 Good morning. Welcome to day two of the conference on fossil fuel supply and climate policy. It's really a pleasure. A lot of full conversations continuing from yesterday and this morning. I'm very pleased to kick us off today with a fantastic panel, plenary panel, led by Jesse Burton from the University of Cape Town who will be moderating. Welcome, Jesse. Thank you. Morning, everybody. Thanks so much for being here this morning and welcome for this amazing panel on breaking carbon luck in and developing countries. We have a very esteemed panel and we're going to address some of the key drivers, especially the political, social and economic, that support the ongoing use of fossil fuels in developing countries, especially coal. We're going to start with some of the key global areas, looking at financial institutions and their approaches to just transition before moving on to policy approaches for just transition and then case studies from developing countries, as well as diplomatic lessons and experiences. So without further ado, I'm going to start with Isabel Blanco. Isabel is an associate director and the lead environmental economist of the economics governance and policy group of the EBRD. She holds a PhD in economics and offers more than 20 years of experience in the fields of climate change and sustainable infrastructure. And she'll be speaking on the multilateral development bank's common approach to a just transition. So lovely to be back after the COVID gap and I was just chatting with some colleagues. I was here on this plenary session. I think even at the same time on the second day, four years ago, so in 2018. And so many things have changed since I was speaking last time about a slightly different but related topic. What I'm going to say today or the topic of my presentation is multilateral development banks common approach to a just transition. So what do we mean by that? What do we do? And how do we collaborate with others? Just transition as a concept started many years ago, but I think for the multilaterals, the starting point was the Katowice Cup in 2018 precisely in Poland. And four years ago, the landscape was very different from what it is today. So in 2018, we had very low energy prices and there was a still fresh in the memory of many countries and multiraterals as well. The crisis of 2014. So in 2014, the fossil fuel prices had a very record low and this had a huge impact in the fiscal balance of some of the fossil fuel exporters, including some European countries, by the way, which saw that some of their assets in Europe had the risk of being stranded. So it was probably the right time for a discussion on just transition. What do we mean and some leading international bodies like the European Commission, they came up with, for example, the just transition mechanism, which is a financial package for coal communities in Europe and neighboring countries. Now, fast forward and we are in 2022. And what I see this summer is a big increase in energy consumption worldwide after the COVID crisis. I see supply imbalances triggered by the Ukrainian crisis, but also by other events like nuclear power outages in France, for example, and record fossil fuel and energy prices. So fossil fuel companies and the power companies have posted record profits in the first half of 2022. And talking about just transition in these circumstances is a bit more challenging. Or maybe we need to change a bit what we mean by just transition. And this is something that I wanted to tell you before we start the conversation. The just transition as a concept may be farther away today than it was four years ago for all these elements I'm telling you about. Now, getting to the topic of my presentation, which is, you know, a joint declaration by multilaterals about promoting just transition. And you will think, what a dull topic. How could they disagree? Well, actually, it took us ages to agree on a text that was mutually convincing or that was acceptable to everybody. And this is because multilaterals, we come from very different geographic spaces. We have a diverging, not diverging, but different mandates and we come from a variety of backgrounds. So I work in EBRD, which is a London based institution. So for the EBRD and for the EIB, when we speak about just transition, this is mainly about coal communities. And what do we do with mono industries that are facing assets that are losing value very rapidly, either by economics themselves or by policy. Now, you go to the African Development Bank or the Latin American Development Bank, and when they speak about just transition, what they mean is, how does this affect or how do we protect the people who are being affected by climate change and probably haven't done anything to deserve this. For some other multilaterals that have a lot of oil exporter countries, the discussion or just transition means, what are you going to give me if you want me to stop pumping oil out of the ground, because gas is green, right? So that's the starting point. And on Sunday, I was preparing these notes and I was talking to my husband and I said about just transition and he said, this is about lower energy bills, right? So all this to say that the concept of just transition that we are using in this conference, in reality, I don't think it's set in stone. And this is the second point I wanted to make for this presentation. Now, with our further ado and very quickly, as I said, we started discussing about just transition. The multilaterals started about just transition just before the pandemic. So a couple of years ago in this very different environment I told you, the declaration was made in the COP26, less than a year ago in Glasgow. We agreed on the approach, some of the principles that I will tell you about, the peer learning and some partnerships. So we agreed on collaborating with each other on this topic. Our next milestone is the COP27, where we are asked to come with concrete and practical steps or what is it that we are going to do about just transition. I said some of this, the variety interpretations of just transition and all the many activities that multilaterals are doing that can support the just transition. I'm going to put a few examples later so that you see what kind of projects and what kind of policy guidance we give when we speak about this. These are the principles, very long, be worthy, but every word was discussed, negotiated and agreed. So there is nothing that is missing and nothing that can be put on top of that. I'm risking my life here by making a summary of what they mean. So the first one simply says that just transition is about both climate and social economic outcomes and both need to go together. The second one is that the focus is on moving away from greenhouse gas emissions, intensive activities. And remember what I told you about the African and American Development Bank thinking it was about climate resilience. The third one is about MDBs encouraging just transition through some of their existing activities. So there was not a need to restart all the world there rather to collect and to complement and to improve activities that all of us were doing in this space without specifically calling it just transition. The fourth principle reinforces that just transition seeks to mitigate the negative social economic impacts, supporting affected workers and communities. And again, see the emphasis on workers and communities, particularly workers. And finally, this one is about governance. And this is the recognition that many transitions have happened before and sometimes the solutions come top down. And this is a recognition from MDBs that for a just transition to work, it needs to take into account and have a fair, transparent and participatory process in which stakeholders are involved. Now, in practical terms, what are MDBs doing to support just transition? This is a bit dated slide, actually, which we used in the COP26. And some more things have been happening this year. Although, as you know, the focus these days is all about securing some energy supply and helping communities pay their energy bills. But anyway, some examples of projects that we do that can be called just transition, we have been doing a lot of mind repurposing. So minds that are being closed, they are repurposed for other uses. And the photovoltaic is a very common use because the infrastructure is there and it's a place that normally suits well for solar photovoltaic. Another thing we've been doing is helping regions and countries plan and think about the just transition programs and processes. So planning and diagnostic studies that convert into plans. Another thing that we have been doing is training in green jobs, upskilling and rescaling affected workers on those communities. We have been providing finance, which is tied to the closure of some stranded assets or near to be stranded assets in particular coal, including some conditions on staff reallocation and rescaling of affected people and communities. And finally, we have been doing a lot of economic diversification activities in mono industry regions trying to widen the range of activities that could be done there. Our next step is the COP 27 in a couple of months time, where we are going to collect the progress that has been made by each of us and come with concrete proposals for collaboration. And I think I've exhausted my time. So thank you for your attention. I'm very happy to take questions later. Thanks. Thank you very much. And you were actually ahead of time. So we've caught up a minute. Thank you. Next we have Gailo Montmeson-Clay. Gailo is a senior economist at Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, which is an economic policy research institute based in Pretoria, South Africa. And he leads TIPS's work on just transition and sustainability. And he'll be talking about a policy toolbox that he and some colleagues have developed for just transitions in the global south. Thanks so much, Jesse. And good morning, everyone. It's really a pleasure to be here today. And I guess I'll be talking really about the balancing act that we're trying to perform when we're working about just transition to be ambitious and transformative and radical, but at the same time being practical about it and how we go. I guess as a way of context, there's a few things to remember is that the first thing is we really need to get the transition going. And I feel like sometimes in the just transition spheres, we forget that the transition actually is not really on the way. And that shouldn't overshadow what we do around just transition. The global south faces the burden of climate impacts. And we can't talk about just transition if we don't have a climate compatible pathway. That's the first bare minimum to think about. The second thing is to acknowledge that the need for one global just transition is another. And we must really acknowledge that from a global south perspective, that historical responsibilities actually matter of the countries that created the problem, but also, of course, the wealthy in every single country. And I think that's something that again, from a global perspective, we must internalize in the thinking. And we do at a global level, there's no national just transition without a global just transition. In terms of then moving forward, it's really important to acknowledge that a just transition is not an add on. It's not just we doing a transition and we're trying to make it just. It is effectively a paradigm shift. And that obviously creates a lot of complexity in terms of how we implement that going forward, but it is the reality on the ground. We have to acknowledge the past and the present. The current situation is neither just nor sustainable. And that's again, something I feel like in a just transition discussion, we forget. Often I feel like we're talking about maintaining a level of existing justice. In the global south, the situation, the starting point is generally unjust. So we're actually trying to reverse that pattern. And I think that creates the scale of the challenge. Of course, no transition has even been just. So it's not like we have a blueprint to do that. And that makes it even more complicated. We need to acknowledge that the current economic system is not sustainable economically, socially or environmentally. And that the current trajectory of our transition, even though it is very slow and not really moving, is very pro-rich. It's pro-rich countries, pro-rich corporations and pro-rich households. The rest is being left behind. It's already behind anyway. And it's being left behind in the transition. So again, putting a bit of emphasis on the scale of the challenge. The basis of the just transition certainly from our perspective is that people, companies, communities, countries have a different ability to adjust to disruption and to respond to it. We can't avoid the disruption. It's how we respond to that. And certainly the idea behind just transition for us is that vulnerable stakeholders should not be negatively impacted by the transition. And ideally, they should actually be better off. And that's recognizing that the starting point is unjust. And I think that puts the foundation of a new paradigm of development. The way we understand just transition is through three key fundamental ideas. One is procedural justice. It's a very simple idea that says there's no just outcome without just process. It must be bottom-up. It must be inclusive. It can't just be decided in the center of power being economic or political. The second is distributive justice. We need to deal with the impact. That's what people tend to reduce to just transition. Well, someone's going to lose their jobs, going to lose their livelihood. What are we going to do about it? It's extremely important, but it's only one component of the just transition, of course. And then who's going to pay for that? We add a third fundamental dimension to that, which is restorative justice. What it says is that we need to right historical wrong. It's a pivotal opportunity. It's a unique opportunity in time to actually address some of the longstanding inequalities and problems that we face in the global south that we can address through just transition effectively. Having said that, we have to acknowledge that it is economy-wide and society-wide, so it's not about coal. It's not about fossil fuel. Of course, coal and fossil fuels are the center of that. They're the hotspots, but we see it as very much an economy-wide and society-wide transformation. We start with coal. Everybody talks about it, but it is broader than that. What about transport? What about agriculture? What about tourism? What about other manufacturing? Other mining and so forth. We also acknowledge that it's only truly effective if it's going to be transformative and really trying to encompass those three dimensions of justice and do that in a fairly radical way. Of course, there's different understanding of just transition. Not everybody, as an agreement, I think was already shared that everybody's got a slightly different version of it. Importantly, there's also a lot of people who actually have visions of just transition that are incompatible with just transition. We have had to tend with greenwashing for a long time, now we have to deal with just transition washing, and it's quite hard to have to really tackle that. But even within the spectrum of people who actually believe in a just transition, you have different levels of ambition. I think that's quite important to acknowledge as well. That's just a little summary of what that means in terms of, I guess, the least ambitious versions try to really deal with the consequences of the problems, whereas the more ambitious ones, of course, look at the roots of the problems and not just the consequences. So just a little summary of that. But if we try to be quite practical about it, now I've said the kind of ambitious part of it, and very practically, we've tried to map some of the tools to do that. When it comes to participatory justice, it's really about making the process as inclusive as possible. So it's not just saying, well, we've consulted or we're going to consult, but it's really about empowering people and giving them the opportunity to meaningfully contribute in terms of having access to, of course, the financial means to do that. But more importantly, I think the skills and the knowledge and their ability to bring the evidence forward for themselves is really critical. There's a lot of examples of processes that are bottom up that are trying to do that. The difficulty is they're not always connected to what's happening top down. And of course, then how do you connect with bottom up initiatives to actual decision making processes is critical. Lots of really great experiences that I can speak about in the Q&A as well later on, but we're really trying to build a process that's going to bring some trust and empower people rather than just tick a box. If we think about distributive justice, there's three set of key policies that we can harness. The first one that everybody kind of talks about is so-called labor market policies. In a nutshell, it's kind of retraining and rescaling. And that's what people think about. You know, we're going to train people to get new jobs. Definitely necessary, but vastly, vastly insufficient. Tends to only work in an environment where you have high job creation, which sadly is not the environment which most global source countries actually operate. So you need to do it, but if you think that's going to solve the problems, you really, really mislead it. There's of course other labor market policies that are employed, both on the active and passive side, and they're quite important, particularly to have minimum labor standards and working conditions and to raise the bar, but they're not sufficient in providing the solution. We see it quite quickly that we have to complement that with industrial policy to set the economy of the future, effectively, and to transform the function of the economy. And that's through having an impact on ownership patterns, of course, but also the market institutions and infrastructure. But industrial policy can also be used to influence existing sectors so that they can be more inclusive and more sustainable, and that's through finance, through trade, through skills and so forth. But acknowledging that it's not just about workers and it's about the whole society, then social protection becomes really critical going forward. And there's a lot of mechanisms. Contributory social protection tends to be linked to employment, but non-contributory social protection, particularly through social transfers and public employment programs, but also the recognition of social care are key avenues to do that and to expand the benefits and the ambition of just transition beyond just firms and workers to society as a whole. If I look at the last area, certainly not the least, restorative justice. It has three key components. One is socioeconomic empowerment. So it speaks to issues around access to modern housing and modern services like energy, water, but also transport, but also access to new technologies. And by access, it doesn't mean everyone is to own the technology, but they must benefit from it. And I think that's quite clear when we talk about solar power, you know, climb the spot like a culture, electric vehicles and so forth. And then more broadly, of course, access to economic opportunity, primary land in a global country is fundamental. The second aspect is social cultural restoration. And in nutshell, it's really around non-pository use of land, particularly around mining, but certainly around any kind of big project. And that speaks to respect for local cultures, but also access to health and education and a lot of other things. Lastly, of course, environmental restoration in terms of land, air, water, but also carbon is quite critical in the center of any action. So as I conclude, really what I was talking about is the Grand Balancing Act when we're talking about policy. We're trying to maintain this transformative ambition, very radical thinking and action, but also charting practical ways towards implementation. That's not easy. But certainly, you know, through bolting blocks, we can we can try and achieve that going forward. And it's all about wielding political will, as well as the vested interest from all parties that's regaining power. I think we've been talking about it yesterday already. And as we gain more power to wield the political will and vested interest into action, then hopefully we can move toward our just transition going forward. Thank you. And I look forward to the discussion. Thank you, Gay Law for that very insightful set of options, I suppose, menu, portfolio, orchestra. We use a lot of words to describe it in South Africa. Our next speaker is Claudia Strambo. Claudia is a research fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute, where she leads the tackling carbon lock-in initiative. Her research interests include the politics of energy transitions, the political economy of extractive industries and just transitions. And she'll be looking at the geopolitics of carbon lock-in and fossil fuel dependent developing countries, looking at Colombia and Nigeria. Welcome. Thanks, Desi. And hi, everybody. Good morning. Good you made it that early. So today I'm presenting ongoing research we are doing with colleagues at Adelphi and the Stockholm Environment Institute on geopolitics and carbon lock-in. And this research is part of a program on called MISTRA geopolitics, which aims at critically exploring the interaction between geopolitics security and climate and environmental change. And our aim is to understand better how these courses contribute to legitimize and challenge actions and decisions that support further fossil fuel development and reinforced carbon lock-in in developing countries. Just a heads up and managing expectation here. We're not taking a classical approach to geopolitics. We're taking a critical one. So we're looking at how a special agenda from the national governments in these two case studies draw on environmental concerns and objectives to justify their actions and inactions. Oh, yeah. Thanks. So in terms of methods, our focus here is on oil and gas. And we choose Colombia and Nigeria because of their high dependence on this fossil fuel for balancing their national accounts and their important role it plays in development policy historically. They also have both national oil and gas companies and a history of domestic conflict. But there are also differences, for instance, in terms of the international organizations that belong to or the structure of the economy. And we work with national policy documents, speeches by high-level officials and quotes in newspapers for the periods between 2015 and May 2022, so just before petrol selection. And we coded them using a list of categories related to energy, climate, development, and geopolitics. And I will focus now in the presentation on narratives, but we also work with other aspects of the discourse. And you see that many of the elements I'm going to talk about, we discussed them yesterday for companies. So in Colombia, oil and gas prediction has remained central to the whole period we look at. And before, of course, government vision really plays it at the core of countries' futures. The plans were to increase fossil production and exports through offshore production and conventional resources and improved recovery rates. And one key narrative is that oil and gas extraction is necessary for energy, autonomy, and sovereignty. But interestingly, interestingly, there is very little elaboration on that. It's very naturalized. Like, we need it because of our security, but that's it. We keep it there. Another narrative is about the role for development and peace under Santos, especially through the revenues they generate and an expression that comes back often is taking advantage of the underground wealth to address ground poverty, as if ground poverty was not related and an outcome of extracting this underground wealth. The more detailed narrative, actually, that emerged during this period is about gas as an essential component of the energy transition through substituting other fuels in transport industry in the residential sector and thus reducing emissions relatively, improving access to clean energy, generating the revenue necessary for the energy transition. And gas is presented as a bridge technology, but without explaining how and when we get from one side of the bridge to the other side of the bridge, which is quite typical from this narrative. But the narrative also recognizes that there are changes in global policy and markets that requires adjustments in how oil and gas are being produced. So there's a lot about the carbonizing the oil and gas sector through energy efficiency, tackling vegetative emissions, on-site renewable energy development, CCES, of course, and carbon offsetting, which will save us all. Another aspect is making the sector, and especially co-petrol, the national oil company, a key contributor to reforestation and renewable energy development, and also use fossil fuel to produce and export blue hydrogen, which would contribute to address transition risk by substituting decreasing revenues from coal exports. As most of you know, probably coal is one of the main exports of Columbia. And according to this narrative, this strategy together with a lot of efforts in renewable energy development and energy efficiency movement is positioned in Columbia as a regional leader in the energy transition. And I realize I forgot to change the slide. Now, as for Nigeria, here too, producing gas is presented as the pillar of the country's energy and economic future. Gas projection is used, gas projection and use is seen as a solution for the country's objective of increasing energy security by diversifying the energy mix and improving energy access with health school benefits and meeting climate mitigation targets by substituting some of the oil domestically, especially in the mobility sector. But the stronger and more detailed narrative is regarding its role for economic diversification and industrialization. For instance, with petrochemicals, we had a presentation about that yesterday. And in turn, petrochemicals would enable the expansion and the growth of the agriculture sector. So there is this like chain effects. And the ambition altogether is to make Nigeria the African hub for gas-based industries and a future pioneer on global markets through technologies powered by gas. So gas transition fuel is also present here with an emphasis on richer countries needing to respect Nigeria's own pace in the move to renewables. And overall, gas is clearly prioritized over renewables. And finally, gas is presented as a way to increase regional influence through cross-country pipelines and improve the country's position in the global economic system by enabling a more complex economy. And as for oil, the narrative is much less developed. And it's the same in Colombia. There are mentions of the need to diversify revenues and a vision to become a major exporter of refined products. But oil production is very much naturalized. There isn't much about arguing for its continuity. It's a given. So some key insight from the analysis so far is that the framings of gas futures fit with how the countries position themselves internationally. So Colombia has been positioning itself as a leader of the SDG and climate agendas globally. It's also a member of the OECD since 2020. So their expectation as to the pace and direction of the energy transition that come with that. And then we see the narrative emphasizing the role of gas for the energy transition. And in Nigeria, which presents itself and sees itself as an important oil and gas player and original power. And also is a member of OPEC since more than 50 years. The emphasis is on shifting from being an oil to a gas nation and the importance of gas for industrialization. And also both narratives sustain the domestic and global status quo. There is no change in distribution of power in either domestically or globally. A little bit with Nigeria seeking to have better terms of trade but under the same rules of the game. Then the next point is about the discourses that surround these narratives or these narratives belong to point to developed countries decision and actions or inactions to legitimize their own visions for the sector. So Colombia talks a lot about Canada as being both and at the same time in a compatible and balanced way. A leader of conservation and climate mitigation but also a leader in a leader in mining and hydrocarbons. And Nigeria talks about how lucky we are that the EU taxonomy takes gas as a clean fuel. So oil and gas narratives are strategically also quite unclear about the links between domestic and international transition. So I think your points about there is no just transition domestically without a just transition globally here is interesting to put it in context. They mix up different sorts of fossil fuels and importantly they completely ignore and sometimes even undermine the harms that oil and gas production imposes on local communities. So what does that mean in terms of tackling carbon lock in? We need to keep pointing to oil and gas narratives inconsistencies. As Stepa said yesterday, repeat, repeat, repeat, right? So gas has a low carbon fuel and here I mentioned Colombia long term strategy that says this strategy does not contemplate the disappearance of fossil fuel nor gas in the energy mix. So fossil fuel does no longer include gas in the long term strategy of Colombia. Stranded assets and responsible macroeconomic management of course also work on this narrative and renewable energy versus gas for energy access. But it's not enough and it's not enough because as Gaylord predicted very well the issue fundamentally is about much more than energy. The quote by Nigeria's minister of petroleum here shows that the main objective is not delivering energy for development fast but finding ways to take advantage of gas in a post-Paris agreement setting. And underlying this is the political role of fossil fuel through the revenues they produce and the political influence into which these revenues translate. Renewable energy does not produce the same levels of rents. So the Colombia and Nigeria cases highlight that alternative energy narratives are not sufficient. That we need alternative development narratives and that these help shift power redistributed both domestically and globally. And when designing these narratives we need to remember as by Hanville that these are to be successful these need not only to be coherent but they also need to address audiences' main concerns in accordance with their core beliefs. So we really need more work like the one Cara Pike present yesterday afternoon on identifying these audiences our audiences' main concerns and core beliefs to design narratives of transformation. Thank you. Thank you Claudia for that very interesting insight into the alternative development pathways that countries depend on for fossil fuels in contrast to this kind of transformative approach that just transition might offer. So moving on to another very interesting innate fossil fuel mostly called exporter. Dr. Radicha Wiranagara from the Institute for excuse me the Institute for Essential Services Reform. Radicha is a senior researcher at ISR which is an energy and environmental think tank based in Indonesia. He's responsible for conducting research on the energy transition in Indonesia towards 100% renewables. And part of this includes the decarbonisation of the country's thermal power plants and then he's going to be presenting a fascinating framework to assess the implications of an accelerated and just coal power phase out in support of Indonesia's 2050 net zero emissions target. Thanks Radicha. Hello. Thanks Jesse for the kind introduction. Hi everyone. Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here to share our latest work which is in collaboration with the Center for Global Sustainability of the University of Maryland US. And as Jesse has mentioned before, yeah it will be about a framework that has been developed to assess the financing needs and impact of a just an accelerated coal phase out specifically in Indonesia. So before going into further on the methodology and the outcome, I'd like to just put in some context first on Indonesia's position in its net zero target. So in the last COP in Glasgow, I think our minister, the ministry of energy of mineral resources have endorsed three out of four classes and whilst agreeing on considering an accelerated coal phase out by 2040s. And this is conditional upon receiving the additional support from the international community in terms of financial and technical assistance. And it has, I have to admit it is a big, a huge task because as we, the coal fire power plants account to about 65% of the generation mix in Indonesia. And that translates into a quarter of the country's total CO2 emissions. And apart from the one in the COP26 event, the government has actually proposed a plan. This is led by the state-owned utility company PLN. And it includes a plan to phase out its coal fleet by 2050 sticks with no new coal fire power plants beyond 2023. And of course, this comes with some exceptions. And these exceptions include those projects which are already under construction and or have reached their financial close with the financier of the projects. And in order to accelerate this coal phase in Indonesia and to meet with the 1.5 degree Celsius compatible pathway, I think it's reasonable to have this additional support to minimize the socio-economic impacts that is coming from the stranded assets and the job losses and also the investment that needs to be put in into scaling up the renewables to meet the growing demand and also to be replacing the coal fire power plants that are being phased out. And we are also considering a number of financing mechanisms, including one that has already been going in South Africa, the JetP, and also the one that's being launched last year in the COP event which is the ADB's energy transition mechanism. Right now, the ADB's energy transition mechanism is in the phase of developing a CESA, a socio-economic, I forgot the long term for that, but it's still on the early phase of implementation of the mechanism. So yeah, just a little bit of update in this coal phase out dynamics. So Indonesia just recently produced a presidential regulation. This is on the mandate to accelerate the development of renewables in the electricity sector. And the regulation also acknowledges of course the need to retire these coal fire power plants earlier. And given the situation that we have 65 percent of the generation come from coal, it is reasonable to phase out the coal fire power plants as soon as possible so that the renewables can come in into the system and meet the demand that is needed. And the details on the coal fire power plants accelerate phase out is covered in Article 3. And this includes a instruction to the MEMR, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, to develop a roadmap for an accelerated coal phase out. And this needs to be coordinated among other ministries, including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-owned Enterprises because we are talking about phasing up coal fire power plants that some of them are owned by the state-owned utility company. Most of them are owned by the IPP, the independent power producers. And also on the article there is also a paragraph on bending the new coal fire power plants. Again, this comes with some exceptions, especially those power plants that are contributing to the value-added economy, the national economy. And also the article also includes the limitation of the operation of these coal fire plants and that would be until 2050. And also there are also criteria on the technical and economic part that is for the assessment of units that needs to be phased out. And I'd like to also mention that IESR also been asked by the MEMR to work along with them and the PLN to develop this roadmap. And this will be in the form of a ministerial decree. And we are currently working on it. And this will be, hopefully this can be showcased later on the G20 event in November in Bali, Indonesia. And yeah, moving on to the framework that has been developed. So in the framework we have three steps. So the first one is we developed this national net zero pathways. And to develop this pathway we use this global integrated assessment model developed by the University of Maryland. It's called GCAM, Global Change Analysis Model. And the pathway that has been developed in that step will be feeding in, was feeding into the next step, which is on the development of detailed plan-by-plan retirement. And we'll use a multi-criteria scoring system for this exercise. And the last step that we did in this framework is to quantify the benefit and cost from implementing a just and rapid coal to clean energy transition. A little bit about the coal fire power plant split characteristic in Indonesia. So as you can see from the graph there. Yeah, so it's even the graph here. We can see the development of the coal fire power plant that has been started since the 1980s, late 80s. But then it grows up quite significantly after mid 90s. And that has been forced by the need to meet the demand of the countries. And most of these power plants, if you can see from the graph here, are owned by an IPP, so independent power producers. And yeah, the next one is owned by PLN, which is the state-owned utility company. And we also have some captive plants, which are used for their own needs. So like in smelter, smeltering of mining and for some industrial activities in some part of the country. And as I mentioned earlier, IPP has most of the new, larger and more efficient plants, as shown previously. And this is just more on the breakdown of that. So in this analysis, in this framework, we focus more on the power plants that is owned by PLN and IPP. So we exclude the captive plants. So in total, there are about 40.3 gigawatts in capacity and about 72 plants. And this is just further details on the methodology that we use in this framework. So yeah, I will try to speed up. Okay, two minutes, right. So yeah, I think I'll skip this and we can discuss this further later after the event. And this is just to show you the pathway that has been developed through the model. So we have a, by 2050, expected that we have most of the generation comes from the solar PV with some minuscule proportion of the coal abated coal fire problems and biomass. And the graph on the right here, just to show you that if we follow the trajectory of the coal fire problems that are currently in the planning, in pre-permitted construction and operating, it will go beyond 2050. So we need to focus on more on this blue solid line, which is going to be the one that is compatible with the 1.5 degree pathway. So if we're following this line, then the coal will be completely phased out by 2045. And yeah, this is just on the multicarterial scoring that we use to rank the priority of the phase out of the units that are operating and in constructions or in the PPA stages. And we only consider these three criteria. It's on technical attributes and profitability and environmental impact, but we left out the grid stability and equity because we don't really have that much data at the time to do the scoring for those criteria. And we use a normalized rank scoring and we average them to be in a single combined metric. And then we ended up with this graph where we see that most of the power plants that are in the lower end of the graph is considered to be having a worse performance, both in the technicality and profitability and environmental impacts. So as you can see that most of them are power plants with capacity lower than 300 megawatts and with technology of super critical steam cycle technology. And in this framework, we also identify the low hanging fruit plants. So these are power plants that we consider that needs to be retired quickly in the near term between 2022 and 2023. And of course, if we show this to the government, they will smile and then say that I think it's too early to do that because we are in the 2022 and next year will be 2023 and the government are not quite ready to do so. But anyway, we will still showing that this power plants needs to be phased out because we know that and from the result that they have poor technical economic and environmental performance. And yeah, this is just a further elaboration of the outcome from combining the pathway and the ranking system that we had before. So by between 2022 and 2023, we have about 9.2 gigawatts and then the largest capacity being phased out will happen in 2031 and 2040 and the rest happened in the last five year period between 2045. And since Indonesia is an archipelago country, so we have a separate power system and this system are still not interconnected. So this is just to show how the phasing out speed in each of the system and this are showing a similar retirement speed across different system. So by 2040s and 2045, there will be phased out and yeah, this is the framework that we use to assess the cost and benefit analysis. And from that, we see that the benefit actually outpays the cost that is we quantify that two to four times larger than the cost that is going to be incurred if we consider an accelerated phase out of the coal-fired power plants. And this is just a breakdown of the cost that would be mostly going to cover the cost that's going to be on the retirement of the IPP plants about two-thirds of it. And yeah, this is on the standard asset cost that will be bear by the finance needs and this is the investment that is going to be needed for the renewables investment. So in total, it will be up until 2050, there will be about 1.2 trillion US dollar needed to replace this coal-fired plant and to meet the electricity demand. I know this is a huge number and that's why we require the financial support in doing so. So these are the key findings that I think I've covered before and policy recommendations. Some of it are already being implemented by the government with the production of this presidential regulation, which is a positive development so far. And for the future research, we will improve some of data and metric quantification because, as I mentioned before, there are information that are not available at the time of the study and we will try to improve that and include in our future research. And the second thing that I think need to be done in the future research is on the assessment of the power systems because in the study that we've done before, we only do it in a national level, an aggregate and we need to do it down into the power system and how that affect the quality. Yeah, that's done for me. Sorry for taking much of the time. Yeah, yeah. Thank you. It was super interesting. I'm sorry I have to catch you off. I work with modelers so I want to look at all the detail. But I think we can come back to some of those interesting questions around power system and other issues in the Q&A. So last but not least, we've got Elias Spickerman. Elias is a policy officer within the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action in Germany, where he works on different topics around international climate action and energy transition. And he will be speaking today, he'll be sharing lessons learned and experiences from his daily work on carbon luck and energy system work in the ministry. Okay, perfect. Thanks a lot. And it's a great pleasure to be here with so many experts. I cannot share, as I said, any research results, but I can share the experiences that we're having in our daily work. As you all know, carbon logins are not exclusive to developing and emerging countries. And logins in developing and emerging countries are often connected to the activities in industrialized countries and their banks and companies. Therefore, I would like to start with looking at the current German policies. You are all aware of the energy crisis, as other countries, Germany is facing very high challenges when it comes to energy security and connected prices. And therefore, there's some whole set of measures taken. Some of those measures are, from my perspective, I would argue, future-proofed. However, Germany is still in some of the carbon pathways are locked in in carbon pathways. So some of the measures are for sure based on fossil fuel technologies. Most prominently, you've probably heard about the aim of reducing the Russian gas imports in Germany and replacing those imports first by reducing the demand and second by replacing those imports with pipeline gas and LNG gas from other countries. Germany doesn't have any LNG terminals yet, so there are currently terminals in construction. And Germany is trying to reduce the danger of lock-ins in those new infrastructure by looking for installing floating units and looking that those new infrastructure is convertible for the use of green hydrogen later on. However, given that the additional gas demand from Germany is creating investments in other countries and producing countries, and given that the EU is drastically or will drastically reduce the gas demand in the next 20 years, there might be dangers of carbon lock-ins in those producing countries that are now building up capacities. Another measure that you've probably heard is on coal. So there is a policy to reactivate coal power plants. This is a shorter measure for one and a half years, and the idea is to reduce the gas demand in the power sector by using additional coal. However, this policy is not interfering with the aim of ideally phasing out coal power in Germany by 2030 and due to the cap of the ETS in the EU, additional emissions will be limited. Overall, and this is maybe another message than Christoph sent yesterday, overall I hope, we are hoping very much that the repower measures and the national measures that we are taking currently are boosting the energy transition and will reduce emissions in the medium to longer term. I would shortly like to stick to the example of Germany and coal. You are probably aware of the coal phase out in Germany, and this is maybe one example of breaking carbon lock-ins. And it comes with quite a few lessons learned. I would just like to mention three of them. Just a short recap. So there is a compensation for lignite power plants operators. There is tendering mechanism for hard coal power plants to get them out of the market. And there is quite a few, quite a big sum of finance to support structural changes in the coal regions that are affected in Germany. And in total, it's around 40 gigawatts that will be closed. To the first point, the measures that I just mentioned are quite pricey. At least the price tag is quite high. So in Germany, we will spend until 2038, around 45 billion euros to break this carbon lock-in. And talking to developing countries and their governments, they start laughing at us and saying, okay, this is not a possible option for us. It's super expensive. And that's why I would like to underline that this is a political price. And it's not reflecting the cost that is needed to breaking the lock-in. It's in the end much cheaper, I guess. And tomorrow, you said yesterday, we need to repeat, repeat and repeat. You said it as well. It's a good message. So sorry for the no-brainer. Germany, and this is the second point, has been subsidizing coal production for decades. So it's key to look at fossil fuel subsidies and introduce carbon price so you're reflecting the true costs of the production. And the second no-brainer is you have to start early to tackle carbon lock-ins. It's just cheaper and much easier. So carbon lock-ins are not only, as you know, about economic issues. It's also about social lock-ins and cultural and political ones. So these makes it pretty difficult. And it's important to start early to address those issues. Leaving the German example, I would like to broaden the perspective and just share some experiences from our everyday work in the international sphere in our ministry. Three on industrialized countries, and there are potentials to avoid or break carbon lock-ins or help breaking carbon lock-ins in developing and emerging countries. Three with respect to developing countries, and two overarching if I'm in time. So when it comes to industrialized countries, first point I wanted to mention is that when Germany found the national consensus to phase out coal power, we were in a position internationally to address the topic and to discuss and promote the topic internationally via energy partnerships, bilateral programs or initiatives such as the Powering Pass Coal Alliance. And I guess it's very important, as same for the BOGA, to kind of expand the global discussion and to introduce like a new normal. I guess talking about coal with many countries five years ago was very difficult. And now it's, we are late, but now it's normal. And this is something we have to achieve also in other topics. Second is private finance. Yesterday was in the leave it in the crown session. And there was a list of German banks showed that are engaging in those carbon bomb projects. So financial markets are becoming more carbon sensitive. However, this is going very slowly. And I guess industrialized countries need to support this process also by regulatory aspects. And this is, I guess, a homework which is not yet done among industrialized countries. On public finance, this is the third point we are doing our homework at the moment in Germany. We are a supporter of the COP26 statement, it has also been mentioned yesterday, on phasing out public finance, international public finance for fossil fuels. We're currently revising our instruments and align them with the climate targets. And we are very much aware that this policy is somehow difficult to communicate when we are at the same time going into LNG terminals and LNG infrastructure. And therefore, this brings me to the points on developing countries. It's key to work together with developing and emerging countries to find solutions and alternatives to avoid carbon lock ins and break carbon lock ins. The chat piece has been mentioned. I guess this is a very recent example. However, there are many more. And I guess we also have to think about additional partnership forms to accelerate the developments. And as you all know, the potentials for renewables in developing countries are quite significant. So there's not only a chance to creating access, but also to create local industries and value chains. Second point, what is needed to make those decisions? And I guess among others, it's knowledge and awareness. We see again and again that availability and access to knowledge and data is key and is like the enabler for climate action at all levels. So therefore, we appreciate the launch of the fossil fuel registry as one very positive example. But I think there are still huge knowledge gaps that we have to address, for example, when it comes to consequences of higher temperature on national economies. So I guess there's additional room for action. And third, I guess data and awareness is not enough. So we need to work on people focused narratives. And Claudia made also already the point that I wanted to make. So I jumped over this. But I guess narratives are much needed to address the social and cultural dimensions and also political dimensions of the carbon locons. The two overarching points, and then I'm done. Yesterday we heard about Bogar and PPCA. And I think I'm convinced that those initiatives, international initiatives and regionals can be very supportive in helping to avoid carbon locons and breaking carbon locons. However, we need to put quality over quantity. There's a recent EU study, I guess from the last year, counting 450 climate initiatives in the last 10 years that have been launched. And from our everyday experiences, even for a well equipped government like Germany, it's not possible to cope with those numbers of initiatives. So we need to think about how to streamline the international collaboration and how to find solutions to this issue. And the last point, globally, energy savings and energy efficiency must be at the forefront and must be boosted. There's a huge potential which is currently not tapped. And reducing the energy demand by those measures is, I guess, a very important way to address carbon locons from the demand side. Thanks. Thanks all. I don't know who has the fluffy box. And thank you. So we've heard about the challenges of what it means to get agreement on just transition, how these processes of implementation can be challenging. There's amazing options and menus of looking at these approaches to achieve different kinds of justice. Fossil fuel based development pathways that even where you have good technical work, like finance, remains a key policy question. And also the important role of partnerships and norms. So let me open the floor and let's have some questions, please. Can we start at the back? I don't know who had their hand up first. There's Pao Yu and somebody else. Thank you. Thank you so much. So Pao Yu, from the Fossil Exit Research Group in Flensburg. My question is to several of the panelists as there's a remarkable plans, how basically renewables are not part of the solution for the country. However, we speak with a lot of exporting countries representatives over there. So it's just one part of the metal, so to speak, if we manage to include renewables within Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa, Indonesia, but we still keep exporting the different products. So I would be interested in your takes and how far in the countries there is, what is the strategy if you go for a coal phase in Indonesia in the 2040s? Is there then the plan to just export all the coal that you're not needing to other countries? Or in how far this is also thought or would you say we can't talk about this now? So we first have to push coal plans out of the market and then we have a second strategy upcoming once we're done with this to also say well if all of us did the same then no one is buying the stuff anyhow so we'll be fine. So therefore just wanting to touch upon that issue. Thanks. Yeah, Gareth Edwards from the University of East Anglia. Just following this question, obviously 80% of Indonesia's coal and 80% of Australia's coal is exported. So picking up Gay Law's point, what kind of a just transition is there internationally if we focus only on domestic decarbonisation? And then a broader question actually about the I've been to a number of things recently where in preference to just transition the terminology of economic diversification has been preferred. And I have three questions about that that are like the panelists to perhaps reflect on. Firstly, where's the social in economic diversification? Secondly, where's the transition? Because at least in Australia there's no sense of a transition. And thirdly, where's the justice? Because as soon as we start framing just transition in purely economic terms, we lose some of that urgency and we make it more amenable to mainstream existing status quo approaches. Thank you. Thanks, Chloe Ferrand from Climate Home News. Two quick questions. The first one may be to Isabel. Are MDBs discussing these alternative development plans? We're hearing a lot about the need for alternatives to these fossil fuel pathways to development. What is the conversation between MDBs on planning and finance package and to try and get that conversation going? And then to Alias, maybe, just a point on this green hydrogen-ready gas infrastructure. I think there's been quite a lot of pushback from experts and analysts about the fact that some of these gas infrastructures can't actually be that easily converted for hydrogen use. I think maybe Michael Liebridge makes quite strong comments on Twitter if you follow him about this, saying it's a kind of hilarious idea to think that these energy terminals can be converted to green hydrogen. So is this something that you're just saying as part of the German government, or is this actually a real thinking behind this? Thank you. Is that on the recorder off? Cara Pike with Climate Access, a question for Riddhi Chibhout. You mentioned there's two to four times the benefits of phasing out the coal fire power plants. I'm wondering what those benefits are. Okay, I'll let you guys respond and we'll come back for a second round. Yeah, thanks a lot for that. Yeah, I guess I'll start with a question around economic diversification. I think that's quite clear that that's a very limited narrow perspective. It shouldn't be forgotten, of course. I mean, that's quite critical in a lot of countries and it's certainly inside. Coal is very concentrated in one particular region. I mean, it's pretty much two municipalities that are entirely reliant on coal. So you have to talk about economic diversification of those particular regions to avoid ghost towns. I mean, we've got a particular history of ghost towns in South Africa with the phase out of gold exploration for different reasons. And then we've got other potential ghost towns that could pop up, you know, we're talking at breakfast on platinum, for instance, South Africa is also a major platinum producer, it's very concentrated. For now, it's booming, but who knows where it's going to go going forward. And if it doesn't continue, then we'll have potential ghost towns there as well. So it's part of the equation, but it's just one small part of the equation, effectively. And I think, you know, certainly in what I've presented, you know, we try to take that much broader view looking at the diversification, but also the social protection aspects and really position economic diversification just as one of the pillars. So certainly, I mean, it shouldn't be reduced to that at all. But it is something that helps drive investment. And I think, you know, I think we need to consider it going forward. And then on, I think on the kind of renewables versus coal, I mean, for me, it's quite interesting, because I mean, in South Africa, we're not really talking about coal experts at this point too much. Even though they're really important, because they're 50% of the coal sales in volume, but they're 70% in value. So, you know, tend to export the good shit. And we keep the crap. Not an unusual pattern. But so I think, you know, that's the viability of the coal industry without export is close to null. So I think that's, you know, that's quite an important narrative. But at the moment, it's quite focused on trying to resolve internal problems, which is a to get electricity and B to get it clean and cheap. But but link to that, you know, in terms of building the renewable energy industry, I think that's been that's been a big debate in South Africa around, well, there was been a big debate about building the renewable energy industry overall. But no, we're trying to say, well, we want to go big on renewable energy, but how? And I think, you know, the linkages was trying to build industrial value chain. That's not straightforward at all. You know, we have been debating and struggling on trying to build actual industrial value chains around renewable energy for quite some time. That's something that we grappling with at the moment, really at the moment, trying to get up a plan around building a renewable energy value chain. But unfortunately, you know, global renewable energy companies are not very different from any other big global conglomerate. And we'll do things that are only in their interest. And if it's not in the interest to localize any of the production, then they won't do it. So we are facing those challenges at the moment and trying to define a path forward. Yeah, very quickly on how you question. So I think if you read the narratives, it's really not clear what's the long term perspective on exports and how it interacts with domestic developments. Strategically ambiguous, I think I wrote on the slide. So there is this connection that enables narratives that very conveniently can put things together that are not compatible, right? And you can see that with this idea of an energy transition leadership in Colombia that is based on both renewable, rapid and ample renewable energy production expansion domestically, but also gas. I mean, the situation is slightly different now with petrol, but in the previous governments. Thanks. Yeah, thank you. I'm going to start by paying tribute to Sham Bradley. I forgot before she's here today in the audience and she was one of the promoters of this MDB Just Transition Common Principles. So she would be able to tell you much more gossip about all the things that went behind the scenes, you know, so I'm putting her on the spot here. And thank you very much to her for the very good job she did on that this year. There was a question specifically addressed to me, which is, I think, what are MDBs doing in planning and financing packages in different countries? Look, well, MDBs have different mandates, so some of them do not do planning because they don't do policy. EIB is an example for you, you know, the finance packages, but the policy will come from someone else, so it depends. Now, most of the others, we do some policy engagement and technical assistance, technical cooperation, one way or the other. There is an issue with the political economy of the Just Transition. So, for example, EBRD is helping some countries do what we call Just Transition Diagnostics. And when we talk to them, we say you should be announcing the transition first, and then we'll have a discussion on how the transition is going to happen. And they say, no, this is not how it works. Let's look at the consequences first and give me the answer on how this is going to affect my people. And when I understand the consequences and I have the plan on how to tackle them, this is when I'm going to make the announcement. So we are in a bit of a vicious cycle situation, you know, that sometimes we are asked to start financing diversification activities, or EBRD does not do some of the social packages that were being mentioned before, but, you know, we do training. This is something we can do. We do some investments, early closures, and so on. But we have to do them without the commitment of the country that they will face out call, or whatever. It's not only about call. It's about other things as well, heavy industry. So it's a bit of a real-life situation here and something to keep in mind. You cannot always get the country or a company to agree on something until they fully understand the consequences. And by the way, I want to see some manifest. So this is one point, you know, maybe worth highlighting here. The other I wanted to make is about the value chains. So there's a lot of discussion, and there was a lot of discussion here about social packages for affected workers and communities and this and that. Look, in reality, these companies, the coal companies or oil and gas companies, whichever we are talking about in this just transition, they tend to be most of them state-owned or state-controlled and powerful and large companies. So they have good social, economic, or financial packages for their workers. The most vulnerable part of the value chain is not with these companies. It's with the value chain, you know, the suppliers, the clients, especially the suppliers and the sub-suppliers and the third-time suppliers, some of which, by the way, are not in the region where we are making the intervention. So it becomes a bit complicated. But this is another thing we're trying to tackle somehow, which is how to help the most vulnerable parts of the standard assets value chain. And those are normally out of any compensation package. Final thing about this diversification. Why is diversification good? Look, diversification, I think, is a good option in life, generally, for many reasons. Some of these countries, regions, etc., they are mono industries, they have a very high weight on one particular sector, promising as it may be, things change as we all know. So it's good to have a portfolio of alternative economic activities people can resort to. And it may not be a one-to-one transfer from this worker that was in the smelting company is going to whatever other industry which is coming up. But it's good to have the option. And some people may choose to have mobility anyway. This will happen in, you know, people like me, coming from Spain and living in London, and so many others. So creating economic opportunities is a very valid narrative for just transition, even when you are not capable of making the direct link between the worker here who may end up there. It's a broader and more general economic story. And I'll leave it here. Take the really unpolitical question on hydrogen first, I think. I was about to ask if there was a question for me. Just to add what you said, most vulnerable parts of the value chain, I guess what is important to mention is also the informal economy that is heavily affected. And it's very difficult to count in just transition processes. On the age to ready questions, a very valid and important question. If I'm correct, I guess in the law on LNG terminals, it says not age to ready. I guess it says the infrastructure needs to be ready to be transferable to the use of hydrogen. There are no technical specifications on it, I guess. And very much depends if you're going to import green hydrogen or derivatives. And we don't have very solid estimates about how much this costs at the moment. And there are not many examples for the adjustment of those infrastructures. I guess you have to look at the very different parts of the infrastructure and have to find solutions for different components in the end. I'm not sure if this answers your question, but I hope it gives some of the ideas. You can pin them with coffee. Raditya, do you want to talk about the costs and benefits for what you did? Yeah. So the benefit that we can gain from that, we think we can gain from facing out the coal early is on the avoided costs from the coal subsidies. I'm not saying that we are subsidizing the coal in power generation, but since our electricity is being subsidized and most of the power generation comes from coal, that indicates that it's indirectly subsidized the coal. So with the accelerated phase out, we then avoided that in long term. And the second thing that is being avoided is the health costs. And of course, we know that the communities surrounding the coal fire funds will be impacted by the pollution and the emission produced by the coal fire plant. And there has been cases where a coal fire plant sits nearby, a community pack with people, and there has been reported health issues. And if we can again accelerate this coal phase out, especially in the pack communities, and then we can avoid the costs that is being incurred from treating these communities with all their health problems. Thanks. Second round. I think he had his hand up first last round. So that gentleman, you and Zepra. Thanks. Thanks very much. Peter Neal from Sussex University. Two quick questions, but big questions. One is about how well models of just transition travel. Because I wonder sometimes if we make assumptions about powerful trade unions, a strong state, and the existence of democratic space to have discussions about energy policy futures. And that combination of things doesn't describe many situations or many contexts around the world, including northern contexts as well. So it's not just a southern challenge. So just any reflections there on positive models. But the second one is about squaring the procedural and the distributional. Because sometimes when I'm in discussions on just transitions, people talk about the emphasize the procedural, right? We need to bring all actors with us or losers, leaving no one behind that type of dialogue. And yet if we're talking about coal transitions in Europe, for example, we're talking about a very limited number of minds that are at all viable and most are probably largely inconsistent. So what actually are we deliberating about? So sometimes, and this goes to the point about just transition and washing, I hear this from companies, they put the emphasis strongly on the procedural and bring everyone with us and having an exit plan and retraining. And that makes some sense in lots of contexts, but it's often used also used as a strategy for delay, right? To slow down the process and make sure we don't make the transition at all. So I'm just wondering how we square the procedural and the distributional. We're definitely going to answer that in the next three minutes. The girl said we must have five, the goal is not ready. And the private sector of private sector banks are playing a key role here. We saw the credential agency work with the Asian Development Bank with the Asian coal retirement program. And that's going to come back. At the moment, the major investment banks have commissioned the major investment banks have commissioned three northern NGOs, Rocky Mountain Institute, Climate Policy Initiative and Climate Bonds Initiative to design a managed phase out financing package for the world's most coal-fired power, most of which is in the global south. How do global south NGOs work with global north NGOs in designing the specifics of these? And they're going to get launched at the COP. And I think it's going to be rather late if the global south perspective isn't heard until the packages have been designed. I'm interested in your views on that because I sit on one of the working groups here. Oh, sorry. There was the woman behind you first. Sorry, she had her hand up. I forgot. Yeah, yeah. And that's sorry. And then we have to stop because now the coffee is ready. I'm wondering if you could address where you're seeing or if you're seeing conversations around debt relief in order to ensure a global just transition. I've talked to so many countries that are currently looking at or pursuing new expansion of fossil fuel production just in order to feed their debt. And of course, there are some countries like Ecuador that literally have outright debt for oil agreements with China. So it seems to me until we start addressing debt relief in a global just transition conversation in order to stop the expansion of fossil fuel production, then we're not going to be able to ensure a just transition in the global south. And I'm wondering are there bilateral amounts of that or conversations that you're seeing happening on this because it seems pretty critical. So I'm going to ask you each to just do 40 seconds, 40 seconds per person on justice, debt relief and north-south relations. Go. Yeah, 40 seconds. All right. I'll do models of just transition travel. I think they don't travel very well, particularly from global north and global south, but it's really important to have some overarching principles. And then that will help you to then have your place based model, which are very context specific from country to country. So that's one of the things we're trying to do at least is not to repeat the global north experience. And then another 10 seconds on, as I said, you know, yes, some stakeholders are clearly using the just transition narrative as a way to block the transition or injure it. We have it in South Africa, we are many countries where it's like just transition is no transition. That's obviously very incompatible with the concept of just transition is actually the opposite. And that's something that we have to deal with quite a lot. And I think by taking the global south perspective to it, we can certainly do that. I think global north institutions design anything for the global south is highly problematic. So I would not really condone any of that. Apple or probably a vote 40 seconds already. So yeah, I was going to talk to the same one. Everything that Geller said and yeah, I think we have this general frameworks that helps us think a bit more systematically about who is going to be affected in which ways, who is likely to benefit in which ways and which type of sectors need to be involved. And then, well, then that's it. And then we have to apply it to different circumstances, which often don't have the same institutional basis that the North has benefited from in what they have started with the transition, and especially I think in terms of subnational capacities in developing countries. So there is this to work with, but then it's very context specific. And even within country, different regions have highly different contexts and also cultural and social organization that will enable social trust issues in a post conflict or post apartheid country that will completely change the Latin in French the setup we work with. On the debt relief and whether there is a discussion, a formal trade off between debt relief and just transition, not that I am aware in multilateral, I can mainly speak about mine. So no, there are no, but I am aware of the cops, you know, as part of the conference of the parties, financial packages are being discussed. So yes, it is part of the conversation, probably not only about just transition, it's also about climate resilience, how are people coping with climate change impacts and so on. Yeah, I guess it's definitely an elephant in the room, debt relief, and it's a very complex topic. I would say the government is very much aware of it, but I can't give you details because it's not discussed in our division. Yeah, I think I'll comment on the partnership of the global and south NGO. So it's interesting you mentioned RMI because well, they partner with us for the financial modeling of the coal fire power plants phase out and we, I think the local NGO can contextualize the work because we know the landscape, the policy landscape and the key stakeholders that we need to approach if we want to make this successful. So yeah, I think, yeah, we are currently on the partnership with RMI to work on the financing model development. Yeah. So yeah, I think. Thanks. So one second, the coffee is ready. I must remind you there's coffee here, but also in the place where we had lunch. So if that's full here and you need caffeine like straight into your blood like me, you can walk across the beautiful garden thing. And thank you so much for your great questions. And thank you to the panel. Please come and grab them for more discussion.