybersecurity and the new frontiers of robotics? I am just always amazed as I talk to them at science fairs. Oh, but there's more. Did you know that these students are coming here on Fintech, Hawaii to share their story with us? Come and join the new young talents making way show and discover how these students are shaping our future. Starting on February the 6th, every Tuesday at 11 AM. Only here at Fintech, Hawaii. Mahalo. OK. Jim Cochran. Right. All right. History professor at HPU, long time skill, long time familiarity with what's going on in China and in Asia. And our principal discussion today here on what Fintech Asia is an update on foreign relations in Fintech Asia. And more specifically, what in the world is going on with this secret? It was secret. Visit between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping with the green train. You know what the green train comes secretly to the border? It's a luxury train. It's bulletproof, so it weighs a lot. So it's very slow. That's how our friend Kim Jong-un travels. And he travels in secret to Beijing and says hi. So and that's over. You never even knew what happened until he was gone again. So my question to you is, what does all that mean? And who does that affect? Why did they do it and who does it affect? And how does it affect the position and the interest of the United States in the forthcoming, hopefully the forthcoming talks? Yeah. I think the first thing to point out is we can't read their minds. They are Chinese and they are Korean. And when people get on TV or wherever and say, well, the Chinese think that and the North Koreans want to do, they don't know unless they actually are Chinese living it or North Koreans. That's the first thing that's really important to understand. And we kind of attribute to them motives, which really are American motives, pinned on Chinese and pinned on Koreans. And we get completely off track with this. So that's the first thing. So the second thing is, China is North Korea's mentor. Actually, North Korea exists right now because of China. If you go back to the Korean War, Chinese people's volunteers, which was the PLA and Mufti, went in there and saved the North Korean army and North Korean regime. The grandfather, Kim Il-sung, from Obliteration, because we were at the Yalu at that point. So if it hadn't been for China, North Korea wouldn't exist today. So North Korea is China's baby. And one way to exemplify that is the fact that some 90% of all foreign trade from North Korea is done with China. 90%? So that's a very important thing. Keeps them alive. Exactly, exactly, yeah. And it's more than just that percentage of trade. There's more going on. And then another thing is the Chinese, they need North Korea. First of all, China needs buffers. They invaded Tibet in 1950, the year after they took over from the nationalists. That's no time to conduct a new operation, a massive operation, but they invaded and occupied Tibet. Why? They needed that buffer. They needed that buffer in the south and southwest. And they have the buffer in Inner Mongolia in the north. And Southeast Asia, they've always been jumping on. Burma, they keep Burma very, very close to them. And Vietnam has been a problem child on and off. And it worries them even today, greatly worries them. And then the South China Sea, that's a buffer. They've now built those seven pre-nonexistent islands that are now existing. They've built those in the past five years and have manned them with military forces. And now, really, China now has dominance over the South China Sea. And by the way, they don't call it the South China Sea. They call it Nanhai, which just means South Sea. So a few important things like that. But one of the most important buffers is that North Korea, because that keeps the gringos a very comfortable distance away from our border. And we don't want them near our border. And they're doing communication, listening, and sneaking people across. And there was a land border between North Korea and China. Yeah, it could just cross right over. No, what I'm saying is North Korea itself is the buffer in the border that they need. North Korea itself, that area. And then the other thing is North Korea is a fellow communist traveler. And I keep kind of running into people who say, well, China is not communist anymore. Hey, well, if you are Xi Jinping and you are the general secretary of the Communist Party, which means you're the leader of the Communist Party, and you're the president of China, which means you're in charge of the government, and you're the director of the Central Military Commission, which is, runs the PLA, OK? And you can't be there if you're not a communist, a Chinese Communist Party member. You can't even be in the position. As a matter of fact, you can't be in any of the positions, even starting at the lower level, unless you are a vetted member of the now, I think, to have some 70 to 80 million members of the Chinese Communist Party in this place of almost 1.5 billion people, right? So North Korea is probably, I guess you could say, the only other really operable communist nation now. I mean, Vietnam getting very, you know, iffy. And Russia is just a dictatorship. Yes, I agree. And then Cuba, as always, is fascinating. So those are some of the reasons. I think the primary reason for China is that that role is a buffer zone to keep the foreigners at arms distance. Very, very important. They would not like to see a unified Korea with foreigners having access right there at that border. No more buffer. That's right. Exactly, so that's very, very important. Now, North Korea, of course, what's in it for them was one of the questions you've asked. They made this visit. I love it. The train moves 37 miles an hour as he's pushing down the track. But look, here's something that's really important in international diplomacy. We have just seen a state visit by head of state to what could probably be seen as maybe the second most powerful nation in the world, Beijing, number two economy in the world, headed to become number one in the next decade, the second or third most powerful military in the world, so Beijing, you know, the royal palace, the imperial palace. And we had a head of state arriving for a visit. And it's all done shrouded under the radar. And this isn't the way visits of heads of state are done. And so it's important to realize that. But what Xi Jinping has done is he has sanctioned Kim Jong-un. You see, he's kind of like the Pope. And he's kind of blessed him. You see, he comes to the Vatican. And you have an audience with me. And we talk about things. And so whether or not China gets a seat at the table, if there are ever talks between the President of the United States and the dictator of North Korea, at this point is not necessarily important. Because North Korea will be walking in those talks with China's agenda in their hip pocket. So whether China is at the table or not, as it has been at the talks in Pamlin, John, at the DMZ from the very beginning, China has been there. As a matter of fact, I just happen to have been quite close to the Chinese representative, General Wang Ming. He was the head of the Chinese military element in Dhaka Bangladesh. You know, Dhaka Bangladesh is a very low order kind of operation. But the largest PLA, People's Liberation Army military element outside the Boris of China was in Dhaka Bangladesh in the 70s. Because they were competing with Russia for the good favor of the Bangladeshis for strategic reasons. Because during World War II, this is where America went in the back door to help China against the Japanese through that area, Assam, Bangladesh. So those are a few of the things. I hope I haven't overdone it. No, no, no. But OK, let me throw some possibilities at you. Kim Jong-un loves to wear Xi Jinping's epilates. He loves to say, I got big friends. Don't mess with me. I got big friends. And that was an acknowledgement, a confirmation, of that very same statement. Exactly. And the train thing was really interesting in the sense that not only am I friendly with Xi Jinping, but I bring my train. And he lets it come in. My train, the Korean train, lets it come right into Beijing. So we're not only friends, we're good friends. OK, and Xi Jinping is interested in influence. He's interested in the bufferages, as you say. Both of them benefit by this. I guess the question left over, and we only have a minute to try to address it, is what does this mean to the US? What does it mean to the possibility of talks? Does this enhance that possibility? Does it assist us in some way, or is it all negative for our prospects at those talks? Well, look, in my humble mind, North Korea and Beijing want these talks to work. Kim Jong-un has stated that he wants denuclearization. He said, following in the footsteps of my grandfather and my father, I want to denuclearize. He has stated this just the past couple of days. And so now what that means, if that happens, what's the trade off, and what he's going to want, first of all, is assurance of his safety and security. And that may mean a real diminution of military, US military force on the peninsula and in Asia. He may want that in return for denuclearization. And Xi Jinping would love that. That's true. And he would prefer to have massive aid. Because look, we have a country here of 25 million people. 25 million people. 18 million people have no electricity. 25 million people, about one million, have a telephone subscription. And only three million have a cell phone. And the World Health Organization has labeled it as one of the worst in the world from the standpoint of malnutrition of the population. And there is forced labor, where literally people are worked to death not only in North Korea, but when North Korea contracts people out to other places. So there's a lot that can be done here to assist the people of North Korea. Yeah, and it enhances Kim Jong-un's power to bring better economics to North Korea. Maybe, maybe, because this is a real problem. Because I'm sitting here wondering, once he denuclearizes, why do his generals even need him anymore? We're going to leave that hanging. That's the rhetorical question that we will leave hanging on the basis of this discussion. And we'll have another discussion, won't we, Jim? To follow up on it, because I can guarantee you there'll be more events in the world today in the next few weeks, which we will need to discuss. Jim Corcoran, HPU. Thanks very much. History and also US-Asia Affairs. So nice to talk to you. OK, thank you, Jay. Thanks very much.