 the newly voted option, okay? So this is normal operation. So how does the attack work? So I'm gonna show you an example where we really wanna pipe, set it. So first what we do is find a combination of proposals that has not been voted before, right? A specific combination and we compute that hash of chain. When we have this, we vote for that hash and what this will do is the contact doesn't have the association I told you about in storage. What it will do is it will record my vote but it won't produce any approvals for the options because it doesn't know what options these are. So this will produce some sort of cost votes. So we simply wait for other users to vote for the actual proposals that were in my original vote. And once I have enough support for these options, what I do is I actually vote for the option I really wanna support, right? And so what this will do is it will reduce the approvals for the other options but as the approvals are not mine because in my first vote, there were no issue, no approvals issue. What it will do is reduce the approvals from other voters. And of course it will increase approvals for my newly chosen option. So with this, what I managed to do is to steal votes from other users, okay? And the second consequence of this issue is that say another yellowish user wants to withdraw their funds from the contract. So what we'll do is this is the picture that I made. They say, okay, I can call the free function to free their maker but the contract has a different picture in mind, right? It thinks that there's no approval and approvals for the option the yellow user voted for. So it tries to reduce those approvals. It will fail to do so and it will regret the whole transaction. They're all logging the funds of the user, okay? So there's two attack flavors. One is for free. If one can find a combination of feasible proposals and with this I mean that proposals that will be eventually voted for. So this is for free. Or if I cannot do this, I can always create a new proposal which is to set any figure matters and perform the attack at the cost. So we discussed this with the maker team and they quickly showed a fix and helped users migrate their funds so everything is good now. Okay, so I invited you to visit our blog where we have this and many other vulnerabilities and we recently correct Libra as well and we have the audit reports for Compound and we also have discussions in the forum. So please join. Thanks.