 Good afternoon, everyone. It's my pleasure to welcome you to this conversation with the Prime Minister of Jordan. It is certainly I don't need to spend any time reminding everyone of the urgency and stakes of the conversation we're going to have today and the issues we're going to address. Nor am I going to spend time going over your long and distinguished record in both domestic and foreign policy so we can get right to the substance. I'm Dan Kurtz-Falen. I'm the editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine in New York and so it will be no one's surprise that I'm going to start with the war on Gaza, certainly the thing front of mind for many of us. Your government was, I believe, the first in the region to support South Africa's case at the ICJ. You've been very outspoken. The King has been very outspoken on the need for a ceasefire in Gaza. But I think it's worth stepping back a bit in trying to get a sense of Israeli objectives and how that fits with this growing call and the first ceasefire in the growing humanitarian toll. I'd be very interested in your assessment of what Israel's objectives are in Gaza at this point. Do you see depopulation as a real threat? You've certainly heard that from ministers. Do you, you know, are we going to be here next year and be talking about an Israeli occupation of Gaza or is there some path to a ceasefire that averts that outcome? Thank you so much, Daniel. And it's both a pleasure, a privilege and honor to be speaking here and to be addressing, among other things, the pressing issue of the continued atrocities that we see committed in Gaza and the continuation of those atrocities that have led today in the death of around 20,000 people, the injury of around 50,000 people, plus and the missing of around 70,000 people. And the prospects and possibilities as this, and hopefully it will not continue, basically expanding beyond the limits of Israel-Gaza and generating reverberations in other hotspots. And what concerns us mainly in Jordan is, among other things, the possibility and the escalations and transgressions that we see in the West Bank, whether in the form of increased settlers' violence, which has been consistently condemned by the international community, and which is something that's extremely alarming or in the context of transgressions on the Muslim and Christian holy sites that His Majesty the King of Jordan is the custodian of and that are subjected to guarantees that are accorded by the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and the existing legal and historic status code that needs to be observed. But going back a little bit, I need to tell you that we cannot today, after the lapse of 101 days from this military operation and aggression that Israel has embarked upon in Gaza, we cannot today at all subscribe as we have from day one, that this is an aggression operation that operates in the context of self-defense as we all understand it. Self-defense in customary international law is a response to an action that is instant, overwhelming, that needs no choice or means or a moment for deliberation and that has to be always conditioned by the two requisites of proportionality and necessity. And clearly, in the context of this, of those principles of customary international law that are entrenched in the Caroline case, all of this criteria is not something that's met by the Israeli reaction that has crossed all those boundaries and that have regrettably probably delved into elements of definitions contained in the Geneva Conventions about war crimes, about crimes against humanity, and even arguably in many instances in cases if intent is shown in the context of actions that could lead to an act of genocide. You've mentioned our support to the case that was brought about by South Africa. I need to basically tell you that basically what we said to just be clear, we said that when and if the International Court of Justice decides to look into the merits of the case, the merits of the case, what the court does procedurely is that it invites member states to basically participate, willing member states to participate in the submission of written submissions and then oral submissions. And when and if the court decides to basically look into those merits, certainly Jordan will participate in those hearings, oral and written and will present its positions and observations vis-à-vis the merits of the case. Towards the beginning, it was very, very alarming what we saw. We saw a pattern that fundamentally was pointing in the direction of the generation of conditions of creating mass expulsion of the Gazans from Gaza outside the borders of Gaza. And similarly, the escalation of tensions and settler transgressions in the West Bank and the Israeli incursions into towns in the West Bank also was pointing to something that resembled what we feared was a policy that was embraced to embark exactly on that, which is either forced expulsion, forced mass expulsion, or the creation of conditions that would lead theoretically to a voluntary departure, but fundamentally about creating living conditions for the Gazans and Palestinians that are impossible to cope with and deal with as a result of the absence of basic services, as a result of the constant fear of their lives, as a result of the constant bombardment that's indiscriminate, that does not separate between civilians, between medical facilities, not allowing humanitarian assistance and aid to come in, not according to the protections for the insinia that is recognized by international law, international human humanitarian law as sites that needs to be protected, to the extent that the UN and UN staff that lost their lives in Gaza are larger than the loss of life of UN staff that occurred anywhere in the world, previous to that point in time. We saw those patterns, and those patterns definitely were not assisted at all by the rhetoric that came from some of the ministers in the Israeli government in the form of saying that the solution is to have the Palestinians and the Gazans deported to third countries voluntarily, or at some point in time to basically even toy with the irresponsible and abhorrent idea that maybe the solution is to use tactical nuclear weapons and on Gaza, which are things that we never stood for, we can never stand for those issues. And I think that we've managed to gather a lot of international support on those fronts. We clearly stated that for us, the creation of conditions of mass expulsion or conditions that would compel people to exercise theoretical voluntary expulsion that is at heart and in reality, a forced expulsion due to the lack of the basic requisites of leading a normal life is a material violation of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty 1994. I think that those positions, the positions that were also shared with our brothers in Egypt helped in shaping an international, official international position that is, that was quite vocal and I think steadfast in delivering to the Israeli government that those manifestations will not and are not to be tolerated. Today, it's essential and necessary to achieve yesterday a comprehensive ceasefire and to ensure the flow of humanitarian goods and medical supplies to the Gaza Strip, to the entirety of the Gaza Strip and its population north, south and to the medical facilities, the majority of which are fundamentally decommissioned as a result of the absence of staff and the lack of material that they can work with. From day one, His Majesty the King and Jordan have been quite active in attempting to streamline international assistance that goes into Gaza in a sustained and sustainable way and have been arguing that this is something that we need to basically do and we need to have the international community aligned on and the King hosted a meeting for international agencies, humanitarian agencies in Amman that led to an improvement in the flow of humanitarian goods and humanitarian assistance and now we have basically an alternative, albeit a trickle of convoys that fundamentally go through the King Hussain Bridge, the West Bank and then to Karim Abu Salim and cross into Gaza and also we were very active in conducting airdrops using the Jordanian armed forces to provide medical supplies for our two hospitals operating in Gaza in the north in Tullehawah and in the south in Khan Yunis and we've conducted the joint operations on that front to for humanitarian goods in tandem with France and prior to that in tandem with Qatar and with the UAE but again today what goes in is a trickle. It's not more than 10% of what the actual needs of the Gaza Strip and the Gazans is and are. We need to focus in getting in place a ceasefire and a ceasefire immediately that would then pave the way for a sustained or prior to that, a sustained flow, continued and sustained flow of humanitarian aid and assistance that's needed to Gazans and then we need to stray off and I think that basically what happened on the 7th of October and thereafter would serve as a wake-up call. We need to basically move beyond the line of thinking that says that the day after has to be about management in and off Gaza because the definition of insanity frankly speaking as was put once historically is to attempt to do the same thing under the same or similar circumstances repeatedly and then expect different results. As a result of being locked into a management mode that looks at Gaza alone in separation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem being the territorial scope of the prospective Palestinian state, you will always end up in interruptions that are temporary in nature of violence and then the outbreak of violence and hostility that is much, much deeper and more far reaching in complicating consequences than the cycle that preceded it. Today if we attempt to embark on something that attempts at looking at the management aspect only it will not work. I don't think that any Palestinian interlocutor will be able to come in in the context of a model that is presented that looks at management alone. I don't think that there would be an Arab element that can come in absent the existence of a broader plan that contains a clear path and political horizon that is benchmarked, that is timelineed, that identifies the end game as a two-state solution in the crystallization of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and with collective Arab guarantees for the legitimate Israeli concerns on the front of security and protecting Israel's security and integrating it to be part of the region rather than as a country that's just geographically located in the region. At the core of all those issues, we're always reminded that no matter how hard you try with other peace treaties and peace agreements, if you don't resolve the core of the issue, which is the Palestinian issue, it will always act as something that's disruptive to those other agreements and treaties and will definitely not allow the region to take a leap into tapping into the full potential that can be accorded and afforded as a result of a state of comprehensive peace and always drag you back into weakening the premise of those agreements that don't address the core of the issues and will endanger regional stability, give credence and credibility to the tractors, and we have many of them in the region, and give ascendancy to the counter campaign that says that the solution is in using and deploying military violence to achieve the objectives of Palestinian self-determination, which is an argument that I hate to say is oftentimes validated by weakening the Palestinian partner that was committed to the process of dialogue in the middle of the process and by the Arab governments and countries that have basically identified peace as their strategic objective, whether it be at Jordan or Egypt or the United Arab Emirates or the PLO in the context of the Oslo Accords. Let me press you on two aspects of this quickly. First, you mentioned the 1994 Accord between Jordan and Israel. Given events of the last few months, is there a fundamental rethinking of your relationship with Israel, given what's going on? What would it take to push you towards some kind of break in relations? I know there have been certain steps so far, but what might happen? Let me clarify something that I think needs clarification in general, but I think that has been reiterated in word and indeed in the attitudes and approaches of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, even when the advocacy of peace in the region was not that popular. Jordan's strategic choice was to achieve comprehensive peace, peace that sees a closure to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is at the heart of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. This remains to be Jordan's objective today, but it requires always serious partners to tango with on achieving those objectives. For the past 10 years, and I know that you're an expert on matters of foreign policy and foreign affairs, at least for the past 10 years, His Majesty the King has been rightly arguing that the absence of a credible process and a political horizon that fundamentally takes us to crossing the finish line on the front of materializing the two-state solution will always give credence and strengthen the counter-narrative and the counter-cam that sees violence as the way and that does not basically see any value in peaceful cooperation, region cooperation, peaceful coexistence, and achieving a historic closure. We remain to be firmly committed to comprehensive peace. We remain to be firmly committed to our side of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement and peace accords. We will react in the event that there are certain material violations to the provisions and codes that are contained in the peace treaty, but... We're referring to Jerusalem specifically. But we will react when there are infringements that attempt really and clearly at changing the historic and legal status quo in and around the Islamic and Christian holy sites, including the Haram Al-Sharif, and also in the event that there are things that... There are actions and conditions that attempt at generating and creating mass displacement of population, because this is a clear violation, again, of Article 2 of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. And this not only attempts to basically dilute the prospects and endanger the prospects of arriving at the two-state solution, but also it poses existential threats to the Hashemite from Jordan that we will have to react to in that context. And we hope that we never arrive at that point in that junction because we are firmly committed to comprehensive peace. And I think that we have basically always coupled word deed and action on that front. Just prior to the events of the October 7th, we were locked in a serious discussion about regional projects that involved the exchange of energy for water, a clean energy from the Jordanian side for desalinated water from Israel. Today, under the existing conditions, it's quite inconceivable for any Jordanian minister to just sit on a podium and have that type of interaction and transaction with an Israeli counterpart. As regrettable as it is, it's a fact of life. The horrific scenes that are on the screens day in, day out, hour in, hour out of the carnage that is wrecked on Gaza by the indiscriminate targeting of civilians, the majority of which are children and women, is something that renders that not implementable under the existing circumstances. That's why there has to be an end to this madness and a ceasefire and the ceasefire that then attaches to a context and a political plan that is different from previous attempts. There is benchmarked timeline with deliverables identifying upfront that the objective is the materialization of a Palestinian state and then reverse engineering how we get to that objective within a clear and defined timeline. Otherwise, if we continue in this vicious cycle, trust me, the next cycle of violence will be worse. The longer that this lasts, the more prospects we have that would endanger regional peace and stability and security, and it would give basically a way for other agendas that are exogenous in nature inherently to association with the legitimate Palestinian grievances. But they use those grievances to advance their own agendas. It's a free reign. The Houthis being an example of that perhaps? It's a free reign. As long as you have those scenes on television, as long as this aggression and as long as this carnage continues, all and many regional players will basically be able to fundamentally take action and package that action in the context of a solidarity that may exist and may be in the service of other objectives. We don't know. And then turning to the other partner in question here, the Palestinian partner, what do you see as the right formula for the Palestinian leadership both in Gaza and more broadly going forward? Is the PA a viable path there? Is President Abbas up to it? Do you see the right proposals for a renewed PLO with some Hamas participation? What do you see as the right solution there? Obviously, Daniel, I cannot speak on behalf of our Palestinian brethren. I can only basically say that ordering and reordering and organizing the internal Palestinian house is a Palestinian prerogative. I can basically tell you that repeatedly we were told by our Palestinian brothers that they're willing to basically embark on a course of action that rejuvenates the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, and embark on governance structures that are similar to the point in time when even the ad hoc liaison committee that was headed by the Norwegians labeled the Palestinian institutions back then, and that was more than 10 years ago, as fundamentally ready for statehood, but then not treating them as full partners by some of the Israeli governments and being locked into domestic political calculations in Israel led to the weakening of those institutions aggressively took us to that point in time. Today, we're hearing from our Palestinian brothers that they're ready to basically embark on this rejuvenation and better governance of the structures of the Palestinian Authority in general, PLO and Fatih and the border Palestinian political spectrum, but we fully agree that this has to be attached to a right context that sets them up for success rather than setting them up for failure, and the main requisites for setting them up for success is a collaborative effort with the decisions makers and the government of Israel. They cannot expect them to basically function and operate efficiently and effectively if they would hold the returns of taxes that they need to give to them so that they can pay salaries to their security apparatuses, to their administrative structures, to their utility institutions that provide services to a functioning apparatus that can fundamentally shepherd them into statehood. And additionally, you have to exercise definitely restraint that does not undermine them politically by desisting from continuing those unilateral actions of incursions into areas that are theoretically under their security control, giving them and ceding to them areas that are in the context of what our areas see within the context of the previous Oslo Accords and enabling them and empowering them to basically govern in the West Bank and in Gaza and in East Jerusalem with the necessary requisites of success, which requires a lot of discipline and commitment on the part of the Israelis to stop those unilateral measures that undermine them politically and to deprive them from the financial means and the needs that they require to run and efficient and effective apparatus. One minute on the region before we turn to more domestic issues. When you look at the risks of regional escalation, what worries you the most? Everywhere, you have flashpoints today in the West Bank and there are alarming and worrying. They're definitely being deepened by the unchecked settler violence that has become a daily manifestation. Frankly speaking, and with having a lot of the military apparatus in Israel and low enforcement organizations fundamentally turning a blind eye on, the unchecked and somewhat provocative settlement activity and eviction of Palestinian homes, the continued escalations on the northern Israeli border that have luckily not spiraled into something that's bigger so far as a result of restraint that I had not expected from some forces. Do you see any Iranian activity? And definitely I see activity of sub-state actors that are fundamentally using what's going on today in Gaza and its continuity as a rallying propaganda tool that is regrettably resonating with many level-headed individuals across many generations, including the younger generations. My main concern is that the continuation of this, of the horrific scenes that we see of carnage in Gaza, of murdered children, of mutilated bodies, is if it continues, it will create conditions that would deeper radicalize an entire generation on both sides of the divide, which in turn I think will fundamentally not only endanger regional stability, but will be definitely a thorn in the side of global international peace and stability and could give rise to all sorts of manifestations of things that are less of a high profile but would equal danger, including certain terrorist groups that are basically dormant today, like ISIS, like Al-Qaeda, and to have them morph into something that's uglier and more challenging. I want to close by shifting focus to domestic questions. If we've been having this conversation five months ago, we'd be talking about a moment of de-escalation in the region and a chance for a number of governments, including your own, to focus much more on issues of unemployment and development than the whole range of domestic issues that have certainly in the global conversation been lost given all of the regional turbulence in recent years. When you look at that aspect of your job and the agenda within Jordan, what are the priorities and what extent you see those as compromised or threatened by the risk of further escalation either in Israel or more regionally? Today, we are extremely focused on going ahead with ambitious comprehensive reform agenda that was launched by His Majesty the King in 2022, and that carries three tiers, a political component and tier, an economic modernization vision that aims or aimed at doubling the growth rate in Jordan over 10 years and creating one million jobs by the end of the 10 years, and an administrative reform track that aimed at streamlining and generating citizen-centric public sector that's also investor-friendly. And the executive implementation programs for those visions were launched in 2023. 2023, until the 7th of October economically, was an extremely, extremely promising year. Our performance in the sector of tourism surpassed what we used to benchmark against as the Gold Year Standard of 2019 was doing much better than that, and still year-to-year we're better than 2022. Similarly, up until the 7th of October, again, day-to-day there was an increase in foreign direct investment by around 300 million US dollars. The balance of payments was doing much better and our growth rate was possibly was reaching 2.8%. In the fourth quarter, tourism took a major hit, and other sectors certainly are still suffering. And with the developments in Bible-Mendib, the cost of international transport for freight fundamentally went up to around 160% of their original price prior to the 7th of October for the cargo that's imbued from Southeast Asia and 60 to 100% for the cargo that's imbued from Europe and from America. So it has generated a deviation and a challenge, but we're studying the course. We have embarked on leveling the playing field and enabling a conducive environment for foreign direct investment, and that being a key driver to achieve the objectives of the economic modernization vision. We are hoping that things will be back on track quite soon. We are working on that front to the extent possible with our partners. We are relentless in the pursuit of those objectives, and this is one of the reasons that also are moving us in the direction of pressing the need to basically normalize life in Jordan, despite the fact that we are geographically located in a war zone, that we are not currently in a war ourselves. The normal living conditions do exist in Jordan, and the economy has to basically continue performing and to perform well and to be on track so that we can increase our resilience. We have just three days ago successfully had an approval by the board of the IMF for a new extended fund facility program for Jordan for the next four years, and we have maintained, despite and against all odds, our sovereign ratings from the rating agencies, whether standard and poor, Moody's or Fitch, two of them has actually upgraded our outlook to stable, and one of them maintained to optimistic and one to stable, and I think that this is a testament to the economic policies of this country and the political positions are ones that are sound and that are principled, and I think that the fact that they are principled on the political side of the equation is what allows us to fundamentally press the point that what we see today in Gaza are nothing short of crimes. We were courageous in pointing on October 9th, in the context of the Arab League, collectively, that we're against the targeting of civilians anywhere, and this is what allows us fundamentally to correctly and strongly argue that what we see in Gaza is a protection and a double standard in applying a so-called rule-based international system, and it is if it continues endangering the argument that we need to preserve this rules-based international system that does not discriminate on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, religion, or political borders. When you look at Baba Amanda, do you see a solution other than did you support the U.S. strikes that we've seen in the last few days, or do you see another path to reopening the flow of goods there? If the conditions in Gaza and the aggression on Gaza had not continued, I don't think that we would have seen this manifestation increase. The principle of the freedom of navigation is one that needs to be safeguarded, but that has to be done in the context of international organizations, such as the UN, such as the Security Council, and not against the backdrop of a coalition of the willing that initially was constructed when ships of certain nationality were targeted. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you so much for joining us. I realize it's a very intense time for you, so we really appreciate your being here. Thank you so much, Daniel. It's a pleasure. And thank you for hosting me. Thank you. Thank you.