 Yn dwi'n meddwl, mae'n ddechrau i'r cyflawni, a'r cyflawni'n 10 sgyn ar y cesennu. Felly, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Roeddwn i'n Robert Niblit ar gyfer Chatham House, sy'n gyflawni'r gweithio'r cyflawni, ac mae'n ddweud i'r cyflwyno'n meddwl y cesennu. Mae'n gweithio'n gweithio sy'n gweithio'n gweithio. Mae'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. Yn gweithio'n berthynas ar nesaf y bydol a'r parled, ac ar symud roseihist ar flmouth. Micwyr bobl yn dda yn tyfwyr unrhyws yn ffordd, rhoi'n sorig i gael, tan nesafor! Mae'n binyddaiRayster am oxygen i'rgweithio'r C motifohol Beautiful. Yn berthynas nod y Ch for honan o partnered mae'n rhaid i ddim yn gatheras, ond gen i'r RPM fydd iawn yn ddigon felli bydd yng nghyrch i weld y rathion fel ddyd. Ond ydym ni'n gweithio'n gweithio. Byddwn ni wedi gweld y gweithio. Mae'n rhaid i chi'n gweithio i'r ddweud. Sefyddi'r gwbl i ddweudio. A mynd i ddechrau yn gweithio'r gweithio. Yn y gweithio, rwy'n dweud, mae'n gofynio'n gweithio. Mae'n ddweud o'r rhesysgau面au a'r gweithio'n gweithio. Rydyn ni'n deall, mae'n gofyn, mae'n gweithio, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio, i'w hwn i'r clwsogwch'r iawn, ond ag ystod yn ystod yn cyffredinol yn cyfnod o'r ddweud hwnnw i'w bod o'r wych yn gyflawni'r gweithio'i amser. Yn oes, mae'r ysgol yn y ffordd yn y margyn nhw gan Llywodraeth, yma'r ysgol a'r amser yn ymgyrch chi ar y bai, yn dda'r momentau a'r ysgol. Nawr, mae hyn bydd yma, mae wedi cael ei ddweud yr oedd yn ymgyrchol. Felly mae'n cael ei ddweud am wneud i gyffredigol gynnig o'r panl eithaf. Rwy'n gweithio'r gweithio ddwylo'n gweithio unrhyw yma, ac mae'n gweithio'n gweithio i'r gweithio alsiwn. Rwy'n gweithio'n gweithio, mae'n gweithio'n gweithio 10 munud o'u gwneud a'r gweithio. A oedd yn ymgyrch chi'n gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio, Felly, mae'n cael ei ddwy i'r ddweud, yn ym mlynedd, mae hyn yn ymlaen i'r ddweud. Yn ymlaen, Graham Allison, Douglas Tillam Professorys, ym Mwyloedd ym Ysgol Llywodraeth, os ymgyrch, mae'n byw'r ddweud. Mae'r ddweud yn casu, dyflaen, yn gynghwyl, ysgrifennu Llywodraeth, ymddych chi'n gweithio, amdwych chi'n gweithio, ac mae'n gweithio i'r ddweud yn gweithio. is what I saw on the thing, and, of course, importantly, author of the very now-renowned book, A Destin for War, Can My America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap? Mohammed Chattibasri is the former finance minister of Indonesia, now chair and former chair of the investment coordinator committee, chair of PT Bank Madeiri, and also now chair of the pandemic fund, and is on the board of the Lee Kwan Yew School, which I think therefore we're going to call on you for that broader view, and Danny Kwa is here, of course, so that'll be fantastic to get your viewpoints. Jin Keiw, wonderful to have you with us, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics, author of the new China Playbook, Beyond Capitalism and Socialism, and advising lots of companies as well as I think the World Bank and IMF on how to decrypt where things are going. Ishwa Prasad, to her left, Professor of Trade Policy at Cornell, has a chair also in International Economics at the Brookings Institution. I think you all know because we read a lot of Ishwa's stuff in the public press, so fantastic Ishwa to have you with us, and Fred Huw, founder, chair and CEO of Premier Vera Capital, led some very strategically and well-timed investments in Alibaba and Capital, Bright Dance, former partner and chair of Greater China for Goldman Sachs, and former economist at the IMF. So, Hong Kong knows very well. Great panel. We're going to jump in. Let me turn to you first, Graham. Where do you stand on the getting better or worse situation? How do you read the effort that took place in San Francisco, looking now even at the Philippine situation in South China Sea, Taiwan election, so much water on the bridge already. What's your take? Just a quick two, three minutes. Kick us off. Thank you very much, and it's an honor to be part of such a distinguished panel. It's complicated, and if things don't seem confusing, you haven't begun to understand them yet. Nonetheless, let me make three points first. Are things getting better or worse? The answer is yes. The place to start is with the structural realities, and the structural realities are that China is a rapidly rising power. The U.S. is a colossal ruling power. When a rapidly rising power seriously threatens to displace a ruling power, shit happens, so that's basically what it should want. Friday morning. As I wrote in a book in 2017 about this subject, looking to the future, expect things to get worse before they get worse. I think that's a good projection, and I think unfortunately going forward, that's a pretty good projection. So 75% of what we're seeing is baked into the structural realities of a rapidly rising China that is seriously threatening a colossal ruling U.S. A U.S. that's proud of the fact that it's constructed an international order that's actually been quite remarkably successful in giving us 78 years without great power war, 78 years without another use of nuclear weapons, an environment in which the world has seen greater increases in well-being. So there's lots of reasons why this is, for every reason of history, a structural lucidity and rivalry. A second point is I believe unfortunately that's only, if that was it, it would be simple. Unfortunately that's only half of the problem. The other half of the problem is that this is occurring in the particular objective conditions of the 21st century in which, if you ask the question, which should actually be more compelling for rational actors in Beijing and Washington, the incentives to compete, which are all the reasons of history, or alternatively the incentives to cooperate. Actually I give students a test, I say right on the top of the first page, incentives to compete, and if you can't make ten bullet points, shame on you. Turn the sheet over though, incentives to cooperate, and if you can't make ten bullet points, again, you go back and think harder. The survival of the U.S., the survival of China, requires no nuclear war between the U.S. and China. Well if my survival depends on it, that's a pretty powerful incentive to compete. If we live in a enclosed biosphere in which one party's greenhouse gas emissions goes into the same pot with the others, if on the current trajectory we're going to make a biosphere none of us can live in, my survival requires figuring out a way to cooperate with you. So when I can go on down the list. So I think the tension between the incentives to cooperate and the incentives to compete are the ones that people are still trying to get their head around and then to your San Francisco point, which is the third point. San Francisco is very important. I think what it reflected was two adults, Biden and Xi, who understand this is the most important relationship in the world, that's going to be fundamentally rival worse, but that there's a necessity for them to find ways to cooperate. And the fact that they took out four hours to talk privately, candidly, about the most delicate issues, and that we don't even know all the things they talked about. But if I watch and see what's happened since then, if I look with respect to Taiwan and the Taiwanese election, if I look to the rules of engagement that the Chinese have been operating under in the South China Sea recently and in the Straits, if I look at the middle to middle conversation, if I look to what's happening with fentanyl supply chain, they actually made specific progress on particular items. What the most important was that they agreed that they were not going to misunderstand each other. Obviously there's some real differences, but they were not going to let misunderstandings drag them where they did want to be. And as she said in the conversation, if you have an issue, just pick up the phone. That's pretty remarkable. That's what adults should do about particular issues. So I'm positive about 2024. I would say chances of war between the US and China 2024, 99% against chances of war, chances of military conflict over Taiwan 2024, 99% against. Now looking further, that's more complicated. I'm glad you can give us one year without war. And I think a lot of those more firm timelines that have been given by certain American military officials were in 25. So we might come back to that in a minute and just see where we want to go with that. Mohammed, let me come to you next. I was going to say, a view probably from the region in which a lot of this competition is playing out, the competition that Graham just described to us. How does that look? You've got China leading the regional comprehensive economic partnership. Police are getting that off. That's a positive, but we're seeing in particular with the Philippines right now some actually pretty sharp competition that has military dimensions to it, should we put it. So could you give us your take on this balance? Well, thank you very much. Thanks for having me in this very distinguished panelist. I'm not so sure where I can give my response in two or three minutes to answer this very complex situation. But let me start by saying that for the Southeast Asian economies, we don't have the luxury to choose between US and China. And that's important because China is one of our largest trading partner. It's a very significant impact on the trade and economy in Southeast Asia. The second one, if you look at on the many Southeast Asian economies, China has the long-standing investment present in so many sectors in Southeast Asia. And of course, this may have an implication if we, if ASEAN should take side, either we'd go with China or the US. But I get the impression that maybe the policymaker in Washington is a bit difficult to understand our position here. But at the same time, we also understand that there are a couple of issues that are very sensitive to Southeast Asia. You mentioned about this South China Sea and an expansionary of the Chinese policy, for example. That is why the geopolitical balances in Southeast Asia are needed. Well, I have to say that this US tension has this, I hate to say this, but this will have the positive implication for some Southeast Asian countries because the relocation of the supply chain from China into a country like Vietnam, to Indonesia, to Singapore, et cetera. But I think the fragmentation, the cost of fragmentation is still very big for us with the technonationalism, the economic security, and this will have an impact on the supply chains. So under this kind of situation, as I said that ASEAN, we don't have the luxury to choose. The solution is what can be done to solve this problem. I'm being realistic. I'm humbled by the political reality. I always like to quote what Jean-Claude Juncker said. We all know what to do. We just don't know how to get re-elected after we've done it, right? So the question is what can be done at the given political and institutional constraint. The first one is you mentioned about the RCP. The RCP itself is not led by China. The idea is there is no single ASEAN countries can deal bilaterally with China. That is why we need agency. We need an entity in which that ASEAN become a hub. So the idea is to help ASEAN with China, ASEAN with Japan, with Korea, and the US. Of course the challenge is about the leadership in Southeast Asia. We can discuss this later on. That's one thing. The other thing is try to look at about, I can give an example of it, try to find the common denominator in which everybody around the table can work together. So let me give an example when Indonesia hosted the G20 meeting in 2022. The tension was so high related to the Ukraine issue, etc. But we tried to find an issue that everyone around the table, everybody around the table will agree to sit together. And the issue was pandemic. Because if you're talking about health issues, if you're talking about pandemic, Russia, China, US will agree to sit together. Now I'm a co-chair of the pandemic fund. We've been able to mobilize about to seat capital about 2 billion US dollar allocated funding last time 350 for 37 countries for grants and the next will be 500 million US dollar. So the idea is try to find the common denominator. Maybe on the climate issue, maybe the joint research between Beijing and Washington. Try to look at the collaboration. At the same time, ASEAN also need to improve their bargaining position through the RCP. And the other thing is diversification. Not to realise so much even though I know this is easier to be said than done, but try to diversify. But one thing if I can say about the pandemic fund, the ability to sit together somehow to me is a reflection of the testament to the multilateralism. So I live in here. Great. Thanks for those opening points and we can come back to you said some later on in particular the kind of influence Southeast Asia is trying to have collectively building up some joint capacity to negotiate with China. KU, let me come to you next. One of the big phrases that the Biden administration has tried to use to define a pragmatic approach has been Jake Sullivan's, you know, we're going to build a small yard with a high fence for technology corporations, an area I know you work on a lot. So I suppose my question to you would be, is that definition working? Is that creating some sort of guardrails under which more cooperative relationship or competition as we had in one of the panels earlier on could emerge? Or do you feel in a way that fence is just porous? And the yard keeps enlarging and no one's quite sure what its definition is because there's something inevitable about the technological competition. Your take. So at the core of it, US-China competition is about the China model, development model, Chinese aspirations and most of all Chinese technology or technological competition. I think it's as bad it is because of a lack of mutual trust and very different world vision values and culture, which I think we under-appreciate. President Xi recently said we hope that America would be prosperous and hope that US would wish China to be more prosperous as well. I think that does send a message. But I do think that the two countries are recalibrating the relationship, learning from what has happened. I don't really think there's a set specific idea of how it's going to look like. And recalibration comes from two important things, I think. First of all, is that internal challenges for both countries, China for sure on the economic side, political side, military and so forth. A lot of the focus is now in word. Chinese don't think about Americans all day long. But also second, there's a huge unintended consequence of these technological restrictions coming back to your technology question. We've seen it in history. We've seen that whenever there are restrictions or kind of walls, it accelerates technological development. So what we have seen in China recently is a national mobilisation. Unlikely partners from the big techs working together, university, industries, governments, all trying to tackle the hard and impossible. And that's totally accelerated some of the endeavors to leapfrog. And I think that we're going to see much more of that because of these restrictions, not despite them. And we've already seen some of the, you know, they were before, they were comfortably importing chips. Of course, Chinese companies would love to just import Nvidia chips. Now they have to turn to domestic substitution and that's accelerating and that's making domestic chip companies much more profitable and in many, many different areas. And of course, it's leaky. You cannot really restrict technology flows and you're basically enriching the intermediaries. You know, there are a lot of third countries from where we're seeing a huge surge in imports of chips. I wonder what happened there. So collaborative competition, I think, is the way we should define the relationship. Look, US and Japan has similar competition, economic technology competition. And guess what happened? Everybody was better off because Japan pushed the US to do much more. Lots of these really important, you know, kind of important innovation pushes were because of Japanese competition. The two biggest themes this year, AI and sustainability. One represents competition between the two. The second represents collaboration. There's no way we're going to get to green transition without the collaboration of the two. So my advice would be, first of all, start from small victories to build trust. I think we've already seen a little bit of that. Anthony Binkham has mentioned some of that and recalibrate and readjust to real-time circumstances. Thank you very much, KU, for that. And again, let people come back to them maybe in the next set of remarks, because it does strike me as you said. Technology is probably one of the defining elements of the 21st century. Graham was pointing to the opportunities for positive cooperation through it, but technology is the other defining element that may sharpen the competition, despite everything you were just saying there. Ishwa, let me come to you next. I mean, you're based in the US between Cornell and DC. You've got a lot of experience of what it's undertaking there. I'm just wondering, to what extent is America trying to unpick a form of interdependence that it acquired there because of the structural nature of the competition that we've described so far? Do you think like a strategic decision has been taken across all fronts of US policy decision-making that we've got to pull back from the intent, you know, the close relationship we had? And does that mean that, therefore, we can end up with a kind of much more separated economy or not? Is it also part an area where we can have cooperation? Well, Robin, when I saw the title decrypting the US-China relationship, given my work on digital currencies, my needed question was, who the heck encrypted it? Or what caused the encryption to take place? Now that may be a little too cute by half, but certainly things have been getting worse. So to butcher the analogy a little further, it's worth thinking about what is the algorithm underlying the deterioration in the relationship. And I think of characterising this relationship along multiple fronts. And again, to take a somewhat simplistic view about this, there were two elements that were crucial in terms of keeping the relationship between these two countries in balance. Now, if you think about the geopolitical aspects of the relationship, as Graham has correctly pointed out, this is ultimately a zero-sum relationship. One country gains and other country has to lose. And that would seem inherently bound for conflict. But there was a period, a fairly long period, when the economic relationship between the two countries was seen as a positive sum game. And my sense is that that element kept the overall relationship in balance, because while the geopolitical relationship clearly could not be moved to a positive sum aspect, the economic relationship was seen as important enough so that you could maintain balance between the two. Things have changed. Even the economic relationship is now seen as a zero-sum game or indeed in certain areas that are important to both economies is seen as a negative sum game. So the question is, what is the dynamic that has shifted that has changed this relationship? Now, I've been an academic for about 17 years and I've been dealing with various US administrations and various informal advisory capacities. And in the US I've noticed one thing that the political part of the administration, which is typically the White House, the National Economic Council, the National Security Council has tended to take a harder line towards China on the economic as well as national security and geopolitical fronts. Treasury tends to be the balancing force here. And what was Treasury representing? In a sense, it was American businesses, American financial institutions that were very eager to maintain a positive relationship with China, because they saw China as very important as a market, as a cog in their supply chains, and as very important to the overall business model, because China remains a very large and important and growing market. That has shifted in a fundamental way. Speaking to corporate leaders, leaders of financial institutions, I sense the promise that they had anticipated that China would open up its markets, would allow them to compete in a free and fair way domestically, has not panned out. And what we've seen is that that coalition does not really work that well anymore. Now, even that coalition was a little fragmented. If you think about the National Association of Manufacturers in the US, they represented companies that felt threatened by China. But there were enough companies and institutions on the other side who saw opportunity in China that kept this in balance. But across the board right now, things have shifted. There has been a disillusionment that China has not lived up to its promises, that China is providing a somewhat more hostile environment for businesses operating there, trying to sell into China's market. So that, I think, is a fundamental shift. Professor Danny Kwad, the other day at a dinner, referred to economics eating geopolitics. So this is a slightly different characterization, but it goes along the same theme. For a while, the two were actually balancing each other out. That has now gone. I think both of them are sort of chasing each other's tail to push Danny's analogy a little further. There is an additional complication there, as I was saying, and KU has correctly alluded to this. There is domestic politics, as well as domestic economics that now has added to the mix and made it much more toxic and volatile. So at this stage, if you're thinking of decrypting as basically coming back to a period when even in terms of economics, one could see this as a positive sum game, I think there are some avenues where that can take place, but in a broad front, that is going to be difficult to do. Well, we're decrypting in a negative direction. I can sense that already. I mean, balance is the best we're able to hope for at the moment. Fred, this must seem a little bit bleak to you, and I'm just wondering, especially with the references I made to financial institutions and the kind of belief that was held by even companies like Goldman Sachs at a particular time that there were real opportunities there in the market. How do you see it? How important is China's own development, its economic development, internally, to the balance of this conversation? And how much do you agree or disagree in particular with the last two sets of comments by KU Enishwa? Thank you, Robin. Without any doubt, the China-US relationship is a defining challenge of our lifetime. And for people in this room and our children, it was likely the most critical factor, determine whether we will be doing in the world peace and the possibility of war and conflict. The relationship between the US and China was so important, has been taking no style from bad to worse, for many different reasons. Some have been articulated by my fellow panellists, but I also think a two-logic degree is caused by false narratives, wrong assumptions, and unsubstantiated, acrimonious acquisitions. For the particular, I think, this is sort of the competitive relationship. For many of us in business in finance, we know why competition generally is a good thing. That's really the source of efficiency and value creation. But right now, when the relationship is framed as a competitive relationship, it's really viewed as zero sum or worse, negative sum game. And on top of it, increasingly, very normal ordinary trade of goods and services and technology and data are also viewed almost exclusively from a national security lens. So then it's very hard to have a balanced, carefully calibrated, healthy, sustainable relationship. If just everything you look at it is national security, you see it as a threat. So then you have a knee-jerk reaction, xenophobic reaction. And some of the tools curve on advanced semiconductors. If you're truly carefully calibrated as a small yard and high fence, I guess for most of us, probably life goes on, unaffected. But the hard truth is, as many of you are like me, I have a house, I have a front yard and a backyard. Those yards are really, really small, because even I can plant my flowers and take care of my lawns. But I think the restrictions, as they are enacted, imposed, these are several photobooth fields, big. That's not how it could as a small yard. And the fence is almost unreachable and invisible. That's also not like, you know. So that really makes it hard for the Chinese business, for American business, who work with China, and also take the world economy as a collateral damage. Business investors, we need a predictable policy regime domestically and internationally. Right now, there's no certainty. There's no predictability. You know, every day wake up in some shocks, you know, surprises. So that's not a good person to be. Having said this, however, actually, I don't want to give a sense of doom and gloom. I actually feel better than I have been for the last five, six years about the outlook of the bilateral relationship. You know, some factors are mentioned by Graham and others. You know, first, I do think that the Biden presidency in San Francisco has really put the floor underneath the relationship. Okay, that's important. On top of it, there's been resumption of, you know, climate talks and military talks. Okay. And the second, you know, last week before we were all scattered here in Dallas, there was really consequential election in Taiwan. Okay. Just even before that, some of the media commented, some of the hawks say, well, look, you know, what Putin did to Ukraine, that's what Beijing is going to do Taiwan. Watch out. You know, the election happened in Taiwan. I think it's notable for the absence of drama. Okay. I'm even the four. Why? Because, you know, I since February 2022, I get a lot of inquiries from my friends in Europe and the North America asking me, right? What do you think when Beijing is going to take Taiwan? I used to give a lengthy discussion on history, you know, geography and the quality why it's not going to happen. Then I really get sick and tired for more than a year trying to say there's no war coming. Then whenever the question come out, I say, well, no war because China is not Russia. Taiwan is not Ukraine. Okay. So that's a very, very important factor. Now, last most importantly, you know, this is also what the career alluded to, except I would carry this differently. Career said, well, you know, the relationship is not going to get even worse because China is turning more inward. I wouldn't use the word inward. In fact, Lee Chong just came here. He launched a channel for investors to welcome, come to business in China, right? So China is not turning inward in the sense of economic strategy or development policy. China is opening up more widely. But what I'm saying, I think Kerry's right, you know, China is single-mindedly focused on domestic economic development as the top national already. Unlike America right now, you know, I'm sure you saw what I would know in Washington DC. I have a lot of friends like you should live in DC. There's a healthy, even dangerous obsession with China. Okay. Everything is ready to China. I know someone working in the autonomous startup in California and they were working with Congress trying to come up with a bill about highway safety when you have autonomous driving vehicles on the roads, like coming going with human drivers. So the draft bill, the title is Be the China, Enhance American Highway Safety. Think about it. You know, many Americans, you know, Americans are very popular society, many problems, whether it's homeless on the street of San Francisco or my shooting or made in America, but oftentimes politicians try to make it in China. So what I'm saying is, as China gets its own actor together, focus on the domestic economy, not to seek a quarrel with the U.S., I think things just be fine. Okay. You got to optimism at the end. I saw that. We've got about four minutes before I want to turn to questions for five minutes. So obviously, do your best to try and give me telegraphic answers if you can on these questions. I think there's a natural lead in, Graham, from where Fred was trying to note the optimism, the putting a floor on the relationship. There wasn't the big blowout after Taiwan. What happens if there's a change of administration at the end of 2024 in the U.S.? Where those animal spirits, that instinct to put China at the heart of everything, suddenly accelerates. What's your view? I'll give you that killer question. Trump administration type of policy towards China Taiwan. So given the time, I'll just do one minute. So first, I agree with Fred very much on what happened in San Francisco. It's a floor that I would say, think of it as a pause button, and I think we see a lot of evidence of the pause button, but people are therefore watching fearfully what happens in 2024. So Biden has one objective in 2024, which is to defeat Trump. As the specter of Trump becoming president by this time next year, rises, countries everywhere are beginning to factor in what I wrote about this week as a Trump put that is taking account of that in their choices and actions now and dealing with the Biden administration. And I think from the Chinese perspective, since Trump has made very clear that he sees China as the principal adversary, his trade adviser Lighthizer is very clear about it. He calls it the lethal adversary that in his administration, he'll start by withdrawing most favored nation trading. He'll put on a 10% tariff across the board. He'll do tit for teft tariffs for anything larger. That's for everybody. And then in particular, in relations with China, they will quote, eliminate dependence for critical materials, including electronics, steel, and pharmaceuticals. So I would say, yes, you can hardly imagine what that means. I think Chinese are beginning to think about this saying, one, could this be real? Yes. Then if that's were real, this one colleague Chinese that I know very well said, he said, we're beginning to think maybe he would succeed in decoupling the U.S. from the global economy more than he would do decoupling us. So I would say, tighten your seatbelts, it's going to get worse going forward. And I think in particular for those of us concerned about the U.S.-China relation, we've gone into our silly season in which Americans, and especially American politicians, are even sillier than normal. And the connection between what they say and what they think or any reality has become completely detached. And so you will hear more and more harsh things about China because nobody gets in trouble for being tougher than their adversary, their competitor about China. And I try to tell Chinese, don't take it personally. This is the theater of American politics. And the one sort of reassuring piece is, be sure Trump and Biden will say worse things about their American competitor than they say about Xi. So thanks very much for that. Again, I'm trying to go very quickly here. Mohamed, BRICS G7 is, when we're decrypting the relationship, is it a global competition for friends, allies, that kind of leadership? And where do ASEAN countries, where's a country like Indonesia sit on this? I'm not even sure whether you're on that list, you know, that's considering BRICS. Thank you very much for this. Well, from the Indonesia perspective, we can understand and appreciate some efforts that have been put for some countries to have a serious discussion on BRICS. I can understand maybe from the perspective of there is a risk to holding the US dollar because the impact of the sanction. But the way I look at it, this will take very long time before this happens. So from the Indonesian perspective, the government has decided not to join the BRICS, but we are aiming to join the OECD, to look at to explore the possibilities still in the enfancy states. And I think this is the right move because we need to ties our reform with the international benchmark. Robin, well, in the case of Indonesia, a lot of things need to be done regarding the bureaucratic reform about regulation hurdles. I always call that one of the reasons of why many Indonesians become religious is because we have to deal with the government. If I apply for the investment, it's like a black box. There's nothing you can do except pray to God. That's the reason why we need to improve the reform. That's why it is very important to benchmark our reform for the OECD standard, for example. Thank you very much. I've got to keep moving down there. I thought you made a very interesting point, KU, about that maybe part of the competition is about development models. Could you just say a word or two more about that because that would mean that really it's a structural type of competition and maybe a competition that goes global as well? After reading Jake Sullivan's, you know, reviving national American economy, it sounds pretty much like the China model with industrial policies and subsidies and a huge national boost. And look, you know, the China model is about having a unique coordination between government and markets and individualism and communalism. But look, you know, I think there's one fundamental misunderstanding about the Chinese from the American side, which is, and if it is that, that China's sole goal is to try to overtake the U.S. That is not the Chinese aspiration. The Chinese people with a billion people still trying to have a better life. It's overwhelmingly pragmatic. Chinese people right now still think about getting an apartment in the cities and sending their kids to school. And so that is the ultimate legitimacy, source of legitimacy also for the party. When we talk about war and all that, it's about peace and stability, which is the best conditions to make that happen. So what we're seeing with U.S. and China, I think again, coming back to the recalibration, look at trade. Yes, U.S. and China's structural trade is declining, but I guess what's happening, it's just being rerouted from Vietnam and Mexico. But the ultimate sources of demand and supply are still coming from the two largest economy. It's just taking a much longer route and adding to the trade costs. And it's going to add to the cost of innovation, going to add to the cost of inflation. And so I think, you know, coming back to the American voters, I believe that ultimately defining this year's election is still going to be overwhelming, pragmatic about the everyday livelihoods of these people. I suppose there are huge amounts of trade, toys to all sorts of basic consumer goods, which are at the moment passing beneath that radar. Ishwa, one very specific question to you. You talked about trade potentially suffering at all sorts of levels. What about foreign investment? Do you think in this political environment you describe the Chinese company thinks, well, you know what, I need to try and gamble with investing in the United States, helping American jobs. This is the traditional route that Japan, European, other countries have taken when they face that kind of American protectionist instinct is to try to get inside. Is that going to be impossible in the political environment we're in? So first of all, on the broader issue about what Fred and Graham have characterised as the floor, certainly it's good that there is a floor. Unfortunately, it is as treacherous as the streets of Davos at the moment. I think it's certainly not something one can count on for stability and stability very often does come from commercial relationships. And as you pointed out, Robin, one could think about investment as being the tool through which these relationships can be brought in. But I think here there is again a problem from the point of view of American businesses. There is a sense of uncertainty about Chinese policies towards the private sector more broadly. This ties into the issues about China's development model and how that is evolving. There are still some questions about that, but also US policy towards China because the US has been restricting investment. On the flip side, I think there are good reasons for China, again, building on what KU alluded to, for them to invest even in the US in order to try to change a political discourse. But unfortunately that political discourse is getting distorted with Chinese investments seen as essentially being hostile in some way towards the US even though they may create some jobs. So I don't think we are in a good place yet on that front. The good thing, however, is that on the very big issues on which the two sides need to cooperate like climate change and so on, it's good to see that there is still some high level cooperation. So there is a lot that is not good, but at least on the huge issues on which the two sides really need to cooperate, there seems to be some forward progress. Fred, last comment from you. A lot of comments about your floor. Any thoughts back in reaction before I just grab three or four questions and take them back to you very quickly. Well, based on the floor, it is with the security and stability, but also there's a lot of upside without the climate and global pandemic and coordination. I think if China really learned some of the lessons from the last five years, China clearly also made plenty of mistakes domestically and internationally. The wolf warrior diplomacy, how they didn't want China any friends, but they made many more enemies. So China now definitely caused a correction internationally trying to make more friends, right? And quoting Europe and consulting relation with the global south, Southeast Asia in particular, but the Middle East and Africa and South America. And also, I expect China in the next few years will also seek really to improve relation with the immediate neighbors, Japan, South Korea and India. So as China does that, China's image here slowly but surely will improve, trust will be regained. Then most important is domestic economy. If China really single-minded focused on domestic economy, get back its economic module to vitality, that will become still tremendous magnet for global businesses and investment. Then China is going to have actually a bit more cloudy influence without overtly competing with Washington for global hegemony. I don't think that's China's goal. China's goal is really domestic economic economy. And that's the hope for me more upside in the relationship. Thank you very much. Look, we've got a big panel. I'm going to get a horrible look at the end of this thing from the organisers. There's one hand up here. I'm going to take literally three questions. One, two, three. That's it. Very quickly. One here and there's two at the front there. If somebody can bring the microphone down there. Hello. Very short. Absolutely. I'm from Czech Republic. Last six years, I was living in China, Beijing, Hong Kong. I agree with you, Fred. In America, Beijing of China, it's a zeitgeist, but so it is in China. When you look on global times, how to get out of these rhetoric, Professor Ellison took it, this trap of rhetoric especially now when Chinese macro has so many problems. The nationalism propaganda might be... How to break it. Brilliant. Thank you. I want to go back to this idea that there is a very deep-seated reason for the lack of trust and understanding between the two sides. You sketched out quite well, KU, business models, well, not business models, development models, et cetera. If one argues from that premise, are we not being naive in thinking that there can be a circumstance in which trust can be rebuilt? Is that not just managing distrust, if somebody put it? Is that not the best we can hope for? Thank you. Last question there. Hi, Min Jae from China Daily. We heard so much about US-China relationships from a political and international perspective. I want to ask a simple question. How does the panel anticipate that the US-China relationship will impact the daily life of ordinary people in China and the United States? Thank you. Let's go in reverse order on that one actually because that's where you were talking about that focus at home. How do you think it'll impact the daily life with the direction that has been going in so far? You've got each of you 30 seconds. A bad relationship between US-China definitely is bad for the people in both countries. I don't see anything positive out of it. So, how many relationships would certainly serve both countries better than their people much better? Keep borders open, student flows, academics, knowledge flows, and leaders should talk more often. So, people-to-people, very important point. Communication, continue for the research collaboration? I agree with all those, but if I take the question over here, I would say that the rivalry is so deeply baked into the geopolitics that the attempt to deny it will be self-defeating, but at the same time, if my survival requires cooperation, I'm going to have to learn to cooperate as much as I compete, and that's a contradiction, but I think that's the life that's going forward. So, I think we've decrypted a lot of the dynamics behind the relationship. It's negative in terms of trust. It's structural in terms of geopolitical competition, but I think there's a sense here from the panel that you've got two big countries trying to work out a way to live with each other. Even if there's a change of administration, hopefully it'll be more theatre than action, but we'll wait and see. I was part of a panel yesterday where it sounded pretty blood-curdling. Could you please thank the great panel here? Thank you for coming.