 That the, in effect, the alternative is to risk the loss of the personnel and the planes that are denied or move Marines in? Yes, sir. That's the alternative. Now the risk is, it's just medium. I don't think it's a high risk because I don't believe the Vietcong are going to attack Denang in great strength, but they were 40 miles away today, southwest to Denang, having fairly substantial strength and giving a hell of a fight to the South Vietnamese forces at that point. And the cable, the last cable that came in in the morning said the fight had not yet broken off, so that's getting pretty close. And they've been infiltrating in the hills behind Denang in large numbers over the past several months, and the intelligence estimates all give them a larger capability than they have yet exercised. So this is the risk. Now here's what depresses me. There remains a question in our minds as to how we can just open the door to readiness for talks. This is a point on which both Dean and Bob especially are quite concerned. They both feel for somewhat different reasons that it is important to show that we are ready to talk about Vietnam, always on our own terms, but in all appropriate international channels. They point out that in one sense that is what we're doing, the ambassadors. But Bob goes a lot further. He believes that we should find a way to have real talks in an international meeting. I think his motivation is we'll need a conference table if things go worse as he expects. Dean and Bob both feel that to hold some of our allies we may need to be less rigid about talks than we have in the last 10 days. He predicts the pressure which is visible today is from the British, who are nervous by one sub-cabinet resignation and a lot are yammering from their own churches and McGoverns. What the British want is to make some explorations toward the possibility of talks and to say that they have been here in consultation with you. This is not an urgent matter over the weekend, if only because Wilson is bond, but it will be up for judgment now next week. My own opinion on the diplomatic front is that we can always get to the conference table and we need to and there's no great hurry. Dean agrees though he wants to keep the British happy. I think there's a lot to be said for detailed careful study and so on and so forth. Dean's background or yesterday went a little way in this direction and we would all be helped by knowing your reaction to the resulting stories. Well my reaction is, ain't a damn better use of going out and bombing all morning and tell them all afternoon you didn't mean it and you ought to talk at a conference table. President, what my position is that we're drifting from day to day here and we ought to have inside the government some thought as to what we're going to say tomorrow and the next day and next week and so we don't get backgrounders like that of yesterday. Which as you say... I called them and they say that there's nothing in there. It's that toll. It's just not correct. This is a pure New York Times deal to bring us to the conference table. Well Russ didn't say a thing in the world and the New York Times and Chalmers Post just got together at Chalmers Robertson and played it that way as a kind of a propaganda move. I don't know. They're Russ out of town, balls there and they got no notes of it. Well I don't know either. And Ball said he heard it though and that Russ said exactly what he had said all the time for the last two years. That's when they left their neighbors alone there'd be no problem. But until that there's no use of having nothing to talk about. And I thought that's the line and I think I'd just take that line all the time. Now he wants to know my reaction. This is Bundy. It's a three page memo. I told him first I don't know how to stop this Wilson but if he thinks I'm going to be here and let Wilson use my platform to talk about my consulting with him about where to have a conference. He's crazy as hell. I have to go hide to hold up the Johnson City. I'm not sure to do it. And he better tell him that and I told Ball that too. Now on the Marines the answer is yes if there's no other alternative. I'm sorry that the general was wrong. I think that the dangers are maybe 60-40 against our getting involved in a big war with them as the Marines fighting with the Viet Cong and really starting the land war. I don't think that's necessarily follows our sending them there to guard these things that might prevent it. But the psychological impact of the Marines are coming. There's going to be a bad one. And I know enough not to know that. And I know that every mother is going to say oh this is it. And I know it. What we've done with these B-57s is just going to be Scundi school stuff compared to the Marines. And all they're going to do is be a policeman and damned if I don't know why we can't find some kind of policeman besides the Marines. Because a Marine is a guy that's got a dagger in his hand. And it's going to put the plague up. And an Army boy is not so much. And a Navy boy is not so much. But when we George Reed you said the Marines coming in Mississippi I damn near had to evacuate to White House. I know. When I said the boy with the White Jersey is coming in there's a hell of a lot of difference. We straight it out in 21 hours. And I just point that up. I don't dodge the question. I've been it seems to me that we ought to be able to find some way besides the Marine uniform. But I would certainly in my announcement then if I had to do it and this is the only way the Joint Chiefs can figure it out. I'd certainly say that this is a group, a security group somewhere or a policeman group whatever you call these fellas. You took the what's called group did you take out of there a thousand one time? Security battalions. That one what did you call them? What did you call them? MP battalions. That's right MPs. Well these aren't MPs. We can't call them that. But we can call them security battalions. Can't you call them security battalions? Say similar to MPs that preserve security? No sir we can't really say that. But we can say security. That's clear now. They're quite different from the MPs and all the press knows that we just be accused of falsifying the story. Well we'll just go with it and we know what we're walking into. And if rather than have it said well we wanted protection by plane he wouldn't give it to us and I answered yes. But my judgments no. Well I agree with you and I told the members of Congress I talked to Mr. President that was exactly the problem and I didn't say to them we decided to do it. Mansfield told me well he said you've decided to do it and I appreciate being informed. I said no we haven't decided to do it. Mike I'm calling to get your opinion. He said I said I'm cold as hell to this myself. I'm just telling you that the field command is recommended. Can't think of any other solution. And I'd like to know what you think. That I hate to see this done. And then he went on. I was trying to push him around reluctantly agreeing and I got him sort of half agreed but he'll fall off if anybody attacks him. I'm sure of that. All right we'll take care of this President. When are you going to issue the order? Well we should do it this afternoon. I'm just so scared that something will happen out there. When are you going to announce it? Well we'll make it late today so it'll miss some of the morning additions and then there's no afternoon addition on Sunday. I'll handle it in a way that will minimize the announcement but there's going to be a lot of headlines on it when it comes out this afternoon. Are you telling me? Okay all right then.