 If you wondered what we were doing, we were here. We're back. We're live with Brad Glosserman here on Think Tech Asia. Again? Again. Where else would we be? And he's the executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. And an article in today's paper, and it's been all around the news the last couple of days, about this interesting TV appearance that Emperor Akihito made, I guess on Monday, saying, not in so many words, it was kind of kabuki, if I may, about how he may, he may retire because although he's in good health, he's worried about the decline of his health now that he's 82. I just got to be a mixed message in that. I'm in good health, but I'm worried about my health. So therefore, I'm going to abdicate, even though nobody has abdicated for 200 years in Japan. There is no legal mechanism for abdication, which is what's interesting about this. But I mean, you would call it, by our Western standards, this is kabuki, no, perhaps a little slower, and no masks. But the fact of the matter is, Jay, that by Japanese standards, he's shouting from the treetops. I mean, this is about as transparent a plea as one could possibly imagine. I think it's a testimony to the utter inability of Americans to appreciate subtlety to know, you know, for us to wonder, what is he really trying to say here? Screen beyond screen. You know, a funny thing is, he doesn't make TV appearances. The last time I made a TV appearance was when they had the tidal wave and all that. The Great Earthquake and Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster in 2011. Yes. I wrote a book. I'm writing a book on that, hopefully. About the earthquake. Yes, the impact on Japan, yes. I want a great book. Let's hope so. Let's hope so. I would hope that my reviewers and my publishers will take you up on that opinion. We shall see. I'll write a letter. We'll be back again, and we can talk about that. But yes, I mean, the Emperor of Japan has lived traditionally in a bubble, an extraordinary bubble, and the idea that he is, in many ways, invariably a he, by the way, which is part of the problem. The notion that he is the master of his own fate is extraordinary misreading of the actual power, status, place of the Emperor within Japanese society. He's revered. I mean, I think people that... And there's the reverence, of course, for the institution of the Emperor and the Imperial household in Japan. And there's, I think, an extraordinary respect for a man who has lived an exemplary life. And for someone who has mistaken the political system, someone who, from my vantage point, someone I've admired for just what he's done and the way he's carried himself, it's a tough, tough job and truly a difficult, difficult life. You know, back in the days of what was it? James Clavel and Shogun. You know, the wheels within wheels and all these strategies and arcane, you know, interness in politics and all that and off with his head and assassinating... No, that's gone. That's done. Now, they've been in power. I mean, this family had been in power for 1,500 years. Are those six... Well, they traced the line of the Emperor by, I think, 6,000 to Amorat. 6,000? Okay, so... Hey, what's a couple of thousand years here and there between... But who's counting? But there must have been... It'll take a while. But there must have been a time when it was like Shogun, right? And you chop off his head. Well, interestingly enough, the Shogun was not the Emperor. Shogun was the military commander and was, in fact, the power behind the throne. So, I mean, even in the old days when you had the Shogun, it wasn't the Emperor that was... I mean, the titular head. But the power was invariably elsewhere. And you've certainly had, I mean, you know, the most immediate last couple of hundred years history. You had the Shogun who was by and large around the state. You had an Emperor who was, for the most part, a figurehead. And in 1868, you had the Meiji Restoration, in which case the Japanese Emperor at that time, Meiji, was restored to the throne, which meant the Shogun was booted. And that was a response to the American, the arrival of Commodore Perry in Japan in 1853, right? The Americans coming back and saying, it's time for you guys to end the closed doors, the Cocoa Policy, which not completely closed, but nonetheless. You have to be careful here, Jay, for intriguing and fascinating about Japan, but maybe a little off point, so just drag me back to reality. Drag me back to contemporary... It's all related, it's all related. Right, it's always related. So in 1853, Perry shows up, tells the Japanese that they have to end their isolation policy and that they need to open to the world. He has the Black Ships, an important image, to this day, a hundred and, what, 70 years later, 60-something years later, the Black Ships are still used as the metaphor for a foreign force, that it comes into Japan that forces change upon an unwilling society. He comes, and while the ships are impressive, more impressive are the guns that he's brought with him, and the Japanese recognize that they are no longer going to be masters of their own destiny. They, over a 15-year period of tumult from his arrival, that they then overthrow the Shogun, restore the emperor, and then, in fact, what you really end up with is a cadre of the Genre, the leading intellectuals and senior figures of society and politics, et cetera, who are then propelling Japan into the modern era. And that, the short version is that Japan succeeds too well in modernization. It becomes a imperial power, not unlike that of the West. In fact, it even exceeds the West. It becomes the leading power in Asia in 1895 when it defeats China. It then does the unthinkable and defeats the Russians in 1904-1995. It becomes a great power of the world. And then is eternally frustrated in its ambitions to be treated as an equal in international councils. That pushes it into a certain form of isolation, militarization, as is all the imperial powers do, conflict with the rest of the West, the other great countries, and that erupts in war. The Pacific War begins by some statements, 1931, 1937, with the Marco Polo Bridge, but certainly with the United States in 1941 when they attacked Pearl Harbor. We defeat them in 1945, and our story then takes another twist when the United States rewrites the Constitution or writes a new Constitution for Japan that strips the emperor of power. Although one could well question, was in fact the emperor, did he really, while he was the head of state, did he truly have any authority to push the ship of state, guide it to make decisions in one way or another? And by and large, and there's a great debate about this, as to how influential or at all the emperor was in pressing decision-making during the 1920s, well, 30s and 40s during the war. In 1945, though, he does apparently overrule the war council, says we must suffer the insufferable and bear the unbearable. We resign, we surrender. And then, despite the call for unconditional surrender, up to that point, the United States decides under the occupation authorities, John MacArthur, to keep him as a symbol of the state. So now, what you had was Akihito, the current emperor's father. Hero Hito. Hero Hito, being the emperor continuing in power and being a symbol of the state, though, with officially no political duties and political power whatsoever. He died in 1989, Akihito becomes the emperor and... He died without advocating. And that's the way you're supposed to be in that office. There is no provision for abdication. Stay there till you die. Exactly. And my guess as well is that to the degree that... And I'm speculating, we all would be speculating, no one would get into Hero Hito's head, the degree to which he would see himself as the rightful leader of the state without having a democratic root such that he would ever think that the state, there would be any abdication. He embodies all of the authority, the symbolism, and thus, he is either the emperor or he's dead. I think Akihito was raised in a very, very different cultural context and consequently is prepared to think of the emperor as an institution, a political institution that exists with the state and is not necessarily embodied in his own life. And so that raises so many of the questions that he has, the conversation that he's pushed today, recently with this announcement that he wants to perhaps retire. Yeah, perhaps. He didn't actually retire. He only said he might. Of course. Well, there's no mechanism for him to do so. He cannot actually step down. He's waiting on Abe, isn't it? Well, to run something through the legislature. And that's where this becomes very, very interesting because Prime Minister Abe has said repeatedly that he dreams of constitutional revision, that his great ambition as a politician would be to rewrite the constitution that was forced upon the Japanese in the aftermath of World War II. Has it been rewritten at all since? Never. Never amended. So it's still inviolate from 1945 or the... ...67, whatever. Right. And there is a debate about where, while the Americans gave them the draft, to what degree did that represent Japanese ideas and what Japanese input existed. But, yes, it has never been touched. And I mean, most people that wrote the constitution, certainly those that pushed it on the Japanese from the American authorities, never expected it to survive as long as it did. So the debate in Japan today is in the main. And see, we need to be careful because it's very easy to oversimplify what's going on here because as most people focus on the constitutional debate, as far as they're concerned, it's only about Article 9, which is the war renouncing clause that says in sentence one that the Japanese will abjure the use of force as an instrument of state power. In other words, that they will never wage war to solve international disputes. And the second one is to preserve that, the Japanese will never have the instruments of war, meaning they won't have a military. No, it's nonsense, because they have it. They don't have an army, a navy, an air force. They have a ground self-defense force. They have a maritime self-defense force. They have an air self-defense force. And this is a, you know, a slight of hand. I mean, it's just, it's rhetoric. The Japanese have, by some measures, the fourth largest military in the world. It's incredibly modern, incredibly capable. But the Japanese people take this very, very seriously. Now, for conservatives, like Prime Minister Abe, this notion of giving up war, of giving up a military machine is essentially emasculating. You know, for them, that is the denial of the essence of who the Japanese are. And there is a certain macho militaristic ethic in this. There is a notion that Japan as a modern state has to be able to make contributions to regional and international security that are commensurate with its status as the world's third largest economy in a country that has enjoyed significantly the benefits of peace and stability and should give more. And then as an ally of the United States and partner, we have to, we, the Japanese, should be able to more fairly and equitably distribute the burdens of that partnership. And so Abe et al. and there's a lot of folks behind him that would seek to amend the Constitution mostly to focus on Article 9. And every year, I mean, right now, we're in a moment of sort of a certain flux where the Japanese are talking about that constitutional amendment. In fact, constitutional amendment represents a far, far greater expanse of issues than just this question of Article 9. Some people would suggest that we actually, in fact, need a constitutional amendment that changes the status of the emperor, symbol of the state with no actual power. Unable to abdicate can only be a man. Maybe we should change those things. Some people want to talk about personal rights and personal protection. Some people want to talk about women's rights. Some people want to talk about environmental protection. So it's Pandora's box. You open it up. And maybe what he said was, you know, I like to abdicate, or in not the same words, I like to abdicate, but I'm going to need, you know, you're, I'm going to need approval. I'm going to need to change the Constitution. And maybe in there somewhere is saying, maybe we should start a change process that will cover other issues. Actually, I would argue my guess, and this is merely a guess, is maybe it's just the opposite. See, you're not thinking this through, Jay. But I mean... We don't always agree. I want to make that clear. The difference, though, is I'm usually right. And so much so that we're going to take a break right now so we can regroup and maybe negotiate something in the next minute. We'll be right back. Welcome to thinktechhawaii.com. This is Johnson Choi, your host. My focus is Asia in reveal. We talk about interesting subjects in Asia. Be sure to check the thinktech.com website on the next topic. Thank you. Aloha. I'm Kirsten Baumgart-Turner, host of Sustainable Hawaii. Every Tuesday at noon, we talk about issues important to Hawaii's sustainability, the issues of conservation, renewable energy, land management, food and energy security, and other issues that are extremely important as the World Conservation Congress approaches in the first week of September, and next year's World Youth Congress that's taking place here that's focusing on sustainability as well. Please tune in, join us as we highlight all the good things that are happening to achieve sustainability in Hawaii. Mahalo. Lawyer. We'll be right, we are, we are right back. That was fast. And we were unable to negotiate anything. But still, I feel we ought to hear what Brad has to say about this important issue. We weren't even negotiating. I think we were just making fun of each other. It's a pity you don't have this live. So, sorry, where were they? You will see a number of surveys invariably, particularly on Constitution Day, which is in early May in Japan, where all the newspapers ask, do you do surveys of do you favor change of the Constitution? And typically it's in the 40 to 40, low 40s to high 40s range in favor. So there's no majority. Every now and then you get a survey that suggests there's a majority in favor of constitutional reform. But the tricky bit here is constitutional reform could mean any of those basket of issues that I mentioned. So there's no guarantee that in fact what you're looking for is an Article 9 change that the conservatives would be backing. My sense of what the emperor is doing right now is, I mean, I think he's genuinely concerned about his help about the ability to safeguard the institution. There are indications, and to go beyond that I think is bold and perhaps overstates the point. And you need to be very careful. I mean, the people that protect the institution and respect the institution of the imperial household in Japan are very, very touchy. So it's really, really hard to talk about this with a lot of certainty. But there's speculation that what in fact the emperor is concerned about is precisely the conservative drift of the current government in Japan. And that by opening up the question of the role of the emperor, what you do is you shift the debate away from the question of Article 9 reform. And that what you force the government to do is to spend political capital, time, resources, et cetera on a political debate that moves away from the constitutional reforms that might in fact trouble this emperor. It's hard for me. I mean, I certainly don't have any... I don't know what he thinks. But like I said, there are a number of episodes in the last 20, 30 years and even more recently that suggest the emperor is very, you know, very much wedded to the current constitutional order in Japan and very much troubled or somewhat concerned, let's just say. Have we seen that before? Because he's been living in a bubble, as you say. He's not permitted by law to make political statements. And I guess that's why he couldn't say I want to abdicate, because that's a political statement. And, you know, query, does he follow it? Does he have telephone calls with Mr. Abe? Does he really engage at some other level, some maybe quiet back room level with the politics in Japan? I don't... I mean, again, I'm speculating. And what I've read about... I mean, there are interesting indicators of how the emperor and the imperial family reacts to certain things. So, for example, one of the most contentious elements of Japanese policy in regard to the history and the way that history is considered is the Yasukuni Shrine, as you well know. And Yasukuni is where the souls of all the people who fought on behalf of Japan are in Shrine. It's not a cemetery. It's literally... And it's not as if there are urns of cremated bodies, but literally the souls are entered there. So... Very symbolic. Right, extremely symbolic. In 1978, one of the most contentious issues regarding the significance of Yasukuni is the fact that the 14 individuals that were convicted of class A war crimes and put to death by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, their souls too were interred in Yasukuni. In 1978, and it was done surreptitiously, the chief priest of Yasukuni, apparently in a nighttime secret ceremony, brought them in, did whatever was done to inter them, and went through the services. Ever since that occurred, the imperial family has never gone back to Yasukuni Shrine, which suggests they did not look upon this as something that they approved of. And that's the sort of evidence... They would never say it. Of course not. No. That would be an overt statement. So we infer from these gestures. And there are other things where, for example, if you look at the language that the emperor used at the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, most of the attention was focused on Prime Minister Abe's statement, the one that he released on the 14th of August. That was, I think, pleasantly surprising for most people that expected a revisionist version of history. And yet, for as pleasantly surprised as we were, if you look at what the emperor said at the same time, much more forward-leaning, much more accepting and calling for a clear-eyed view of history. And what would be, I think, you know, not acknowledging the crimes that Japan did in a far more unblinkered way. And that if you look through his statements and the visits that he has made during his reign, that it has been far more of an outreach and a far greater acceptance of the conventional narrative of Japanese behavior and the need for repentance or whatever the appropriate word is. And all of these, by the way, are very loaded phrases. Every single one of these could be... Is that sensitive? Yes. And so all of those together create this portrait of a man who seems to be far more concerned, greatly concerned about the prospect of Japan perhaps turning his back on that particular historical interpretation. But you know, it strikes me that the Constitution in the late 40s put him as a bird in a cage. And he couldn't do politics, and it was a matter of law. And he walks down the street. I don't think he walks down the street very much. But as he goes through life, I mean, I think the Japanese people see him as the embodiment of the end of the war, of the defeat of that Constitution, which is a reflection of that defeat. No, his father might have been that, because remember, his father was empowered that. And by worshiped his father during the war. Right. And I think that he was seen more as the symbolism of the defeat. I mean, there's the iconic photograph of him in Douglas MacArthur standing in his office, right, where MacArthur is towering over this man. So I think, I mean, my sense is that the emperor's revered because he's genuinely seen as a good man and a good person. He married a commoner. He has been an extraordinarily devoted biologist. He has, you know, it seems to me, struggled to embody all of the virtues of the modern-day Japan as it is truly, I think, encapsulated within the popular narrative of Japan. Not a revisionist narrative at all. And he's a man who, again, his children, he has struggled, I think, to embody, and I'm repeating myself, but to embody all of that goodness. Well, let me offer this thought. Every year that goes by, his benign-ness is more clear. And that means, in a way, when you look at it from the PowerPoint of you, he's less relevant. This is not the only place where it has happened in the world. I mean, it has happened in the U.K. as well, and I'm sure you can find other countries, you know, with vestigial monarchies that really have no effect on anything. And, you know, for a while, and it's kind of a romantic sense and a nostalgic sense, you know, you appreciate the monarchy and its bloodline and all that, but over time, you know, the fickle finger writes history and they, all of them, become less relevant. Isn't that what we're having now? I could take issue with that. I mean, you could... I want you to. I figured this much. You do that a lot. But I mean, for example... We need another break. Right. In Thailand, for example, the legitimacy of the government is contingent upon the ultimate approval of the king. And much of the uncertainty and great, great potential for unrest and crisis in Thailand is a function of questions surrounding the future of the king and his ill health. So, in that case, the king is an extraordinarily relevant player. Even in Britain, for example, where you have a monarchy whose power has been greatly circumscribed, it nevertheless has the capacity, if you think about what Prince Charles has done, more so perhaps than his mother, in various crusades that he's done in the social space, the civil society space. I mean, certainly not political, but you have the opportunity to make a statement and to bring to bear the considerable resources that he, as the Duke of Wales and the royal family has in Britain on certain issues, like it or dislike it. Nevertheless, you know... Social issues, issues of decency, kindness, morality. Well, even... I mean, or you could be really shallow and you can talk about fashion and you can talk about, you know, just representatives of a certain sensibility. Like the role of the First Lady. Right. That's what it is. In some ways, more so I perhaps... I mean, I'm not a follower of British politics, but probably more so than the wife of the Prime Minister. None though... I mean, you think about Lady Diana, for example, and I think the role that will be played by what's her name, the Duchess of Cambridge, who will, you know, become the Queen when William takes the throne. You don't even have that in Japan. I mean, you have a... The embodiment of the royal family is the Emperor and that's really about it. His wife walks a couple of steps behind. Similarly, his children exist only in so far as they are positioned relative to the throne. There are... The question, I think that you raised earlier, or perhaps you've discussed as well, the biggest debate they were having was would they need to amend the Constitution to prepare for a woman? I was discussed earlier. Right. They didn't have a male heir. In which they do now. That's, I think, what the Prince is now, five or six years old, maybe a little bit older. So, you know, I think the Imperial family in Japan is far more constrained, far less... They don't own the land that the royal families do in the U.K. or that they do in Denmark or that they do... The Sultan of Brunei to say nothing of the families in the Middle East, you know, those kingdoms. So, it's the only authority that this... The Emperor has... The only authority in the royal family is that of the Emperor and it's the moral authority that he brings to bear. And I think it seems to me that he has had greater authority by being as resolute and as groupulous about being, you know, respecting the lack, the limits of who he is and the power and to be truly the symbol of the nation in the best possible way. So, what does it mean that he abdicates? It's interesting. I mean, my first question is, does he get Social Security? I'm willing to bet the Imperial Household Agency probably has a budget for that. But I mean, you know, that's... It's interesting because the Imperial Household Agency in Japan is incredibly powerful. They do control the purse springs. And I have... You talk about when a... When a member... When one of the members of the Imperial family marries a commoner, if it's a woman, she leaves the Imperial family and they are given an allowance to essentially, you know... I suppose it would be the equivalent of a dowry. So, yeah, so nobody would be embarrassed. We don't want to find her, you know, impoverished on the street. That would embarrass everyone. Yeah, I'm not sure that's probably an option for all sorts of reasons, but nonetheless... The fact is that the Imperial Household Agency really is an extraordinarily powerful agency. And for those people who would somehow think that there are a lot of rewards to being a princess, think again. I mean, you've seen a number of mental breakdowns from women who have joined the family and lived in very, very, I think, difficult circumstances. It's by no means a... It's a tough one. He makes a thousand appearances a year. That's three a day. And there's a burden in him and his wife. Tightly scripted. And, yeah, it's really... I mean, we mentioned at the outset Kabuki. I mean, it is that scripted a performance. So, what do we know about Narohito? Can you paint us a picture of how this is going to be? I remember the palace is right there. It's in a dominant place in Tokyo. Right in the heart of Tokyo. Right in the heart. And it's really quite a scene. And now, I guess he still lives there as the... He has an apartment. Ohana housing or something? I'm not... There's several imperial palaces or household residences nearby. I mean, I think the thing that's most interesting about Narohito is that... And the most interesting story is his... He married late in life. And he was interested in Masako Iwata, who was the daughter. Very, very, you know, foreign ministry employee. Went to Harvard, went to Oxford. Her father was one of the most distinguished Japanese diplomats. He's now... I believe he's still in the world court as a jurist there. And he wanted to marry her. And he asked her to marry her. And she said, no. And there were a lot of people in the imperial household agency that, A, were not crazy about this wedding in the first place or this match in the first place. And B, thought, okay, this is it. Done. He did not... He wasn't prepared to take no for an answer for a variety of reasons. This was the woman he thought was his soulmate. And he pursued her and wouldn't take no for an answer and kept going, pursued her again, asked her again. And again, the gossip, the stories are that he promised to protect her against the implications and the pressures of the imperial household agency and to make sure that she could maintain some... I mean, normalcy is probably asked too much. His father wouldn't have done that. Again, it's a different culture. But mind you, his father did marry a commoner as well. His father married a woman whose father came from a very, very wealthy family. But nonetheless, she was a commoner. I just wonder if the successor now, the 56-year-old, Narohito, is he going to be a different kind of break here? Are we going to see different things from him? Or it's going to be more of the same? I think it would be more of the same, mostly because the ability, if you will, to improvise the space that's afforded this person to act within the system is fairly limited. There's no indication to think that he's, you know, chomping at the bit. He's got looking for elbow room to assert himself and to make certain statements. Thank you, Brad. Brad Glossam and elucidating for us, telling us things we didn't know and telling us things we did know but we were wrong about. Or telling you things you didn't know but just kind of doing it in ways that made you think he was smarter than you. Oh, it should only be the case.