 Well, the Eurozone can be seen as a marriage. It's obviously just a metaphor. And it's bad in, I suppose, two respects. First, the country's concerned. The members were extraordinarily diverse, very different politically and economically. And they didn't fully understand what they were entering into, what it implied to become part of a currency union of this kind. And as a result, they made many, many serious mistakes in the early years in what I think of as the honeymoon phase, in which everybody seemed to be getting exactly what they wanted. But in fact, they were going into very dangerous extremes in opposite directions, the credit of countries and the debt of countries. And the second big problem was that the institutions were lacking to cope with a crisis. Now, what needs to be done to make it work is to have proper symmetrical adjustment across the Eurozone, to have a reliable system of support for governments' finances in a real liquidity panic. The ECB has provided that in part, but not totally. There needs to be a true banking union, which I think means a fiscal backup as well. And there isn't a fiscal backup. In the long run, I have no doubt there has to be something a bit more like a fiscal union, partly for that reason, and partly to support governments when they're in really big crises. And I think all that requires some degree of political integration. So there's quite a big longer-term program to make this a good, solid sound marriage, rather than the rather fraught one it is now. The ECB is actually in a very, very difficult position. Inflation is well below its target. It's actually been below its target of pretty well for the last five years. It's now, I tend to look at the core measures, which exclude food and energy, tobacco, alcohol, is well below 1%. That creates tremendous difficulties for adjustment, because it means countries trying to improve their competitiveness essentially need falling prices. That makes their debt problems worse. And of course, it also means that growth has been unsatisfactory. The low inflation is a symptom of that. So what can the ECB do about this? There is sort of an economic problem and a political problem. The economic problem is that the only really powerful instruments it can use now are either massive expansion of the balance sheet through purchase of a much wider range of assets, including riskier assets. I don't think just government debt. And the other possibility, or even they can do it together, it's moving to really strongly negative interest rates on bank deposits at the central bank, which would, I think, transmit to the economy negative interest rates would, I think, encourage people to spend at last far more than they are doing now. In a low inflation environment, why should people spend? They're quite happy to hold their money. Unfortunately, the big problem is even if these worked and it's a genuine question whether these would work, either in the economy or by weakening the euro, it's not clear that they will get political consent for it. And they clearly cannot do any of these extraordinary measures unless they have overwhelming support of the ECB council. I think it's pretty clear that the immediate panic of 2009 to 2012 is over. The main reason for that has been the ECB's actions in indicating its role as a lender of last resort, but also there's been very substantial adjustment in some of the crisis hit countries, notably including Ireland, perhaps most of all Ireland. So the panic phase is over. That has left, however, two big problems. Growth in the eurozone as a whole is still very, very weak. The economy is still, I think, very depressed. A number of economies have very high unemployment rates. And this excess capacity, high unemployment condition is likely to last for a long time. That creates political problems and political difficulties and it's very difficult to foresee how electorates will respond to these long-term, semi-depress conditions. More related to possible return of crisis many countries have been left with very high debt levels, public debt or private debt, in most cases both, in a low growth environment with possible deflation. It's quite difficult to grow their way out of this debt. In many countries the debt is continuing to rise even where fiscal deficits are small, where fiscal deficits are large as they are in Spain, of course it's rising quite rapidly. So you could well imagine a return of crisis conditions associated with that debt. So it's the problems of slow growth, politics, rising debt that might yet bring back crisis conditions. I'm not foreseeing that as probable, but it's clearly possible.