 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Kevin Quinn, and it's my pleasure today to introduce the moderator of today's panel, Vice Admiral William Hallardies, the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, or NAVSEE, as we say. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1981, Admiral Hallardies went on to a distinguished career as a submarine officer, serving in both fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. The highlight of his operational career was command of USS Key West, SSN 722. Since becoming an acquisition professional in 2002, he has served as director, advanced submarine research and development, program manager for the SSGN program, and program executive officer for submarines. He assumed command of NAVSEE on 7 June 2013, and now oversees a global workforce of 56,000 civilian and military personnel responsible for the development, delivery, and maintenance of Navy ships, submarines, and systems. As a former commander of the Naval Surface Force Atlantic, I can tell you that there is no command more important to surface force readiness than NAVSEE. And I couldn't be happier that NAVSEE is in the hands of such an inspiring leader and consummate professional. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Vice Admiral William Hallardies. Thanks, Kevin. I appreciate it. Thanks for that very kind introduction. I'd like to first acknowledge the surface Navy Association, kind of admired from afar over the last 31 years or so of my career. Now I feel like I'm home, and I very much appreciate everything the surface Navy Association does for our Navy, particularly our surface Navy, and I have to say the only thing missing from the agenda is a clam bake. So you have to go to Groton to figure out what that one meant. I'd also like to start by thanking many of you, both on the industry side and on the government side, for everything that was done over the last three and a half, now almost four months since the terrible tragedy in the Navy Yard. We found ourselves homeless, almost 2700 NAVSEE, predominately civilians, but civilian and military folks, wandered around M Street literally looking for a place to work. What was brought home in the immediate aftermath was how much the Navy needs NAVSEE and how much, how important our headquarters is to the execution of the daily business of the Navy. And to each of you who either hosted some part of our workforce, helped them out just in the matter of their daily business, I just want to sincere thank you from all of us. The workforce is almost to its new normal. We crossed over 2000 folks moving into the temporary facility down at Buzzard Point. Thank you. I know there were some Coast Guard officers here. I thank them for vacating our building just in time for us. And I'll just highlight, normal to the average person who used to work in building 197 is a desk, a phone, a computer that has a reasonable bandwidth to NMCI that you know you're going to show up at every day when you come to work. And we still have about 500 who haven't quite gotten a new normal. We're really close. And again, thank you for everything you've done. I also have to acknowledge I could not be more proud of those people, those great Americans, who gutted through some of the most difficult times that I can imagine. And 916 happens to fall about two weeks prior to the end of a fiscal year. The NAVSEE books, almost $28 billion, matters a lot to the Navy and the Department of Defense how NAVSEE finishes a fiscal year. And the contracting workforce, the budget financial workforce, the program management folks did an amazing amount, used to have a tot up of all the things we accomplished in that last two weeks, but it included delivery of a ship and almost $1.6 billion in contracts that were done from that virtual headquarters scattered all around M Street and the rest of Washington. And then I would be remiss if I didn't remind you all we can never forget those 12 great Americans that were killed on 916. I visited with almost all the families. I still have two left over the holidays. They're doing well and they really appreciate the support that many of you put out to them. I will specifically acknowledge, I won't acknowledge the organizations that asked not to be acknowledged, but some of the organizations that gathered up resources and distributed to the families did a great job. The families are very appreciative of everything everyone did to help them. So thank you. The reason I start with that is, in the middle of that, about a week and a half after 916, a box showed up into my temporary office. I was using MSC's conference room as my office. It's a beautiful big wood table with VTC and it was my office, literally. And the box shows up and Pat Dolan comes in and goes, the strategic business plan is done. So the business plan, the color glossy that many of you have seen, was finished printing. We decided what that business plan was going to be. The team had signed off on it well before the 916, but the printer delivered it shortly thereafter. So we got the leadership team together and we did a quick review of the tenets of that strategic business plan and decided as a team that it still met the mark, that it was still where we wanted to take NFC over these next few years and that, although we'd had a temporary diversion, that those business plan elements were the critical business plan, the critical things that we thought we needed to get done over the course of my tenure at NFC and, of course, I hope it endures past that. The tenets of it, I think we have a chart. If I can get the next chart up. Are fairly straightforward and I think that for this conference, the first title, It's All About the Ships, is really the essence of the strategic business plan. And what our panel today, we have Admiral Dave Gales going to talk about our efforts to go really continue the progress made on improving surface ship maintenance and modernization. It really should have those words in there now that I look at it. The Shipboard Preventive Maintenance, it was interesting, we did a reduction in administrative distractions drill and PMS came up again, just like it does about every few years. And the sailor said, boy, PMS is hard and it's cumbersome and everything else. Mark Whitney's going to talk about our efforts to streamline the system to make sure we have the right maintenance in the PMS system and that we've made it as easy as possible for those sailors to do the maintenance that's required on their equipment at that level to make these ships last for the longest period. And then the third part about it, it's all about the ships is war fighting system commonality. That has been the principal job of the integrated warfare system PEO since it was created and Joe Horn will talk about our efforts in that area. The other two areas I'll just touch on briefly before I turn it over to the other panel members. Technical excellence and judiciousness and what's highlighted in that title is the and. It is very, very difficult to be technically excellent, but we have achieved that. Our technical folks at NAVSEE and in the supporting commands are the best at what they do in the world. To be technically excellent and judicious, that is to bring cost into the equation to think about the places where the requirements we put on to be excellent are driving us out of business in many cases and then figure out how to quantify the risk, present that risk to the war fighters and the food commanders and say, hey, are you willing to take on this risk? We're willing to recommend that you do. Here are the things we think you should do. That and is the essence of that topic and it really comes down to, you know, we wrote the curves when we talk about the knee and the curve. The requirements curves were made by the technical folks at NAVSEE with our industry partners. And so to ask the fleet where to set the requirement, we should be coming in and saying, no, if you reduce that requirement by this amount, that's where the knee and the curve is. Where you can save a bunch of costs and get the 95% solution or the 80% solution if we decide that that's where it should be. The other part of that technical excellence is really about our workforce. As many of you know, we took about a 15-year hiring hiatus and that demographic is still in our workforce. And so our most excellent folks, the people who are at the top of those pyramids, there's about a 15-year gap in experience between them and their replacement. I worry about that gap a lot as those senior civilians predominantly move to inevitable retirement. I'm told that we'll all get there eventually. That we lose that essence of what makes us technically excellent. And so we're investing and investigating ways to go both accelerate the knowledge, transfer across that gap, and of course to use modern learning to go help with the experience part, which is very hard to build 15-year experience designing ships when you're not designing ships. And so that'll be a tremendous challenge to us as we move forward. The last one is sort of a no-brainer in the current fiscal environment. By every measure, the next three to five years are going to be in flat to declining budgets. And so our ability to go control the costs of everything we buy and control the cost of everything we modernize will be critical. I think that there's in the challenging the requirements, and again, that's partly in the mirror. Pentagon owns the requirements, but we do all the work below them. That's work for us to tee up for the Pentagon. I think there's an organizational piece. I'm a rodent and I've been working on this. How do we go bring the right level of decision makers together, present those opportunities, and then decide them? And really, I'll say internal to the surface Navy, because predominantly the things that'll come up are surface-related. And the SCIB was how we used to do that. We used to have a good conversation about requirements and cost in the SCIB. It probably won't be called the SCIB, but the SCIB ID is what that was after. And then in the maximizing across platforms, we talk about it a lot, and predominantly across platforms results in either the way you build the ship or the way you modernize it, making it common between ship classes. We stood up a new code at NAVSEE, NAVSEE 06. We kind of recycled the number. And it is its predominant job, NAVSEE 06, led by my Vice Commander Admiral Tom Kearney, will be about that cross-platform commonality. It will require teamwork between my four shipbuilding PEOs and the main body of NAVSEE. And again, that's a team. That's a shared responsibility. But my PEOs are committed to going and bringing that into the new construction side, and then in the modernization we'll work those commonality initiatives as well. So that's the essence of our strategic business plan, and now we'll move to the panel discussion. I think that this panel, and predominantly I think Admiral Gortney set it off last night. We are going to take back control of the ship's schedules. For Admiral Gortney and the fleet commanders to have control of the ship's schedules means we have to get our maintenance and modernization done as predicted, that is start on time, finish on time, and do it in a cost-effective way. And so I think it's very, very appropriate as we really stand up our ability at NAVSEE to coordinate both maintenance and modernization, bring those two things to the table and to the fleet commander, and then execute that maintenance and modernization in a coherent way that I think the panel is well prepared to discuss that. And so I think first we'll talk, well, Admiral Dave Gale talked about improving service ship maintenance. Dave? Sir. Good morning, folks. It's a great pleasure to be here with you again. And as I prepared for this event, I reflected on the four-plus years that I've been grinding away at this business and making incremental progress that it's probably the fourth SNA event. And as some former or another, I've been able to speak to you about the business we're in and some of the challenges we face. The first slide that's up here right now should not be new to anybody who has been at any of the previous engages me on this business. If I could reflect for a moment when Admiral Harvey commissioned what was referred to as the Belial Report, and there was some deep and thorough look at the business of ship readiness and how surface maintenance and modernization played in some of that, I was tasked by then Vice Admiral McCoy to go understand and start codifying and displaying the gaps and start working on those issues. And I'm happy to say that four years later, the story remains unchanged, that we understand what challenges the business from end to end. The one modification in this slide that I will confess is that we started out with five big rocks. But as I started to apply whatever heat and light I could apply to an organization that involved over probably close to 6,000 civilians and sailors and that many more private sector wrench turners, that there was a missing piece that we needed to get at, the sixth rock on the right called alignment and oversight. And today I would tell you that alignment and oversight is probably the single biggest challenge before us as we consider how many different organizations there are in this business that have some effect on whether or not we plan it right and execute it right in the form of stabilizing requirement, flowing money into the process at the right time to do proper planning and to be able to execute to a schedule that we all agreed to at the beginning. We are challenging that area and Vice Admiral Lard has mentioned that there's a lot of interest and certainly NAFSE is going to be helping lead the way and what it's going to take to get that right. I'm going to quickly update you on the six rocks. Assessment plan and policy, a program known as Totalship Readiness Assessment, the term pulled right out of the submarine playbook, fully resourced, let me say that again, fully resourced to the mandate to execute assessments on every ship that's in the program for assessments. It is not under resourced by one minute or one dime for full execution. The challenge in it is, and we're working with the type commanders on this and Admiral Bill Galinas on the RMC side to make sure that it is aligned with the ship schedules in the SFRM, Ship's Readiness Manual. That is, I'll say, some early learning ground for us. The program was challenged a little bit in FY 13 when we slowed down spending on the Omen side. It did put some perturbations into the full implementation of TISRA, but again, it's a fully resourced program in 14 and out. So we do not lack for resourcing or process to go do assessments. And as we know, assessment's done right and done at the right time better inform a work package. Very important. Sustainment program. Not as much progress on this one as I would like, but it maybe just took as long as it would take for me to eventually maybe become C-21 to move this one a little further down the road. This one's about aligning all of the resources for lifecycle management of systems and equipments and how they perform in platforms into a common program that looks across all surface ships, all systems, and that we're doing the right lifecycle activities to fight our way through obsolescence or maybe readiness challenges and the way systems are designed and performed so we can go and approve that. So I told Admiral Rodin that my intentions are to single it all up. And so when we talk diesels, for instance, that it's not just amphib diesels, that it's diesels across all surface ships, for instance. So that's sustainment program. SurfMap. I cannot say enough about what we've done in this investment at SurfMap. This is bedrock. This is engineered requirements to do the right maintenance, the right deep maintenance at the right time to be able to deliver on an expected service life of a platform that we envisioned when we engineered it at the beginning. It gets 35, 40, 45. Even if we changed our plan and said we needed to take a platform out five more years, we now have the capability to go look hard with right engineering rigor on exactly what it's going to take to get five more years out of a ship. These are bedrock requirements. Nearly every ship in the surface Navy is in the program. There are some exceptions. We're not making investment in FFGs and LCSDG-1000 or coming in on the left-hand side. But I think I would be able to say that by mid-year 14, we're on a glide path that we have every ship that can be in the program, in the program, and at about a third of those ships have either completed their first engineered maintenance availability or are in the process of planning for the execution of that availability. And this is one where we just need to stay the course. The leadership of SurfMap is solid. The processes are solid. Much of it, if not... Well, there are some exceptions. I would say much of the process is lifted right out of the submarine playbook at SurfMap. And it is going... If these requirements are flowing into the budget process, every ship's requirement is treated equally and the same in that process. Every man-day of required engineered maintenance that we have asked for in that process, we have gotten the budget to go execute that. Now, in the year of execution, what does that really look like in the flow-down? That's another debate. But we are succeeding in this area. We are growing the requirement, and the budgets are growing right along with it to go execute it. The challenge for us, and the thing that I'm working on, very aggressively, is taking advantage of what we know in that requirement, marry it up with the program modernization requirement that's coming together for the same availability, and telling the fleet early exactly how many days and weeks that's going to take to accomplish all that work. Right now, today, we perform twice as much maintenance in dollar terms from 10 years ago in a notional schedule that's not engineered. We have the know-how today to go engineer the schedule to when we're going to do that. RMC capability capacity. Bill Galenis relieved me. Still very much climbing up the curve on restoring the manning in the RMCs to be able to oversee an increasing volume of work with increasing pressure for quality and schedule. We need to continue to climb that curve. I would tell you that the initial buy three years ago, I think, was 635 additional civilians, and we wanted to regrow the eye-level capabilities in the RMCs by as many as 1,800 sailors. We're continuing to climb that curve. We may not have that number right on the civ per side, especially. And on the sailor side, I would just tell Aberrode and as many sailors as we can find a way to get into our IMAs, the more progress we can make in rebuilding our sailor's capability and maintaining ships at sea. So the RMC capability capacity thing is very, very real. It's an issue. It needs to grow. The budgets are there to support some growth. We may not have that number right. We need to continue to grind on that. Availability execution work certification. This is kind of the feedback piece. At the end of the avail, did we certify the work that we did to get the quality that we needed, and did we complete all the work that we said we were going to do at the beginning? Did something happen in process that took work out for one reason or another that we need to catalog and track? This is bedrock, again, activity for surf map to keep track of all maintenance that was scheduled, all maintenance that was performed, and to keep track of whatever backlog we might be building so that that too can build the budget for the next availability. And then last, like I said, the alignment and oversight piece is I think the thing that looms most heavily right now on our business and be able to perform it better. Too many people, individuals, all well-meaning, who have the ability to go and make a decision or pull a lever or to destabilize a solid funded requirement, budgeted requirement, then a planning process or an execution that can put any availability over a cliff. And in some cases, before you ever started. And this is the piece that Admiral Hallard is and myself and many others, Admiral Rodin's in the team, Admiral Koepman, Admiral Guumatow-Tow. There is a lot of, I'll say, heat and light again on the subject of who is going to be in control and accountable for this process from end to end when it comes to doing it right, tracking it from left to right, and being able to take the face shot in the end if we failed. And I'm peppered with face shots. So it's a sport, it's a fun sport. But again, really, I think for me the visual is, you know, when you succeed, how many people are going to be on the stage with you to get the award? And when you fail, how many people will be on the stage for you when you get shot? And there's always a difference. There's a delta in that game. But, you know, again, I would certainly be privileged to be the guy who was accountable with all the organizations behind me to go get this done right. But we've got to get that aligned right where I can't win. If we can go to the next slide very quickly. So the alignment piece. You know, today we have two different policies, one maintenance and one modernization in this end-to-end process involving two years with the left side planning before you ever get to day one of execution that is not run very well. The policies are not integrated. The IT applications that we use to, I'll say, screen, build work packages, plan work packages, integrate work packages between maintenance and modernization are not synchronized today. I will say culturally, we tend to have divide amongst our leadership and our workforce on whether they're in the maintenance game or the modernization game. But what if we were both in the maintenance and modernization game and we started thinking about it that way from the top down. That is critical thinking that has to play out. What this chart depicts, and I'm not sure if it jumps out at you, but we'll see today on how we're supposed to be planning. We don't follow it. What you see on the chart on the right-hand side in the red area is that most of it comes together, either in a, I'll say, stabilizing work package, getting it contracted for, and even getting it into, I'll say, on contract and putting it into execution is happening sometime in around about three months before you start the availability. A lot of people are showing up, and they're like, what are you coming from? Oh, I'm going to put this new thing on the ship. No, you're not. Well, today we go for the waiver, we put it into the package, and the RMC is left to fix it on the downswing. Very challenging. As I proposed to Admiral Rodin and Vice Admiral Hilarters and Admiral Copen, we need to pull this thing to the left. We know at 720, the program requirement for maintenance and modernization is to know what we're going to do on an availability. We can understand and take advantage of the fact that every program's got a fielding profile and that the great work of surf map and op nav to get a budgeted engineered requirement into a work package on availability, we can lock that down and we can plan it and not change it. We can perform in this business. We've just got to decide that we can do that and give the right people, the right authority to go manage that requirement with a great deal of stability. That's the game for the future and I will say one more thing as I close, SPIM authorities, SHIP platform manager authorities, we gave it up on our side of the business, going back to, I'll say the carrier and submarine examples, they know how to do it, they know how to say no, they know when to say no, they know how to get to yes if you're doing it right and we need to reestablish the FFC C21 on behalf of the fleet and the type commander and every pathfinder program out there that both Mr. Stackley and Admiral Rodin are sponsoring to get this plan better. We know what we're going to do, we've just got to have the right people overseeing modernization, the disciplines of the modernization planning process such that we can win this game and with that I'll turn it over to you, sir. Thank you. I simplify this down putting the weight of NAVSE behind the cop and the cop, the cop, the policeman, the sheriff that's going to oversee this and make sure that people follow the rules or if they don't follow the rules it's done in public as opposed to in the middle of the night and then a common operational picture on what's in and what's out, what we're going to get done, how long it's going to take and I think if we can pull off those two things we'll have gone a great measure in the OFRP that Admiral Gortney laid out. The other half of this, of course, is the modernization side. Principal modernization provider at NAVSE is PEO IWS and Joe's going to talk a little bit about how we go bring the modernization piece into this topic. Thanks Admiral, appreciate it. Before I start I did want to introduce you all a little bit to PEO IWS. It's a PEO that contains about 155 programs and we work with probably some of the most professional industry partners in the world. We've got 13 of the finest program managers and 17 of the best captains any flag officer could ask for. Without them, none of this commonality would be possible. Indeed, none of the fine development that goes on in IWS would be possible. Our imperative here is very simply one dealing with cost and inefficiency as well as the efforts that we've been hearing over the last couple of days in terms of cost by installing multiple different systems designed to do, in essence common functions across different ship types or different classes of ships is leading us to cost in many arenas. It's leading us to cost in training. It's leading us to cost in buying different parts. It's leading us to cost in the infrastructure it takes to keep those systems up and sustained and it's a cost we can no longer afford. It's also leading to mass inefficiencies. I think Vice Admiral Koteman talked about it a number of times in his presentation about sailors, about having to maintain several different school houses for ostensibly the same equipment that functions or achieves the same function just with different piece parts of equipment. And then lastly, the mandate that has been voiced very eloquently here by Admiral Gale and Admiral Hollardis, but sort of hammered home through the presentations by the Director of Surface Warfare, the Commander in Able Service Forces and then yesterday by USFF that we have a dedicated period of time that we've got to be in in our maintenance and whether it's maintenance, whether it's modernization we've got to be in and we've got to meet those timelines. Certainly a common approach with common measures and common equipment sort of increases that predictability and gives us the confidence we need to be able to meet that mandate. The situation that we have is we didn't get here in the last 11 months and it's going to take us a lot of time to do this in a judicious manner. But let me give you one example. C-21 was chartered by Vice Admiral Coatman some time ago to do a navigation study and look at where we were in individual pieces of the navigation suite across multiple classes of ships and then to focus that examination by strike group. And what we found was daunting. You take any typical strike group requiring to deploy and look at the pieces of equipment that do common functions. Inertial navigation. Among those 11 ships we may have four different kinds of INS. Three different kinds of speed logs all of them obsolete nothing on the drawing board to replace them. When I say all of them obsolete the parts that in those have significant obsolescence issues. Six different kinds of computer programs describing the ECTIS solution the presentation to the ships team on how they're going to navigate the ship. So we are far from common across those arenas and one we have to strive for. The opportunities this gives us are many. First in terms of development reduce cost. It is common processes lead to less overhead among our industry partners so therefore we can do things across multiple ship types across multiple baselines in a fashion that is the same and get rid of that overhead. One time pass through through the certification and safety frameworks and I don't mean that variations in computer program only have to go through one time but we can if we have common baselines we can then proceed to that framework and only focus on the differences. Right now to get an update to a baseline five eGIS program versus a baseline seven program requires a complete end to end examination through that framework and something that we've got to we've got to indeed reduce. We can leverage this substantial quality of evidence that we've got to gather in order to proceed through those certification processes and not have to pay for a gathering of evidence several times in order to carry several different weapon systems through. Training. We can focus our packages again on those differences instead of having to create out a whole cloth a training package and train the sailors as they proceed to their career in eGIS alone as they go from baseline to baseline we owe it to them to have to do the same function in different matters requiring a different six week training period. We need to get them through and then focus on those differences and we ought to look to reduce those differences that comes through variance reduction or through common out. And lastly testing our testing periods are what they are because we have to guarantee our sailors tend to sleep with their ordinance and we need to make sure that warfare systems are safe to operate. So we go through an extensive testing regimen again as we proceed from baseline to baseline or from ship type to ship type or even among classes of ships being able to leverage that OQE is something that provides us a tremendous opportunity in terms of commonality. And lastly we can look to reduce we can look to to focus those reduced dollars that we have to spend to fix the problems that we see in development and fix them once and not have to fix them and discover them across multiple different weapon systems in multiple different classes of ships. The next opportunity is in sustainment. You've heard again multiple senior surface warfare leaders and both Admiral Gale and Admiral Hallardus mentioned this morning in terms of training parts and corrective maintenance variance reduction offers us a tremendous opportunity again to be able to reduce costs and to stop focusing that increased variance on the backs of our sailors as a sailor goes through that pipeline again we can focus on difference and not and not recreate the training package for him each and every time he goes through. The upgrades can support those objectives established by Admiral Gortney in the OFRP and spoken to very eloquently by Admiral Gale here this morning and that is we have a very focused time period we need to get in we need to operate according to that structure we need to be very transparent we need to get in and then operate in that to install and modernize in the period of time that we are provided and not be the cause of any delay. Again commonality or variance reduction provides us that opportunity. There are some potential issues however that we're not I don't want to paint a picture that we are proceeding with all haste we certainly are working towards this effort but there are some barriers that stand in our way and some efforts that we've got to overcome first is the implementation when I first started looking at this and those PEOs before me we have tried various models we've tried a model where we have demanded a certain piece of equipment and offered that equipment to our industry partners as CFE so they would the shipbuilders would then mandate that in a contract to their shipbuilder they would procure that and install it in the ship we've looked at a model where GFE is the way to do where my program managers would procure that equipment and then meet the in-yard need date imperatives established by the shipbuilder which model is the best in I can't sit here today and tell you with a fact the way we should proceed but one thing is for sure we've got to get to this virtual shelf of commonality where a shipbuilder or the folks that are modernizing can know that they can reach to a piece of equipment a common piece of equipment and whether that equipment is the same an SPS73 Victor 16 Victor 13 I'm sorry exactly the same between an LPD 17 install and an Aegis install or whether the modules inside that surface search radar are exactly the same we've got to get our arms around that we want again what the imperative is is to reduce cost to remove that burden from the backs of our sailors and to make sure that we're in and we're out when we need to be in terms of modernization so we've got to come through that and examine some of that one thing we cannot do we can't perturbate those schedules that have been addressed in multiple forms here about we cannot reduce performance and I'll talk to that a little bit but what I do worry about in those alternatives that we've looked at and we've tried is we cannot increase cost and that I can't I've got to in a GFE environment where we are procuring those and providing them to our counterpart PEO's I've got to have competitive pressure to ensure that my costs are what they are and we're not just a monopoly in providing Admiral Lewis or Admiral Moore or Admiral Antonio this is what it costs because this is what it costs we've got to do everything we can to keep those costs to a minimum but also as Admiral Hart has mentioned that me and the curve I think we've done an awful lot to examine cost versus requirements and what is good enough but we've got to do everything we can to continue to keep pressure and reduce that cost in performance we've got to create a mentality where we we we don't get so locked into this to commonality that when capability arrives in the ship it's not pacing the threat it's common but we're not pacing the threat across a broad class of ships or a broad swath of US Navy capability some of the examples that we have achieved success that I'd like to bring to your attention first the efforts that Joe Reason is doing in navigation are bringing us dividends today both in our focus on ensuring that we have a common computer program across multiple platforms positioning our hardware to accept that common computer computing program and getting to a long term arrangement where we look to a navigation suite of equipment that we might be able to compete across multiple industry partners we have achieved massive amounts of success with the common source library where the same baseline that we're using to modernize our ships today baseline nine is the same baseline that we will put in new construction when we begin with those ships it is a remarkable achievement we've never before been able to focus that and you look across what we're doing with baseline nine whether it's cruisers destroyers new construction or in fact Aegis assure the reuse of that code is well above 95% across multiple applications and achieving massive success SSDS the same single source library has ensured that the code reuse between multiple classes of ship is again above 90% and getting better we are seeing in applications and how we shoot ESSM how we shoot RAM it's the same regardless of whether we're going to shoot it from a large deck or whether it's an aircraft carrier and the computing program the reuse of that code is exactly the same Admiral Coatman in his presentation the other day brought up the presentation to the sailor with common functions ought to be the same I am proud to report we are embarked upon an effort for ASW air controllers where how a anti-submarine helicopter or a helicopter in an anti-submarine mission is being controlled is the same whether that air controller aircraft carrier or whether he's on an Aegis ship that Aztec module resident in a baseline in ACB-16 or in ACB-16 of SSDS will be the same so the presentation to the sailor at the glass the buttons he pushes will be the same in that tactical application of that capability more importantly anti-submarine tactical air controllers through that training that school house how we train him in the ship will be the same regardless of the baseline or of the computer program that he's operating from in Aegis and SSDS there are other successes that I'd like to highlight the joint track manager which is how we take in vehicular tracks from our various sensors that track manager module inside those computing plants are the same that module is the basis for how we handle tracks and gives us the opportunity to create other examples of commonality as we go forward and it is a tremendous force multiplier we are at the across or we are actually delivering common displays and common processing to sailors across multiple instantiations of ships again, amphibs, cruisers and destroyers ESSM that Jack Knoll is working very hard on the new block 2 missile that we are just embarked on creating that missile will have the rocket motor is absolutely the same as what we will see in the propulsion system actually the same as what we will see in multiple other missiles the electronics and the navigation system inside the missile same as it is in standard missile so again at the depot level how we open those missiles up how we care for those missiles how those missiles speak to the ship is the same that gives us further opportunities for commonality as we proceed to employ those capabilities I talked to you about the joint track manager common displays that's a work of some very fine captains and civilians what they are doing there is not sending to any mandate they are just doing common sense engineering what IWS was created to do future candidates I think there is much more room to do in navigation and we are focused there so we get to that navigation suite we are far from ready to do that we are having inquiries with industry but I can tell you that we very much want to get to a part where we can compete a suite of equipment and look more broadly instead of trying to address a speed log issue address an anemometer address a DRT we are looking at broader swaths of equipment that we can bundles a bad word but that we can collect together and then compete surface search radars we have multiple different distanciations of that radar and we are moving out with the SPS-73 to get that common and ensure performance is in accordance with the dictate required by the resource sponsors and then lastly in standard missile standard missile offers us multiple opportunities not just with weapons inside navy but also with AMRAM and opportunities for commonality among services that's where we're going and we have our obsolescence program a program which looks at the life cycle of that missile and how we would manage obsolete parts right now we are largely taking the cue from the program manager of the Air Force who has a very robust obsolescence management program with our industry partner and while we are looking to manage it together so the future is bright we didn't get here overnight we won't have this fixed by Friday but I can tell you that there is tremendous effort not just in IWS but throughout with our partners and the various PEOs and resource sponsors and fleet staffs to ensure that we've gotten the message and we're working very hard to achieve that variance reduction thank you great Joe and I think you're bringing to life what integrated warfare systems was intended to do at it as it was created last topic is is about the basic sailor maintenance plan maintenance system the baseline that Dave Gales operated on when he takes a ship into the avails that the PMS has done the training and readiness of those radar systems is essential in the PMS and yet sailors don't like it and the leaders don't like it so what Mark is going to talk about is the significant effort that we've undertaken and more to do on making PMS better go ahead Mark thank you I'm going to keep this short and simple which is the way PMS should be so I'm going to be consistent in that regard so it's my intention to talk to you about the issues that we're hearing what we're getting as feedback I'm going to talk to you about what we're doing about it right now and in the foreseeable future and then give you a sense of what that future vision looks like so as the Admiral mentioned and a source of the information was from the reducing administrative distractions initiative the sailors are definitely giving us the feedback that PMS is overly burdensome and it's complicated and it should not be and that's a couple of different perspectives so from the force revisions it takes a lot of hours at the work center supervisor to get the force revision implemented go through all the changes and everything that's there from the actual MRCs the actual cars that are going down there there's a lot of steps, a lot of noses, a lot of cautions it is just a lot of extra work for them to get the work done and also one of the feedbacks was being the father of twin teenage sons that are very visual and tactile I'd like to see a handheld why can't I have a handheld why can't I take something down there and use that to do my PMS from the tycoms perspective we've gone to the very generalized PMS because it's easier that way so what we've lost is we've lost the configuration based PMS and that multi configuration documents it just makes it hard from a policy perspective from the fleet that broad kind of shift in the mentality such that across tycoms it's a little bit difficult to handle from a policy perspective the documentation again is complicated it doesn't work well in largely distributed command structures LCS, LCS Ron where the ships are going to be it just makes it a challenge for them to handle it the inconsistencies in the schedules is a challenge and the PMS feedback screening we get it back in headquarters there's work that we can do that makes it easier such that the answers are not as costly nor time-consuming and that again from the fleet perspective some of the ambiguity and the expense that it incurs on getting maintenance done so what are we working on so right now what we're working on is policy we're working on process and we're working on tools all at the same time so in process right now from a policy perspective is standing up a fleet requirements management board all the stakeholders are involved the intention there is to make sure that what we're working on is prioritized and the right things that matter most the configuration board at NAVC is going to be kind of the oversight piece of that and make sure that we're driving the change in an expeditious manner one of the first things to do is to work on the fleet policy and institutionalize it within the joint fleet maintenance manual within the process tackling the MRC cards taking those cautions taking the overly prescriptive PPE hazmat and making them such that they're simple the step by step and maybe some pictures in it something that the sailors can take and actually go execute so that we're executing the maintenance at the right place at the right time at the right level this is also where we start moving towards that configuration based PMS this is where we will start moving down the decentralized or the generalized PMS and start getting it to where it's hull specific something tied to the configuration records of that ship and I'll touch on that here in just a second for the tools SCED 3.2 moving in the right direction from where we are now the plan right now is to have SCED 3.2 in all of the ships that are it's planned to be on by the end of this year fiscal year just so we're clear fiscal year and that's either live and or in training mode and so that's a big leap forward that is that is also going to be able to give the leadership on board a different dashboard so that they have some metrics to see how how the maintenance is being done another aspect of that is tailored force revisions this is where we are starting to do more of the work shore side before it gets out to the ship so it reduces the the burden the administrative burden to implement those things that are changing and it's giving like I said it's giving us some opportunity to get some different looks at different metrics both on board the ship and how the quality of the PMS is working out so what's the future look like it is configuration based PMS it is tied to the ship can you picture a day where there are no more line outs there's there's no force revisions there it's simple it's done shore side it's continuous revisions so it's not tied to specific time frames and it gives us a good complete history of the maintenance that's being done on that ship web based integrated metrics things that will help both ship and shore side make sure that the maintenance is being done right at the right time and it also allows us to go down that road a little bit further with the handheld device which we will pilot as part of the rad program but this is an opportunity here when we get the IT piece of it moving in the right direction so that's 3M in a snapshot we've heard it we're working on it and we're going to make it better short sweet new to the point that's it great thanks Mark so what you heard here is not anything really wildly new we're mostly going to do this is about discipline and execution almost all the policies are already in place all of the boards and meetings are already there we need execution a cop and a cop and so with that let me just stop we present a lot of data across a broad spectrum but ultimately the success of the OFRP will be on whether we can get our ships modernized and maintain in a timely manner and whether the sailors can keep them up in between those maintenance periods and so we'll stand by to answer your questions thank you very much well first off thank you gentlemen excellent presentation Kurt Warden from Nova Power Solutions or a sub component supplier across multiple SISCOMs and what I would I'm going to address PMS first because it was the last subject so the one of the things I've noticed is that on our component the maintenance requirement even the periodicities on those requirements are different between systems and can you talk to us about what efforts are being made to make common components have common maintenance requirements so that's going to be that will be within the purview of what we're going to be looking at once we move forward with the configuration based PMS is looking for consistent PMS on consistent components consistently that's right so so that is that is recognized as an area that needs work because even differences between ships we have found that we've got differences there and so we will tackle that your specific concern as we move forward for sure there is one one point on that would be is the main component that it's attached to may actually be the driver so that could be the difference but it should be as consistent as it can be actually you could actually probably save quite a bit of money if you use the same maintenance procedure from piece to piece and rather than rewriting it just lift it from one and move it into the other no absolutely agree with that gentlemen thank you great thanks see for Admiral Coltman in his brief mentioned condition based maintenance a couple of times and talked about the need to implement not just on new construction ships but to put it back on legacy vessels as well when it came to the PMS side I didn't see CBM mentioned so how does that fit into your planning to be able to streamline PMS and make it easier for sailors to maintain their ships so CBM CBM plus is absolutely part of it it's connected it I'd say it runs it'll run in the background but that's that's something that's also under my purview is NAVCO 4 and we've got a we've got a separate initiative going forward to back fit the ability to get that data off the ships so we are working on that specifically but the condition based maintenance requires data and what we what we lack at this moment is the data actually to go fully implemented so it's collecting that data is be important part of all that so yeah great great question thank you thank you gentlemen thank you very much for your time this morning max Cooper PMS 339 surface training systems as we start talking about future surface combatants and starting to truly develop a ship that is a product of modern server technology and software capabilities how do you see the modernization process changing in terms of having to simply update the computer program versus having to actually swap out the hardware in order to get the increased capability that we're going to need as these ships go through their life cycle so yeah let me let me take a first stab and then I'll I'll let both these guys from my point of view the ace there's an asynchronous yet an asynchronous problem the ship and the physical infrastructure of the ship is on a 30 35 year cycle and every time you pull out the welding torches you're talking big money the hardwares on a four to six year cycle depending on which server farm you buy which which part of the the system you buy from before six years and then your software might be on the six month cycle in response to an urgent fleet need to change the electronic warfare posture of the ship I think you got to take into account that asynchronous nature of those three things and separate them get the physical infrastructure right to host common hardware get the software right so that it can be hosted on that that common hardware and and you'll have achieved the kind of the kind of alignment of those things that that is possible it is possible to do it it's really hard but I think both the animal horn animal gale are working towards that broad thought and from a policy perspective I'll tell you that Mark Whitney and I have had conversations already about the need to evolve Navy modernization policy such that we're not treating software changes that are non ship impacting especially where availability is a concern and feel that stuff in different ways at different times then we feel the ship impacting other operations which are heavy moving parts cutting welding wrench turning kind of work today they're treated the same they needed to be treated differently so that we can feel them more effectively on the software side from the software perspective I think key to what you're speaking of is the ability that some of the attributes that we see in the common source library and the single source library where we are almost in a continuous checking capability out of the library working it developing it testing it checking it back into the library and then when that opportunity opens up we're able to pull from that common source library and get it in the ship in a very in a very a lot smoother fashion than here before great thanks thank you so in the near future we expect the administration to release a new national security strategy we also expect the results of the UDR to come out and Congress has offered some relief to sequestration but certainly not as much as we had hoped so I'm wondering how from a policy perspective how your plans how you think these external factors are going to impact you this year in terms of readiness and in years ahead yeah I think that's a great question and predict in the future has the typical pitfalls all attempt to avoid I would say regardless of the financial outlook there is I think adequate resources in the readiness accounts if they're applied properly that is the discipline we're talking about applied well executed as predicted will result in there being adequate resources for readiness if we don't get this done we'll continue to under resource readiness and so I believe that the answer is there's enough there we got to go execute and if we execute we'll actually save money and be able to fit within those declining budgets I would to echo the admiral's words absolutely right regardless of where we are with financial uncertainty I think this is an imperative because we as I said before all this in terms of weapon system commonality that variance is balanced on the backs of our employers we can't do that any longer regardless of how much money we have did I answer your question or do you want another bite at that apple I think so certainly these factors particularly sequestration I think will limit significantly what you are able to do it will certainly impact the plans and execution but I think you also you make the point is our navy has never been more in demand whether it be things going on in the Mediterranean or in the Persian Gulf or out in the western Pacific those 284 85 ships we have today have to be made to last to their service life beyond this I haven't indicated that is the least cost solution to a largest possible navy so that path goes straight to the middle of what we were talking about good morning admiral's Chris Barrett with Delta Resource thanks for your service and thanks for your active engagement with industry question I have maybe a slight variation on the theme but I think we can agree that there is a cycle of lessons learned and enterprise evolution if you will that you know that indicated by where we were and where we are now and what we can debate the frequency of that cycle the fact remains that that it's there and it's driven by any factor of factors emerging factors such as budgetary perturbations world events and demand on assets political influences changes in the industrial base and so on so forth but I think that there are a few overarching factors that drive us to where we are we are not where we are now by accident and you consider such things as appropriations and the restrictions that that places on our flexibility to achieve some of the objectives you've laid out here from SCN to OMIN to OPN enterprise organizational structure that drives acquisition strategies and contracts and even such things as configuration management systems and so on so forth that handoff there so what do you see as the barriers to objectives and how do you either break through those barriers or work around them to achieve some of the objectives you've laid out I'll start and say that and I think Dave Gale probably talked about it the most is that for the last couple of years although we've put a lot of money into the maintenance accounts it hasn't always been executed well and as we looked at it much of it was due to the uncertainty right around the first of the year so you get to the point of beginning to execute the next fiscal year you're on a sequestered baseline you're on a continuing resolution and that results in a smaller dollar amount than you would hope to have and maybe you plan for during the course of the run-up to that point there's a tendency to reach into that planning that planning that was on Admiral Gale's chart and pull things out and then the money come oh no it looks like I'm going to have a budget and it goes back in and as a result the planning product that goes into the start of that avail is all over the map we took all the tanks out because of the last budget drill and now all the tanks come back in and now go execute that avail on the schedule you said we're going to go try to create a machine that takes that into account that is plan almost with your blinders on so plan the avail with all the engineered maintenance with all the modernization that was in the budget all the way up to the point of issuing the RFP to the contractor who's going to do the maintenance and on that day we have the big meeting we say how much money is there and invariably over the last couple of years on that day there's almost always been enough money for the avail if we had fully planned it and in some cases it's well I know you descoped it but put it all back in and what that results then is in execution you're executing a plan that you didn't create and as a result we struggle to get through those avails and it happens over and over again so what we're going to do is say we're going to plan and provide transparency of that plan and then on the day you've got to decide is that's the day to decide the final scope then issue the RFP and go down and execute that maintenance that takes into account that variance that sine wave that you talked about if we can execute that process and execute it well we'll plan those avails and my assertion would be that in almost every case the fleet will have the money on that day and we'll execute those avails well and support the RFP we're trying to change the dynamic not by changing the system that got us there but by adapting to it and presenting a process that will work repeatedly regardless of whether you have a budget on one October I'll also add on the left hand side of the business of planning prior to the year of execution where we can stabilize the requirement we kind of enter the year of execution in a relatively I'll say good place if we take advantage of everything we know as I said earlier we don't do that very well and we need to do that in the year of execution when as Admiral Hallard said things get a little wacky where's the governance of what's really going to happen with those availabilities there's not to be a lot more than just somebody waving their hand over and saying plan it like you're going to get it when in reality I am taking work out putting work in taking work out putting work back in because the controls on that availability truly in the system are changing and when you talk about making those decisions is it an integrated view between maintenance and modernization when we make the decision in the early days in the fourth quarter that we're going to take first quarter next year availabilities and pull them to the left we have just taken months out of the planning process and we never call the modernization guys to say hey what's the impact of me doing this to you can you do long lead time material procurement how's your planning affected is it going to be integrated in maintenance what's this really going to look like in execution so it's truly at the flag level there has to be a governance structure put into this business that nobody gets a chance to go reach in and pull a lever or point at somebody and give them direction without us all agreeing that that was a good thing or because we have to do it that we understand what the real impacts are going to be in execution because that's often forgotten until we get into execution everybody looks up and goes holy crap what did we do to ourselves here that's a technical term and it works and then we're trying to fix it on the downswing and we can't it's ugly, it's poorly executed it comes out late and everybody's dissatisfied with what's happened so I would say just roll it back there has to be put in place if we're going to win an accountability and a governance structure that allows us to make decisions collectively in the rugged environment we're trying to operate in so we all know how we got there alright, that's my point I was having a rodent class and I'll go on record thank you very much yes ma'am hi, I'm Laura Seligman from inside the Navy so you had about due to sequestration in the CR you had about a $3 billion shortfall in ship maintenance going into 2014 I was wondering what those numbers look like now and if you're going to be able to do all of the scheduled maintenance in 2014 I don't know if I've got insight actually, I don't think I have I don't have insight into that we don't really, although the Congress has decided, I don't think they told us but Erica Platt is here, she knows the answer Eric, go ahead what? what was the answer, Erica? and it kind of goes to the point I was making is up until this moment, I couldn't have told you for just the reasons you said if we had planned well, sort of with our blinders on to this point those avails would all be well planned and we'd have a chance of executing them well we did we reacted to those budget drills we modified those avails we took it out, we put it back in and as a result we won't be as good in 2014 as we could have been if we'd had that discipline so you made my point, thank you very much good morning Admiral, thanks for being here good to see you sir question if I could, probably for Admiral Gale and Admiral Whitney, when you look at the C4ISR installations and the modernization there, can you talk about the collaboration and how tightly in the processes that's working across the seams and maybe even to naval aviation and for Admiral Whitney, is there a mechanism by which you're talking about the commonality of presentation for what on the maintenance side we call PMS the IT side is probably configuration control and management from a day to day network security point of view the way that is presented to the sailor so it's common when you get into equipment people understand that process commonly across the IT guys and the fire control guys great, thanks sir let me just cross this the idea of reestablishing the ship program manager authorities as Admiral Gale talked about they've heard those words they've nodded to those words I don't think they've really met that person yet and when they do they'll probably be less happy about it but I think Admiral Horn said it best is when you establish that discipline and you make it clear that you're not going to bend on it that it's going to be real discipline very quickly the program managers will respond and react in a line I know Admiral Brady is committed to it although there's always that asterisk except when the fleet says no, I've got to have that all and that's I think what Admiral Gale said is that we still have to be able to override when we have to override but it should be the exception not the rule and today it's the other way around it's the rule not the exception I will say it really is going back I'll use the term SPIM but in the bigger sense it's about how you lead the problem I was in a conversation yesterday regarding a Keynes install on a carrier and it was a conversation happening months before the avail starts that should have happened two years ago two years ago we should have been debating what it was going to take to do that work areas of success if I can go from C4 to C5 I'll just say C5 we have I think relatively high success today in fielding Aegis modernization it's because we lead the problem years in advance in the planning in the programming in the detailed effort that goes into making sure that a multiple I'll say a multiple set of SCDs combined is Aegis modernization that we understand how it's wired together and how it's going to integrate in the availability and how we're going to execute that that whole idea of leading that problem Aegis modernization into things like capstone Keynes and anything else that ship impacting we've got to pull that conversation to the left like I said in my cone chart at 720 we should be having very detailed discussions about specific modernization packages on a ship and talking about what's going to integrate well what may not fit do we need to buy more duration what maintenance is planned to integrate so that when Admiral Gourtney truly in the end wants his ship back on time that what we did two years prior to that delivered on that and it's not just we'll fix it on the downswing or we'll just add months to the availability because that's what we need to do because we didn't plan it right so you said C4 I say it goes to everything pull it to the left lead it from the front we can win the fight did you have you want to take a stab at the other part of that I'll take a stab at it and if my answer is not appropriate then Mr. Andy Kelly is here in the front row and he's the program manager so anybody else has a 3M question you can flash mob him afterwards so to get to your question to me it's as simple as just getting we got to get down into the technical details and no kidding go down to the specifics it's centralized it's time to go back and getting down into the details and the specifics by component and making sure that we got it right thanks guys appreciate it guys thanks Tony it looks like we're almost out we're out of microphones oh we got one more I think thank you sir Calvin Foster with task we've been assisting NSWC Port Winnie and PEOIWS with information assurance authority to operate challenges on the self-defense test ship of difficulties that brings to the table that requirement brings to the table along with cyber readiness inspections do you how do you address those kind of challenges at your level and how do you see going forward the intricacies of the combat systems and integrated information systems and how you kind of plan maintenance and operations of readiness for that thanks sir for us at the end of the day inside the combat system it's all about executing a fire control loop the issue that we have with information assurance largely today and this is being actively worked I don't want to leave you with just the problem but the issue that we have today is a lot of the solutions that we bring to information assurance are business solutions and not focused on making sure that we can keep a 4 hertz update rate to the standard missile or whatever is required in order to execute that fire control loop it's not a business solution that we're after we acknowledge that there are issues we certainly acknowledge that those issues have to be addressed but we are embarked upon multiple efforts to ensure the business of the combat system can be accomplished while we look at those various protective measures both inside the domains of the combat system and outside on those boundaries to protect what's inside from the perspective of modernization our perspective as IA is a very forthright but also very cumbersome in execution of the paperwork required from an IATO to complete certification there's an awful lot of steps that have to be accomplished there as Admiral Gale said we understand that process we just need to lead turn it so that we're not presented at an inappropriate time with hey we still got 17 steps left and only time for 12 of them to make I'll just add one piece of that is that the total IT infrastructure of the ship which includes combat systems, navigation systems and then just the regular lands that you run PMS SCED 3.2 on that broadly if you understand its configuration and build it to the configuration and then keep the switches internal to the system set to the switch positions that were specified when it was designed those systems are highly responsible even the older ones what happens is we've broadly lost control in many cases of the configuration of that IT infrastructure too many other things have been connected to it too many other switch positions have been modified to make those things happen and so in modernization simplification that gets you a relatively straightforward to operate ships land like Keynes is when it's up and operational will help with that to a great measure I'll just add one piece here both in the configuration of the ship and then the maintenance of the I'll call the software configuration that's installed on the ship so thank you very much for that question I think that's our last question that is I want to thank you for some really informative and terrific presentations and for your candid responses during the Q&A period but more important than that I want to thank all of you and your commands for what you do for this readiness, thank you