 Hello and thank you for joining. My name is Elizabeth Murray and I am a senior program officer in the Africa Center at the United States Institute of Peace. Together with the Peace Appeal Foundation, USIP is pleased to host today's virtual event to share expertise from our series of case studies on national dialogues. Our recent publication, National Dialogues in Peacebuilding and Transitions, Creativity and Adaptive Thinking explores dialogues held between 2008 and 2015 in Kenya, Central African Republic, Senegal, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen. These six national dialogues came about amidst conflict, political dialogue, or transitions, but the specific context in which they arose are very diverse. They're likewise very diverse in the forms that they took. We have a great lineup of speakers for you today. We'll walk us through some of the lessons from these processes. And today's event is broken into two panels, and each panel will explore three dialogues. In both panels, we will see short, pre-recorded videos from each, from three of the case experts, and then here, a discussant will share some reflections on what he or she has heard and ask some questions of our experts before we move to the audience Q&A. For our live viewers, we ask that you please submit questions using the chat box on USIP's event page, and we also encourage you to tweet about this event using hashtag national dialogues. Our first panel, which will begin in just a few minutes here, will delve into inclusion, the question of who participated in the dialogue and why these decisions were made. And our experts will reflect on whether the dialogues had any long-term impact in broadening who is at the table for important conversations about a country. Our second panel, which we moderated by students again, will explore the role of the international community in national dialogues and how international support and diplomacy can best be leveraged to meet the needs around national dialogues. The publication that we're discussing today took a long and winding road to completion. We began the project several years ago amidst tons of enthusiasm within the international community about national dialogues. And there was a sense that these processes had tremendous, perhaps unprecedented promise to resolve long-standing conflicts and to make societies more inclusive. And there was particularly great enthusiasm around these large, very inclusive national dialogues that would bring hundreds of people from all stakeholder groups to the table to discuss a broad agenda. And while we at USIP appreciated the promise in this highly inclusive model, we also believed that there was a lot of value in exploring smaller dialogues and their potential to broker agreement, particularly around thorny issues. And so we specifically included in our cases several national dialogues that didn't fit this large, very open model. We included several dialogues that were smaller elite level affairs. And in observing a range of cases, we've seen that the organizers of national dialogues often have to navigate a change in between being pragmatic in pursuit of a quick agreement and striving for the broader inclusion that can bring about longer term change in who has a seat at the table in a given country. In the videos that we will see now, Pendebaugh discusses the striking inclusivity that characterized Yassiz national processes in Senegal and the long-term impacts more than 10 years after the conclusion. Dan Brumber will discuss Tunisia's national dialogue, essentially an elite affair, but one that facilitated agreements among a divided political class. And Aliyah Buon explores Lebanon's national dialogues and how the power sharing system there impacted inclusivity. Let me say a few words about our experts before we start our pre-recorded videos. Dr. Mam Pendebaugh is an associate professor in political sciences at Gaston-Burger University and a scientific director of the PhD program on political science. She also co-authored the USIP case study on Senegal's Yassiz national. Her research interests include public policy, particularly on education, gender and religion. Dr. Dan Brumberg, Daniel Brumberg is a professor in the Department of Government and a director of democracy and governance studies at Georgetown University. He's a former senior advisor at USIP and a current senior non-resident fellow at the Arab Center, and Dan authored the Tunisia case study in USIP's publication. And Dr. Aliyah Buon is the director of Middle East and North Africa programs at USIP. He joined USIP after serving as the executive director of the Arab Human Rights Fund. Prior to this, he led the Danish Refugee Council's program in Iraq, and Aliyah authored the Lebanon case study. So if we could please roll the videos now. Thank you. The Yassiz National of Senegal were held from 2008 to 2009. It was the most innovative and inclusive deliberative exercise in the contemporary political history of the country. The trigger for this event was the presidential election of February 2007, which formed a president of July 1 in the first round. The opposition denied the results and the situation led to an extreme polarization of the political field. All dialogue between the government and the opposition were broken, and among other decisions the latter decided to boycott the legislative and senatorial elections. In fact, the election electoral crisis was just the tip of the iceberg because Senegal was in a turmoil of a multi-dimensional crisis that was ethical, political, economic, social and cultural for several years already. To understand and overcome the crisis, the opposition initiated this very unique participative process and were soon joined by all component of the society. 200 issues organized in 214 teams were discussed, going from economic, cultural, politics, governance, education, health, religion, infrastructure, energy, ethics, justice and even the conflict in the Kazanans region. The most famous output of the assays is the Charter of Democratic Governance signed by 234 stakeholders that summarizes the main conclusions of the national dialogue. The first impact of the assays national is that this national dialogue reshaped Senegalese democracy by passing citizens at the center of the decision making process and the making of public policies. This is a very paradigmatic shift from a long past, a colonial and post-colonial past, where decisions were taken by a very small political and economic elite and its international allies. Even if Senegal used to vote since the 19th century, the assays national marked a turning point towards a democracy centered on citizens. The assays designed then new ways for elaborating and implementing public policies in which citizens' voices and participations and evaluation are mandatory. The second impact can be the promotion of the country's national languages. And this is a very strong and a very symbolic point because for the first time in our modern history, discussions around domestic and international issues are held in the native languages of the citizens. Even the Charter of Democratic Governance was available, not only in French and English, but also in the six national languages that are Jola, Malanke, Fula, Serre, Sunnike and Wolof. And this is the first time again that such dignity has been given to the vernacular languages. And maybe last point, it was all the process was done relying on national and voluntary contributions. The Senegal democracy has always been captured by a urban and French-speaking intellectual elite, and the vast majority of the population has been excluded from the exercise of power, except during electoral period. This is one of the main reasons of the lack of identification of the people with the state. The Assis tried to correct this gap between the people and the state by inviting all component of the country, private sector, politicians, civil society, NGOs, trade unions, experts, religious people, academic people, ordinary citizens, men, women, young people, they all govern in all cities, in rural areas, but also in the diaspora, and particularly in Paris, New York and Toronto. Two bodies have been set up for these discussions, what they call thematic committees and the citizens consultations. The two bodies together allowed the widest possible participation and the co-production of knowledge and recommendation for Senegalese future trajectory. The main lesson we can draw from the Assis national is that peace and stability in the country are linked to a permanent dialogue and inclusion of the citizens in the decision making process. For the most part, the conclusions of the Assis national have not been implemented by the regime of Abdulawad or that of the current president, Makisal. Senegal has unfortunately experienced several riots in 2011 and 2021 which killed dozens of people. The same in all these riots were linked to a more economic justice, respect of the constitution and rural flow, and governance respectful of the values of Senegalese society. It is precisely these points that were widely debated during the Assis national. A personal conviction is that an essential part of the solutions to our problems are found in the conclusion of these Assis, and we have to go back to these conclusions. So the Tunisia national dialogue emerged in the spring of 2013 as a response to two interrelated problems. First, the failure of the constituent assembly to produce consensus on a new constitution which would provide the foundation for a new democratic Tunisia. And the second failure or the second challenge in fact was rising Islamist violence on the one side and the assassination of two secular leaders on the other which really led to a situation in which secular leaders were prepared to boycott the whole process and the thing it looked like was going to fall apart. The other issue that helped to create the dialogue in a kind of ironic way was the coup d'etat in Egypt in July 2013, which generated similar fears of a coup in Tunisia and really impelled the leaders to find a way to make peace. The dialogue was led by the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Eugé d'etat, in concert with three other organizations, civil society organizations, they created what was called the Quartet, and they led the effort to negotiate among political elites a new sort of consensus that would then allow for a constitution and a roadmap forward. Well, Tunisia's national dialogue was the only successful national dialogue really in the history of the Arab world, and it was successful in a key way. First of all, it prevented a collapse of the transition itself and that itself was a success. Given the alternative which was civil conflict and perhaps civil war, the dialogue stopped that from happening and that was critical. The other thing that the dialogue did was provide an instrument by which key issues that had been debated and fought over regarding a new constitution were resolved. Questions that dealt with and were highly linked to the question of Islamist secular conflict. They came up, the participants in the dialogue came up with various solutions and they were incorporated into the constitution and that itself. Without that, it is possible that the constitution wouldn't have been created in the first place. And the third thing that the dialogue really accomplished was creating a roadmap, not only for the new constitution, but also for elections. This was a matter of hot political dispute. The resignation of the Islamist led government and not that was a prerequisite. The modalities around that negotiation were eventually negotiated, and the leaders came up with a roadmap that really allowed the transition to take place. Those are all the positive sort of outcomes. The negative outcome in some sense was part of the positive. The transition itself was based on a consensus based government. Everybody had to agree, so nobody really did agree. And this focus on consensus has served as an impediment to moving to a more majoritarian kind of government in Tunisia. So the very success of the dialogue also generated its own very serious challenges in the years forward, but in the main it was a great success. So how did the national dialogue in Tunisia expand room for representation and participation? It really did it in two interesting ways. The first thing has to be said that the dialogue allowed for the return of political leaders that had been linked to the ancient regime, the previous regime. And those leaders had really not been part of the political dialogue, but had they been excluded, they might have opposed it and sabotaged the whole transition. So the dialogue created space by which these leaders from the previous regime, one of whom eventually becomes president, to participate in creating the new democratic Tunisia. And the other thing that the dialogue did as well, it involved civil society organizations and gave them some space, but it has to be said at the end of the day, those civil society organizations were not, aside from those four in the quartet that managed the dialogue, newer younger civil society groups were really not critical to the success of the dialogue. It was an elite enterprise and it involved an expansion of the nature and political diversity of the elite that gave the whole process more legitimacy and more inclusion, but ultimately ensured that what was an elite enterprise. So what lessons can we learn from the Tunisian dialogue, I think that there are several interesting lessons first of all let's keep in mind that every dialogue is unique and Tunisia had its unique aspects. And one was that they usually take the labor union was both a key mediator of the dialogue, and at the same time a protagonist and antagonists in the whole drama, and it used its capacity to mobilize and threaten the other members of the dialogue to manage it. That is a very unusual situation. That's probably not easily replicated and help to create success and I just think it's important to recognize that. But there are broader lessons beyond what is unique to Tunisia that are worth keeping in mind and one is dialogues cannot have an overloaded agenda. They have to be focused, the issues that have to be addressed have to be limited in nature. And if you have too many people too many groups, too many issues, you're going to get the potential for collapse very quickly so the genius if you like of the Tunisia dialogue was that was in fact limited. And it had a number of issues to resolve, and it struck a crucial balance and this is important between the need for autonomy, and the need for being hived off from the political arena, and the same time for the need, the need for input, and getting that sweet spot between the need for for autonomy and the need for engagement was something that they did pretty good job of. And that's a lesson for all national dialogues in the Middle East and be. There were four rounds of dialogue in Lebanon between 2006 and 2012. And the four of them happen in different contexts and for different reasons. The first one happened in 2006, it was mostly about the Syrian relation or Syrian Lebanese relations in the aftermath of Hariri's assassination, as well as the problematic issue of the weapons of Hezbollah. In 2008 it was completely different because back then there was an acute political crisis between the pro Hezbollah and anti Hezbollah political forces around the issue of the private telecommunication network that the Hezbollah was maintaining in Lebanon, and obviously Hezbollah considered this as a matter of direct threat to its leadership and its operations in Lebanon. In 2009, the main issue, the dialogue did not happen because of a crisis, it happened as one of the first things that President Suleiman undertook as he became president of Lebanon. And in 2012, the dialogue was mostly driven by the conflict in nearby Syria, and the role that Lebanon should be playing in this conflict whether it's a neutral role or an active role. I think it's unfair to say that the dialogues did not have an impact at all, but it's also inaccurate to say that they had a durable impact. So basically the way I would qualify it is that each of these four rounds of dialogues had a partial impact that resulted in unblocking a crisis, the crisis that triggered the dialogue basically, without addressing the longer term issues that were causing this political crisis. So in 2006, the main output was some sort of an agreement on how the International Tribunal for Lebanon should be set up, as well as an agreement that Lebanon should request Syria to accept diplomatic representation in both countries. In 2008, obviously the situation was more problematic because we had a military invasion of the capital, and the role that the Qataris played back then was instrumental in maintaining the ceasefire, but also brokering a short term political agreement that resulted in legislative elections, as well as appointing a new president of the Republic. In 2009, there was no tangible result of the dialogue because it was cut short by the legislative elections that happened that year, and in 2012, actually there was a document that basically asserted Lebanon's neutral role in Syria's conflict. And on paper, the text looked really great, however, it was known from the beginning that complying with the requirements of this document would be very difficult for the various political forces in Lebanon. But the output was a nice document about how Lebanon should look at regional conflicts in general, and more specifically, the Syrian conflict. The four rounds of dialogue did not really have a huge impact on the political representation or political inclusion in Lebanon, in general in Lebanon. And the reason is that because of the power sharing system in Lebanon, the dialogue participants had always to be selected among the, you know, 10 or 15 most important political leaders or leaderships in Lebanon. So if you look at the four rounds of dialogue, you would see 70 or 80% of the participants being the same or representing more or less the same political forces with very few changes happening between one round and the other, you know, adding a couple of personalities here or removing personalities from there. So there was not really a significant change in who is taking part in these dialogues and who is, who's basically having, you know, a role around this table. What is worth noting, however, is two things. The first one is an attempt by the French government to call for a for a dialogue in Paris, to which they invited two representatives of civil society organizations that was a first in Lebanon's military. And the second one is a parallel track that was started by a UNDP funded project called the Common Space Initiative that became later on an independent organization helping in national dialogue. The first of lessons learned, I guess the first important lesson is that in the case of Lebanon, it's always important to have an external facilitator or mediator involved in convening and facilitating dialogues. And this probably is due to the power sharing system in Lebanon. The second one is about addressing the longer term issue, causing a political crisis on top of addressing the immediate ones that triggered the dialogue. The second one is about political representation. I, it's, you know, it's a reality that in Lebanon, the power sharing system requires, you know, working with and through specific political leaders or parties or structures, but at the same time, we need to be creative in how we ensure that other emerging or youth political leaders are also included in these political processes. Thank you to our experts for recording these outstanding videos. You covered so much ground in just six minutes each. And thank you so much to our AV team for working with us to produce them. There are so many insights that I'm very eager to explore. And I hope that our live audience is as well. We encourage you again to submit questions using the chat box on USIP's event page. Before we get to your questions, I'm pleased to introduce Derek Brown, who will serve as our discussant for today. Derek is co executive director of the Peace Appeal Foundation, which is USIP's partner organization for this event. Prior to joining the Peace Appeal Foundation in 2005, Derek was the vice president and associate chair of Ashoka Innovators for the Public. He was also previously a USIP Jennings Randolph fellow. Derek has written and advised widely on national dialogue processes, so we're very eager for his insights. He's going to go ahead and offer some reflections on what he's seen in the videos and ask a few questions of our panelists. Derek, over to you. Thanks very much Elizabeth and thanks to our distinguished panelists for their insights and their work and obviously to USIP for hosting the events. There are a few initial comments on the cases presented and then I'm going to ask the panelists to a pine on a few questions that I have before I turn to the audience. I mean as as you've heard each of these three processes is very different in their purpose and their structure and their outcomes in those in very different political contexts with varying degrees of conflict and threats of violence. I would say that to strike me as having served primarily as vehicles for managing distinct and immediate political crises. Well the third attempted to address systemic challenges in the wake of a contested national election that being Senegal's Tunisia's national dialogue is perhaps the best known of all these cases, and it's generally perceived as the most successful. It really sought to pull the nation back from the brink establishing a national dialogue process to implement contested transition Senegal is a cease national rising in the wake of a contested election really sought to do something much more ambitious even it was seeking not only to change policy, but to change a national political culture dominated by urban elites as pendant noted. And but Lebanon's national dialogue experience reflects the complicated confessional politics that you decided that continue to paralyze the country today. In that context where the countries periodically comes to crises that threatens to spin out of control their national dialogues plural really served as safety valves really a formal mechanism to support communications among party elites, which if even if limited are still somewhat more inclusive than the lack of contact or just bilateral exchanges. And this really gets to the point about inclusivity and representation which is inclusivity is always a matter of degree. In terms of thinking about a broader context what strikes me about the Senegal process is that it really fits our classic notion of what we think inclusivity and increased representation might be and that it engaged literally, you know, hundreds of ordinary citizens the business community in a way that was really quite remarkable. Whereas Lebanon's process was was limited it was an elite negotiation by and large it had from 15 to 19 stakeholders. But as he recited there were attempts to bring in other actors, and even just with 15 to 19 political stakeholders at the table that that is more inclusive than a lot of the bilateral. One to one party to party conversations to take in place so I think we need to keep that context of inclusivity in that broader frame. Similarly with with with Tunisia, I really appreciate Dan's comments about how that which was largely an elite negotiation that there was a way in which there were important actors who could have served as spoilers. And so when we think about inclusivity I would just encourage us to make sure that we're thinking about it in the broadest terms I mean how do we, how do we how does it fit the appropriate context. I think another area of particular interest that comes out of these cases is the interplay of a range of different strategies for promoting political change, engaging multiple types of actors, both among the process and within other processes. So, the things that I've heard in reading the case studies and in the presentations we just heard the strategies range from sort of formal negotiations which I would not describe as dialogue as such. Consultative processes, a genuine consensus or largely consensus based dialogue, there have been mass mobilization that was employed street protests, there were back channel talks even diplomatic efforts and regional pressure. In the case of Lebanon, and all of these, all of these sort of added to the ability for some impact to be achieved, although we'll be talking about impact and the limits of that later. All of these processes, whether in the official dialogue itself or in the parallel efforts that were cited, provided opportunities for that wider engagement. We really, I think that's one of the things that we want to examine further as we go, as we go forth. The question here is, did that inclusion have a lasting impact or did it just serve an immediate purpose. And if not, why not and what can we learn. Another interesting common element that comes out of these that strikes me in the case is, is the apparent success of the convening of each of these national dialogue processes, and how their structure from convening to the state bringing the particular stakeholders who came together serve the process to a greater or lesser extent. Senegal's journey to this is national was conceptualized by the opposition, but then turned over to civil society who implemented. And civil society made the brilliant choice and choosing a very respected convener who nonetheless was never ever fully successful in having that process rise above its association as an opposition process. Lebanon's convening was different at different rounds, arising in 2008 out of a regional conference in Doha that was set up to confuse a crisis the Doha agreement charged the new incoming president Salomon with relaunching a national dialogue. Yet, even as a compromise candidate as a president Salomon's credibility as a dialogue convener was damaged over time, both as he attempted to enter electoral politics in Lebanon, which is not what the president is supposed to do. And then in subsequent in subsequent elections and as the product and how we manage the process. Tunisia's convening is perhaps the most interesting. As Dan has noted, it raises important questions as the nominal convener the quartet, led by the usually they say, was both a protagonist. And the circumstance that led to these different convening models instructors raise important questions about how power is exercised, both by the conveners themselves, and as a source of influence for the conveners and for the ability of the dialogue process to make the process. For conveners as well as the process reputation is a source of power. I'm at a much done with mobile seems to have had the reputation that allowed those who directly participated in the dialogue as well as the general public to have a degree of confidence in the power was more that of his office, and it was much more contested, whereas usually they tell you and the quartet had varying degrees of reputational power, but also most importantly they had the influence rooted in a membership of over 600,000 people in the union. I guess my final comments before I turn over to our panelists relates to the question of impact, and whether these dialogues are perceived as successful. I would say in international circles there's been a tendency of late to be skeptical of national dialogues of seeing gaps between their very ambitious goals and what they delivered. Yet at a national level we see increasing calls for national dialogue to serve as a possible vehicle for transforming deeply entrenched conflicts. These calls for national dialogue resonate with the increasing interest by scholars and activists alike in the last decades and a more inclusive deliberative democracy through to the structure, the structure of national dialogues usually lack the representative characteristics of formal legislative bodies. I think penabas comments suggesting that the disease nationals contribution or lesson maybe the importance of permanent dialogue as means of connecting people to the state seems to attest to this, which is not to collect the critical importance of national dialogues as mechanisms for crisis management, whether seeking in short term to avoid disaster or to transform systems. I think at the end of the day the perceptions of impact must be locally determined. As these cases exemplify what's common among Senegal Tunisia and Lebanon examples is the remarkable degree to which they were locally rooted and determined with very little external involvement. So with those initial comments I'd like to turn to our panelists and use the discussants prerogative to ask a few questions. I guess maybe my first question would be for Penda you and for Dan. I'm hoping the two of you could in turn respond to the following. What were the main sources of the power that allowed the processes to achieve the influences that they did. And where did this power fall short. And what lessons is any would these hold. I think that you want to start us off on that. Or would, I think you're. Can you ask again the. Yeah, could you say what were the sources of power that allowed the disease national to achieve the influence that it did. And where did this power and influence fall short. Okay. I think that what happened in 2008 in Senegal is that we have these kind of great and massive consensus on that we were in a deep crisis. You know, I think that the whole population, and even the rulers, a knowledge that facts that we were at a kind of breaking point, and that things were not working at all. And remember that we are in the this hell region, where, you know, I very close were in crisis, money, not yet, but would be very soon, etc. So, our, the, the, the, these consensus on on the fact that we were having maybe one of our major crisis lead people to to go. And, and, and the fact that also, you know, all these segments of the society economic component of the population, the political parties, NGOs, people abroad, etc. I think that it worked like a big pressure on on, you know, on on on people to go and do something. I think that the idea was that something were to be done before a kind of collapse in the society. Dan, do you want to weigh in on the Tunisian experience? Yeah, and the Tunisian experience was also in some way brought about by a crisis. That's a similar sort of story and you mentioned that Derek. I think that the key point here is they usually take Tay, which was the leading member of the Quartet and they can really be real convener and tremendous legitimacy as the largest sort of nationalist organization convened before a different moments in Tunisian political crisis. So there's an ample precedent for this organization sort of taking the lead. It has the kind of national credibility that no organization in Tunisia can match. And that's really important. And of course, as you said, they were able to mobilize, and they were always willing to mobilize their leaders, their followers, rather, if, if, in fact, the, the parties didn't agree. And that really meant if, in fact, the Islamist party and not that didn't agree to the terms demanded by essentially by the Quartet itself. And that raises another point and that is what brought the Quartet together is not only a crisis, but their mutual concern that a Naqta and the Islamist party or semi Islamist party was obstructing progress. And what brought the four members of the Quartet together was their shared suspicions of a Naqta. So this is a very political process. Let's, let's not romanticize what was going on for one moment. This was a profoundly political process and that of course is itself a mixed legacy. And then finally, I'd only sort of add one more point, and that is international forces did in the end play an important role. A pressure from France and the United States and from Algeria and from the EU got the leaders of a Naqta and a Cairo Sebsi, who becomes president and leader of Nida Tunis, the call of Tunis party together to talk about coming to an agreement. So international pressure in the end comes in, it's instigated from below, it's embedded in Tunisian soil, but at the right moment the regional international forces play happily and perhaps in an exceptional way, a very positive role. Thank you. I had an additional question but I see the time has run out and I think we want to turn it over to the to Elizabeth so we can hear from the audience as well. But really, thank you. I had one question I wanted to ask you but we'll save it for a private conversation later. Well, in the case of Lebanon, I mean the two dialogues in 2006 and 2008 have different power plays in 2006 Syria was under a huge international pressure. It was under the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri. And, you know, not only it was led by the US and EU but also there was a regional pressure from Egypt and some of the GCC countries. So definitely the Syrians had no other choice but to push their proxies in Lebanon to sit down and find an honorable way for the international tribunal that was in the process of being set up. I think that was the main motivation that allowed, you know, the dialogue to happen and in terms of power, you know, obviously, the actors were Lebanese. So we didn't have any visible external power involvement dialogue but behind the scenes, the whole dialogue process was instrumentalized by regional and international powers. In 2008 it was different because the dialogue as I said in the video the dialogue came right after a military invasion of Beirut. So back then Hezbollah had an interest in sitting down and negotiating a political arrangement because they found out that this is the limit of how much they can do on the military level. And while the second party, which is the anti-Hezbollah coalition, if I can call it like this, was basically a defeated one. So they saw in the dialogue as an opportunity to refresh basically or to reassert their presence politically speaking. So, but again in 2008 the role of the international community was much more obvious and visible. So Qatar was taking the lead but with a very strong support from the United States, the EU, some GCC countries obviously and the League of Arab States. So the international powers were never absent from any of the rounds of the dialogues in Lebanon. Sometimes they were more visible than other times but they were always the main proponents of the dialogue. Thank you really. Elizabeth back to you. Thank you very much Dan and Lee and Derek and Penda for your answers. I was really interested in how you raised the point that even though these dialogues had domestic conveners, the international community was in the background in the cases of Lebanon and Tunisia influencing the players towards dialogue. I think there's a tendency to think that a dialogue is either convened domestically or internationally but oftentimes it's a sort of hybrid that gets us to the place where the dialogue commences. I want to ask about public perceptions of these dialogues. This is as our audience questions are rolling in, but a burning question for me is public perceptions of these dialogues and how the public perceptions or the public legitimacy impacted the outcomes. So then this question is specifically for Dan and Lee and then I have a related question for Penda. Dan in Tunisia we see that the dialogue very neatly achieved its four objectives, but it was an elite affair and you know in your case study that that the dialogue was was sort of perceived as an act of political theater by some members of society but it was difficult to assess the longer term impact of that. And I'm wondering now with with a bit more time if you have any comments on on what it meant for for Tunisia's politics that this dialogue was an elite affair, how it was perceived and the long term impacts of that. And similarly, Ali for for you, you very clearly explained that these dialogues. They provided as dark summarize a safety valve in moments of crisis they allowed a sort of partial easing of a crisis without a full resolution of the problems. And you also explained that it was some of the same players that were always in politics that were at these dialogues. What were people on the streets in Lebanon thinking of the dialogues and how did those perceptions impact the dialogues success in easing tensions but at the same time failure to sort of fully resolve a crisis. So let me go to Dan first on that and then to Ali please. Great questions. We could have an entire conference on these questions. Very quickly, first of all, let's keep in mind that the four members, particularly the usually Tate and the main organization representing business in the trade community have large constituencies is a country of 11 million people. If you've got 600,000 in the labor union that's, even though you're negotiating through elites you're speaking for considerable constituency so in some sense that that was already bridge but you're right. In the beginning of the dialogue, the various new emerging organizations are brought in and there is a kind of elaborate theater where people sit down and they declare and then the elites go and they actually do the real talking right. And I think that, and as you well know us if you supported a study of this from the ground up by Tunisian scholars and and they sat with civil society organizations and they said yeah I mean for us. Eventually this was a kind of political theater we don't feel we had to kind of input. And I think the legacy here is that in many respects given the current disillusionment with the Tunisian politics from from the ground up for many young people politics is still seen as an elite affair. And the current president case site is manipulating and instrumentalizing this perception. And he said just the other day he dismissed the importance of the dialogue which was I thought very unfair of him. He's using this sort of public disillusionment to advance a populist strategy sounds familiar I think, and, and in so doing he's trying to sort of read his re draw the lines of the initial dialogue to suggest it was completely sort of irrelevant. And that's quite an unfair of him but I'm not here to break the Tunisian president I'm only trying to say that the perception of this being an elite affair continues to endure and provides a background for a major question. Tunisian politics and that is how and what way to link the political apparatus to the wider society. Thanks that was really interesting and your depiction of the convening entity that the portets so really the UJTT and Tunisia is so interesting I think we could do a whole other conference on conveners and uniqueness of Tunisia's cases is really noteworthy. It's so interesting to hear that the fact that the dialogue was an elite affair is being brought up what six, seven years post the dialogue. So, so thanks for sort of bringing us up to the present on that. Ali, can I turn to you for this question now please. So in the case of Lebanon the public perception of the dialogues is not really one of a political process it's mostly a perception of a kind of a bargaining exercise that is happening between the elites who are controlling at the same time, the landscape and the business landscape because the synergies out if I want to use a positive term the synergies between business and politics in Lebanon are very high, very visible. So, so the public perception in general is is one that is very skeptical that looks at it as you know just a bargaining exercise to diffuse a crisis, and then spend some time before the next crisis comes in it was never looked at a durable, sorry as a political process that could lead to durable outcomes. Thanks Ali that's really interesting to hear about the perceptions and I see some parallels to the Tunisian experience in that case. So I'd like to look to look at the seas national now and ask into a question and the seas national had had a really unique origin for national dialogue and that was in the frustration of the opposition politicians after they had had boycotted the elections. And, and, you know, you and Emily described in the case study that the dialogue began as an initiative of the opposition but it seemed to bridge fairly quickly into a broader exercise that was that was able to be depoliticized and then welcome the participation of an enormously broad group of members of society. And so my question is, is, is what I'm first is what I'm saying accurate did the dialogue managed to become depoliticized from an opposition affair to a broadly inclusive one. Did it succeed in welcoming people, even those who were supportive of President wad. And if so, how, how did that happen. How did the organizers managed to make the dialogue broadly appealing for for many groups of society to participate. Yes, I think that the, the, if what we can call the public perception of the assist national in Senegal is is great it's it's because this this process was a success. Getting it was the original idea was absolutely a the idea of the political opposition, but when they went out to their coalition they've made a coalition and and and they were you know doing the boycott of the legislative elections, etc. But the next question for them was to say, what else what now, because I do like what is still running even if we don't recognize game him as our president, what we have five years to deal with him, what what to do next and the idea was to go towards these national dialogue, but they couldn't do it by themselves they had to to bring people legitimate people and organization with them. So they went and do what they call visit, they were out you know visiting representative of economic sector, seeing big NGOs, etc. And these remarkable people that people respect in Senegal, and mostly you know the religious people. And because we know we have these very strong brotherhood in the country and people like I'm a do much time though, who have you know a very brilliant and exceptional trajectory. So they went out to their comfort zone, you know, political zone and and and and and and while they were doing these meetings these visits with all these other other groups, people come to them and tell them that they were interested in having this conversation, even if only if only if they were ready to discuss real and serious issues and not only fighting Abdul I was governance, but thinking about Senegalist trajectories Senegalist problems etc. So in this society, first, you know, the opposition to broaden the agenda and and bring in this agenda new issues, including the way that these actual the current opposition at that time, used to govern. They were going back to the 16th after independence, and they were questioning and addressing these bold issues. And that's why that's at this this turning point, when they were capable of saying telling to the people that they will address all these issues and do it in a you know, right and left, you know, manner that you know people were really interested and get and jump, you know, in the process. Yeah, so they were just a part of the process at one point and not at the center. And then they were, I would say first to, to make room, you know, for all these other people and all these other issues, other than only you know, electoral matters or constitutions, etc. So, that your depiction of what is happening behind the scenes is so interesting and to me it really really lays there the fact that what happens before the dialogue during the preparatory phase is as crucial to the success as as the dialogue itself as the deliberations that happen within the dialogue so thank you for walking us through how the dialogue went from an opposition of their to to one that was perceived as more more broadly inclusive and more broadly legitimate. And we're going to get to audience questions in just a minute I think that they're they're rolling in and being passed to me. I wanted to raise, since Panda has raised the question of the preparatory phase, I wanted to invite the Lee and Dan to to describe a little bit how the preparations happened behind the scenes. How it was possible to get these, these parties that were in such tremendous opposition to one another to the table and how how the conveners were able to use their leverage to do so. So, could I ask Ali to comment on that first preparatory phase. Yeah, but I think in the case of the 2006 dialogue the prep, you know they, the, there was more time to prepare for the dialogue compared to 2008. Most of the preparation was, as I said it was instigated by international regional powers, but was carried out actually by Lebanese figures Lebanese political figures who were you know, even in the worst time of the civil war in Lebanon. So, these figures never stopped communicating amongst each other so the communication existed at all times. We never had a complete disruption of communication between the key political figures in Lebanon. And what happened as I described in the case study is that the person who took the lead on this was the speaker Nabi Hberri in 2006 he was the one who took the lead in talking to the different parties. So, first raising the idea with them then agreeing on participants on the modalities on the agenda on the talking points etc. So he took the lead, but he was definitely acting in the framework of this international regional support that was provided. Thank you. Thanks Ali Dan. It sounds a little ironic that I suppose what led up to the dialogue was not so much a preparatory phase but a series of somewhat failed efforts by other players to get dialogues going including President Marzuki at the time and, and each one sort of went only so far but helped to sort of create the impetus for the dialogue itself so in some sense it wasn't formal preparation or even informal but a series of efforts that each one sort of built on the other because the previous one didn't work out. I mean it was put in that in that way. And so, there was an crucial meeting in Paris between Afonushi and Assebsi who later becomes president and Afonushi being the leader but not the party. Of course by the international community that basically said to these leaders you get together you come to an arrangement you agree, and then you come back and you push this forward and that really was crucial because without these two antagonists coming to an agreement about the basic sort of premise of the idea of a negotiation. But it would have been very difficult to have it. So that too was part of the process. So there were a series of different efforts led by political leaders that sort of helped set the stage without necessarily being part of a formal process to prepare for the specific dialogue that then emerged. Thanks Dan. I think the point that I really enjoyed from your case study is that we should consider Tunisian national dialogue as Tunisian national dialogues. The same national dialogue got so much attention and indeed it was such a success but it's important to see all the processes that led up to it. Your depiction of Nabi Ferry's ability to pull all of the parties to the table really speaks to the fact that the person who's convening needs to have that sort of leverage. So thank you both. I want to ask a question from the audience about the question of inclusion. An audience member asks and this is this is a lot of questions into one. So I'd like to briefly give each of you a few minutes to speak on it. How can we foster dialogue given social exclusion in our communities. What techniques can be used and what are the risks of leaving out groups who are already marginalized. So I'd like to go to Panda first on that to speak to the DSC's national processes and because it was so broad. And then Dan and Ali as well because I think there's questions about what an elite level dialogue does to groups that are already marginalized. So Panda over to you please first. Okay. How did they do to invite people and involve people in this dialogue. Actually, there were several mechanisms. The most popular one was these citizens consultations consisting in a kind of decentralization of the process. So the whole thing is not to think the dialogue in like something who has to happen in cities in the capital or in big hotels etc. What they did is a very strong decentralization. Working with local communities and for example schools were used to gather people because you know you have school absolutely everywhere you know and there were these were the space where people were gathered but they were this kind of representative in each departments in each local area. So the process was really like a pyramidal one. They were everything was thought you know at the central level but at some point there was you know these this decentralized process and they use a lot. But what we call here radio communitaire. I don't know how to say it in English but you know these local radios and you know the discussions were diffused at the same time on the on the radio so people were you know what what was happening and they were invited to be there. So the idea that this is the first time that the floor is people actually they just say to the people the floor is yours. So you will have this expert going you know in these places but saying to the people that they were here to listen and not not even discuss with the people they just they were there to let people talk to hear what they were saying and engage in after that in conversations. I think that decentralization is something very very important and and really inviting people through you know these meetings but only you know through the the through the web through through the Internet. I was telling you that you know the diaspora played a major role and they did it in in these outside Senegal that's very interesting you know the assies were in a in the very very local spaces very central places like Dakar or San Luis but at the same time in in places outside the country to to because you know the issue of inclusivity were that who every Senegalese men and women have to have to have the chance to say something. And that was the way they were thinking and and that's why the diaspora was was brought in in this in this process so you had several layers you know and means to to to people was for example sending letters you know what people would write again people would send email people would would would come and and etc so you know we have this massive data and archives around you know this participation with and that's just amazing. The way that that was that it the way that it was done to give people a chance you know to to engage in this discussion. Thank you. The, the architecture of the seas, that's you know is is absolutely fascinating and you've managed to provide us with so many specific techniques that can be used to, to counter exclusion so thank you for those those really concrete examples. I want to ask a lead to comment briefly on this early in your video message, you mentioned that that new approaches are needed to bring in youth and and others non traditional elites into the conversation and Lebanon. And I know there was there was some civil society efforts around some of the national dialogues through the common space initiatives do you want to comment on any of those are or more broadly ways to counter exclusion. I think you're on mute. Sorry. Yeah I was saying this is a very important element in the success of any dialogue you know inclusivity will definitely contribute to having more durable results or outcomes. The question is how to do it in a highly polarized landscape. And, you know, I, if I may, if I may give an example from Libya I mean in our work as an institute in Libya we are still facing a very strong pushback and resistance to including youngsters in any kind of political process with dialogue at the level of otherwise. So, this is just to tell you that, you know, there are cultural obstacles in the region to this kind of inclusion. I'm not saying this to say we should give up, but I'd like to make the point that it is, it is not only a matter of design. It's a matter of feasibility. So you may well design a very nice and inclusive process when it comes to implementation, you will face this cultural challenge that I just mentioned. Thank you. Thanks very much. Dan, any, any thoughts on how to counter exclusion. I think we put his finger on the issue which is questions of feasibility. Tunisia has a large marginalized community in the West and the South. There's no doubt about it. It's a privileged elites along the northern coast that are critical and help to play the role. But interestingly enough, now there's our, we've seen in Tunisia an emergence of the last few months, a whole series of new groups, many of which come from the marginalized communities which are really pushing to be included in a new national dialogue. And I do not see any obstacle to that happening if the political elites who are now sort of in charge of Tunisia, including the president himself, would be open to such inclusion. So a lot will rest on the political will and capacity of the elites to take advantage of the opportunity of such groups that are militating for inclusion to invite them in. And so we're now at a point now where perhaps the kinds of inclusion that was not possible at the beginning, because in the beginning you had to get an agreement and get it quick. Could is as possible, but we also see that a number of elites that are part of the political apparatus and the power structure are not facilitating this. So a lot has to do with the political will and readiness of elites to take advantage of opportunities to promote inclusion. Thanks very much, Dan. We're going to wrap up our first panel here as we as we conclude I'm really struck by how how much our understanding of national dialogues has has involved over these these these past 10 years, when 10 years ago we might have thought that this national dialogues would be sort of the be all an end all of conflict resolution I think now we have more of an understanding of how there are so many processes that complement national dialogues, and how we can learn from peace processes from negotiations for our national dialogues and how we can take our insights from national dialogues and apply them to other governance and peace processes. I want to sincerely thank Derek Panda Lee and Dan was a wonderful panel I wish we could stay here all day but I'm likewise so excited for our second panel so I want to encourage our audience to take a five minute break and we'll be right back with our second panel on international involvement in national dialogues. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Good evening. Good afternoon. I'm pleased to welcome you to the second panel for today's event on national dialogues, hosted by the United States Institute of peace and the peace appeal foundation. My name is Susan Stagant, and I'm the director of the Africa program at the United States Institute of peace. Today's discussion draws on us IP's recent publication. National Dialogues in peace building and transitions creativity and adaptive thinking. The presentation examines dialogues in six countries, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Lebanon, Senegal, Tunisia, and Yemen. It draws on the experience and expertise and insight of those who were involved in designing the dialogues diplomats, participants delegates, academic observers, assistance providers and those who have supported them in other ways. These experiences show the possibilities for fostering dialogue, forging agreements, strengthening inclusion and driving towards peace. And the report offers guidance on the possibilities and practicalities for those considering convening a national dialogue. In our first panel, we heard from authors of the case studies on Senegal, Tunisia and Lebanon and focus discussion on inclusion in national dialogues. In our second panel, we are joined by authors and experts on the experiences with national dialogues in Kenya, Yemen, and the Central African Republic. We will focus our discussion on the role of international partners and international engagement. So why look at international engagement. When us IP began to look at national dialogues and their promise as an approach for peace building questions about international engagement came up in several different ways. At the time, efforts were underway or being explored in Sudan and Libya and recent success in Tunisia and hope in Yemen fueled hope for a commitment to a stronger more sustainable way towards inclusive settlements. From those who were leading the design of national dialogues and governments where they were being contemplated, we heard very clearly about the sacred sovereign nature of a national dialogue. And the core questions about the state, the relationship between citizens and governments that were being contemplated. At the same time, we heard attention in some instances with the desire for international recognition of the process and the outcomes, as well as the desire for financial and technical support. We also heard from those who were leading or designing dialogues, a recognition that beyond designing inclusion, the agenda, the mediation, the facilitation, the logistics, the operations that they also recognize that international engagement had to be managed. This meant leveraging international partners who could influence towards a credible sustainable agreement. It also meant mitigating the risks that some international partners might interfere or inhibit agreements. Finally, we heard from our colleagues in the US and other governments from the United Nations and other multilateral institutions who are puzzling to determine what their roles should be. When and how should foreign governments provide financial support? What, if anything, should foreign governments say in public diplomacy or quiet engagement? How can foreign governments or partners continually assess whether national dialogues are making progress towards meaningful peace or solidifying divisions power or even violence? Today, we have an excellent panel to help us to explore some of these complicated questions from the experiences that they have delved into. We will hear their initial reflections through a series of pre-recorded remarks, and then you will open up for a conversation and hope to bring any of our live viewers into the discussion. You're welcome to submit any questions through USIP's event page. You can also send questions or join the conversation via Twitter using the hashtag national dialogues. So let me briefly introduce our panelists, and then we will turn to hearing their initial remarks. Jimmy O'Chiang is a social scientist who focuses on governance, political communication, public opinion, political engagement, mediation support, and reconciliation. He has consulted for the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, the United Nations, and the Bergau Foundation. He is currently a graduate in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi. We're also joined by Erica Gaston, who is a non-resident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, and a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge. Previously, she's led USIP's law portfolios in Afghanistan and Yemen and designed programming related to traditional dispute resolution, women's access to justice, land conflict, and rights. Erica is the lead case study author on Yemen. Finally, we're joined by Rachel Sullivan, who is a program specialist with the Africa Center at USIP, where she coordinates initiatives in the Central African Republic. Rachel co-authored the publication on car. So let's turn now to hear from our panelists. The Yemen National Dialogue was viewed as the hope of the post-Arab Spring process. It was a way for Yemen to engage in a holistic political settlement that it would allow it to overcome long-standing political, regional, and tribal divisions, and come out of the bloodshed that had really taken over the country in 2011. It was an enormous process, vested with tons of energy, both by Yemenis and by internationals. There were more than 500 delegates from across the political spectrum, political parties, tribes, all regions, civil society, youth, women. They came together. They deliberated for nearly a year on every imaginable type of proposal or issue, healthcare, retirement, the federal structure of the state, women's rights, transitional justice. In the end, they came up with some 1800 recommendations touching every type of reform possible. But as the dialogue went on, the Yemeni state was already slipping into further conflict. And ultimately, although the dialogue came in with high ambitions and high hopes, it was not enough to overcome some of the structural factors and political divisions that had wrapped Yemen. So the Yemen national dialogue was really a departure in terms of the way that it brought such a diverse range of Yemeni society around the table and in terms of the sort of issues that it tried to tackle. It really did set a landmark in terms of saying that it was equally important to pay attention to some of the military and security issues and issues like women's rights, like health, like transitional justice. But in the end, a lot of the key factions who had long contested the Yemeni government did not buy into the dialogue and did not participate from the onset. Some of those that did were already sort of opting out as the dialogue was going on and conflict was escalating in the north with the Houthis, even as the ink was drying on the paper. Ultimately, in the end, the capacity of the delegates to offer recommendations and to come to their own internal accord proved to be greater than that of the Yemeni government to actually implement them. Conflict between key factions escalated even as the conclusions were being signed and Yemen slipped into civil war within six months with almost no possibility to implement any of them. It's not clear that this was an entire, this certainly was not the fault of the many national dialogue, but in retrospect, the fact that so much energy and time was spent on this large scale dialogue at a time when there were so many other crucial security and political issues to be dealt with and sort of fraying at the seams may have been a costly distraction. The international community was a big part of Yemen's transition process and specifically the national dialogue. So the Gulf Cooperation Council and the countries that are part of it, as well as the US and a number of European countries were key mediators, helping to broker an initial peace agreement and a political settlement and negotiation process that brought Yemen out of the conflict in 2011 that had followed its Arab spring process. And they were equally involved in the national dialogue process from the initial preparatory phase through to providing the financial support for the dialogue, as well as any additional support that the Yemeni government might need to conduct outreach on the national dialogue, help with any of the technical facilitation or preparation for trying to implement it. So the international community certainly played a huge role in the national dialogue would not have happened without the support of these different international actors. The Yemeni community and the Yemeni public initially really supported this international intervention. They recognize that it was helpful to have international mediators that it was crucial to breaking some of the political divides. However, as the national dialogue went on, it started to have this reputation as almost an international, you know, almost a two formal process that was prized by internationals. But how much was it really delivering for the Yemeni public. So it was held at the Movenpik hotel this very fancy hotel and each of the members the national dialogue received a large stipend, and they would just say that it was the Movenpik negotiations. In addition, there was a critique that the international community really wanted this flagship process, and we're pushing it, even when the necessary ingredients were not there, or when there were other potential priorities going on in Yemen. So one of the key omissions in the dialogue was that many of the southern delegates, you know, South Yemen used to be its own state and they wouldn't some constituency still seek independence. And many of those are not buy into the process and it was the international community in particular the UN the US a lot of the members of the GCC who pushed for the national dialogue to go forward, even though some of the prerequisite conditions demanded by southern delegates had not been satisfied. And so certainly that haste to get to this formal process over attention of whether the conditions were right on the ground might have been some of the factors that led to the dialogue's failure. On paper the Yemen national dialogue was the gold standard. It met the blueprint for what you would want for a national dialogue process. It was inclusive. It was representative. I've heard every sort of issue that you would want to have to renegotiate a political settlement, but it didn't have all the right people around the table. It was so large and unwieldy that it was impossible for a struggling state to implement all of those negotiations. And ultimately it didn't keep pace with the facts on the ground, which were unraveling, even as they were making progress at the table. So to have a national dialogue really work. It has to be synced in with what's going on around it. The Yemen national dialogue and reconciliation process was set up in 2008 in response to the unprecedented violence that followed disputed 2007 presidential elections between the party of national unity, led by Mike Eberki and the orange democratic movement, led by Rayla Odinga. The violence led to the death of 1,113 people and displacement of more than 600,000. The purpose of KNDR was to end the violence that was threatening to spiral out of control and find solutions to constitutional and institutional reforms. Four agenda items guided the process, immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties, measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, healing and restoration. How to overcome the political crisis and getting to the root causes of long-term issues and solutions. The African Union chair, John Kufo, convinced the disputants to agree to a negotiated solution supported by the African Union panel of eminent African personalities, led by Kofi Annan, Benjamin Kapa and Grasa Masher. The principles appointed four representatives each to the negotiations. The negotiation phase, which started on 29 January 2008, ended after 41 days and finalized agenda items one to three, leading to the formation of a grand coalition government. The African Union panel of eminent personalities works together with the African Union, the United Nations Center for Humanitarian Dialogue and Diplomatic Missions to convince the parties to agree to a ceasefire and embark on a dialogue. There are a number of roles that the international community played. One, it was able to provide a platform for other actors to be able to participate in the negotiation and implementation phase. Two, it was also able to assist the country to set up key institutional and legal reforms which led to the establishment of a new electoral body and other strong institutions that could be able to withstand the stresses and shocks of government interference. More importantly, it was also able to help build a culture in dialogue exchanging, which made it possible to later allow two key principal actors to initiate a dialogue process after the contested 2017 elections. External assistance was very constructive in one getting the parties to agree to only one mediation process and avoid forum shopping. Kofi Annan, upon arriving in the country, insisted that his process was the only one that the two parties will subscribe to in order for the country to be able to have a negotiated solution to the crisis. Second, the parties also carried out the implementations because the international community made it possible for them to be able to have the necessary technical and financial support to oversee the implementation process. Thirdly, external assistance was also able to provide a platform for other stakeholders, especially civil society to engage in the process and give views on how best the crisis will be resolved. More importantly, at the end of the negotiation phase, the panel of eminent African personalities engaged throughout the implementation process through the coordination and liaison office, periodic visits to the country and annual conferences that did a stop taking of how the implementation was being carried out. In addition, the team that was in charge of negotiation was also transformed into a dialogue team that was able to oversee implementation, considering that these members were appointed to the cabinet, made it easy for them to guide the implementation process. However, there was one shortcoming when it comes to external assistance, the party of national unity felt that the involvement in the country's negotiation process in free on the sovereignty of Kenya and would occasionally try to find a way to avoid fully implementing the agreement switched. There are a number of lessons that we can draw from the support provided by external actors and the way that KND arguments were implemented. First, the right people for the job. The structure of the panel members made it easy for them to reach out to the international community to provide the needed support and also help to move the process whenever it's taught. Two, the international community was united behind a single process and spoke with one voice. This made it possible to consistently influence the way the parties responded to the implementation process. That the international community accompanied the implementation phase from the beginning to the end, providing the necessary technical and financial support to implement constitutional and institutional reforms. There was also the issue of ensuring that the time frames which had been agreed on were available up to the end and an independent firm was given the task of monitoring how implementation was taking place and provide feedback whenever there was a slow down of momentum. The inclusion of the public at key stakeholders through regular briefings in the media, through meeting and engaging with civil society, getting their input and providing feedback, and also through the parties engaging their constituents and how the process was unfolding. The national dialogue process in the Central African Republic was composed of three parts, a ceasefire agreement, popular consultations, and the Bangi National Forum. The national dialogue itself was proposed as a solution to decades of conflict that had escalated in 2013 to a violent coup d'etat where a group of armed rebels from the north came and seized control of the government. Retaliatory violence between these rebels and self-defense groups that came to be known as the anti-Balacca eventually escalated into an ethnic cleansing of the minority Muslim population. The international community concerned about what it saw as an increasing trend in violence and in particular atrocities against civilians intervened and pressured the rebel government to step down in favor of a transitional government. The transitional government was tasked with leading the Central African Republic back to constitutional and elected government. Part of their journey was to put on a national dialogue process, which started with a ceasefire agreement between the transitional government and the armed groups, and then moved into the popular consultation phase where citizens around the country were invited to give their views on not only what caused the conflict but the best ways forward. These were fed then into a national level dialogue that took place in the capital, Bangi, which resulted in a Republican pact for peace, a report that took together all of the different perspectives and laid out specific recommendations to bring the country back to constitutional governance and laid the foundations for building peace in the country. The outcomes of the Central African Republic's national dialogue were mixed. On the one hand, there were some really good immediate outcomes that helped people be more involved in their peace process. On the other hand, there were some negative outcomes that were related to struggles with the implementation of the agreement, and a lot of that had to do with pressure to then move into the national elections. So on the positive side, some of the outcomes included the official recognition of Muslim holidays, which is a big deal for minority population that have been targeted by a lot of the violence in the country. This was also the first time many citizens in the Central African Republic had had an opportunity to be consulted in a peace process and to be consulted by the representatives on serious issues of policy. So these were really important positive gains and outcomes from the national dialogue process. Some of the negatives, however, had to do with the way that it was implemented. And in particular, one of the biggest challenges was that this national dialogue process was seen as a part of the transition back to an elected Democratic government, and the elections were to come almost immediately after the dialogue, which meant that a lot of the focus, as soon as the dialogue was over, was shifted onto the election because it was urgent. And that meant that a lot of the follow-up, a lot of the monitoring and a lot of the implementing of the outcomes of that process weren't prioritized in the immediate aftermath and were dropped. This also meant that the consultations that were so important and were so positive as part of this national dialogue process came to be seen sort of as a box checking exercise in a one-off event, rather than a continuous process that would help the country to be more inclusive and build peace. The role of the international community in the national dialogue process in Central African Republic was very important. They both provided a lot of logistical and technical support to carry out the dialogue itself, and they provided a lot of stabilization and other diplomatic support in addressing the conflict. The economic community of Central African states, for example, helped to institute the transitional government whose job it was to implement the national dialogue process and bring the country back to a democratically elected government. The United Nations, which provided a peacekeeping mission known as Manuska, also provided a lot of logistical and technical support in carrying out the popular consultations and in putting on hosting the Ban Ki National Forum. Other entities such as the African Union and NGOs such as the Humanitarian Dialogue Center did a lot of work as well. One of the key roles of the international community was in helping to convene the dialogue process and also in helping to compile the information, distribute it, and make it more available in the follow-on. There are a lot of important lessons that can be learned from a national dialogue process like the one in the Central African Republic, but the one I'd like to focus on is what it teaches us about inclusion. In CAR, citizens weren't used to being consulted on matters of policy, on matters of things like peace processes. They're not used to being included. And so the popular consultation component of the national dialogue was historic, and it also generated a lot of excitement. And I think we can learn both from that enthusiasm and that reaction that people had to wanting to be able to participate in peace and in policymaking in their own country. And we can also learn from some of the criticisms that were levied afterwards about ways that it could be done better. Some of these, for example, included that people didn't have enough time because the dialogue was so short to really offer their full perspectives. There were also people who felt like they didn't have their perspectives, the things that they cared about that they had raised, come back to them. And I think that can really be tied to the lack of follow-on and implementation of the process and the ways in which the outcomes weren't broadly accessible to citizens in the Central African Republic after the dialogue had concluded. And this, for example, is seen in how long it took the report to be published, to be translated into Sango, and to be disseminated. Thank you, Rachel, Erika, and Jimmy for those really excellent insights in a very short time period for incredibly complex processes that not only lasted for the duration of the actual national dialogue, the preparatory phase that went into it, the implementation that you all reflected upon, but are really rooted in the particular conflict context in each of the countries. Before we come back to you live and in person, I'm really pleased to introduce Dr. Reverend Kenneth Ntata, who is the General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches. He is an educator, he is a leader, and he is deeply involved in various initiatives by the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and in Zimbabwe related to dialogue. And he has agreed to reflect a little bit on what he has heard on each of these case studies, and we'd like to invite him to lead us off in the conversation part of our panel. Kenneth, can I turn over to you? Yes, thank you very much for this opportunity just to share my initial reflection. And I think this has been very educative also for us because we are involved in some form of national dialogues initiative, which are still taking shape and therefore we are learning a great deal. I think for me maybe the first issue I seem to be getting from the panelists, which I may want to raise maybe for our further engagement is how to establish inclusion. Inclusion here seems to be a very difficult issue. I've heard it being raised in the first panel, so I think we already have enough engagement maybe, but I think it would be helpful to get some input. But if we come to what I think has been the highlight of this session is the involvement of international actors and international engagement. The first issue I felt maybe is something we may want to think about is how the local actors view external contributors. We can see that almost always there are those who are on the weaker parties in the engagement who find value in external participants or external contributors. Because they feel that they can represent them at an international level, and they can also amplify the voices of those who cannot speak for themselves. Then there are those normally the incumbent or those with power who feel that their sovereignty is being challenged. And we have heard in all the cases here that there is some level of uneasiness for those with power to allow too much participation of external actors because there is a feeling that they can end up marginalizing or compromising the national sovereignty. I also saw maybe a very important advantage that has been raised about external actors who bring in their stature. Because sometimes what you are looking at is you want the process to have some level of credibility. Now the credibility of the process is not only around inclusion, whether everyone is represented on the table, but the weight of the outcome of the dialogue. Because if there are no participants, especially international actors who can underwrite or who can give weight or make sure that the implementation is going to take place. Then this becomes a little bit the agreement can end up being sort of just a talk show which cannot be implemented. I've also seen that there's a third issue which I find very important as far as external actors may be concerned. That is their technical support or their technical expertise. The question here is whether this technical expertise is viewed as an imposition of a process that is not locally owned. Or it is viewed as a contribution that gives credibility or objectivity of the process. Because it is very possible that the process can be viewed as simply being dominated by outsiders and therefore it slowly starts to lose ownership. The fourth issue that I think I got from these related to international actors is that sometimes the way the whole process is structured can end up being viewed as some kind of a dialogue holiday. Where people are going to a very nice conference and they are eating nice food and they are getting per diems to the extent that the dialogue process becomes an end in itself. And a benefit for those who are participating and not producing any outcomes for the benefit of the nation. This is I think very important especially in countries that are in transition because you may take lunches for granted, you may take bottled water for granted. But for situations where the participants are in desperate need, those luxuries become very valuable goods that can end up, that can become an end in themselves. I think you have been raised these observations. I have a question that I hope our panelists may want to look at. Because what I did not hear a lot about is what incentives does the international actors bring? Because normally without clear incentives for all parties, sometimes the international actors only bring the threat of force. That if you don't do this maybe we are going to deny you development aid or we are going to send our soldiers to your country and so forth. So they normally they are threats but I wanted to hear a little bit more what is the nature of incentives that the international actors bring? The last question that I also have which I also think can help us understand is how do the international actors guarantee the continuity or the sustainability of the outcomes? Because the infrastructure that is put for a national dialogue process that involves international actors somehow gets dissolved when the dialogue has been concluded. What replaces it? I don't know in different countries if we could get examples. What replaced the presence of international actors when they left? These were some of my few reflections that I have and I think these two questions will help us maybe to continue with the conversation. Thank you very much. Thank you Kenneth and thank you for making this very practical and grounded. The intent of this conversation and the publication is really to be useful to people like you and your colleagues who are wrestling with these issues. If we are not grappling with them, if we think they are easy then we are completely wrong. These are all complex issues that are inherent with a lot of dilemmas. So thank you for drawing those out. I would like to turn to our panelists maybe to cue off of some of Kenneth's initial questions and I will encourage you to be as concrete as possible. I'm going to layer one question on top, which is I think all of you talked a little bit about the coherence or lack of coherence of international engagement and partnership. And I'm wondering if you can say anything about what were the mechanisms that helped to get the international community around a shared view, a shared vision, a shared goal, that then might inform how leverage or incentives are then applied. If people are applying leverages and incentives towards different objectives, then I think that's what puts national dialogues in incredibly difficult positions. They get pulled apart. And I think that's one of the external realities that designers, conveners, participants really have to grapple with. Erica, I'm going to turn to you first to lead us off and there's kind of three different questions there, so we'll invite you to grab what you think fits with your experience. Right. Yeah, I mean, I think for the international community and their relationship with Yemen's national dialogue, I think at the time that the national dialogue was going on, the major international actors are involved, which was the group of 10, so it's the U.S. and number of European countries and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that were heavily involved. And they were all fairly bought into the transition process. They had helped negotiate the agreement and have helped set up a lot of the national dialogue and wanted it to succeed for what it was. So in that sense, I would say the international incentives were fairly aligned. What was probably more dissonant, and this relates to the broader issues with Yemen's national dialogue, the different international actors, so predominantly Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, the U.S., had probably pretty divergent perspectives on what groups within Yemen they would accept being in power. But those were issues that were, you know, they were trying to entrap those different conflict incentives within and more institutional structure. They were trying to have this formalized process within the national dialogue to have Yemeni state, and that was not holding with the reality on the ground in Yemen. And so I would say that it wasn't so much that there were different international incentives pulling apart, but the international pressure was to make this process succeed and have it be the flagship process. And put all of the energy into it. And really it was a very hollow shell that wasn't addressing a lot of what was going on in Yemen. So it was the international attention that almost allowed it to suck all the oxygen out of the political space and prove to be a costly distraction. Thanks. Jimmy, you talked in your video about the success in many ways of the ongoing accompaniment by the international community and the ability to bridge, not just during the actual dialogue process, but then into the implementation. Do you have any reflections on tennis questions or observations? I think what made the international community efforts to more or less be united in the Kenyan context is to do with the stature of the panel members. These were people who were able to reach out to anybody in the world and they will trust them to carry the process in a way that will be objective and fair. And importantly, we also saw the panel working with the international community in a way that they had a network which was called the donor group network which more or less had subgroups for each of the key issues that were identified and agenda for. And when you have such a manner of thematic handling of issues, it becomes more easy to ensure that a given set of donors are dealing with a given set of themes. And one thing Kenneth asked is about sustainability. And if you look at the Kenyan process, you go to the 2017 election, you see a situation where the country has really have a culture of dialogue exchanging and you're having the protagonists more or less coming up with a platform through which they drive a national agenda trying to also resolve the issues that arose after the election in their own accord without having to call in experts from the outside. Thanks, I think that's really interesting to to think about not just resolving the immediate crisis but what what structures or capacity what culture and commitment as a kid does it build over the longer term and I know Erica you've you've written about this in the past. In relation to Yemen's national dialogue and the role that women and other political entities played so maybe we'll pull that out and in some parts of the conversation. Rachel I want to turn to you and and I'm sorry in your introduction is the lead author not not the co author as the car case study. Any reflections on on what Kenneth brought forward from which what you observed in in the car dialogue process. Yes, absolutely. I thought it was a really interesting way of framing this panel's discussion. I think that when we talk about national dialogue we often talk about the process of that specific intervention of that specific series in this case of and oftentimes we're looking only at the international relationships that are happening during that time. But I think in this case in particular. I thought about you know when you said what happens after the international actors leave, they haven't left yet. And so this national dialogue and Central African Republic took place in 2015. You can see, you know, many years of international actors, particularly the regional actor and also the United Nations, some intervention from the EU as well, coming in and working with the car government, working with civil society organizations, having peacekeeping missions. And so one of the things that really struck me from that conversation is this need to reflect and remember that the relationships of the international community don't begin and end with the national dialogue process. And in particular in this case I think that's true. I would say that that also leads to complex feelings about what the different international actors represent on the part of Central Africans, right, you know, there are different moments in conflict where they are happy to see somebody come in and do something new such as the popular consultations and then unhappy to see the results that the implementation plan really hasn't been followed and I think that that's important to keep in mind. Then what that also means though is that when we're looking at the national dialogue process is that it continues to have an impact it continues to have reverberations as peacebuilding processes continue so we've seen for example in 2019. The African Union and ECS also helped to convene another ceasefire agreement right and they drew on some of the outcomes of the Banking National Forum in 2015 to do that. And so I think that this long view of these relationships and remembering that they continue to evolve is really important. Thanks. Thanks for adding those additional thoughts to it. I want to pick a little bit on this, this question of navigating changing dynamics, because I think it's come up in various different ways across the case studies. And I think if we're if we're honest and humble, it's particularly difficult for international partners to change course along the way. So once once sort of the big mechanisms get stood up to to fund dialogue processes to put in place partnerships or grants or contracts or to develop a policy to start delivering diplomatic messaging to go here with American, European, African, Middle Eastern partners, that ship starts moving and it's very difficult to turn. And so I wanted to ask our panelists in in the circumstances of the dialogues that you've looked at respectively. Can you can you either see any example where the international community did pivot effectively and what do you think contributed to allowing that to happen. And then if they if that didn't happen, where where were the inflection points that were missed and and why. But what could be done differently to allow a little bit more agility and adaptivity to something that is inherently political that is inherently related to conflict. And if you want to jump in here from to reflect on your own experience and I'm happy to have you you contribute as as part of the panel to the extent that you're you're happy to do so. To me, why don't we start with you on this one. I think most of the time when the international community has decided they're following a specific path is difficult to deviate from that path. And the moment you try to deviate from that, but it means that you're giving the protagonist a leeway for them to seek alternative options. So I think sometimes sticking to a specific path helps the protagonist to take the process seriously, to avoid seeking alternative option and stick to a single process until it comes to its fruition because anytime you give political elite options to definitely take this option because they never come to a process to give in or to let the other side win. So I think sometimes it's a better path to ensure that the process that not only research and negotiation but also implement the stipulations of the agreements reached. Thanks Rachel do you have any thoughts on this from from the car perspective. Yeah, I think that so I want to pick up on one of Jimmy's points and that sometimes not pivoting and not changing can be a good thing. I think sometimes sticking to a plan that you've set out and these have you going to do is one way of building credibility as we talked about earlier with sort of this guarantor type of role. But I think one instance where I would say there was a good pivot was at the beginning of this transitional process in car when I guess was working with the first transitional government as part of that process. They started to see an escalation of conflict and realized that this was maybe not the right actor to work with and that that actor wasn't able to stop violence against civilians and decided that they needed to go a different way and needed to shift into what eventually became this dialogue process that started with the ceasefire that started that started with the ceasefire and continued with popular consultations and national dialogue. Thanks Rachel. Thanks for that really concrete example. Over to you. It's a really interesting point you make as well that you know once you start these formal processes and contracting and things like that that the international community can kind of get caught up in its own its own inertia or its own energy on those things. I mean certainly in Yemen's case I think many would argue that the role of the international community in different international actors whether the UN or other bilateral parties was much more effective in helping to mediate the initial resolution to the Arab Spring post-Arab Spring conflict and protest so bringing to all the sides together to create the transition agreement. That was certainly a place where international actors played a strong role but it's one where there wasn't a lot of formal blueprint or process until the transition agreement is signed. Versus in the national dialogue conference you know that was very much a flagship process and it invoked all of the things you're talking about where you've got the certain rhythm of funding and programming and almost everything else was on hold until that could be completed and this is part of the reason that I think a lot of international actors for example the US in particular but also the UN really pushed for it to keep to a time scale and there's a there's a logic in that in that, you know, since it was involving major decisions about the state it was hard to move forward with other issues until the dialogue had been completed but at the same time the kind of crucial flaw that a lot of people point to and why the dialogue failed was that it didn't have sufficient southern representation and therefore it didn't have enough legitimacy it didn't have the right people to make an agreement stick sitting at the table and a lot of people point to the hey so it was the international community wanted to have this national dialogue happen and go forward and said we're moving along and you know this wasn't an unknown debate at the time it was a tension that you know do we go forward with it even though we don't have full buy-in versus we need this process to happen. In retrospect it does seem like that was a crucial flaw to having a national dialogue be meaningful at all so yeah I mean there are certainly ways that once you get that blueprint and you have a haste to follow it you might be missing opportunities for actual negotiation of issues. I think it's this dilemma that this is inherently a political process and to some extent it has to be handled as a big project because it is a big project but if we project aside national dialogues I think we're missing opportunities. Kenneth please. Yes I think the question you raised about changing dynamics of international partners is very very interesting for us. Actually in this particular week we have just seen a new dynamic image you know for quite some time it looked as if the conditions for the United States to be involved in the national dialogue in Zimbabwe was going to be on the basis of the existing law that is governing the United States and Zimbabwe's relationship which is the Zidara but all of a sudden because a new security issues emerged in Mozambique we have started to hear new ways of engagement and this has also created a new way of looking at the possibility of establishing a national dialogue in Zimbabwe so all along the issue was on how we find internal settlement but now it looks like what is going to be a major starting point for a possible national dialogue is how international re-engagement becomes the basis for starting a national dialogue because the international isolation was actually called for by some internal political actors so this for us is a very interesting dynamic that all of a sudden you can see that there are new interests for the United States because they want Zimbabwe to play an important role in providing security in Mozambique and for this reason Zimbabwe can come to this dialogue platform now with some form of leverage which it did not have all these other years so we have seen that what is called political interest turned to change the dynamics of national dialogues and what I still need to understand in terms of assessment is does this benefit citizens or does it only benefit political actors this is something that I want to depend my understanding it's a fascinating dynamic and it reminds me you know Jimmy you said so succinctly write people write time and then you know that these windows often open in strange ways that cause people or countries to have a different interest and then fundamentally how do you use that opening and opportunity and navigate it I hope we can come back together and have more of a conversation on that we're coming to the top of our program and I wanted to do just a quick lightning input from each of you because we talk about international partnership and engagement like it's like there are these big institutions or big buildings that are completely devoid from people we also talk about national dialogues in that way and we know at the end of the day that it takes a tremendous amount of courage it takes a tremendous amount of sweat it's tremendous pressure to navigate every single relationship that all of you have been involved in navigating and so I wanted to invite each of you to share a piece of advice with hopefully some of our diplomat colleagues who are watching some of our USA colleagues who are watching some of our international partners who are watching about how how can they best approach and engage with those who are doing the very hard work as national dialogues as as credible partners who are kind of walking in solidarity in these incredibly complex processes and moments and so I'm open to whoever wants to lead us all from there. I know it's a big question. Rachel do you want to lead us Sure I can go ahead and just give some quick thoughts and advice. I think that we we touched on this a little bit earlier in this idea of consistency. I think is really really important and transparency is of course very important. And I think that for a lot of these long term relationships and what we've said about, you know, people really valuing being able to give their input and give their opinion and and seeing how we can come back to them. It's, it's those things that give people trust in a process and give them trust that pieces a possible path forward. And I think that's a key key component. Great. Thanks for so Jimmy can I turn to you. Two things will stand out one will be that normally the best approaches light engagement and giving more or less the leaders themselves or an hour or an African organization like a you to check the front it wasn't in that way it's easy for the parties to embrace this group of actors because they believe that they more or less understand the issues and then second and more importantly is that in, in, in almost all instances, the opposition parties as a disadvantage and as much as we say that technical expertise come with some with some new answers. It normally helps to leverage the capacity of the opposition parties and this makes it easy to reach agreement because they're able to understand the issues easily and appreciate what is at stake. Thanks Jimmy. Those are great advice. I would say give it give it time and space that allows more informal organic negotiations to take place. And as part of that, not to overload or front end, you know, we do have a lot in the report talking about agendas. If anything, I would want more streamlined one because ideally you've got your delegate every amazing initiative that came out of the national dialogue or on the sideline was brought forward by a range of you many delegates and I think having that emerge organically rather than a very full agenda at the top might have resulted in more constructive process. Thanks, Erica. I think that fits very well together with both Jimmy and Rachel's. And Kenneth, you're in the slick of this right now. Your, your advice. Kenneth you're still on mute. So I think in my in my observation, the one important issue is how to avoid the process from being elite, because we have seen that elite parks tend not to be sustainable. And therefore the question is to put an eye on who is not on the table, rather than only to look at who is at the table because those who are not able to be represented will tend to remain disgruntled. And if they cannot embrace the process, they are likely not to embrace the outcome, but also the proposals the issues that have been raised by my colleagues here are fantastic. I, I, I, I pick this one quite special that remember that the opposition, whoever is called opposition in the process is likely to be the most vulnerable, and therefore they need to be defended somehow. Because normally when they come to such a place, they, they don't have much power. Thank you. Those are great, great wise words. A colleague always reminds me we should look for who is not there, what is not said, and what is not being done because of what's actually happening in the room. So that we don't get distracted away from some of the key people who matter most and it's often those who are most directly impacted by by violence and conflict itself. Thank you to Jimmy, Rachel, Erica, and Kenneth for a wonderful conversation for your insights for your contributions to the book. Thank you to our other panelists, the other authors in the volume. And thank you to Derek Brown from the Peace Appeal Foundation for all his work to do these videos, our colleagues at USIP. Thank you to Elizabeth Murray, who moderated the first panel and was the co-editor in the book and really carried the water on a lot of this work. So we, we hope that those of you who joined us today will see this subsequently will benefit from the insights. We look forward to continuing the conversation and wish you good courage, good luck and good health as you move forward with the various dialogues in your respective countries.