 Welcome, everyone. We're here today for a very special discussion on the 20th anniversary of the invasion of Iraq by the United States. Steve Hadley has served on the board of the United States Institute of Peace three times, including a seven-year term as the chair of the board of directors. Before that, Steve was the deputy national security advisor when the decision was taken to invade Iraq and then served for four years as the national security advisor from 2005 to 2009. Steve, thank you for being with us. Nice to be with you. We'd like to use the next few minutes to talk about the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. We're very particularly interested, 20 years on. And whether you think the decision to go into Iraq was the right one, and whether if you got to do it again, you would argue for the same decision. Well, these, it's a pleasure to be here. Those are tough questions, but they're fair questions to ask. There's a view out there for many folks that we went into Iraq to spread democracy out of the barrel of a gun. That was not the case. We went into Iraq because of national security reasons and concerns for the United States and for our friends and allies in the region. People have forgotten that there were 17 UN Security Council resolutions, 17 of them that called for Saddam Hussein to stop pursuing weapons of mass destruction, stop supporting terror, stop tyrannizing his people, and stop invading his neighbors. And those were serious national security concerns that were behind the decision the president made. Of course, one of the principal things that was of concern to the United States was the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. We thought from the intelligence that he had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and had an active nuclear weapon program. That turned out to be not the case. That intelligence was wrong. Had we known at the time that that was not the case, despite all the other terrible things Saddam Hussein was doing, I think the country would not have gone to war. I think President Bush couldn't have taken the country to war, even if he had wanted to. You remember the decision to go to war was supported by substantial bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate. Had we known there was no WMD, I'm confident we could not have had those substantial majorities. And the authorization from Congress would not have been there. And the president I think would not have been able to take the country to war. But he did. And we went to war in 2003. We removed Saddam Hussein and removed what we thought was a serious national security challenge to the region, to our friends and allies in the region and to the United States. The question then became, what next? What now? And what we heard from the Iraqi people now liberated from decades of brutal tyranny under Saddam Hussein, and people have forgotten how brutal his rule was, using chemical weapons against his Kurdish populations, brutally putting down his Shia uprising after the first Gulf War in 1980 and 1990. So once Saddam Hussein was gone, the Iraqi people had the first chance to articulate a vision for their own future. And interestingly enough, it was a vision for a democratic state where Sunni, Shia and Kurds could work together for a common future. And we, the U.S. administration, embraced that vision. Why was that? One, because it was consistent with our own values. You know, we're the United States of America. We were founded on the basis of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law. Every war we have ever fought in our history has been in the name of those values. So for when the Iraqis made clear that they wanted a democratic future, it was natural for the president to say, look, let's not just substitute one dictator for another, let's support the Iraqi people in their effort to build a democratic future. We also felt that the only way Iraq was going to stay together as a country was in a democratic framework, because otherwise it was going to fall into the pattern that we've seen elsewhere in the Middle East. Sunnis either oppressed Shia, Shia oppressed Sunnis, and both of them tended to beat up on the Kurds. And the opportunity was to have a country in the Middle East escape that history. That's what the Iraqis seemed to want, and that's what we was consistent with our values, and what we thought was the best way to leave Iraq as a unified country. That effort was not as successful as we had hoped, to say the least in history has shown it. And one of the reasons was a failure on our part from 2003 and 2007 to stabilize the situation in the post-conflict state. There was initial looting, there was an insurgency, that insurgency was accelerated, and the violence was accelerated by al-Qaeda, which provoked Sunnis, Shia, to retaliate against Sunnis, and really helped fuel what became close to a civil war in Iraq. And during this period from 2003 to 2007, we were unable to put that down. And that is a huge failure on the part of the United States in undermining our credibility, but more to the point it cost Iraqis lives, treasure, disruption, economic progress, and it deferred that vision and made more difficult to accomplish that vision that the Iraqis articulated for themselves. It took us until the surge decision in January of 2007 for us to figure out a different strategy, which ultimately over time defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq, brought the level of violence down to the point that it was no longer a strategic threat to the Iraqi people, and it allowed politics to resume. The security situation improved to the point where President Obama in 2011 pulled all U.S. troops out of Iraq. We were gone. Security and sovereignty was in the hands of the Iraqi people. Everyone talks about Iraq as an endless war for the United States. Well, that war for the United States ended in 2011, but what happened? Our pulling out of our troops, our reducing our focus on Iraq, was an invitation to Prime Minister Maliki to pursue a more sectarian, pro-Shia agenda that alienated the Sunnis. He also politicized his military, so when al-Qaeda reconstituted itself as ISIS in Syria beginning after 2011, in 2014 they were in a position to come into Iraq and take control of 40% of the country in an effort to try to establish a caliphate in the regions they controlled in Syria and Iraq. At that point, President Obama makes a decision. President Obama, not President Bush, makes a decision in 2014 to put U.S. troops back into Iraq, not as a combat role, not as tens of thousands of troops, but a number of troops that would be sufficient to support the Iraqi people and the Iraqi security forces in their effort from 2014 to 2018 to kick out ISIS and reclaim control of their country. And the Iraqi security forces with the support of the Iraqi people and support of U.S. military, but also a number of paramilitary groups, some of them supported by Iran, succeeded, but it's a huge accomplishment for the Iraqi people because the end of the day they liberated themselves from the challenge of ISIS. So this is now 2018. Subsequent to 2018, things have not gone easily for the Iraqi people. If you think about what they've been through, decades of brutal territory by Saddam Hussein, the dislocation of our invasion, our failure to stabilize the situation for four years, then the occupation by ISIS, the struggle against ISIS, finally succeeding in 2018 and then of course they've got a meddling neighbor from Iran which is using its influence with Iranian-backed militia in Iraq to destabilize the country. They've got fluctuations in oil prices, they've got the COVID crisis. This is a country that has been through enormous suffering and yet it is held together. It has had over six free and fair elections that have resulted in peaceful transitions of power. Yes, the Iraqi people are getting disillusioned with his democracy that fails to produce the kind of standard of living and life they hoped for. The participation rates have fallen, but the country is held together. We now have a Shia coalition that is governing that country and a Shia prime minister who interestingly enough came to the United States and told the American president that we want U.S. troops to stay in Iraq in a role of supporting and training the Iraqi forces and is a balance against the influence of these Iranian-backed Shia militia. We still have a role to play. The Iraqi government is struggling to meet the needs of their people and the demands of their people, but it's not without some progress. It looks like they're going to finally agree on a budget deal. It looks like Masoud Barzani is talking about how we may finally get an oil deal after 15 years, something that you wrestled with in your career, at least. So I have not given up on Iraq. The cost has been way too high for everyone, but I think there is a chance that the Iraqi people may surprise us all and actually realize that initial vision that they had and that we supported of a democratic Iraq in which Sunni Shia and Kurds are working together for a common future. And if they succeed, that is a powerful example for the region. There were years when the international community tried every available diplomatic and economic measure to persuade and compel the Iraqi leadership to change their behavior. You mentioned the resolutions that the United Nations passed, the sanctions that had been imposed, and yet none of them worked to effect. And as you reflected, it was very clear that there came a moment where the Bush administration had to decide whether it would use military power in order to tip the balance. When that decision was taken, there were people in the United States and all across the world that doubted the wisdom of that decision, that protested. When the decision was taken, how did the administration weigh the concerns of so many people across the globe with the threats that you saw and the determination to use military measures to tip the balance in a democratic direction for the people of Iraq? Well, it's interesting that you should raise those issues. Richard Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has talked about this notion of wars of necessity and wars of choice. You know, it's my life experience that anytime someone says to you it's either or, it's always some of both. But I think in the case of Iraq, it's a different model. Because of the factors you suggested, I say to people Iraq was a war of last resort. We had been at this business of trying to get Saddam Hussein to honor 16 UN Security Council resolutions and to show that he had no weapons of mass destruction, stop supporting terror, stop invading his neighbors, stop tyrannizing his people. And to enforce that, we used our diplomacy. We used no fly zone in the north and southern part of the country. We had dumb sanctions, smart sanctions, smarter sanctions. We had various inspection regimes. Under President Clinton in 1998, regime change became the policy of the United States because for almost 10 years we had struggled with Saddam Hussein. And we continued to struggle with him for five more years under the Bush, two more under Clinton and three under the Bush administration to try to get compliance. President Clinton even used military force against Iraq in order to get the inspectors back in. President Bush pursued all those measures, but he also tried coercive diplomacy. He tried to increase U.S. military presence in the region to convince Saddam Hussein to either comply or leave the country. And I think to this day he thinks it might have worked. We got the 17th UN Security Council resolution, 15 and 0, with the support of, by the way, both France and Russia, which called for Saddam to comply, demonstrate compliance on pain of serious consequences. And Bush thought that actually that coercive diplomacy would succeed until February of 2003, one month before he invaded, when President Chirac of France and President Putin of Russia and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany said that under no circumstances would they support the use of military force against Iraq. And at that point coercive diplomacy was over. Saddam Hussein thought he had to get out of jail free card because he thought Bush would not go to war without yet another UN Security Council resolution. He made a bad judgment in that respect. And the 18th resolution, of course, would be not possible because he knew he had in his pocket a veto from both Russia and France. So Bush at that point is faced with the following choice. I can say to Saddam Hussein, we were just kidding. 17 UN Security Council resolutions don't matter. And we could pull our troops home. Sanctions would have come off. The inspectors who went into Iraq and found that there were no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction or active nuclear program also said that once Saddam was out of sanctions he would resume those programs. And it would have been interesting what the Middle East would have looked like with Saddam still in power, not chastened by his experience of 12 years but probably empowered by it and potentially in a race with Iran to see who could get a nuclear weapon first, not particularly as a prescription for stability in the Middle East. So Bush could either take that option or he could use those forces he had built up to enforce the writ of the international community under 17 UN Security Council resolutions and remove Saddam Hussein from power. And he decided to take the following option. Yes, there were demonstrations abroad. There were fewer demonstrations in the United States and of course that meant more to the president. But the presidents have to make tough decisions in difficult circumstances and listen to the voices of the demonstrators but also make some judgments about what is really in the long-term national interests of the United States and what will contribute to the stability in the region where we have a lot of friends and allies and he made the judgment that removing Saddam is the right course. Steve, when the president made the decision to invade Iraq it was a very different Middle East than it is now. The U.S. was clearly the dominant power in the region. We were the chief provider of security and we were at the same time the chief promoter of peace. Things are very different now. As you look at the new Middle East and the role that the U.S. has played is playing and perhaps what we should be playing what do you think we should be doing as a country? Well, the history here is very important and we've now had three presidents President Obama, President Trump, and now President Biden who have said that the United States needs to reduce its profile in the Middle East, reduce its investment in the Middle East so it can turn its attention to problems elsewhere. For example, Russia going into Ukraine yet again in 2022 and of course the emergence of China. Now there are a lot of reasons for that and many people will say with some justice that both Americans and the region were disappointed at the result of the major invasion and the events that followed are going into Iraq and there's some justice to that. But the Middle East has heard that and they've also basically American people have heard three presidents in a row say that Iraq was the biggest mistake the United States has ever made in recent memory. But the message to the region has unfortunately been heard and it has caused the region to conclude, our friends and allies there, that they can't rely on the United States that the United States is either unwilling or incapable giving the results in Iraq in the short run to play the role they had hoped. So they're changing their diplomacy and their mantra is everybody is now going to talk to everybody and you want no problems with your neighbors. You have had the UAE for example deciding that it's time to outreach to Erdogan and Turkey. UAE is of course very concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood and thinks that Turkey has been the big support of the Muslim Brotherhood but nonetheless they've decided to reconcile to Turkey. The Gulf States have reconciled to Qatar. Saudi Arabia is now going to reestablish diplomatic relations under the auspices of China. This is an evidence of the Middle East repositioning itself and it reflects of course the emergence of China as the principal buyer of Saudi oil and also a China that is much more aggressive and wants to play not just an economic role but a diplomatic role in the Middle East. But that doesn't mean the region doesn't still want the United States to play a role. They do and it's interesting that at the same time the Saudis under Chinese sponsorship were talking to the Iranians about reestablishing diplomatic relations. They're also talking to Israel in the United States about an Abraham Accord. Another of these agreements between Israel and Arab states so far including UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan to normalize relations between these Arab states and what they viewed as a historic enemy, Israel. That deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel depends in some sense on the United States giving Saudi some assurances. What are the Saudis asking for? They want some security guarantees from the United States. They want support for civil nuclear power. They want an easing of our ability to get weapons transferred to those countries in the Middle East. So the United States still has a role to play. It's very much in our interest to play that role. It's very different from the role we played in the run up to the Iraq war. There's no question about that. And my worry is that even though the expectations have been reduced by our friends and allies in the region including Israel, I worry that we are unwilling to play the role, even the reduced role that they expect of us. And that will sadly further diminish our role in the region and I think that is not good for American values and I think it's not good for American interests. As you think back on what we accomplished through the invasion and what the cost was, you reflected candidly with us on how you see some of those issues. If you in the end had to make a determination about whether it was the right thing to do or whether it was a mistake, what would you say? You know, there's this probably apocryphal story of Henry Kissinger talking to Joe Enlai and saying to him, what is your judgment about the consequences of the French Revolution, Joe? And I said, too soon to tell. You know, I think the thing we have to remember is the story of Iraq is not over. It's in the hands of the Iraqi people. And as I said before, I have some confidence that they may end of the day, they make it. But that's not to say that we handled it the way we should have. The costs were much too high for the United States. For all that coalition of countries that joined us, people forget that it was not simply a unilateral U.S. action. But a lot of friends and allies joined us as well. The cost to all of them was too high but most importantly, the cost to the Iraqi people was much too high. There's no doubt about that. Whether in the end of the day that cost will even be remotely justified by the results, it depends on what happens in Iraq and it depends on what happens in the region. And that story is still unfolding. Steve, thank you for spending time with us. Allow me a very personal comment. Thank you for the exceptional leadership that you have provided to the United States Institute of Peace. It's a privilege and an honor to serve with you and to have you with us here today. It's been a real pleasure. Thanks so much.