 Section 66 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Supplement on control of disorder. Legal needs for riot control. 6. Legal needs for riot control. We emphasize that law, no less than the desire for order, must provide the framework for all control efforts. Applicable laws relating to control efforts of federal, state and local governments fall into two general categories. 1. Laws permanently in effect, primarily the penal laws of the state, supplemented or augmented by municipal ordinances. And 2. Special emergency laws put into effect only during a disorder, as for example curfews, special emergency closing ordinances and martial law. The commission will also consider certain legal aspects of the use of state forces to aid local police. 3. Laws permanently in effect. Many of the acts committed by rioters are crimes in violation of long established penal laws. In the disorders of last summer, arrests were made for crimes ranging from homicide to curfew violations, including for example robbery, burglary, assault, theft, arson and disturbing the peace. A commission survey of selected police departments revealed no basic lack of legal tools available to control disorders, but the survey and other evidence have indicated five other areas where further legislation may be necessary. 4. Laws governing the manufacture and possession of incendiary devices. Watts, Detroit, Newark and other major disorders have shown a disturbing increase in the possession and use by rioters of a variety of incendiary devices, primarily Molotov cocktails. Although the use of such a device is undoubtedly arson or attempted arson, some jurisdictions have no laws governing manufacture or possession. Others seek control through use of inadequate fireworks ordinances. 5. Forceful interference with the work of firemen and emergency workers. Firemen and emergency workers have been subjected to physical abuse and harassed and interfered with in performing their duties. Obviously violence against any of these persons is a crime, but the experience of some riot-affected communities indicates that additional laws prohibiting forceful interference with the work of firemen and emergency workers may be necessary. 6. Restrictions on the sale of firearms. The crime commission studied the relationship between violet crime and the easy availability of firearms in the United States. In its report, the commission pointed out that during 1965, 5,600 murders, 34,700 aggravated assaults, and the vast majority of the 68,400 armed robberies were committed by means of firearms. The crime commission further stated that all but 10 of the 278 law enforcement officers murdered during the period 1960 through 1965 were killed with firearms. The crime commission surveyed existing federal, state, and local gun control legislation, and concluded, since laws as they now stand do not accomplish the purposes of firearms control, the commission believes that all states and the federal government should act to strengthen them. The commission recommended specific federal and state legislation reasonably regulating the purchase, transportation, sale, and possession of firearms. The fact that firearms can readily be acquired is an obviously dangerous factor in dealing with civil disorders. It makes it easier for a serious incident to spark a riot and may increase the level of violence during disorders. It increases the dangers faced by police and others seeking to control riots. We believe that all state and local governments should enact gun control legislation of the type recommended by the crime commission. We also believe that federal legislation is essential in order to make state and local laws fully effective and regulate areas beyond the reach of state government. We therefore support the president's call for gun control legislation and urge its prompt enactment. Restricting possibilities of theft of firearms. Certain recent disorders were accompanied by a dramatic increase in the theft of firearms from stores and manufacturers. The most serious incident reported to place in Plainfield, New Jersey, where during the disorder, 46 carbines were stolen from a local manufacturer. The commission recommends that state and local governments consider enactment of laws or ordinances controlling the storage of firearms and ammunition in order to diminish the possibilities of theft. Such laws could require, for example, that all firearms and ammunition be stored in heavily protected vaults or areas or that essential parts of the firearms be so stored. Unlawful assembly, riot and siting to riot and related legislation, federal anti-riot legislation. 47 states and the District of Columbia have statutes that either explicitly prohibit participation in or incitement of riots or provide more general control through prohibitions against unlawful assembly. Two other states rely on court decisions based on common law. The commission's police survey and other evidence disclose that many of the statutes need review and revision. Some that deal with incitement to riot are so broad that they may improperly inhibit the constitutional right of free speech. Some that provide no definition of incitement or comparable terms are dangerously vague. Those that define a riot in terms of groups containing as few as three persons may be applied in situations where nothing even approaching truly riotous activities taking place. These statutes should be tightened. In addition, some older statutes require that police officers on the scene literally read the riot act before taking action against rioters. Such legislation should be amended to ensure adequate notice without unnecessarily inhibiting police action. A supplemental question is whether this network of state legislation should be supplemented by federal anti-riot legislation. We recognize that criminal law enforcement is principally a matter of local responsibility and that crimes committed during disorders can generally be controlled and should be controlled at a local level. Moreover, the investigations of the commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have so far revealed no national planning or conspiracy behind the disorders of 1967 and few instances of interstate travel which would be subject to federal law. There is also a risk that too broad a bill would encroach on the right of free speech and peaceful assembly. Although no criminal legislation, federal or state, comes to grips with the underlying causes of disorder, the commission feels that a tightly drawn federal control statute might play a limited but important role in dealing with disorders. Even if there are only a few persons traveling with the intent of precipitating disorders, these few can do enormous harm. Federal legislation, if enacted, should be precisely drafted with a clear definition of all operative terms so as to preserve scrupulously the constitutional rights of all Americans. Such legislation should be combined as the President recommended with the federal firearms bill. Both are important means of restricting the interstate movement of forces of destruction. Whether or not legislation is enacted to deter those who would incite disorders, Congress should affirm now that violence is not to be tolerated in any sphere of our society. The prompt enactment of the civil rights legislation, now pending, which would make it a federal criminal offense to use force to prevent the exercise of civil rights, is important for this purpose. This legislation is also central to the long range goal of ensuring that Americans in all parts of the country enjoy equal rights and opportunities. Laws applicable only in emergency situations. Effective control of a civil disorder may require special laws in addition to the normal complement of penal statutes and ordinances. Such emergency laws range from street closings to restrictions on sales of certain items. Laws of this sort have been used in practically every control operation. The Commission recognizes the utility and need for such laws, especially those which provide for a specific limited response to a particular problem rather than wide-ranging emergency powers. The Commission cannot consider all such laws, nor can it consider the constitutional restraints that may be involved in the application of particular laws, such as search and seizure in connection with curfew violations. It will instead point to a few instances where the need for special legislation is apparent. Restricting access to defined geographic areas. In the early stages of some disorders, failure to seal off some streets had tragic consequences. Unsuspecting motorists drove headlong into barrages of bricks, stones and bottles. Cars were set afire and occupants were beaten. Restrictions on access may also be necessary to keep vigilante groups outside the riot area. The Commission recommends legislation or ordinances to permit disorder areas to be sealed off immediately. Since speed may be necessary, the laws should provide that the authority can be delegated to operational levels. Restriction on sales of particular items. Of the 26 police departments responding to the portion of the survey concerning effectiveness of specified control techniques, all replied that closing stores selling firearms and ammunition was effective. 25 replied that closing liquor stores and taverns was effective, and 22 favored restrictions on sale of gasoline. The Commission recommends that laws be enacted to permit closing of potentially dangerous businesses during riot situations. The authority to impose such restrictions would primarily rest with the mayor or city manager. Provision should be made to ensure that, if necessary, similar restrictions can be imposed in adjoining jurisdictions. An ordinance restricting sale of ammunition in one city would have a little effect if the stores in an adjoining city, a block away, remained open. As with the imposition of other emergency measures, notice of these restrictions is of paramount importance, and notification procedures must be integrated into any control plan. Curfews. The Commission Police Survey shows that 23 responding departments favored imposing curfews. The Commission recommends that states that have not already done so should provide explicit legislative means to enable mayors and other local officials to impose curfews. The size of the areas covered by curfew restrictions has varied greatly. Milwaukee imposed a citywide curfew restricting all persons to their homes, closing all streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic, and permitting no one in or out of the city. Other curfew areas have been less restrictive in time and area. Unless care is used, the curfew itself may enable criminal elements to close down a town with minimum effort. In drafting curfew legislation, there are at least two potential problems. A, the need for provisions which enable curfews to be imposed in adjoining cities in order to ensure coverage of the entire disorder area. B, the need to ensure that notice of the curfew is given to all who may be affected by its terms. Legal problems concerning use of state forces. The relationship among the National Guard, state police and local police, and joint activities has been considered in the portions of the report concerning the National Guard and state local planning. Although these questions relate primarily to planning, certain legal problems require attention by state and local governments. C, command and call up procedures for state and national guard forces. Most states have laws identifying the state or local officials who have the authority to call up the National Guard. Usually only the governor has this authority, but in some states even a local sheriff may call in the guard to aid local law enforcement. However, only 20 states have laws specifying the relationship between National Guard forces and the civil police. In other states, the crucial command problem is left to agreements or executive directives. Although problems of call up authority and command authority can in part be resolved by proper planning. The commission recommends that each state review its laws concerning guard call up and command and make any necessary changes to facilitate adequate planning. Arrest powers of state police and National Guard forces. In the absence of martial law, only seven states have laws granting National Guard troops the arrest powers of peace officers. This lack of authority is not important if police officers have been designated to accompany guard troops when arrests are to be made. The problem should be reviewed in the planning process. Responsibility for payment of the cost of using National Guard forces. Use of National Guard forces to quell a civil disorder may be costly. Whether the state or the local community must bear these costs is a serious policy question. On one hand, prevention and control of a civil disorder is part of the local responsibility to ensure civil peace. If the state is to bear the cost of guard forces, a local community may limit its efforts to prevent disorders or its efforts to provide adequate control in the early stages. In reliance to that, I'm calling the guard whenever there is danger that an incident may develop into a disorder. This attitude may also contribute to the dangers of overreaction. If costs of using the National Guard are to be assessed against a local community, the mayor or other local officials may unnecessarily delay calling in the guard. The commission recommends that all states consider this problem in advance in past necessary legislation providing either for the assessment of costs of National Guard forces or otherwise ensuring that the problem is resolved by agreement between the states and local communities. Liability of guard officers and men when aiding local law enforcement. Questions have been raised regarding the legal liability of guardsmen when assisting local law enforcement officers to control a disorder. The commission recommends that each state review its laws on this subject to make any necessary changes to ensure that individual guardsmen are protected against legal liability when acting pursuant to the valid orders of their superiors. Compilation and distribution of laws relating to disorders. The people have a right to know precisely what the law requires of them during a disorder and an equal right to know the legal limits of control activities by law enforcement officers. Certain cities, counties, and states have already prepared booklets containing this information, have distributed these booklets to all police departments and other law enforcement agencies, and have made the booklets available to the public at large. We recommend adoption of such a policy. End of Section 66. Section 67 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Eric Evans, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Commission Report. Other supplements, Attorney General Letter, Constitution, Timeline. Exhibit A. Letter from the Attorney General to the Governors. Dear Governor, at the President's request, I am writing you regarding the legal requirements for the use of federal troops in case of severe domestic violence within your state. The requirements are simple. They arise from the Constitution. So the principles will be clearly in mind. I will briefly outline here the basic considerations of federal law applicable to such a situation. The underlying constitutional authority is the duty of the United States under Article IV, Section IV, to protect each of the states on application of the legislature or of the executive when the legislature cannot be convened against domestic violence. This pledge is implemented by Chapter 15 of Title X, USC, and particularly 10, USC 331, which derives from an act of Congress passed in 1792. The history of the use of federal forces at the request of governors in varied circumstances of local violence over more than a century is also instructive. There are three basic prerequisites to the use of federal troops in a state in the event of domestic violence. One, that a situation of serious domestic violence exists within the state. While this conclusion should be supported with the statement of factual details to the extent feasible under the circumstances, there is no prescribed wording. Two, that such violence cannot be brought under control by the law enforcement resources available to the governor, including local and state police forces and the National Guard. The judgment required here is that there is a definite need for the assistance of federal troops, taking into account the remaining time needed to move them into action at the scene of violence. Three, that the legislature or the governor requests the president to employ the armed forces to bring the violence under control. The element of request by the governor of a state is essential if the legislature cannot be convened. It may be difficult in the context of urban rioting, such as we have seen this summer, to convene the legislature. These three elements should be expressed in a written communication to the president, which of course may be a telegram, to support his issuance of a proclamation under 10 USC 334 and commitment of troops to action. In case of extreme emergency, receipt of a written request will not be a prerequisite to presidential action. However, since it takes several hours to alert and move federal troops, the few minutes needed to write and dispatch a telegram are not likely to cause any delay. Upon receiving the request from a governor, the president, under the terms of the statute, and the historic practice, must exercise his own judgment as to whether federal troops will be sent, and as to such questions as timing, size of the force, and federalization of the National Guard. Preliminary steps, such as alerting the troops, can be taken by the federal government upon oral communications and prior to the governor's determination that the violence cannot be brought under control without the aid of federal forces. Even such preliminary steps, however, represent a most serious departure from our traditions of local responsibility for law enforcement. They should not be requested until there is a substantial likelihood that the federal forces will be needed. While the formal request must be addressed to the president, all preliminary communications should be with me. When advised by you that serious domestic violence is occurring, I will inform the president and alert the proper military authorities. You can reach me at my office, my home, or through the White House switchboard at any hour. Enclosed are copies of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, and a brief summary of past occasions on which a governor has requested federal military assistance. Your legal counsel, I am sure, keeps you fully advised of requirements of state law as well. If you have any questions or comments, please let me know. Sincerely, Attorney General. The Constitution. Article 4, Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be convened against domestic violence. Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 15. Section 331. Federal Aid for State Governments. Whenever there is an insurrection in any state against its government, the president may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into federal service such as the militia of the other states, and the number requested by that state, and use such of the armed forces as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. Section 334. Proclamation to Disperse. Whenever the president considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time. State Requests for Federal Assistance in Suppressing Domestic Violence. A Chronological List. 1838, Buckshot War. The Pennsylvania governor asked for federal assistance, based on Constitutional Article 4, Section 4, and restoring order when violence resulted from a bitter political contest. President Van Buren refused on the ground that federal interference is justified only where domestic violence is such that state authorities have proved inadequate. 1842, Door Rebellion. Rhode Island Governor King asked for assistance to stop the attempt of Door to claim the governorship. President Tyler replied that the time for federal interference had not arrived since there was no actual insurrection. Further requests were denied on the ground that the legislature was in session and the governor therefore was not authorized to apply for aid. The president said he would issue a proclamation if a lawful request was made, but Door dispersed his troops and this was not done. 1856, San Francisco Vigilance Committee. California governor requested federal aid in stopping the committee from usurping the authority of the state. The Attorney General advised President Pierce that the circumstances did not afford sufficient legal justification for federal assistance since there was no actual shock of arms between insurgents and the state, and the state had not exhausted its powers to deal with the situation. 8, Opinion to the Attorney General, Page 8. The president took no action. 1873, New Orleans Unrest. Lawlessness due to racial problems and also political uncertainty as to proper occupants of political office resulted in violence. Louisiana governor asked for federal help. President Grant issued a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse. Failure to heed the proclamation and increased disturbance resulted in further proclamation and dispatch of two regiments. 1876, South Carolina riots. Riots resulted from an altercation between the Ku Klux Klan and Negro State militia. The president issued a proclamation in response to a call for federal intervention and troops were stationed at 70 places in the state to secure the peace during the election. This action culminated in enactment of Posse Kamatata's Act of 1878. 1877, Railroad Strike Riots. Upon request for federal intervention, President Hayes issued proclamations with respect to West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Illinois to restore order. The Ohio governor asked for and received federal arms but did not request troops. Indiana asked the president to authorize the commandant at the U.S. arsenal to aid the state. On the ground that the request was incorrectly made, the governor was informed that federal troops would be used only to protect U.S. property. Michigan, Wisconsin, and California also made requests for help but the situation in those states did not become critical. 1892, Idaho's Kurt Delaney Mining Disturbances. During a seven-year period, presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley furnished federal assistance which was requested by Idaho governors. 1894, Coxsey's Army of Unemployed. President Cleveland instructed the Army to assist Montana in handling violence of a Coxseyite contingent in Montana at the governor's request. However, the president did not issue a formal proclamation. 1903, Colorado Mining Strike Disturbance. President Theodore Roosevelt denied assistance to the Colorado governor who made two requests for such aid as I may call for but promised that the federal government would act when a request was made in a manner contemplated by law explaining that under HR 5297 there must be shown an insurrection against the state and inability of the state to control it. 1907, Nevada Mining Disturbance. In response to an urgent request from the governor, President Roosevelt ordered troops to assist. Later, a president's investigating committee found there was no warrant for the assertion that the civil authority of the state had collapsed. After the president threatened withdrawal of the troops, the governor convened the legislature which asked that federal troops remain for a short period until the state police could be organized and equipped to handle the situation. 1914, Colorado Coal Strike. At the request of the governor, President Wilson sent troops to stop rioting but only after considerable negotiation and exploring of avenues of peaceful resolution by government representatives failed. 1919, Race Riots in Washington, D.C. and Omaha. Gary Steele Strike. On the theory that the service by the National Guard in the war left the states without adequate protection against internal disorders, the Secretary of War instructed commanders of the departments to respond to state requests for assistance. The use of federal troops in 1919 was without a proclamation or other formalities. 1921, West Virginia coal mine warfare. President Harding was requested by the governor to intervene. The president stated that he was not justified in using federal military forces until he was assured the state had exhausted all its resources. A subsequent outburst of violence resulted in a proclamation and order to dispatch federal troops. The troops met no resistance and disarmed the miners. 1932, The Bonus Army. Needy veterans who came to Washington to seek veterans' bonus legislation were housed in tents, shacks, and government buildings which were being demolished. The Treasury Department attempted to repossess a government building in order to continue demolition, resulting in a clash between the veterans and police. The district commissioners asked the president for assistance and the army moved in, cleared the buildings, and destroyed the shacks. No proclamation was issued. 1943, Detroit race riots. The governor advised that the state was unable to suppress domestic violence. The president issued a proclamation and federal troops were dispatched. 1967, Detroit riots. The most recent incident, of course, was the dispatch of federal troops to Detroit on July 24, 1967 at the request of the governor. President Johnson issued a proclamation and executive order pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title X, U.S. Code. End of Section 67. Section 68 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Betty B. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Commission Report. Appendices A through C. Appendix A, Executive Order 11365, establishing a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, July 29, 1967. By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows. Section 1, Establishment of the Commission. A, there is hereby established a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Here and after referred to as the Commission. B, the Commission shall be composed of the Honorable Otto Kerner, Chairman. The Honorable John V. Lindsay, Vice Chairman. Senator Fred R. Harris. Senator Edward W. Brooke. Congressman James C. Corman. Congressman William M. McCulloch. I. W. Abel. Charles B. Thornton. Roy Wilkins. The Honorable Catherine Graham Petten. Herbert Jenkins. The President from time to time may appoint additional members to the Commission. Section 2, Functions of the Commission. A, the Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to, one, the origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, including the basic causes and factors leading to such disorders and the influence, if any, of organizations or individuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence. 2, the development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders, including the improvement of communications between local authorities and community groups. The training of state and local law enforcement and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot situations and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and governmental units which may become involved in such situations. 3, the appropriate role of the local, state and federal authorities in dealing with civil disorders and, 4, such other matters as the President may place before the Commission. Section 3, Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies. The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of the Chairman, from any Executive Department or agency, any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this order. Each Department or agency is authorized to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds to furnish information and assistance to the Commission. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in particular, shall provide investigative information and assistance. Section 4, Compensation, Personnel and Finance. A. Members of the Commission who are members of Congress shall receive no additional compensation by virtue of membership on the Commission. But, as permitted by law, may be reimbursed for travel, subsistence and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission. Other members of the Commission shall receive $100 per day when engaged in the performance of duties pursuant to this order and shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law 5 USC 5703 for persons intermittently employed. B. The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions and is authorized to obtain services in accordance with the provisions of 5 USC 3109. C. All necessary expenses incurred in connection with the work of the Commission shall be paid from the Emergency Fund for the President or such other appropriated funds as may be available for the purposes of the Commission. Section 6, Administrative Services. The General Services Administration shall provide administrative services for the Commission on a reimbursable basis. Section 7, Reports and Termination. The Commission shall make an interim report as to its findings effect not later than March 1, 1968 and shall present its final report and recommendations not later than one year from the date of this order. It shall terminate upon presenting its final report and recommendations. Lyndon B. Johnson, the White House, July 29, 1967. Appendix B. Remarks of the President upon issuing an Executive Order establishing a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, July 29, 1967. This morning I have welcomed the members of the Commission on Civil Disorders to the White House for its first meeting. The Commission is chaired by Governor Kerner of Illinois. The Vice Chairman is Mayor Lindsey of New York. They are both here with me. I have commanded these 11 citizens for what they have agreed to do for this nation. They are undertaking a responsibility as great as any in our society. The civil peace has been shattered in a number of cities. The American people are deeply disturbed. They are baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence that has occurred both in small towns and great metropolitan centers. No society can tolerate massive violence any more than a body can tolerate massive disease and we in America shall not tolerate it. But just saying that does not solve the problem. We need to know the answers, I think, to three basic questions about these riots. What happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again? Beyond these basic questions, there are others. The answers to which can help our governors and our mayors, our chiefs of police and our citizens all over the country to cope with their immediate and their long range problems of maintaining order. Why riots occur in some cities and do not occur in others? Why one man breaks the law while another, living in the same circumstances, does not? To what extent, if any, there has been planning and organization in any of the riots? Why have some riots been contained before they got out of hand and others have not? How well equipped and trained are the local and state police and the state guard units to handle riots? How do police community relationships affect the likelihood of a riot or the ability to keep one from spreading once it has started? Who took part in the riots? What about their age, their level of education, their job history, their origins and their roots in the community? Who suffered most at the hands of the rioters? What can be done to help innocent people and vital institutions escape serious injury? How can groups of lawful citizens be encouraged, groups that can help to cool the situations? What is the relative impact of the depressed conditions in the ghetto, dobleness, family instability, poor education, lack of motivation or health care in stimulating people to riot? What federal, state and local programs have been most helpful in relieving those depressed conditions? What is the proper public role in helping cities repair the damage that has been done? What effect do the mass media have on the riots? What we are really asking for is a profile of the riots, of the rioters, of their environment, of their victims, of their causes and effects. We are asking for advice on short-term measures that can prevent riots, better measures to contain riots once they begin, and long-term measures that will make them only a sorted page in our history. I know this is a tall order. One thing should be absolutely clear. This matter is far, far too important for politics. It goes to the health and safety of all American citizens, Republicans and Democrats. It goes to the proper responsibilities of officials in both of our parties. It goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and of great stress. I think the composition of this commission is proof against any narrowness of partisanship. You will have all the support and cooperation you need from the federal government as the chairman and the vice chairman lead this commission in this study. Sometimes various administrations have set up commissions that were expected to put the stamp of approval on what the administration believed. This is not such a commission. We are looking to you not to approve our own notions but to guide us and to guide the country through a thicket of tension, conflicting evidence, and extreme opinion. So, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, let your search be free. Let it be untrammeled by what has been called the conventional wisdom. As best you can, find the truth, the whole truth, and express it in your report. I hope you will be inspired by a sense of urgency but also conscious of the danger that lies always in hasty conclusions. The work that you do ought to help guide us, not just this summer, but for many summers to come and for many years to come. Thank you. Appendix C excerpts from President Lyndon B. Johnson's address to the nation on civil disorders, July 27, 1967. My fellow Americans, we have endured a week such as no nation should live through, a time of violence and tragedy. For a few minutes tonight, I want to talk about that tragedy and I want to talk about the deeper questions it raises for us all. I am tonight appointing a special advisory commission on civil disorders. Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois has agreed to serve as chairman. Mayor John Lindsay of New York will serve as vice chairman. Fred R. Harris, Senator from Oklahoma. Edward B. Brooke, United States Senator from Massachusetts. James C. Corman, U.S. Representative from California. 22nd District, Los Angeles. William M. McCulloch, U.S. Representative from the state of Ohio, the 4th District. I.W. Abel, the President of the United Steelworkers. Charles B. Thornton, the President, Director and Chairman of the Board of Litton Industries, Incorporated. Roy Wilkins, the Executive Director of the NAACP. Catherine Graham Pedden, the Commissioner of Commerce of the State of Kentucky. Herbert Jenkins, the Chief of Police, Atlanta, Georgia. The commission will investigate the origins of the recent disorders in our cities. It will make recommendations to me, to the Congress, to the state governors and to the mayors for measures to prevent or contain such disasters in the future. In their work, the commission members will have access to the facts that are gathered by Director Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI will continue to exercise its full authority to investigate these riots in accordance with my standing instructions and continue to search for evidence of conspiracy. But even before the commission begins its work and even before all the evidence is in, there are some things that we can tell about the outbreaks of this summer. First, let there be no mistake about it. The looting, arson, plunder and pillage, which have occurred, are not part of the civil rights protest. There is no American right to loot stores or to burn buildings or to fire rifles from the rooftops. That is crime and crime must be dealt with forcefully and swiftly and certainly under law. Innocent people, Negro and white, have been killed. Damage to property owned by Negroes and whites is calamitous. Worst of all, fear and bitterness which have been loosed will take long months to erase. The criminals who committed these acts of violence against the people deserve to be punished and they must be punished. Explanations may be offered, but nothing can excuse what they have done. There will be attempts to interpret the events of the past few days. But when violence strikes, then those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job. Not to analyze, but to end disorder. That they must seek to do with every means that they're command. Through local police, state officials and in extraordinary circumstances where local authorities have stated that they cannot maintain order with their own resources. Then through federal power that we have limited authority to use. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to issue new training standards for riot control procedures immediately to National Guard units across the country. Through the Continental Army Command, this expanding training will begin immediately. The National Guard must have the ability to respond effectively, quickly and appropriately in conditions of disorder and violence. Those charged with the responsibility of law enforcement should and must be respected by all of our people. The violence must be stopped quickly, finally and permanently. It would compound the tragedy, however, if we should settle for order that is imposed by the muzzle of a gun. In America, we seek more than the uneasy calm of martial law. We seek peace based on one man's respect for another man and upon mutual respect for law. We seek a public order that is built on steady progress in meeting the needs of all of our people. Not even the sternest police action or the most effective federal troops can ever create lasting peace in our cities. The only genuine long range solution for what has happened lies in an attack mounted at every level upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are. Ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions not because we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America. This is not a time for angry reaction. It is a time for action, starting with legislative action to improve the life in our cities. The strength and promise of the law are the surest remedies for tragedy in the street. But laws are only one answer. Another answer lies in the way our people will respond to these disturbances. There is a danger that the worst toll of this tragedy will be counted in the hearts of Americans in hatred, in insecurity, in fear, in heated words which will not end the conflict but prolong it. So let us acknowledge the tragedy, but let us not exaggerate it. Let us look about tonight. Let us look at ourselves. We will see these things. Most Americans, Negroes and white are leading decent responsible and productive lives. Most Americans, Negro and white seek safety in their neighborhoods and harmony with their neighbors. Nothing can destroy goodwill more than a period of needless strife and suspicion between the races. Let us condemn the violent few, but let us remember that it is law abiding Negro families who have really suffered most at the hands of the rioters. It is responsible Negro citizens who hope most fervently and need most urgently to share in America's growth and prosperity. This is not the time to turn away from that goal. To reach it will require more than laws, more than dollars. It will take renewed dedication and understanding in the heart of every citizen. I know there are millions of men and women tonight who are eager to heal the wounds that we have suffered. Who want to get on with the job of teaching and working and building America. I call upon every American to search his own heart. To those who are tempted by violence, I would say this. Think again. Who is really the loser when violence comes? Whose neighborhood is made of shambles? Whose life is threatened most? If you choose to tear down what other hands have built, you will not succeed. You will suffer most from your own crimes. You will learn that there are no victors in the aftermath of violence. The apostles of violence, with their ugly drumbeat of hatred, must know that they are now heading for disaster. And every man who really wants progress or justice or equality must stand against them and their miserable virus of hate. For other Americans, especially those in positions of public trust, I have this message. Yours is the duty to bring about a peaceful change in America. If your response to these tragic events is only business as usual, you invite not only disaster, but dishonor. My fellow citizens, let us go about our work. Let us clear the streets of rubble and quench the fires that hatred set. Let us feed and care for those who have suffered at the rider's hands, but let there be no bonus or reward or salutes for those who have inflicted that suffering. Let us resolve that this violence is going to stop and there will be no bonus to flow from it. We can stop it. We must stop it. We will stop it. And let us build something much more lasting. Faith between man and man. Faith between race and race. Faith in each other and faith in the promise of beautiful America. Let us pray for the day when mercy and truth are met together. Righteousness and peace have kissed each other. Let us pray and let us work for better jobs and better housing and better education that so many millions of our own fellow Americans need so much tonight. Let us then act in the Congress, in the city halls and in every community so that this great land of ours may truly be one nation under God with liberty and justice for all. End of section 68.