 Thank you very much, Professor Kampu. This was both stimulating and wide-ranging, as it should, on this occasion. And it is now time to move on to the questions and answers section. And what I'm proposing is that we take three questions at a time and then give Professor Kampu the possibility of commenting on these three questions. I should say that we would appreciate if you would say clearly your name and also relevant institutional contact or affiliation. And let me also add that this event is webcast, so there may also be questions from those who are sitting around the globe. Good morning, Mr. Moderator, Professor Kampu. My name is Noel Gonzalez from the Mexican delegation here at the UN, dealing with the second committee. First of all, let me tell you that your interventions are usually very provocative and very useful in the endeavors that we undertake and in the discussions that we usually hold in the frame of the UN. We are, in a sense, looking for a place for the UN in the international discussion on these matters, and having such an insightful presentation is always very, very useful. Having said that and having stated how much my delegation and myself, we appreciate your intervention and your very clever opinions on these issues. I would like to raise a couple of questions, which are a little bit more provoking just to have your reactions and your thoughts on a couple of issues. First of all, on the concept of elite multilateralism, of course I am Mexican. My country has the opportunity to participate in the G20. And as such, we do not see, we do not completely share the view that was just stated by you. We do believe that the G20 and other efforts are, of course, important, of course, ways to approach and to respond to the current challenges. And we believe that, in a sense, they are aimed at being efficient and effective and provide a quick response that perhaps without them wouldn't have been possible. Perhaps wouldn't have we had the G20, would have we waited until the multilateral system would be as perfect as you were just pointing out. Perhaps we would have gotten really deeper into the crisis and we would be absolutely in a very worst situation than we are today. So, from our perspective, the mandates of the multilateral institutions and of these kind of institutions are complementary and they shouldn't be competing. On the issue of conditionalities and depth, my question would be very simple. Don't you think that if we would promote completely conditionality-free or depth-forgiveness mechanism just as such, we would be compensating for not very responsible economic behavior. Wouldn't we be promoting perhaps even more instability by just giving away things? And a third question which is more related to a discussion that we are having in the frame of the United Nations now in the second committee, which has to do with the creation of a panel of experts on international economic affairs. There has been a lot of arguing about how this event panel would be, for instance, duplicative or dealing with divisive ideas and not really pruning for consensus. There has been comments in the sense that good ideas naturally arise to the surface and are taken over within the existing mechanisms. What would be your response to that kind of comments? Thank you. Daniela from the United Nations Population Fund. Thank you very much for the inviting lecture. I have just one quick question. I'm wondering whether you could elaborate on the effect of your proposals for development and particularly for the implications on its implications for the development aid system as we know it today in terms of both multilateral and bilateral aid. Thank you. Bob Larick, I work with the NGO community on an interfaith whole list of good government and interfaith business security and development alliance in the mental health community. Thank you for your presentation. I agree with what you've been saying and the issues of biases not only against Keynesian and working on these issues myself and promoting most of them. Don't we need a UN that's capable of dealing with the biases in general, not just the Keynesian ones and whatever makes us dysfunctional and the importance of the UN and involving the human condition and the ideas of all God's children, one human family, the meaning of the words in our lives, not just in Korea, Kasmir and Jerusalem and the women's issues but reconciling the one human family and what we need to do to have a more rational UN and global systems generally, going to a mental health function this evening on rational motor behavior therapy. But the idea of win-win collaborative approaches rather than the overly nationalistic and overly competitive orientations generally, which don't we need to transform to a more common good orientation. Thank you. Jose Antonio, do you want to? Let me start in the reverse order to say that I agree that any major reform effort has to include the United Nations at the center. I said the United Nations system because I want to underscore that point that it has to be also the IMF and the World Bank as part of the United Nations system. So yes, you have to think of how to build collaborative frameworks of different sort. On the development aid system, it was not part of my presentation, simply because I think it's a different topic. Very important by itself, you know, but it's not part of the discussion going on. In fact, the way I address I even deleted in my presentation the whole area which is financial regulation, simply because that's an area where most action has taken place. So that's why it concentrated on other issues. Now one implication of my proposals is that the, not the aid system as such, but the multilateral development banks could benefit from this reform through this thing that I call the development link in the international monetary system. That is to a mechanism that would allow the IMF to invest in development bank bonds of different characters. But that's one implication. Of course, for a whole, a full architecture, you need to think of that obvious and very important element of the financial system in the broader sense of the term. Now let me refer to the first two points of the delegate from Mexico to say that I don't mean by any means to imply that the G20 has not played a very useful function. I mean, I think it has. So I have no question that it has been effective. But I just don't feel it is the sort of institution that the world needs on a stable basis. And I'll just mention two, and I'm going to, you know, mention a few countries which I probably should not in a UN meeting, but since I am an independent researcher being invited to speak, I feel free to do that. But one of the very, very peculiar implications is that the G20 has at the same time reinforced the IMF and destroyed a mechanism of IMF governance. Why do I mean that? You know, the IMF is based on a constituency system. So it's a grouping, it's a group of countries that have seats on the table, not individual countries. I mean, there are five members that have a right to be on the table. Now part of the reform is that everyone is going to be elected. Now that means that if a constitution is going to have a specific position, it has to be agreed by the constitution, not by the individual countries. That's the characteristic of that system. Now it just happens, and that's the time I'm going to mention countries. For instance, the constituency headed by Canada has all the Caribbean countries, the English Caribbean countries. Now has Canada talked with the constituency to agree on the positions that it's going to take in the IMF through the decisions of the G20? So it's destroyed. They're the same. Let's see, my country is part, as I mentioned, of the constitution headed by Brazil. As far as I know, my country has had no voice in the positions of Brazil, which I find sensible by the way, so I'm not complaining that the Brazilian positions are not sensible. But my country, which is part of the Brazilian constituency, should have a voice in that constituency, which it has not had. So the G20, at the same time, has reinforced the IMF and has destroyed the governance structures of the IMF. That's my view. And that's why it's not a consistent mechanism in the long term. And that's why I think it has to be brought into another arrangement. I actually think that it has to be a dual arrangement. For the IMF, it has to be actually one reform that I wasn't my slides, but I did not mention, which is a proposal of the this commission headed by Trevor Manuel, the former finance minister of South Africa, which is to give, to create a powerful ministerial meeting of the IMF. So many of the decisions taken by the G20 should actually be taken by the ministerial meeting of the IMF. And there should be a leaders forum, which is my proposal to bring to the United Nations. System, again. So that you have a sort of G20 of a formal character within the United Nations system family. So that's why I think that is more coherent with the structure. So I actually have no problems with G's of any character, so long as the G's are part of the multilateral system in the formal sense. So I think the G77 plays a very useful role in the United Nations. The G24 in the IMF and the World Bank. And you can think of the European, which always work as a grouping, work very well with him. But that's a different, so that's a way the Gs should operate within the multilateral system, not outside the multilateral system. That's why my concept of a little multilateralism does carry, as its name implies, some negative views. Thank you, Mr. President. Let me begin by congratulating Professor Kampo, someone whom I knew as under Secretary General Kampo in course of my participation at the Global Forum on Reinventing Governance. For especially, I think, speaking the truth to the power, quoting Will Dubiski here. I think you have done a wonderful job by in terms of highlighting the issues that we are required to know. And Professor Kampo, you have rightly put before us the dilemma whether we should continue to do the right things or we should get the things right. And I think your conclusion is very much in favour of getting things right and we are very supportive. And as a representative from Bangladesh and I have not introduced myself, my name is Najibur Rahman. I represent Bangladesh Mission at the ECOSOC. I am a delegate to the ECOSOC. And in this very room, many times, we have criticized GE20 for lacking legitimacy. So I think you have rightly done this job because the GE20 has not so far included voice and representation from the LDC countries. Having said this, Professor Kampo, I just want to connect you to one of the larger debates that we had in this building last week in the form of the parliamentary hearing in the context of economic recovery. And the parliamentarians from around the world has largely expressed their disappointment with the way IMF has been functioning by referring to the failure of a lot of structural adjustments programme. Unfortunately, you have not referred to any of that thing, especially how does IMF devise the structural programmes and when the programme fails, the country suffers. But none of the IMF staff was taken to task on this. So maybe your whole thesis of getting the discussion back to the IMF by merging the GE20 in a more democratic IMF structure will have to go a long way in terms of reforming the governing structure, something you have already hinted. So maybe some more commentary in that line would be welcome. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Well, first of all, I would like to express my deep appreciation for the intervention and presentation of Professor O'Kampo. I am from the Venezuelan Mission. I am a second committee expert and have been coordinating for G77. It's position for international action system and financing matters. Well, first of all, I just want to say that we feel in the same way that we should place SDRs in the centre. And particularly the group associates the highest relevance to liquidity, issuing mechanisms without conditionalities. And particularly we see that the SDR has a fundamental role associated with the global reserve system. The matter would be how to implement which are the steps forward to promote this role. We know that there are voices in the G20 that has underlined the need for having an open discussion without prejudice to this matter. And we hope that this could happen in the working group of the United Nations General Assembly to follow up the Financial Crisis Conference. We would like to listen, which would be your recommendations? How to focus that discussion in a way that could be the most productive and action-oriented in the ways UN produces responses, which is resolutions? Particularly you mentioned the need of working on the sub-regional mechanisms. Well, that's the position G77 has. State also has a complementary manner for issuing liquidity. And maybe it would be interesting to know, which is your particular feeling of if there is a real possibility of developing liquidity issuing mechanisms on regional financial systems. Complimentary, let's say, to the central system. Then the last would be just simply fully agree to your comment to the need of a leaders forum. There has been some conversations and formals regarding the possibility of having a highest level political meeting at Ecosoc. And it might bring to the UN the kind of discussions we have seen in G20. And with the benefit that obviously the Ecosoc or other UN process, it's a process based on the election of the members. So all members, you can attend. And there is a fair way to be part of it if the rest of the membership believes so. Also, we believe that that is complemented by the contributions of the working group. I will stop myself here. Just simply to underline that it's under discussion or resolution of the panel of experts and G77 support an independent technique assessment. So it will be important if you express, if you believe that it's possible, independent expert working on a daily base back to back with member states, thank you. And I'm with the University of Copenhagen. You've spoken a lot about what the IMF should do more of. Could you also elaborate a little bit on what it should do less of, either as part of the evolution of the institution, natural evolution of the institution, or in line with the earlier speaker, these institutional arrangements that you spoke of. Thanks. Well, let me first refer to the IMF. I know some of my, some people are skeptical about the IMF, including some of my best friends. So it's not the, so and they don't sometimes agree with my proposals, which is actually to work, you know, by, in a sense by making the IMF do the job for which it was created. You can read the first article of agreement. Actually, I had in my back, I brought it up, but I just don't have it with me at this moment. But it's quite interesting, just read the first article of the articles of agreement of the IMF. And then, you know, I think the institution that was created has broader functions. For instance, it actually starts with monetary cooperation. You know, it has A, B, C, D here. The A is monetary cooperation among countries. I think that it has always been taken out of the IMF by the major countries. So you had, that my point is let's meet that article of agreement. Let's start by doing that, okay? By doing what it says in letter A of the first article of agreement of the IMF, okay? So the problem is whether the, you know, you can create an institution that has more credibility. And yes, the IMF has to rebuild a lot of credibility. But in my view, it has taken some steps to do that. I mean, the reform of the quotas that I presented are a step forward. It's actually a major reform. It's more than it was expected a few years ago. In the reforms of last year in the trade lines, it actually eliminated the link between lending and structural conditionality. So still the IMF could still require structural conditionality, although it has been streamlined significantly. I mean, but you cannot tie disbursement of IMF loans to structural conditionality. That was part of the agreements of last year, which I think was a major step forward. And this issue that I called the eliminating the stigma is also something, I mean, you read it very regularly in the speeches of the IMF managing director today. Because at the end, that's what you need. I mean, in the world it's going to have an, I mean, for instance, let's go back to the problem of excessive accumulation of international reserves. That's one problem that the system has now. Now one way to correct that problem is actually to make credible the fact that, you know, when you are in an emergency, you will have access to the IMF without over burning conditionality. So, and that's what I think it has to be part of the reform effort. I think we have gone some way, but not entirely the way we have to go. That was my proposal that there should be some unconditional overdraft facilities that you want in the IMF. So, you know, you can think of many ways, but I think the, and of course, you have to make the institution more plural in its views, which is a criticism that many of us have had of the IMF in the past. But those are things that I think are possible now. I actually, in my view, are already happening. You know, you read some of the analysis by IMF, there is a significant change in the way the IMF perceives. So that's my answer to the two reference to the IMF. Let me just mention that in my proposal, ECOSOC is something different from my proposal of a UN system organization at the leaders level. For one basic reason, because ECOSOC performs other functions that you cannot transfer to that body. As you cannot transfer, in my view, and I think this is some of the problems I have with the G20, you should not transfer the decisions to be taken in the IMF board to a leaders forum of a limited character, because then you are replacing the institutional mechanism that you want to strengthen. And that's why, in a sense, ECOSOC will be more the internal UN head of the UN economic and social and environmental area, but it will have a leaders committee of some sort at the UN system level that will, in a sense, be mandating ECOSOC as well as it will be mandating the board of the IMF, or mandating the board of the World Bank, or mandating WTO, et cetera. So I see the ECOSOC as something which, as well as the IMF board or the World Bank board, will be subordinate to that new system organization. So that's why my proposal is different from the old ideas of transforming ECOSOC into an economic security council. I think that proposal, in my view, doesn't make sense. Okay, thank you. Francis, you are our link to the participants in the webcast. I understand there was at least one question. Yes, that's right. We have from Clark Mathews in the USA. We have a good Professor Ocampo speak to the problem of financial derivatives, which exponentially leverage the problems of hot money capital flows. Should the IMF ban or tax derivatives or capital flows? Some from you knew wider in Helsinki. In the first part of your very interesting lecture, Oze Antonio, one of the themes was the role of gold, which I believe Cain's referred to as the barbarous relic. A few weeks ago or a month ago, Bob Zolick of the World Bank suggested a completely different model for the global financial system with an enhanced role for gold. And I would be very interested in getting your comments on that. Thank you very much. And thank you to Professor Ocampo. I'm Andrea Cornia from the University of Florence. And thank you to Professor Ocampo for this very, I should say, reasonable proposals. And still I see a few points which may require more attention. A large part of the exchange rate volatility derives not from trade, but derives from capital movements. And the capital movements, the proposal you made concerning the way they're regulated seem to be quite mild. And I think that even if one looks at the measures introduced recently in Brazil or in Chile during the 1990s, I think they have limited effects. And so there is a problem of regulating the problem upstream, which is what the proud speaker mentioned. Now, the US is intervening in the regulation of the domestic, I mean, the US financial market. Now, the UK, for instance, and I've just spent three months there is very reluctant to do that. And so my fear is that we will remain with a problem which upstream is the one which determines large movement of speculative capitals because they might, itself, as we recognize it, with very large costs. And so I think that that should be a part of the proposal. Now, the second observation concerns your proposal about how to manage globally exchange rates. Well, first of all, one has to act on the capital account. Otherwise, we won't be able to maintain target zones. And the other thing is that currencies, when they are not upset by capital inflows of other similar shocks, basically they tend to fluctuate in areas. So there are countries which fluctuate with the Yen, countries which fluctuate with the Yuan, countries which fluctuate more or less along, they are semi-pegged. So perhaps one idea could be to regulate, establish a target zone among the major currencies. Six or seven points. And the last observation, I think that your proposal to bring together more than before the Yuan, World Bank, IMF, WTO, ILO, perhaps, I mean, these institutions have very different constituencies even with the current improvements. And I think there is still a risk of falling into a situation in which the Yuan constituency says one thing. The IMF, which has the money, says another thing. And the WTO, which has another governance system and another one. So they're bringing these institutions together, which would be very important from the point of view of the total global governance, requires a sort of an alignment, a better alignment of the governance among, across this different institution. Thank you for your very nice presentation. Let me start by answering the question of gold here, Tony Addison, by saying that I, as many others, was utterly surprised that the President of the World Bank would come with a proposal to revive the role of gold in the international monetary system. Simply because I think it has been a long-term process of demonetization of gold. And I think the decision of 1971 by the United States, by the President Nixon, was, in a sense, the last step in a process that would lead, finally, to the loss of gold, or the monetary role of gold. I mean, as many people commented after that, very strange proposal by the President of the World Bank, the gold, I mean, the gold standard died and died for good reasons, because it was not good system at the end. And one of the basic problems of the gold standard is that the supply of gold is not flexible enough in the short term. I mean, you need for good monetary management, you have to be able to increase money and reduce money when you, that's what the central bank do all the time. So you have to expand the supply of money and sometimes restrict the supply of money. That's something that the gold standard by itself lacks, or lacks in the past. And that's why with the monetization of gold, gold is essentially the quintessentially speculative commodity, because you cannot produce it in a substantial amount relative to the supply. So it's really absurd to propose to give back a role to gold again in the international monetary system. Now, I'll answer the question of derivatives actually as part of the questions raised by Andrea Cornia, by saying that in a sense, my proposals go exactly in that direction. And my proposal is that, of course, volatility in, for instance, the dollar-euro exchange rate is basically determined by capital flows. The volatility of emerging country currencies today are determined by capital flows. And that's why one of the five building blocks of my proposal has to be a system of regulation of the capital accounts. Except that I think that we have to go beyond the current system in which you essentially, anybody can do whatever they want, but financial markets pressure them to liberalize. That's what the system is now. Into a system in which you have some sort of common agreement on what is acceptable behavior, and that markets understand is acceptable behavior in regulating capital flows. That was my essential point. And I think that will be important for the issue of exchange rate volatility because the Europeans, my proposal is to do something like the Europeans did of having some target zones, some managed fluctuation of major currencies. That's exactly what my proposal is in the exchange rate system. Now, the role of derivatives. I mean, I didn't mention, and I guess I'm preparing to this lecture, I started by thinking a lot about talking about financial regulation, but I decided only to focus on two elements of the financial regulation that are relevant for my topics of the monetary reform, the other topics, let's say, of monetary reform, which is the issue of capital account regulations and the issue of debt workouts. So that those are the two issues in which I focus my attention on the five elements of my proposal. But of course, you can think, first of all, I totally agree that the derivatives have to be regulated. I think the direction of the recent reforms has been good. They run the risk of not being sufficient, but I am one of those who thinks that the derivative market has to be open, transparent, it has to be done not over the counter, but in explicit markets. That has to be subject to specific regulations, including some capital associated to the derivative operations, so as to avoid a pure derivative operation based exclusively on credit, which is extremely volatile behavior. And I guess the most important implication is that as part of the, for my framework, is that as part of what you think of the global monetary reform of global, which one of the elements is capital account regulations, we have to think of what to do with exchange rate derivatives, which is essentially part of that story. And in my view, exchange rate derivatives should be subject to a tougher regulation than other derivatives, and that you probably want to eliminate certain forms of entirely prohibit certain exchange rate derivatives. For instance, non-deliverables, which is one form of derivatives that I find particularly uncomfortable in foreign exchange markets. Thank you for your presentation, Professor Ocampo. Oscar Amigon, historian at City College of New York. My question is, when you talk about the international bankruptcy, I have just one question, is what role will the international bankruptcy system play in today's economy when it comes to specific countries facing economic meltdown? Could you please repeat the end of the question, maybe speak a little bit louder into the mic. I'm sorry. What role will the economic bankruptcy system play when it comes to specific countries facing economic meltdown in today's economy? I'm Roberto Flanquil from University of Buenos Aires. I thank you very much, José Antonio, for the sensible presentation and sensible proposals. I have one question. As far as institute, you are the reserve accumulation. Your hypothesis about reserve accumulation are strongly based on the idea that countries demand reserves because of precautionary motive. This, as you know, has been debated and suppose that this is not the main motive, but countries demand reserve because of a megalithic motive because they intervene in the exchange market in order to preserve re-election rate, depreciated or competitive re-election rate. If it is the case, the availability of a new line of liquidity will not take countries not to accumulate reserves. And if it is the situation, the part of your proposal related to exchange rate has a much more important role in the set of proposals. I thank you very much for your interesting and informative presentation. My name is Mujubao Luokome, and I teach political science at Brooklyn College. And I'm just wondering to what extent developing countries would gain increased voice in the proposal that you make about reforming the architecture. I'm African and I'm particularly concerned about Africa. To what extent are the issues that concern Africa and other developing areas going to be taking seriously in reforming the architecture since they don't really have that much power in the system as it is. On the first question, let me say that, of course, once a bankruptcy court is approved as an international treaty, it will be binding for any country that wants to come to the court. I'm afraid that process will take some time, so for that simple reason, countries under current difficulties will not be able to, in my view, benefit from that arrangement. And maybe some other ad hoc arrangements will have to be put in place, except that the history is that every time you have a crisis, you invent new ad hoc arrangements which is not the best way to develop a stable international system. I mean, after the Latin American crisis, we have the Brady and Baker plans, then we have, for low income countries, we have the HIPAA initiative and we have the multilateral relief initiative. And then you can think of many, many other things. I mean, you have unilateral restructuring processes. So my proposal is less develop a multilateral, like with common framework, and then use it, of course, for every single member of that arrangement. Now, on the question here, on the, by Professor Frankel, I am fortunately on the side that mercantilist policies are not the dominant policies in reserve accumulation. Actually, because if they were, if they were, they would be violating the principle that you cannot manipulate, you exchange rate for trade purposes. So I actually think that that's not the dominant. And I think there is a good lecture that agrees with me. And one very important factor that you see is that the largest amount of foreign interventions in foreign exchange markets take place actually when there is an excess inflow of capital. I mean, that's what you see empirically. And that's why I think the precautionary motive is really the important one. And that's why you have to think of a system that at the same time, following my previous answer, solve the problem of capital account regulations. And the exchange rate system. So as to avoid excessive fluctuations. So you have to tie the two things together. Now, I use, I think in my writings, I increasingly see precautionary motives in a much broader sense than other people. Because in many cases it's almost as preventing crisis in a very immediate way. So you have to have, from that point of view, many developing countries have now more reserves that they need in a very clear way. But the problem is a different one because every time you have a capital inflow, a new capital inflow, you may be forced to intervene. Even if you have excess reserves. Why? Because also for crisis prevention purposes, you want to avoid appreciation or your exchange rate, the generation of your current account, the deficit that you will lead to crisis. So the peculiar irrationality of the current system is that you are forced to accumulate more reserves that you will ever need basically because the system, in a sense tends to reinforce excessive capital flows. So you are forced to have excessive reserves to manage that problem. So that's why the preventive focus may actually lead to excessive flows. And so, excuse me, excessive capital inflows, which in turn may lead to more flows because you say, well, this is safe investor, you know, nobody will, everything that China with the level of reserves will face a balance of payment crisis. So you say, oh, we bring money to China because it's risk free in a sense from balance of payment crisis. So that you actually could actually enhance capital flows because of the self-insurance motive behind the reserve accumulation. Now the issue of voice of developing countries, I think what was done is a step forward. It's insufficient, certainly, in my view, and the issue of low income countries has to be taken into particular consideration. The basic point is that the only way to manage that problem is with more basic votes because any quota system as the recent reform efforts indicate will actually tend to reduce the quota of low income countries. So I think the system has to have an even larger component of basic votes that was approved a couple of years ago when the decision actually to triple the amount of basic votes in the IMF. So the basic votes actually make it, make the IMF a system, a voting system, a mix between the one country, one vote to a small proportion and $1, one vote, which is the dominant. So my point is let's make the one country, one vote larger. And that's, I think, the way to increase the voice of low income and small countries. Alfonso Diaz, no institutional affiliation. Just a country man of Dr. Ocampo. Dr. Ocampo, of all the proposals that you put forward, would you say that the hardest nuts will be the coordination of micro-economic policies? I mean, and it goes beyond the traditional Keynesian versus monetarist divisions or distinctions, but actually has to also with nationalism, different cultures. I mean, Germany still, after more than 80 years, seems to have lingering memories of the Weimar Republic economy. And also the other, the second policy that is nearly impossible in my view to be accomplished is on the exchange rate. I mean, do you believe that the US will willingly give up the dollar as the universal reserve? I'm from Tulane University and I have two questions. First one is, there's been other proposals floating around some in DC and other parts of the world. How does yours in very broad terms specifically differ from others? Is what are the points of contention from what's going on? For example, by the Center for Global Development, the Institute for the Peterson Institute and others who've been putting forward their own proposals. And the second question is, in order to get to the point that you're proposing, which by the way, I thought like my other colleagues was an excellent presentation with a lot of reasonable proposals, it seems that the issue of an arrangement between the US and China will have to be solved because otherwise you're not gonna be able to have the band that you're proposing for the current accounts and also the type of exchange rate policy that you're proposing and coordination may not be acceptable. And I wonder what you think about how that will be solved and can it be solved? Let me start by saying that none of my comments was meant to imply that the US doesn't have financial problems. I mean, that would be not belonging to the reality, right? So what I said is that in a strict terms, the US doesn't have a financing problem during a major financial crisis. In terms of financing, it's balance of payments. So that the US in the foreseeable future, I hope ever, will have the problems, let's say that a typical developing country has during the crisis, which is simply has no access to markets and is then forced to do a very severe adjustments. That's one family of problems in the financial area. Developing companies usually have many, many, many more problems than the US. I mean, actually, when there is this phenomenon of conflict to quality that takes place during a severe crisis, it's actually that people are bringing money to the United States. So it's actually the US benefits. One basic reflection is the fact that when you have one phenomenon like that, what happens is that the US is able to borrow more cheaply while a country's in crisis have to borrow more costly. That's a basic difference and one of the basic advantages of being at the center of the system. Now, will the US ever give that? Give up that. I actually think there are reasons. I mean, to start with, it is very interesting like historically, the United States has been at the center of proposals of special drug rights. So the proposal that effectively was adopted in the 1960s was the more the US proposal than the European proposal. And last year issuance of special drug rights was a special proposal of the US. It came from the US. So I don't think. And one basic reason why I actually skipped one slide that I had of why the SDRs are good for the United States. And I basically agree with one chapter of Professor Stigli's book Making Globalization Work, the one on Global Monetary Reform, in which he actually makes the basic point that the United States has the problem that it has to run deficits in order to give the rest of the world liquidity. But the deficit, particularly if it's a current account deficit, is reduction in the aggregate demand for the US. So actually the US will benefit now from not being at the center of the system by, you know, through that mechanism. So that, and that's why I actually think that the United States is not, you know, of course it's not going to lose in any reform that you can think of, as well as the, you know, major international financial center. But I think the US may be willing to give up or to share or to reduce the importance of the dollar in the international system. It actually may benefit from doing that. That's why I think this is viable. And now on the dollar reminbi issue, it's a very long issue. On the reminbi, but on the dollar, you may see that I agree with the position of the United States that the United States monetary policy does not have exchange rate objectives. So they, and I think that's correct. It may have exchange rate effects, but it doesn't have exchange rate objectives. And secondly, I do agree, however, with the Chinese position that it would not make sense to make a huge, you know, massive appreciation on the reminbi. I think they are afraid of running into the Japanese problem of the late 1980s. And I think they're right. They should avoid that. It will be bad for the world if China goes into a financial crisis. So I think that, but also I do think that the reminbi is overvalued, it's undervalued, so that it has to move into, you know, probably faster than it is moving now. But one way in which China can do it and is doing it and is not recognized in international debate is actually through nominal wages, nominal wage policies. I mean, you can think of increased nominal wages in China, which is a major part of what is going on in China as a major contribution to the correction of global imbalances. Both because it increases cost in China, so it's an effective real appreciation of the reminbi, and because it increases domestic demand of a surplus country, which is also a contribution to the reduction of global imbalances. So I think the wage policy of China should be given more central recognition in the efforts to rebalance the global economy. Well, Nora's question about how the difference is a long, it will take a bit, a long time. I think my major difference, I guess, I think the reserve system has similar proposals, including the Chinese one, by the way, of last year, but probably on the trade lines, there's probably not major disagreement. I think the major disagreement will probably be on some global regulation of capital flows and on the exchange rate system. I do think actually that the US will at the end move into supporting some form of exchange rate targets of a certain character, directly or indirectly. But on capital controls, it's quite clear that the US doesn't want to move in that direction. Just you have to look at it at what the G27 in the last meeting, to understand that the Koreans wanted that to be in the agenda, and that some others, and particularly the US, did not. As always, you have to read it between the lines, that it actually says in the G20 communique that you can actually use capital controls. I think it is time to conclude. I would like to say thank you very much to Professor Ocampo for giving such a stimulating presentation. I would also like to say thank you to all participants for engaging and asking both relevant and pertinent questions. It's quite obvious that the global governance system does need reform, and it is certainly a topic that we will be continuing to discuss, debate, and trying to come up with the right answers. I think it was nice to take one further step in that direction today. And Professor Ocampo, let me just assure you that at UNU wider, we will continue to work according to the principles that you outlined in the beginning. It is our intention to continue as an independent platform where we can bring people from the North and the South, from the East and the West together to try to have an open dialogue where we develop relevant, policy-relevant research where there is a focus on the poorest in the poorest countries. May I say that this was the 14th wider annual lecture as we move forward with our work program? I think that it is appropriate that I mention just by way of concluding that the 15th wider annual lecture will actually take place in Mozambique and it will actually be a Chinese who will give that lecture. This is Dr. Justin Lin, who is the chief economist of the World Bank, senior vice president as well. But that would take place in Mozambique in one of the poorest countries in the world. That is where our focus should be both in the academic world and in our policy actions. Thank you all for being here today and look forward to seeing you in Maputo next year.