 Good morning everybody, good morning and welcome to U.S. Institute of Peace. My name is Nancy Lindborg and I'm delighted to welcome you here this morning to our bipartisan congressional dialogue here at U.S. Institute of Peace. I want to give a special welcome to the cadets in our audience from our Service Academy Education and Development Initiative, welcome, glad to have you here. And for those who have not been with us before, U.S. Institute of Peace was founded by Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan national institute that's dedicated to reducing and resolving violent conflict around the world that threatens our national security. And we do this by working on the ground with local partners in hotspots around the world, providing policy, knowledge, very practical tools so that conflict can be prevented and resolved. And we are honored to have here with us today Congressman Francis Rooney from Florida and Congressman Bill Keating from Massachusetts. Thank you gentlemen. Both congressmen serve on the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats. And they are two thoughtful, important leaders on national security issues, so we're delighted to have them with us. And they join us here today for the fourth event in our bipartisan congressional dialogue series. And this is a series that features foreign policy discussions, national security questions, and enables members of Congress from both sides of the aisle to get together for this conversation. And the series was launched earlier this year to provide a platform for members of Congress who are working from opposite sides of the political spectrum to advance common interests. And I know that you'll hear about that today. As a nonpartisan organization, we believe very strongly in fostering these kinds of bipartisan efforts to strengthen national security. And we found that despite what you read in the paper, there is genuine, substantial interest in the Hill in coming together, especially on these kinds of critical issues, to promote real solutions thoughtfully. And our conversation today will focus on Russia, a 21st century disruptor in Europe. This is an issue of increasingly urgent concern. We're seeing the return of great power competition with an aggressive Russia threatening the established liberal world order that the U.S. and its allies have upheld for the last 70 years. And this includes Russian interference in democratic elections across Europe. We've seen Russia intimidating neighboring countries, especially through the invasion and annexation of territory in Georgia and Ukraine. And so today we have an opportunity to talk about what we should do with our European allies to protect the democratic process, to uphold the rule of law, and counter the disruptive aggression of Russia as it moves to threaten this order. In recent months, USIP has driven a track-to-dialogue process to generate new solutions and build momentum specifically towards a resolution of the conflict in Donbas. And in fact, our Executive Vice President Bill Taylor and Senior Advisor Charles North have just returned from a trip to Ukraine where they're developing a new grassroots dialogue process to bring together Ukrainians from both sides of the line of contact in Donbas. We've also recently hosted an event here with Heritage Foundation, marking 100 years since the founding of the First Georgian Republic with the Georgian Prime Minister and, of course, the invasion 10 years ago of Russia featured prominently in that discussion. So we have a very thoughtful discussion ahead of us. I'm honored to be able to welcome to the stage two very accomplished congressmen. We'll have a productive conversation. I invite all of you to follow USIP on Twitter at USIP and join today's conversation using the hashtag BipartisanUSIP. With that, please join me in welcoming to the stage Congressman Francis Rooney and Congressman Bill Keating. Thank you very much both for joining us. Congressman Rooney, I want to give you the floor first if you want to make a few opening remarks. Sure. Okay. Remember I'm not a professional with this, so it's better to have notes. Things can really twist off sideways if I don't. First I want to thank Nancy and Bill and everybody at USIP and my friend Steve Hadley for all the great work they do and my colleague Bill Keating for coming, taking time to be here with us as well. I thought I might just quickly hit a few of Russia's current foreign policy objectives as we see them. I don't know that I've got it right, but you know a lot of the problems that we're facing stem from the lost territories. They lost two million square feet, square miles when they lost the Warsaw Pact in Ukraine and Georgia, and I don't think they've gotten over it. In fact, it's smaller than when Catherine and the Great reigned. They have no natural borders, which factors into that as well other than the Arctic and the Pacific. And then you factor in that historic Slavic, Russian insecurity and feeling of alienation. It's a dangerous combination with Putin. You know, if you go back to history, the Kevin Rus, when he looks at the Ukraine, it's kind of like the way we look at Texas, if it wasn't for the barbarians up in Moscow, the capital Russian might be Kiev right now, you never know. So now what do we have? They're down driving out the Tartars in Crimea. They're doing the same kind of ethnic cleansing Russian positioning of people that they did in the Stans in the 50s and 60s. They're doing it now in Crimea. So we have a lot of problems with that. At the same time, they're trying to see disruption in the West and exploiting the immigration issue and a few things like that, cyber attacks. And it's got the appearance of a bit of a zero sum game, which is not so good. The other thing, of course, is energy. We'll probably talk about energy a lot. They're exploiting it as a geopolitical tool and we somehow or another need to get Europe to understand the whole perspective of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and focus more on the Denmark pipeline, Transcaucas pipeline, and more LNG in Europe to get free. This is something that we were working on back in George Bush's time in 2003. And we still have not made the kind of headway that we should. And then last, of course, is the military threats. We have the ability to probably occupy the Baltic in four days if they wanted to, bad enough. So I would be arguing for NATO to move some operations east. In fact, I remember talking to John Thune when Putin first went into the Ukraine. I was talking to Thune and Rubio and I said, if it were me, I'd start some military exercises in Poland and Lithuania tomorrow. But we still don't seem to have got with a clear way forward on that. I think we need to raise the price of Putin's aggression. He's gotten South Ossetia, Abbasia, now Crimea, and Donbass virtually free. So at least recently, I think we've put the Javelins into Ukraine. That's a good start. Got the missiles going into Poland and at some point Romania. That's a second good start. And maybe one of the points Trump has is that Europe needs to pay up a little more for their defense, our Eastern European allies are paying up. And so the last thing I would say is soft power diplomacy and an opportunity to shape shape the curve. And I think institutions like the US IP could be very important in that. The convening power that you exploit just like right here. The ability to go where other people can't perhaps offers part of the solution to Ukraine and Georgia. And an opportunity to promote democracy working maybe with the board of broadcasting governors and VOA and some some other institutions that can exploit Russia's shortcomings and leverage our democratic values in Eastern Europe. I know from personally visiting with the Georgians and Ukrainians the last couple of weeks, they are desperate for more interchange, more investment, more ties with the United States and Georgia to be real shame not to take advantage of that. So thank you for having me. I look forward to visiting. Well Nancy, thank you and I'd like to thank USIP for this opportunity. Francis and I serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee and the House together. And it's reassuring I think to know that in this day and age with what you hear about Congress that by far the most bipartisan committee in the House is the Foreign Affairs Committee and it's not by accident. We actually work at it because we realize what we say there, what we do there, what we produce there has enormous impact outside the world. I remember my first year we were speaking about something and I had a line of questioning and by the time I got through the hearing my office said by the way what you just said was broadcast in the other country during that period. So what we do and say is important, we realize it and I think we have the opportunity for an increasing role particularly in today's Foreign Affairs environment going forward. Now we're talking about Russia today and Russia with these would be very pleased that we're talking about Russia today because to me in terms of their influence economically and other weight that they carry they're sort of a welter weight you know punching above their weight class and the more they're getting attention and getting any kind of international respect in that way it helps them domestically at home where they have some difficulties but it also increases their ability to take a strategy that looks like chaos and taking advantage of chaos in the world but is much more strategic than that. I think they're akin to a person that wants to be at the poker table, wants to be able to influence how high the ante goes up, wants to influence what the rules of the game would be to any extent but then also choose when to sit back and let the games occur around them. It's an interesting and strategic way that they operate. Their influence today is on many fronts is important. The way they're economically using the energy issue which is vital to their existence economically but also they're using it as a tool and it's a national security issue for us here and for our allies in the West. The incursions that Francis just spoke about in Europe, in Georgia, Moldova, what's going on there as well as the Ukraine, are all issues that demonstrate what they're doing. Syria, which we may or may not get into, is really intriguing because it's a work in progress along that way but also the interference that they've been so successful with and this is something they can do in such a cost-effective manner. Their cyber attacks, their cyber program does not cost them much relatively speaking for the effectiveness that they've gotten out of it and the way they're using it against the West, including the U.S., is something we have to deal with as well. The better news is this, with what Russia has been doing, we still stand in a position, the U.S. and our allies, stand in a position to have exert so much influence over any malign activity that they might be involved with as well as what they're trying to do to disrupt our historic coalitions in the West and we have to take advantage of that. In fact, our policy, and I think it could be something Francis, I agree on, but many members of Congress agree on, we can influence more through trade and our economic influence, working with our allies to increase our strength and diminish people, countries like Russia and for that matter, China. The opportunities are there as well so as we go through the discussion today, I hope it's just not focusing, I hope people don't come away with the feeling that, wow, Russia is really creating great disruption and they're creating a problem, we're having difficulty dealing with they are, but also we have the ability to do so much more to counter those acts and so hopefully we'll hear a lot of that as the discussion progresses. So thank you for being here. Thank you. That's a great tee-up from both of your opening comments. But before we go further, you alluded to it a little bit, Representative Keating, at a time of heightening partisanship, how is, how does that work that you're able to keep a bipartisan approach? Well, how did you two come to work together on some of these critical issues? You want me to go first? Go ahead. Well, we haven't, if you look back at history, all of our most important foreign policy accomplishments have been bipartisan. I mean, Thomas Jefferson didn't want to go after the Barbary Pirates. He was the pacifist of the group, but he did because he knew it was important and Adams prevailed on him to do it, flash forward to Scoop Jackson and Henry Kissinger with the Russian Jews. And taking Pepsi Cola to Russia, you mentioned about trade. So now we're at a point now where if we're going to engage Europe and promote democracy in these new countries, we're going to need all the help we can get, and we don't need rank core in the middle of our own country. And fast forwarding from the historic perspective to today, the leadership of the committee and the subcommittees, we work at it. I mentioned we work at it. Sometimes we delay getting into some subject matters where there might be conflict that overtakes what we're trying to accomplish. And we also, as a committee, I believe, and this is what the Congress is about. This is what the legislative process is about. We do believe that progress is important. Maybe you can't get everything you want on one bite. But let's move the ball forward. And we have that attitude. We work together. Now, that does not mean there aren't moments in the committee or it wouldn't be any fun to be in the committee. There are moments in the committee where back and forth in questioning and hearings, things can get aggressive and provocative. But that's also a role. But it's realizing that there should be a reason for that. It shouldn't be a political reason to be provocative, but that you want to really have the opportunity to engage greater depth and discussion on an issue and probe and get some of the witnesses beyond, and some of the people here have been witnesses, get them beyond what they came in for with a barrier so that we can learn more. So it's the most exciting committee, I believe, to be on. And I think it's one of the most productive and, as we go forward in the world today, it's going to be one of the most important committees. Great. Well, we thank both of you for that spirit and attitude on these critical issues. So let's dive in. You both mentioned the role that Russia is playing in threatening its neighbors in both incursions and annexations. It's creating a lot of anxiety among all of the border states. What should we be doing? What's our role in supporting those countries? Should we be helping them become more resilient? Are there things that we should be doing? This is one of the critical ways in which Russia's being disruptive. You want to go first? Go ahead. Well, yeah, I mean, all you got to do is look at the situation in Italy to realize how effective, and the alternative for Germany to see how effective they've been. I think that we need to do... And those aren't even the border states. Right. And again, the desperate pleas of these people from Georgia and Ukraine going around our offices all the time saying, please help us, please engage with us, please promote democracy here and help them with their customs and their borders and things like that. So I think to counter Russia, we ought to be doing the same thing to them that they're doing to us, which I have some information that's fairly comforting in that respect with cyber. And I think that we need to promote democracy shamelessly as the better way with our new neighbors in Eastern Europe and deploy people like USIP and the Board of Broadcasting Governors. One positive thing in Iran right now, the Board of Broadcasting Governors Beams Radio in Farsi, they have 17% market share. I wonder if we could ever get that way in Russia. Because they only get the Putin line. They only get the paranoid, hostile, insecure history of Russian diplomacy. And if we could give them the other side like worked in the Warsaw Pact, we might have some of it. Yeah, we also economically have to do everything we can. And the energy is a great issue to use. So they can't use that economic issue as a tool. So they can't have the cold winters that they do and use that to exert all kinds of democratic or anti-democratic activities with that threat. So clearly, energy issues, which we'll get into, I'm sure, are going to be one of the critical center points, the overall economy, making sure that the rule of law exists there and the institutions are there. And honestly, helping some countries, Ukraine, being among them on corruption issues. It's a pretty full slate of what we can do. We can't do it and require these things, but we can exert greater influence than we are now, I believe. I think a lot of people in our country view many of these things too much through a military prism. Because whether we arm, provide lethal defense weapons for Ukraine or not, certainly that's an issue for their existence. However, Secretary Mattis, when he was addressing a small group of us recently, said that he views, and as Secretary of Defense, we should listen to him. He views his role as a reinforcement. He said, our military is there to reinforce our position, to bolster our State Department and our diplomatic efforts. So in his mind, and in my mind, I agree with him 100%, that it's state, it's our diplomacy, it's at the top of our ability to change things. Our military side of this is there to reinforce that and to create barriers for conduct that is so counter that that we can't deal with it diplomatically. But that's where we have to focus. And I think we have to put a greater focus right now. There's been a fracturing with the West right now. Whether it's with our Western alliances, in terms of Paris Treaty. Whether it's the Iran nuclear deal, whether it's the current tariff situation. We have to realize there is a fragmentation, there's a fracture that's there that we have to work hard on making sure that that doesn't deepen. So we have a lot of work to do. But beyond military, beyond some of the technical issues we could do, beyond the work for returning foreign fighters, where we both face that threat from extremists and sharing information. We're doing all those things. We have to make sure economically and diplomatically. And when I say diplomatically, that includes rule of law as well, issues, corruption issues. We have to make sure that there's as little daylight between us as we can. And that's our challenge right now. Between us and our allies. Yes. I mean, you can do so much with Russia, but we can do more and be more influential controlling the power we have together as an alliance. So, and you mentioned Congressman Rooney about the influence, not just on the border states, but going into Europe, Germany, Italy. How should, what should we be doing to reinforce that alliance? And do you see that as a key tool for addressing the Russian aggression? Yeah, I think like Congressman Keating said, I think that the core of Europe needs to be our ally. And we do have some fence-mending to deal with some of the things that have happened recently. I mean, you take like sanctions. I mean, there's only so much we can do with sanctions. We need Europe to do it. Look at the problem we've got in Iran right now. And so if we want to make our sanctions on Russia have teeth, we need Europe to join in that and not do the Nord Stream pipeline. And a few fundamental things like that. So you've both mentioned energy a number of times. So what, this is obviously a tool, some leverage that Russia holds over Europe. What should we be doing to lessen the power of the energy leverage that Russia holds over Europe? Well, first of all, it's insidious to me that former Chancellor Schroeder is like chairman of the Nord Stream Pipeline Consortium. And fortunately, a little bit of pressure recently has gotten Merkel to back off of her support of the pipeline. But that would be a much more advance in Russia's ability to dominate energy in Europe, Eastern Europe and even Central Europe if they could put that in. There's a pipeline coming from Denmark under sea to Poland. That will help. There's a possibility. And say more about where that energy comes from. That come from Norway. Yeah. They've still got a lot of oil in the North Sea. The other one that is, there's talk about building a second trans-Kalkekas pipeline from Baku to Tbilisi, serve Georgia and then go on down to Sehan. And Russia keeps talking everybody out of it. I think that's nonsense. I think we ought to be supporting that openly. And then we need to make sure that we get enough pipeline capacity into the Ukraine. This is some of the Ukraine people were talking about the other day because they don't want to get stranded as these new lines bypass the Ukraine. So we've got a lot of complicated issues, but they all come down to getting alternate energy that's not Russian into Europe and giving them the confidence that they can go it alone. And LNG has a role in that. You've got a lot of LNG right there in Qatar that can come right up the Red Sea to Turkey. Yeah. And that's a great strength for the U.S. right now. We're an energy producer and we can do more. We had a hearing recently on our subcommittee on trade and nonproliferation and terrorism in our committee dealing with LNG and oil and our ability to export that and have more influence that way, help our own economy, and also be providing diversity in the energy alternatives in Europe. Just to give you one example of how that affects some of the other strategies, even though I think Russia is doing it more for their own economy, which is in great difficulty now anyways. But one of the areas that it would affect would be Ukraine. Ukraine really has functions on its ability to be the middleman on many of these energy deals. If the pipeline comes through and expands, Roadstream 2's, if that thing expands, they're getting cut out further and further and further. It's also hurting their economy. So Russia understands the effects of these things and will use economic means in a cruel way sometimes with people in a very strong and harsh way. And that threat that has occurred before still remains with a lot of our allies. So we've got to take a multifaceted approach, make sure we're exporting and make sure we're doing all we can so the production's diversified, take strong stands so they will not having Russia exert continued influence in that regard. And make sure, when there's countries that are really striving hard to become more democratic and more part of the West like Ukraine, make sure they're not hurt directly. So you're not combining their aggressive tactics over land militarily with enormous economic pressure. So this seems like a critical issue, the balancing Russian aggression with energy security. And you've both outlined specific issues that we should be pushing. Because the third one, too, Nancy, if I could put in that, and it's obvious, we also have to be sensitive to these countries energy needs themselves. That's right. The energy security needs. I mean, we have to balance that as well. These are our allies. They're sovereign countries. They're moving forward themselves. So we're balancing that as a factor as well. And what's the congressional role in this critical issue? Well, I think that we certainly need to be in the game on what they do with the Nord Stream pipeline and the Transcaucacus pipeline. We can have a voice in that. We need to be watching the change in relationships with Saudi Arabia and Russia. I mean, look at just recently, and our committee has a lot to say in how the United States responds to this tectonic shift bred in part by our energy independence of now. Saudi and Russia have been basically controlling the price of oil and trying to keep it propped up. Just in the paper today, they said they've been unable to do that. That's a new historic alignment. And it offers some opportunities for us, but some risks as well. Also in the diplomatic side, we have to create a greater transatlantic alliance with our counterparts, with members of parliament in these countries as well. There's so much going on politically there, as well as globally and here, where you're getting a situation where the separatist area. I think I was concerned when our new German ambassador started to issue comments about which side of the ledger their own countries should, whether it should be more conservative parties or not. I think we have to be careful in our role there, that we keep things at a diplomatic level and not use those people that we send for that purpose there to be more divisive. So we have to control ourselves, be as consistent as possible, have resolve, but Congress plays a great role because more and more we're seeing members of parliament from our allies over here, we're going over there. Honestly, I would like to change the direction already and I'm working on it with allies there and with members of parliament and leaders there, even with President Macron when he was here and his delegation. I think we should try and create, you know, take the embers of what was TTIP, the transatlantic trade and partnership agreement, and revive that. Instead of playing defense all the time, we really have an opportunity, if we can work together, to have that kind of free trade agreement with the European Union and we could have a side agreement with the U.K., but we could do these things and then we're dealing from strength. So one of the roles Congress has, and I believe and I've worked on and members of our committee have worked on and a separate TTIP caucus has worked on, bipartisan caucus, is to take the offensive to say, hey, we should have a free trade agreement. That's why these tariffs and these other issues are disconcerting, but they're not fatal. We should be moving in the exact opposite direction. But in the framework of strength and in the alliance. And both of our economies, this is, in my view, a free trade agreement with the European Union and with the United States is a win-win situation. And then you have people, countries with shared values, the things we talked about, the rule of law, protection of intellectual properties. The fact that workers should be, you know, given the great remuneration for their work, environmental issues, all those things we share together. And if we work together and put this agreement, we'd have about half of the world's GDP. And then we're actually able to influence countries like Russia or China from strength. So Congress will play a great role, I think. But I honestly felt that if the TPP wasn't in front of the TTIP, the European Union and the U.S. Free Trade Agreement, this great support, this great bipartisan support for the European Union-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. And Congress will play, I think, a role in reviving that and strengthening it. Yeah, it would be helpful if some of the proposals that are being pushed forward now to get Congress back in the game on approving trade relationships, trade treaties, things like that. You know, our constitutional powers have suffered severely over the years. You know, Arthur Schlesinger wrote a book in 1973 called The Imperial Presidency, be moaning how powerful the executive had become and look what's happened since 1973. So let's pay attention to some of these bills like they've been proposed to get the Congress back in Section 301 and some of the trade disputes. Yeah, and I also think, at least I can say this, I'm concerned with the use of our security powers in terms of imposing tariffs. I don't think that aligns. It does make sense. Did I say that diplomatically, Anna? Well, you could argue, you could argue we're creating security problems, not- Exactly. So trade, energy, economics, you also both have mentioned democracy in the way that democracy is being undermined in many parts of Europe by Russian aggression. What should our role be in that? How can we counter that, address that, support our allies? Well, that might be an area where you really can play a direct role with your convening power and with pep partnering with things like IRI and the Democrat, one of those who's an acronym, I forget. You know, that's what the Ukrainians and Georgians and Poles want. They want to be tied to us and to be supported in their efforts. And the more we can teach them, the more we can bring them up, like Konchviki said, bring them over here and we go there, the more interchange we can have, I think, the better. Yeah, one of the things we're getting feedback from and have for the last few years has been they don't think we've been strong enough, they being our Baltic allies, they don't think we've been strong enough in terms of communication. They were complaining to us that they're getting all kinds of information and propaganda from Russia and it's not being countered as effectively. Our committee's been working on global broadcasting and more use of social media to deal with this and get to, you know, a democratic message forward, but I still think we have work to do in that regard. And the feedback that I've been getting from our allies in that area, we have to step that game up as well. But it's something that the committee has been working on to fund and to promote. We're having later this week a roundtable on Russian cyber aggression downstairs in our peace tech accelerator. This of course is something that has dominated a lot of the news over the last several years. And you just mentioned that the committee has been active. Can you say a bit more about the ways in which you see, I mean, cyber has become one of these all-encompassing, slightly mysterious realms of concern. Well, it runs a broad gamut from digital ads to some very Stuxnet kind of penetration software. So some of the best stuff you really can't talk about too much, but clearly exposing digital ads and seeing what they've been able to do in Italy and in Germany would be helpful as well as here. I think in some of the cyber activity, we're seeing our legal system go ahead. I mean, we're prosecuting individuals for the Yahoo issue. We're actually moving ahead legally. That's important for us to do to the extent that we can. And then we have to, again, getting back to the theme of a strengthened West, dealing with a cyber issue in the way that they're used for corrupt business practices, but also for, you know, affecting our democracies. We're stronger working together. And so again, we have to promote a much better coalition dealing with it. Because particularly from our side, that'll include the private side as well. Congress has been well celebrated on TV when we've had some of the witnesses in from the social media companies in front of Congress trying to hold their feet to the fire. We have to continue to work. They're part of the solution as well. It's something government itself cannot control. We can influence and we can do things that are in our realm. But we do need the help of private companies. And we have to be careful too that we don't go so far as hurting our own domestic companies and creating greater marketing opportunities for other countries with businesses. So I want to throw it open to the audience for questions. So I know we have a lot of people here with a lot of expertise on their own. We have some mic runners. I'll take two to three questions. If you just want to raise your hand, we'll pass a mic to you. And let's start right here. You've got a mic coming to you. Hi, my name's Ty Miller. I'm an intern at the Osgoode Center for International Studies and a master's student in Russian. And I spent last summer in Russia. And I was recently at a talk hearing from Russian opposition perspectives. And then one question I have for you guys is one common theme on people in Russia who oppose the Putin regime is they're also, they support the country. And they feel like there's a big difference between separating Russia and then separating from Putin. Because it's like Putin and then 100 people around him that's essentially around the country versus 140 million people. And how do you, is there a way that, because they constantly feel demonized and I'm not supporting the Russian view, but it's just giving their perspective. It's like they show me a map and they say, oh, there's bases around us. And your military is moving closer and closer. So is there a way that you can isolate the Russian regime and the Putin specifically versus demonizing the entire country? Because at the talk I went to last week, they were saying that the more Russia is demonized in the West, it increases Putin's popularity there. Because he can use the propaganda to say that everyone hates us and I'm the only one that will save us. Okay, let's see if we've got any other, yeah, back next to Bill. Thank you. My name is Marina Mansour from the State Department. And I wanted to ask about what Congress thinks is the right thing to do in terms of the Russian narrative that is very prominent throughout the Middle East. Russia is really, you know, when you turn on an Arabic channel, the only narrative you hear is the Russian narrative. For instance, with the strikes and retaliation for the chemical attacks, they were saying that, oh, you know, 90% of US missiles were shot down and we got two of the missiles and we're going to reverse engineer these Tomahawk missiles. But that was the only narrative. There was no American narrative in the Arabic media. What can we do to fix that? So, two small little questions. Two very simple. No, but two very simple questions. You know, the traditional way that we've been successful, like in Eastern Europe, is by things like VOA, Radio Free Europe, things like that, and democracy promotion language that we can put out to counter that narrative. I mean, Putin's making us the big bad villain is the oldest trick in the book. It's up to us to put ourselves on the map and get information into Russia the same way we're doing it in Iran right now. In fact, I think there's an analogy to Iran with what you're saying there, that the people are not necessarily all the government. And we have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time and build up the people and let them know that when things change, and they will change, that the United States is not a hostile partner, or is not a hostile force, but is a partner for them if they want to do the right thing. That's part of it. We should do the same thing in Arabic, you know, just like we're broadcasting in Farsi. If we don't get our message out, the other guy gets their message out. So I'm sorry to hear that. I know we're successful in Iran, where they have 70% markets here. What if we had that in Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and everywhere else? Yeah. So they shot down our missiles about the same time that Kim won the World Cup, right? Yeah. Got it. Look, they play by different rules. I mean, look at the Malaysian, the downing of the Malaysian aircraft. I would imagine still the people in Russia believe that we might have been responsible for that right now because of the way they control their news media. And the judgment we have, whether it's successful or not, is not whether we think we are. When we hear from Latvia, we hear from other countries and saying, we're not even close to what we're getting, you know, from Russia and what our people are subjected to, then we have to step up our game. We have that ability. In terms of the Russian people, you're absolutely right. And it's an important distinction to make. It's pretty tough to be in opposition to the government in Russia. You know, and if you organize that, you disappear, or you're in prison, or your family's threatened. And, you know, and if you leave the country and you're engaged in activities, such was the case in Britain, you could even get poisoned. So I mean, this is hardball, and it's very hard. It was very hard. I went to Russia just prior to the winter games in Sochi, and the way they were controlling things, the way they were trying to deal with anyone that had counter-views that put people so far out, they might as well have been in another country that were going to protest if they were going to protest at all, the way they cracked down on issues of sexual orientation and what you could do very different. We have to see, we have to remember how tough it is there, and remember that the Russian people don't necessarily support what Putin is doing. They're suffering and living through the consequences economically and in terms of their own personal liberties of doing that. So any ideas that, you know, just coming back, how we can better connect with the Russian people themselves, that's important. And it's a great reminder to people like myself, and when we talk about Russia, to always try and make a distinction between the Russian leadership and the Russian people themselves. So I'll bear that in mind more and more as I speak. Thank you. This, of course, harkens back to the Cold War days when people-to-people initiatives were very active. In fact, I would argue that work that was done laid the groundwork for when the government's change in the Warsaw Pact fell that they knew where to turn and look what's flourishing Croatia, Slovenia, et cetera. Yeah, the other issue, Nancy, that we didn't deal with are nonproforation issues and things. Russia is just moving away and just, you know, breaking the agreements we have on nonproforation. Now, part of the U.S. response is to build a greater strategic nuclear arsenal, too. My own opinion is we should really look at where the greatest effectiveness is, not that we don't have to step up our game on some weapons issues. But honestly, some of the things we're talking about here, some of that money would be better served trying to build those bridges and to have greater ability to forge economic and diplomatic ties. And one of our concerns that I think almost everyone on the Foreign Affairs Committee shares is the hollowing out of the State Department that has occurred and how difficult, whether it's in the Middle East, whether it's in Europe or Asia, how difficult that's going to make our job because the State Department isn't at the strength it should be. And that's going to hurt us. It's going to hurt us and our ability to resolve conflicts before they increase. And it's going to hurt our information flow in so that we have a better understanding of what's coming down the road. And that's a real issue. It might sound like a bureaucratic issue. It has substance to it. And we have to do more in making sure our State Department is staffed that way. I'd be interested, some of you from the State Department, I've been hearing from some senior old friends of mine that the morale is starting to improve a little bit. Is that the case? It's pretty bad for a while. Well, I agree with what Congressman Keating said. We have to have a vibrant and active deployment of soft power diplomacy around the world, engagement with countries through our ambassadors and through our geographic divisions in the State Department. It's really sad to see seven of the top nine jobs vacant. Hopefully we'll get that fixed. And you, of course, experienced that firsthand in your years as an ambassador. Well, hearkening back to what Congressman Keating said about General Mattis, you know that it's diplomacy that's supposed to solve the problem and military deterrence supposed to be the elephant in the room that you hope never comes out. That's when it works best. Other questions? Let's go here, Danielle. And then we'll just pass it next. Good morning. I'm Ron Glass. I was Director for the Office of Democratic Initiatives with USAID in Moscow. Charles North was my boss. When we got shut down, I call it catastrophic success in that period. But the question is whole of government. In various missions we've seen there's been a compartmentalization starting with probably budget in Washington. You have institutions like INL, AID, everyone fighting for limited budgets. I was just wondering if you had any thoughts on how to get to concerted, coherent coordination, and especially with these difficult issues in Europe, probably more important than ever. And then just pass it right next to you. Hello. My name's Christina Pendergrast. I'm an intern with the Oskar Center. And I was wondering if we could talk a little bit about Russia's influence in our own backyard, namely with Venezuela and the regime there. Given how much infrastructure Venezuela has within the United States, with the sit-go and oil and things like that, is the Russian influence there beginning to be of some concern to Congress itself? And if so, what are the plans to address that? Thank you. And there was one more question, let's see, way in the back. I'm representing the Joint Baltic American National Committee. And to my understanding, Congress wants to get involved and help the alliance in the Baltic region. And my question is, what is the criteria for judging the effectiveness of U.S. involvement in those states and other states like Poland and Ukraine? Budget coherence, Baltics, and Venezuela. Let me take a stab at Venezuela. It's kind of more about that part of the world. You hit a really good point. You know, it's both Iranians and Russians. And the amount of air traffic going in and out of Caracas and Lava Hurra to Iran and Russia is kind of like the New York-Washington shuttle. And no one seems to recognize that in a lot of its cargo. There are Russians deployed all over Venezuela as there are Iranians, also in Nicaragua. And one of the biggest fears is if AMLO wins in Mexico, you'll have the opportunity for Russia to re-engage in Mexico as what they consider a historical base of their intelligence apparatus. So I think we need to be vigilant in watching that. I think that's why I was against the NICO Act in Nicaragua because regardless of how bad Daniel Ortega is, he's leaving the private sector alone. The country is stable and we get a lot of information that way. And he will pass too. He may pass sooner than he thinks. But the bottom line is destabilized countries are fertile Petri dishes for Russia. I guess in the Baltic area there's certainly a concern. There's an internal concern in the whole region and in Europe actually if you broaden it with the fact that the separatist movement and what things are going on, whether or not we're going to be left with alternatives of conservative or more conservative types of government, these are all issues that I think we can influence. We don't have control over. But certainly the one thing I think is relevant there but everywhere right now is the U.S. has to be more direct and clear about where it's coming from. And I can go back another administration to it and say the same thing. And we have to have a resolve. I think there's a fear in that part of the world where the U.S. will get involved and then will they be there later on? And I think we have to make sure we have great, show great resolve in everything we're doing. It's clearly the case in Asia and the Middle East as well. So I think part of that has to be demonstrating that and making it clear as well. In terms of the bureaucracy, Secretary Tillerson testified in front of our committee. He was trying to deal with it. Even people that advocate greater funding said there are areas in the bureaucracy, assistance to assistance. There are certain assistant positions perhaps that aren't necessary that way. They might create greater walls. People that I know that have gone from working on the hill into state sometimes say it gets so frustrating because everything's so compartmentalized that they feel like they're closed in and don't have the ability to do that. That would be a great thing to try and break down some of those walls and deal with it. That should not be, however, an excuse used to not fund properly our state department because I think the two things are separate issues. It's not an excuse to say, well, it's so bureaucratic we can cut. I don't think the people that we're paying, career people, many of them, their value is incredible. And you just can't shuffle in and out. And I'm really concerned, as people leave, that we're going to get qualified people with that kind of experience staying there. I don't think it's the case yet. Secretary Mattis told the same group I talked with that he's very impressed that everywhere he goes, there's people there, they know what they're doing, their experience, they're qualified. But we have to look down the road beyond that. So you raise an important issue, but I would make it very distinct that there are walls that can be broken down, but that's just not an excuse to say, well, we've now consolidated things so we can save money. I would also... I was going to say, you know, I'm a CEO, right? I haven't been in the political game very long, really probably not right now. Rex came in, and I know Rex pretty well, we have a joint venture with him in Columbia. He did the reorganization proposal of the way you do it in a corporation. You hire McKenzie or Booz Allen, they write up a nice big report, you get your two or three top trusted people to go execute it. That's just the opposite of what he should have done in the State Department. Pick people in every bureau, every geographic office, get somebody to be the consultant, if you will, and build a consensus from bottom up. Then there's some ways that you can maybe change some of the bureaus to bring them more in line with the geographic organization. I've heard that there's some competition there that's created some silos, you know? There's always improvement, but in something like a government bureau, I think to improve, you've got to improve from within. I would also commend to you the Fragile State Study Group report that USIP did with Carnegie and Center for New American Security, because I think it goes beyond the State Department. It goes into having a shared understanding of what it is we're trying to accomplish and the role that I think you both have alluded to, the role that democracy fundamentally plays, is it a government that cares about its people and has the ability to take care of them? And that's not always a shared understanding of what is the heart of the problem that then spawns all these other aspects. I want to get one more question in. I'm going to use prerogative of the chair here. We haven't really talked so much about the relationship between some of the Russian activities and the rise of these authoritarian nationalist governments in Europe, which is a related concern to a lot of what we've already discussed. How are you thinking about that in the committee? What can and should we be doing? Well, it certainly exploited the migrant issue in Italy and in Germany and everywhere else. We definitely need to bring visibility to that and support the countries that seem to try to solve it in a humane manner. I like the idea of France and Italy moving to have some effort to keep people in Eritrea and get them jobs there and train them up there rather than have them get on a boat and risk their life, that kind of stuff. And of course today is World Refugee Day. Yeah, it's fitting. So the migrant thing is part of it and the other things that we talked about are a big part of it with the cyber. But especially since if we seek to strengthen the alliance, if we're losing the alliance from the rise of these authoritarian regimes, that of course further complicates the solution. And I think too that just as the question surfaced around the Russian people, do you remember the way Russia is really being run through oligarchs and through the profiting of billionaires and billionaires that are actually controlling much of what Russian policy is? And they will look at very right targets around the world, in Europe in particular, where if there's any corruption that's there, if there's anything that they can take advantage of from a business perspective, that they will do it. And certainly, you know, you've seen authoritarian, you saw Yanukovych in Ukraine, you saw some of these people put into positions where they really represent protecting the interests of oligarchs doing business in many of these countries. And that makes Russia, I think, a bit unique. But they thrive on those authoritarian type of governments because part of what makes them go is the fact that they're driven by the profit-making of Putin and the oligarchs. And they thrive on this. So I think there's a business side to their policymaking that's kind of unique in trying to create these authoritarian regimes because if it is built that way, when one person has that much influence, it's easier to corrupt, it's easier to profit and do business as well. So there's that aspect of it, I think, as well. Yeah, it's a good point. You know, in a sense, they never really instituted capitalism in Russia. It's basically a group of Putin's friends got ahold of all the companies, and that's the way it is now. But I understand it's been more diffused now. So you could almost make an argument that the Chinese are more entrepreneurial and capitalist right now than the Russians. So you got to face it. You basically have authoritarian monolith, as Congressman Keating said, that transcends the government and goes through all areas of business. You remember that book by Bill Browder about his effort to start a hedge fund and burn red notice? What's the name? Well, we are just about out of time. I want to thank both of you for coming and see if you have any final thoughts you'd like to leave us with on the issue, on the way that your committee is attacking this issue and working together to do so. Well, I want to end with a little optimism that I mentioned before. We always appreciate that. And truly, the U.S. is in a great position. Our allies are still there working with us, although these are tough times. So we have to go away realizing that we do have the ability to exert enormous influence for democracy, for rising, you know, levels of living, you know, the rate of living in many of these places and paying people well. And we should be a model, because if you go around the rest of the world, and away from Europe and away from Russia, there's a huge, massive number of young people that are beyond hope of any kind of economic well-being, anything in their lives. They're incubators for disruption, extremism, and the things we're fighting. We should look at our alliances in the West and use that as a model and then be able to exert that power economically around the world to help these other areas of the world. It's all connected. And if we can't succeed in Europe, if we can't succeed on the front of the Russian activities in Europe together with our allies, we will never be successful in these other parts of the world. So there's a great incentive for us to show that strength together and work together. And I want to leave people with this thought. There's a great opportunity. It makes sense on both sides of the Atlantic to be dealing with this. And I believe when something makes sense like that, it's ripe for becoming really accomplished. Yeah, I'm going to be an optimist. I don't think our 240-something years of shared values with Europe, I think those are going to withstand some of the things that have been put in play recently. And we'll have the opportunity to continue to work together with our European partners to deal with other parts of the world. The comment about separation of the people from the government is a really good one. You know, we have opportunity... You go back to Yugoslavia and the Balkans, it worked there, and the Daytona Courts have held. And so now I think we need to kind of play for the long ball in some of these countries, support what we can, and have the patience to be ready to have the people want to come to democracy when they have the opportunity. And if we can do that and have the patience, which is not always an American trade, then I think we can win the game. I want to thank you both, Congressman Keating, Congressman Rooney. This has been a thoughtful conversation. We really appreciate both your leadership on the Hill, your thoughtfulness and optimism that you are leaving us with. Please join me in thanking our two speakers today.