 On the U.S., or in general, are we all too complacent here? We are far too complacent, I think. But not so much on the macroeconomic front as on what we might call political economy front. We'll come back to talk about finance. I have some thoughts about that. But reacting to some of what you said, John, I agree with everything that you said on the macro level. But for my money, much of the discussion yesterday and today on the trade panel, with the exception of Mark Nolan's remarks, did not really take fully on board the situation we face in the U.S. with respect to the economy. On the macroeconomic front, things are going reasonably well. There is concern about real wage growth, about productivity growth, and also that for the middle 50 percent, net asset positions have actually deteriorated in the last 10 years, not improved, despite the improvement in the economy, which has important political implications as well. I guess what I want to try to get people who may not be focusing so much on it to understand is that a very large segment of the American administration, including in his heart of hearts, Donald Trump, does not believe in multilateralism, does not believe in global governance, does not believe in trade agreements, is of the view that the way to achieve American goals is by using American bargaining power bilaterally or unilaterally, rather than through international institutions. That may be of little importance in trade because most trade is bilateral, and many trade negotiations are bilateral, but it worries me when we start talking about the international monetary and financial system because by its very nature, international monetary and financial relations are multilateral or global in some sense. I think my concern is a political economy concern, which is that we don't know how the battles being fought out in the administration, between the administration and some members of Congress, what the business community are going to turn out, but it is not implausible that those who are inherently quite hostile to the current structure of international trade and investment and finance will win out. Your concern is that that could be disruptive at a macro level in terms of economic performance. I think it could be disruptive should we hit difficulties, and perhaps we'll come back to this. I think that one of the perhaps unheralded and perhaps unexpected successes of the last ten years was the extent of multilateral cooperation in the aftermath of the September, October 2008 crisis. Although there are people in the administration and in Washington who would like to carry that forward, there are also those who think that that was a bridge too far. I think that's what we've certainly seen that. That's another topic that we could take up later, but I think it's the overarching topic of the entire event, global governance, but my two cents on this is, of course, that the creation of the G20 at the leader's level was the principal institutional response to the economic crisis. In its initial meeting in November 2008, the G20 first of all anointed itself the primary venue for discussion and negotiation of economic and financial issues set four goals. One, the restoration of global growth, two, the repair and reform of the financial system, third, the prevention of new trade protection and the promotion of new trade liberalization, and fourth, the reform of the IFIs. In each case, there was an organizational assignment for carrying those out, the assignment for macroeconomic restoring macro growth, they created the so-called framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth, which is now the framework for strong sustainable balanced and inclusive, sorry, inclusive, there we are, I knew there was a buzzword in there, inclusive growth. That's an effort at which there is an organization at the deputy minister, deputy governor level that has done an enormous amount of work, and my guess is you've never heard of it or paid any attention, even though with every G20 summit there's a long thick document saying what every country is going to do, but the lack of political support means no one, even specialists, pays any attention. For reform of the financial system, they created or mandated, they created of the FSB, which has done a lot of real work, but I think you would say is incomplete, on trade it goes without saying, the principal goal was the endorsement of the completion of the Doha development round, which has now been abandoned, and IFI reform I think you generally would say is incomplete, so I would say the leaders, there was an institutional response for global governance, and I would say you would probably not view it as a rousing success, even though the G20 leaders process does continue.