 We're going to start our second panel. In the first panel, we looked at the North Korean and US strategy and moving ahead with the negotiations. And we also touched on the alliance implications, what implications there were, and the bilateral relationship between US and South Korea. In this panel, I have the privilege of trying to follow Chungmin's Act, which is, I think, very difficult. But I'll try my best. And I think it's going to be easier because I have such a distinguished panel here. Unlike previous one. Yeah, unlike previous one. Better than the previous one. Got Michael Swain, who's a senior fellow for Asia at Carnegie, followed by Ryan Haas, who's a Rubenstein fellow at Brookings. And they'll touch on the implications for China and the different kinds of bilateral relationship between China, North Korea, China, South Korea, maybe China and Japan and China and US. And because China is such a big country, we thought it'd be better to have two Chinese experts, two China experts on this, rather, than having two Korea experts talk about this issue. Korea, I think, a person that we have, I think, can better cover that issue better than I could. So before we get to him, though, we have Yuki Tatsumi, who's a director of the East Asia program in Stimson. And she'll obviously talk about this from Japan's point of view. And Kang will focus, you know, Kang, who's my boss, will focus on Korea. And he'll probably do a better job of this than I could. So I decided, we decided that we were going to shift and we took the liberty of doing this. And I'll be moderating this session. So let me direct my first question to both Ryan and Michael. You know, we heard in the first panel what happened at the summit and what the implications were, what was motivating the two men to negotiate and come out with the no-deal summit. As President Xi Jinping was watching this play out in Beijing, what do you think was going through his mind? What's in it for China here? What's the stake for China? Is this still an important issue? Or is there some other, maybe, you know, issues having to do with maybe trade with the United States? That's even more important. Or is this still important? And is this outcome something that, you know, Xi Jinping liked? Or was this less than an optimal outcome? Let's start with you, Mike. Oh, I thought Ryan would go first. And then I could just agree with everything he said. Well, I think the Chinese are probably reasonably happy with the summit because it was not as bad as it could have been. And I think they, I mean, everything they've said since the summit indicates that they are very much in line with their position before the summit. They believe that the fact that there was no real acrimony at the summit, the fact that there was a reassertion of a desire to continue negotiating peacefully, that there was no sort of fire and fury from either side. And I think also, importantly, I think the Chinese basically, even though the summit didn't produce any concrete results in terms of substantive agreements, I think it generally reaffirmed or confirmed to the Chinese mind that the United States is now accepting a kind of incremental approach. It has moved away from this prior denuclearization front loading of the situation. It's even dropped away from the idea that the North Koreans needed to declare all their nuclear facilities, which was a total non-starter. And so on that score, I think China has looked at this and said, the US seems to be moving in the right direction. It needs to give more assurances, which is always the Chinese position, from North Korea to North Korea, I should say, from the US to North Korea to reassure North Korea more, and that you will then see more progress. I mean, keep in mind, I think the Chinese have concluded, well, they have two basic underlying assumptions in their position. A, denuclearization is going to take a long time. We're not looking at a short-term process here at all. It's going to be measuring years. And B, that they believe Kim Jong-un has genuinely shifted his strategy somewhat. Now he wants to use his nuclear capabilities and the leverage that he's received from those in order to try to extract as much economic benefits as possible, because he needs that economic progress to continue. And that's the leverage with Kim. And the United States needs to recognize that more and be able to use that desire more effectively in moving forward with Kim. So it's kind of a steady as she goes, sort of a view with some reason for optimism on the Chinese side. But still, there is, well, we can talk about the dangers. And that's my initial response. Thanks. OK, Ryan. Well, first of all, James and friends at Carnegie, thank you for having me here today. It's nice to be with you all. I recognize that there's an abundance of talent in this room, so I hope that we have an interactive discussion where I can hear from you and not just share my thoughts with you. But to James' question, I think that from China's perspective, they really have four priorities that they pursue. And on all four of these priorities, none of them were harmed, and some of them may have been slightly helped by what happened in Hanoi. The first priority is to make sure that they remain central to the resolution of any issue on the Korean Peninsula. On that score, I don't think that they were harmed in any way by events in Hanoi. The second is to reduce risk of instability along their northeastern border. And again, the fact that we have a de facto freeze for freeze in place of no nuclear missile tests and the military exercises, I think that that plays to Beijing's benefit. Third, I think that over time they would like to reduce the US troop presence along their periphery. And there was nothing that occurred in Hanoi as far as I can tell that broke the trendline that President Trump would like to pursue on that front. And fourth, I think that the Chinese would like to, over time, develop a effective working relationship with North Korea, where greater North Korean economic dependence on China leads to greater North Korean deference to Chinese interest. And on that front, we will see. But on all four of those priorities, I don't think that Beijing felt stressed by any of the outcomes that occurred in Hanoi. So are you suggesting that China has become a more central player? I mean, China is not, obviously, in the bargaining table. But do you think that the result now makes Beijing a critical player in this negotiation more or less, or it hasn't changed? And the second thing is, you talked about the decline of US troop presence. So let me just go into that a little bit. In the first panel, we had, I think, Chungmin mentioned this, that permanently canceled the joint exercises in spring. Does that make China more or less happier or doesn't change anything? So, well, James, if I was a Korean official, I would welcome a cancellation of military exercises on the Korean peninsula. I think that, from their perspective, that's not a bad thing. But to your first question, I think that President Trump tested the theory, or was in the process, is in the process of testing the theory that a great manifestory approach to getting in the room with North Korea Supreme Leader, the two of them together can solve this problem on their own, bypassing Beijing and other powers along the way. Well, I think we may be bumping up against the limits of that approach. And the more that the limits of that approach become apparent, the more central I think Beijing will become to any process going forward. OK. So, Yuki, I'm kind of curious how the meeting outcome was received in Japan. Was it favorable? Was it a good outcome? Was it a bad outcome? Or was it kind of they were indifferent? I mean, you follow Japanese media on this, and maybe the Japanese government has a different view on it. But can you give us an overview of how it was received in Japan? So thanks, James, and Asan, and the Carnegie to have me here, having come sitting right next to me and then seeing Trump and sitting right in front of me is already making me nervous. Come on, Yuki. I'm going to do my best here. So, you know, Ryan and I were talking about how we actually last met was actually last year. So President Trump and Kim Jong-un met more than we have in the past year when they were living in two different continent and we're living in like a couple of blocks down the street, which is kind of sad. To answer your question, James, is that going into the Sanoi Summit, there was really no good outcome for Japan. It's a worst possible outcome or less desirable, but still okay liveable outcome. And then I think the result of this summit to them is the latter, that they definitely avoided the worst possible case scenario for them, which is that President Trump triumphantly emerged from the summit and say I reached a deal with Kim Jong-un, he committed to denuclearization, not a word about missiles, not a word about abductions, and that's going to be bad enough for Japan, but then further say now I committed to Kim Jong-un that we are working to start lifting those sanctions. That would have been the worst possible outcome for Japan. And I think Japan at least avoided that. So to them it's more like, it's not really a positive, but I think I would say they took a brief great sign of size of relief saying, oh my God, it could have been so much worse than it could have been. But that is not to say, I mean this whole thing, I mean we can obviously get to it later, but Japan has never has not been an active participant in this process and that's the source of the frustration and anxiety that Tokyo constantly has the outcome of the summit really hasn't changed that fundamental reality for Tokyo. So they still remain anxious, but they're not as I guess freaked out for the lack of better words to say about this result of the summit as they could have been. So then that begs the question, what's sort of the best case, what's the best outcome for Japan? I mean, what does Japan like want to see on the North Korean issue? So that would go, I guess counter, that would go counter to what Michael and Ryan said, that I think Japan would now come to accept that this denuclearization need to be step-by-step systematic process where it would take time to unfold. However, I think they would continue, they would like to see more of the denuclearization first process, which is the approach, that original position that the Trump administration went in as opposed to, let's do this tit for tat. If you do this, we do economic incentive because that's really not where Japan wants to be in terms of for its own bilateral reason with North Korea that they don't want to be in the position of force, being those providing those incentive option forced upon them when from their perspective, North Korea still needs to do a lot more. So you've heard, Kang, sort of the view from China's point of view and from Japan's point of view. There's sort of an overarching sort of link. There's a thread that goes through this, which is a preference for, if I'm reading this correctly, based on what Ryan and Mike had said that UK has said that China and Japan would prefer a multilateral approach or they would like to be involved in some way in these negotiations. How would Korea, does Korea favor this approach? And just to pick up, how did President Moon, which was talked about a bit in the first panel, how did President Moon take the news about the summit? Was this a, does this just change this approach in the next steps in inter-Korean relations and South Korea's relationship with the United States or does this, is this really a bad outcome for him? And he needs to rethink his whole approach on inter-Korean relations and the alliance. Of course, actually I totally agree with the previous speakers on their assessment of each country's assessment of this outcome, but actually Moon's administration might be frustrated with the outcome because actually initially they thought any kind of deal could be acceptable by South Korea because actually it would allow South Korea to engage economically with North Korea and open up more project, more dialogue, more programs with North Korea, but actually no deal is the worst deal for them. So of course, it's my own understanding of current, but they have recognized there's a clear limit they can do without having any kinds of agreement and though South Korea cannot go anywhere further because actually there's economic sanctions going on and also the issues to be resolved between the two parties. So maybe President Moon Jae-in would have stayed in the same past as he did in the previous period all the way up to now, but actually there's clear limit for the Moon Jae-in administration to do anything to do with North Korea. Of course they like to have Kim Jong-un in Seoul, but I think that's not possible at this point of time because actually South Korea is not in a position to give a huge gift to Kim Jong-un. So maybe Kim Jong-un has so much interest in coming to Seoul because upon his return he has to deliver to his people. This is what I got from South Korea but actually it's not possible for him to get what he wanted from North Korea. So about your question of multilateral approach, no I don't think so because actually Moon Jae-in of the administration has been emphasized even after the Hanoi Summit, the mediation role to actually try to state another dialogue between the United States and North Korea about whether it's possible. Of course a year ago it was possible because actually Moon Jae-in of the administration actually utilized Pyeongchang Winter Olympic as a kind of ice break moment. But at the moment now U.S. has direct channel of communication with DPRK. I don't know what kinds of mediation role South Korea can play at this point of time. As exactly the punctures instead of having mediation role South Korea should take the side of United States to press North Korea to make a clear strategic decision to denuclearization. That's first one. Second, South Korea once have bilateral talks instead of multilateral talks. Multilateral talks would enable possibly China to be more influential over Korean peninsula. That's quite interesting phenomenon. During the Moon Jae-in, for example, No Moon Jae-in era actually, they tried to establish good working relations with China to have a better policy coordination vis-à-vis North Korea. But Moon Jae-in administration is a little bit different from the No Moon Jae-in administration because actually they are really concerned of increasing influence of China over North Korean issue. So that's why exactly Moon Jae-in, President Moon Jae-in said, we should go ahead with economic cooperation because that's our territory, that's our brothers and sisters. And then we like to see more economic cooperation going on between the two Koreas to offset the Chinese influence over Korean peninsula. It's a quite different approach. And about Japan, of course, you may say actually I had a chance to talk with Japanese official before summit. They are really concerned about kinds of bad smoldering between Trump and Kim Jong-un. Which might exclude the missiles, short and medium range missile that pose a direct threat to Japan. Second, whether the core issue of our administration is abduction issue. Whether abduction issue will be properly addressed in the summit, they were really concerned with the low possibility of having that. So they were really, but Japanese side would be pleased no deal summit, better than bad smoldering. So whether it's possible to have a coordination with China or Japan, I don't think so. The first priority of the Moon Jae-in administration to have a possible summit between Moon Jae-in and Trump. Of course, in June this year, G20 meeting will be held in Osaka. There's possibility for having bilat and trilat summit over there. And I don't know what kinds of outcome will be there, but there's a possibility to have higher level with highest level coordination among also countries. So I wanna come back to Ryan first on this issue of trade negotiation. So earlier part of this year, even earlier, I mean about a month or so, month or two months ago, I had series of meetings with some government officials, both in Seoul and in DC, and we're talking about this trade issue with China that they were hopeful, some of the officials, not all of them, some of the officials were hopeful that if the trade issue can, if the US and China can sort out the trade issue, that North Korea issue will be the central issue that defines the bilateral relationship between US and China, that they felt that China will, even though it's a cooperative partner, it will be even more critical or even more important in the ongoing negotiation. That looks at sort of trade and North Korea issue as a trade-off. Some people actually think that these two things, because the Trump administration, because President Trump sometimes like to think of these transactionally, maybe it could be a transactional thing. Is there a relationship between the two or are these two separate issues? If there's a relationship, what kind of relationship is there between these two issues from Beijing's standpoint? Well, I'm going to do a very unthink tank thing and say I don't know. And the reason I don't know is because the President's views, his publicly articulated views have evolved. At one point, he said that he would go easier on trade issues if China was supportive on North Korea. And then at a different time, he said that China is being helpful on North Korea. And then he said that China is not being helpful on North Korea. And I don't know which one we're at at this very moment. What I do know is that the President does appear to see these things as well, these two issues as well. And what the evidence that I've seen suggests to me is that it's a rather mixed picture in terms of the China-North Korea relationship in the context of what the United States is asking of China. On one hand, China has been supportive of the United Nations sanctions that have tightened pressure on North Korea. And China-North Korea trade has dropped dramatically over the past year. That's just a measurable observation. At the same time, I think that the picture is a little bit muddier for the fact that there also have been four leader levels meetings. There have been a resumption of flights that were suspended at one point between Pyongyang and Beijing. There has been loosened scrutiny of North Korean laborers operating in China. Some coal barges have been allowed to come to China. There have been some oil transfers at sea that have been documented. And the Chinese, along with the Russians, have called for a loosening of sanctions in a phased approach at the United Nations. And so, what does that all add up to? It's very hard to draw a black or white conclusion. What the conclusion that I draw is that it's clear that the Chinese aren't interested in pursuing pressure to the point of strangulation of the North Korean economy. And so I think that there will be a ceiling on how far the Chinese will be willing to pursue pressure. And it likely will be a ceiling that's below the level that may be needed to compel the type of change that the president dropped me a suit from the pre-U.N. position. Yeah, Mike, I was gonna go to you anyway. Well, I was just gonna say that, I mean, I agree with all that Ryan has said, but when we look at the situation now and going forward, it seems that what is needed now is a clear understanding between the United States and China about the road ahead and about how to deal with this problem. We're in a process now where, in fact, the process is roughly similar to what the Chinese have argued for for a long time, which is this two-track approach that move forward on the one hand with the peace regime, on the other hand with the denuclearization process. And it seems from what Trump has been saying and perhaps others that the United States is increasingly moving in that same direction. So the question is, how do you get it so that the two sides are able to coordinate this? Because the Chinese obviously want more on the peace side to reassure North Korea, right? And also, longer term, to reduce the necessity for US presence on the peninsula. So moving forward pretty strongly on the peace front is a very big plus for the Chinese. They wanna see more of that. At the same time, they don't want to get to a situation where you don't have any movement on denuclearization or very little movement on denuclearization because that itself produces problems for the Chinese. I'm not somebody who believes the Chinese don't care if North Korea denuclearizes. I think they do care. And one big reason they care is they care about the reaction of Japan and if the Japanese become increasingly concerned about this what they might do. So that's a big issue for them. And they're concerned also because they're concerned about the US-China relationship. Because if the US-China relationship really continues to go down south, you could get in the Chinese mind, I think, a fear that the United States actually would try to keep the North South Korea problem going. There's a strong suspicion among many Chinese that the United States is a certain element in the United States that actually wants to see the North South Korea situation continue. Continue to be difficult. Why? Because it maintains tension on the peninsula and that maintains the rationale for the United States to remain very strong on the peninsula. So there are differences here in outlook between the US and China, but there is an objective here now in moving forward on the two sides that I think both of them share to some degree. And the question is how can you, if you can, coordinate those approaches? And if the United States is courting confrontations with the Chinese on the trade front, as it's battling on the issue of North Korea, it's not gonna get there. It's not gonna be able to move further along. So I think the Chinese are trying to be cooperative on the trade front to a certain degree, and we can talk about what that means, but at the same time they want very much to make sure that the United States moves forward on the peace side in the North Korean case. And so they're sort of trying to balance. There's not a direct connection there between trade and, I don't think the Chinese are sort of saying, gee, we'll cooperate with you on North Korea more if you cooperate with us on the trade front. I mean, Trump has tried to say that to the Chinese. And as Ryan says, that hasn't got anyone because Trump goes all over the place. Who knows what he's saying. But from the Chinese point of view, I think they're trying to generally keep the two pretty separate. So it's interesting. So you got Mike here saying that China is getting its way with the two track approach. And Ryan also seems to suggest that China is getting its way with regards to sanctions, that it's complying only to the extent that it's not completely shutting North Korea down. Mike, you raised this issue about Japan. So what can Japan do, you keep? Both on diplomatic front, diplomacy front, and also with regards to the terms. I guess, you know, Mike was signaling potential here for proliferation possibly. How likely is that in the long run? Maybe not in the short run. Potential foreign arms race in Northeast Asia is Japan moving in that direction. And then also on the diplomacy front, will Prime Minister Abe continue to just watch or will he engage North Korea? Will he have a summit with Kim Jong-un or is he gonna wait? And if he's waiting, what's he waiting for? What are some of the markers he's looking for that? Where he's looking to move next. And President Trump phoned Prime Minister Abe after the summit, what might they have talked about in that phone conversation? I mean, if you heard anything from the Japanese media on this, it's just kind of, it's a lot of questions I know, but basically the question is, what can Japan do and what is Japan doing? So I think for the, I'll start with your last question, whether Prime Minister Abe will try to have a summit with Kim Jong-un next. So right after the Hanoi Summit, like you said, President Trump called Prime Minister Abe and they had a phone conversation. And after that he spoke to the Japanese media. It's just that transcript has not been translated into English. So beauty of Japanese beauty is that you get that first. But in that it was very clear that he said, I'm very encouraged by the fact that President Trump told me he raises the abduction issue twice with Kim Jong-un. I'm very encouraged about it. Now it's my turn to meet with Kim Jong-un, to really personally talk to him about it. With a bit caveat, it takes two to tango. Mr. Abe may want to see Kim Jong-un and it's logical for him to think so, but Kim Jong-un will also want to meet, will also have to want to meet Mr. Abe for the summit to take place. And from North Korean perspective, there is really little incentive, frankly, to meet for Kim Jong-un especially, to meet with Mr. Abe because he'll know what he's going to get. He will have Prime Minister Abe saying, we really need to come clean on this abduction thing and we have still these 12 people who are confirmed by our government that they're abducted by your regime, your grandfather's regime, and who's an account and account, it's still not certain. And we have been provided by your side less than credible evidence of what happened to them in those two ways. But if Kim Jong-un responded in some way, what would that lead to? Would that ensure Prime Minister Abe to say, if we resolve this, we can do X, Y, and Z, like normalization talks, or part of that package will be how to address the wartime compensation issue between Japan and North Korea? He has no guarantee of any of that at this point. So without those, Kim Jong-un has a very little incentive going into the summit at this point with Mr. Abe. So that's one challenge for Mr. Abe. And I think I will go back to this abduction issue because that's actually really tying Japanese option hand because Japan has really come, locked themselves hard in the position that before Japan have any meaningful conversation with North Korea about anything else, including lifting sanctions, including talking about economic incentives, abduction should needs to be completely resolved. And they have not budged an inch from that position. And I'm not quite sure at this point, given that Mr. Abe is entering the last two years of his prime ministership, if he has any flexibility that he can flex in that rock and heart position that his government has put into place. But diplomatically though, if Japan doesn't want to be just responding to whatever the results of this, whether that's Trump-Kim summit, whether that's North-South summit or Trump-Moon summit, which may or may not happen at G20, if Japan wants to get out of this current position where it just responds to the result of all these summits that are happening minus Japan or just being briefed about the results of it, it needs to get back into diplomatic game in there. But then only way for Japan to get back into the game is really hinges on whether Japan can find any flexibility in its current position on the abduction. And that I think is extremely politically difficult for Mr. Abe. For any Japanese prime minister, this will be difficult. If anyone can show any kind of flexibility that will be Mr. Abe given his credibility, his personal dedication to this issue. But if he can't do it, I really don't see any other political leaders in Japan in the landscape who could even try to create, create some kind of a flexibility. So I think Japan is kind of in a very difficult place at this point. What about the first part of my question, which was that the constitutional reform it you and. So in terms of deterrent side of the Japan's response, you already seen some of that. Japanese government came up with this new five year defense policy plan and the defense acquisition plan. And it's clear that it is acquiring some of those what would have been not possible 10 years ago because those four standoff, enemy attack capability, standoff strike capabilities that would have been politically impossible for Japanese government to include any of those capability in those lists. It is possible now because of the North Korea. So you already seen some of that. And then I think nuclear conversation is really kind of over the horizon issue. But I would say Japan would really, Japan would probably try everything else conventionally that are left to them possible before getting there. Before jumping to the nuclear because that's like given what Japan can do with this civil nuclear power. I mean, it sounds easy, but no, it's not. Weaponizing, testing, it takes tremendous resources and it's just like you try high jump but you haven't even like jumped the hurdle. So, Kang. Yes. I think it's similar question as the one that I opposed to Yuki thinking about South Korea on national defense, on national security and also on diplomacy front does what South Korea's response here. I know that, I mean, you like to talk about South Korea's, you know a lot about the defense planning aspect of South Korea, South Korean government. As I recall, there was a plan to continue under the current administration to continue increasing the defense spending. What's the motivation behind that? And how does that influence, how does that impact the ongoing negotiation with North Korea, if at all? Does this impact South Korea's relationship with China? And if so, how? Also, if you could talk a bit about sort of Japan-Korea relations, how would this play into, well, I'll get to that later. Why don't you start with that part first? Because there's a lot in there that. Okay, yeah. About the South Korea's responses on the current situation on defense reform, actually it seems to me that defense reform 2.0 has been delayed again and again because actually they have taken into account the events of evolving situation on the ground. They were really optimistic about the future of integrating relations, resolution of nuclear issues. So actually it seems to me that what we used to call 3K, that was a kill chain, Korea massive punishment and retaliation, and what is it, K? I only know 2Ks. 2K, KAMD, KAMD, Korea Air and Missile Defense. They actually replaced these words with the strategic deterrence posture. So whether they are going to spend money, enough money in acquiring the capabilities and equipment in those three areas, I don't think so. Because they're expecting the improvement of relations between the two Koreas going into the arms control negotiation because they just scratch the surface of conditions building measures, but they were really optimistic of the future structural arms control issues between the two Koreas. So of course they have promised to increase defense budget. How they are going to use it? It seems that they will spend more money on welfare issues of the soldiers instead of pouring into the acquisition. So then how does that impact the Afghan discussion? Of course. Because that's sort of proven, that's what I thought. Because actually, yeah. Condition based Afghan transfer was based upon the acquisition of capabilities by South Korea. But it seems to me that they tried to expedite the process based upon the observation of inter-cranial relations, not really the threat assessment-based approach. So maybe more politically optimistic of the future of inter-cranial relations that they say, oh, it is necessary. It is not necessary for us to spend more money on that and then maybe we can have a wartime operational control in our hands than we expected. So there's a great opportunity for us to be more independent from the United States and we'd like to have new command structure. But actually, last November, October, both countries agreed to maintain the current command structure, preservation of combined forces command. But actually, who is going to be the commander? That's a Korean general. And deputy commander would be the US general. So they like to maintain the current command structure but they like to have the Afghan within the Moon Jae-in administration's term expired. That's 2003, May, 2023, May. So they like to have that back. And about this, whether that affect the Korea-China relation, probably, as I said before, Moon Jae-in administration is so much concerned unlike normal administration. The increase of Chinese influence over Korean peninsula, very much. So one good point I can make on Moon Jae-in they're really concerned with Chinese military buildup, increased military activities in and around the Korean peninsula. Media cover the Chinese violation of our air defense identification very substantially. So people are very well aware of Chinese, the rise of China in the military dimension, not only the economic direction as well. So, of course, China keeps demanding the removal of that, but still Moon Jae-in administration has decided to deploy it in Songju area. Lotte is still under the economic sanction of China. There may be Lotte is only one company under the Chinese economic retaliation. But now we have increase of Chinese troops in Korea. They try to change the image of China in a different way. Maybe Chinese sharp power policies over there. That's the one response I can make. So, but I have to be very honest about that whether South Korea is going to have more capability to respond to the North Korea's possible potential threat. But actually the outcome of this, somebody may affect the defense reform again because we both United States and North Korea did not produce any remand. So it's staining going on. So it seems to me that South Korea has to revisit their defense reform again. So maybe the delay of the announcement of defense reform, I assume. So Moon administration looks kind of torn between different objectives. On the one hand, you got inter-Korean relations that needs to go well in order for them to move through with Afghan transfer in the manner that it was stated it was agreed to between the U.S. and South Korea. But on the other hand, if inter-Korean relations doesn't go so well then where it's problematic, then they have to rethink this Afghan question and also their defense planning a bit. Probably, but I don't think they have gone into that direction yet. Still they try to stay in the same cause they have been to the expedite Afghan transfer and also to change the division over between the two parties still try to maintain the past and policy line there have maintained since last March, I think last year. And then maybe if the stalemate goes on the pressures will come in from the public side and the policies, the Congress and the House, National Assembly to press South Korean government to be more concerned with the potential of that continuation of that last situation or maybe the worsening situation between the inter-Korean relations two careers. So I wanna then go back to sort of what you pointed out, Mike, about the concern in China about what Japan might do, how Korea might respond. We've also touched on this issue of the missile defense in South Korea with that. How does this, can you sort of unpack that a bit? What's China's approach gonna be? Is it going to be sort of the hard line approach that they've had with how they responded to that? Or is it going to be sort of more conciliatory approach of trying to better sort of create a warm relationship? You mean vis-a-vis South Korea? South Korea. And also what about Japan? What's the approach on Japan? Well, I think the Chinese interest right now is to maintain very good relations with South Korea. And of course, their relationship with North Korea, which has improved. I mean, they're in a relatively good situation in that regard. They're very supportive of the moon policies, of course, towards North Korea. They wanna see more movement on the peace front and they don't wanna do anything that's gonna alienate South Korea from moving forward in that way. And they'll give as many positive indications to South Korea as they can that they're encouraging the North Koreans to be responsible, to not over demand one thing or another that could upset the situation. And I think with the Japanese, I don't, of course, I don't think they necessarily, they're right now in a situation where they're improving their relationship with Tokyo. It's really improved significantly for what it was two or three years ago. And they certainly wanna keep that going as well. So they have to move very carefully in terms of Japan taking a larger role. The Chinese position has always been that they'd like to see a multilateral pollution to the Korean problem, but they believe that the core of getting to that kind of solution is between the US and North Korea. And those two countries have to make their agreement. And in that regard, I think they want the Japanese to be involved in this process, but not too involved in it. They don't want the Japanese concerns to start derailing anything in terms of a abductee issue or other things. They want the Japanese to basically go along with what the South Korean government is doing. Now, of course, one big problem in all this right now is that South Korean-Japanese relations are not good. I mean, there is an enormous amount of, what in my view and in the view of, I think a lot of other analysts, unnecessary acrimony going on here. A lot of tension, a lot of friction between South Korea and Japan, which is not furthering the interests of moving towards a greater unified position in dealing with the North Korea problem. So I think the Chinese are not entirely, I mean, they certainly don't want Japan and South Korea and the United States to be moving all in lockstep from a security point of view. But at the same time, they also don't want South Korea and Japan to be so at odds with each other that this is threatening the prospects for moving forward on the North Korean Peninsula in terms of the peace regime and gradual denuclearization over time. So it's a balancing act. Brian, you agree with that or? I do, yeah. Anything else to add or nothing else or Mike pretty much covered it all? No, I think Mike captured the situation well. You know, one of the things that has been interesting, even though there may be more weariness of Chinese intervention on the Korean Peninsula. When I talk with South Korean officials and when I talk to Chinese officials, I find that they use a pretty similar lexicon to describe the prognosis of the problem and the path forward. And so there may be a effort to keep things at arm's length but there certainly is not a absence of communication taking place between Seoul and Beijing at the moment. I don't find that troubling. I'm not insecure about it, but I do think that there needs to be some clarity and transparency about what is and what isn't happening so that we're all moving in the same direction. Just to take one step back, I think the big goal is to get the rest of the region united and Seoul, or a Pyongyang feeling stress. And right now I feel like we don't quite have that calibrated position. So Kang. Yes. Mike talked about, which I wanted to talk about before, the Japan-Korea relations or South Korea-Japan relations, without getting too emotional, what's going on here from South Korea's point of view? Okay, no comment. No, actually, actually. Next question. This is a really difficult question, a very challenging question, but actually the separation of the security cooperation from the history issue, that's a basic underlying approach of Moon Jae-in administration. Actually I like that, but what the South Korean government has real, actual action plan to implement what it has been arguing for in its relation with Japan. Of course, actually we knew that, actually forced labor is going to come and then Comfort to Woman issue will pop again. But indeed, actually we didn't do any kinds of preparatory works for that. That actually like the public resentment in the part of South Korea and the government. South Korea, actually in South Korea there is issue only not only the legal age, but also the emotional and historical issue. So we keep demanding the apology or recognition of the things done during the colonial period. So it's a kind of national consensus, regardless of your orientation, conservative and progressive. When I was in the foreign ministry, where actually I was asked to come to National Assembly for hearing, it's not possible to gather all the members of foreign affairs at the same time, but if there's an issue on Japan, everybody came back to the hearing and they voted unanimously on this, founding on Japan. But on the other hand, at least behind the scene, we need to have more communication and the way to seek, enhance the corporate between the two parties and practice, but public sentiment affect the government policy very much. Whether the politicians are exploiting that, I cannot deny that. There have always been the case like that. Lee Myung-bak did the same thing, No Myung-bak, maybe even Kim Dae-joon, despite his good relation with Prime Minister Obuji. I think that was the best time of our relations between the two parties. We were going to celebrate Kim Dae-joon Obuji's declaration of new relation between the two parties, but we didn't have that much celebration last year. We have to come back to the situation. Of course, both two leaders maybe can say some mature things toward each other. And then they would lay a ground for the corporation and create a political and consensus among all parties. Of course, I was in the National Security Council during the Kim Dae-joon administration. When he decided to get over the past issue, he was so much determined to do so. Of course, he was faced with strong resentment coming from almost every sector in South Korea society, but actually he said, let's put the past behind us and work for the future. He was really determined to do so. I said, we need to revisit that kind of spirit and then maybe have to say or highlight what kinds of benefit and positive things we can get in having better relations with each other. But I guess you kind of touched on it. It is sort of across the board in South Korea when it comes to Japan and history issue, but is this more politically driven by President Moon in terms of ideology or is it political convenience? So one interpretation maybe, President Moon made this a campaign issue for him during the presidential election that he is going to revisit the Comfort Women Agreement issue, but it also was in some ways pushed on by the progressives that wanted this issue addressed because it was poorly handled in their view by the conservative park administration. Would this be a partisan issue that has more to do with the difference between progressives and conservatives you think, or could it be, some people say that President Moon is under siege at the moment because the economy isn't doing so well, and Pumper talked about the economy being a very important issue in South Korea right now, but economy isn't, I mean, it's doing okay, but by global standards, but from the South Korean standards, it just doesn't, it's not doing well. So could this be an issue that the progressives are tapping into in order to sort of deal with this political challenge or is this something that is more ideologically driven? What do you think could be happening or it could be something else that I haven't touched on? I think this, you're right, actually combination of both, is actually there is a segment that the progressives always try to use that issue to deletionize the previous conservative governments and because actually it made a very wrong agreement at the end of 2015, which was not consulted even by the actually the comfort women themselves yet, so they have no prior consultation with the opposition party like that. So they like to damage the previous administration as well, but on the other, maybe President Moon Jae-in during the campaign, he actually highlighted that issue, comfort women issue as well. So actually it was, as I said before, comfort women issue is kind of national consensus issue. So is that possible for any political leaders to deviate that kind of national emotion towards the comfort women issue? But as I said, we need a leader who can convince or persuade the public what we have to do. But actually initially, President Moon Jae-in launched a two-track approach. Comfort women issue, history issue will be handled on one end, but on the other, we will seek cooperation with Japan in economy and security issue, especially over North Korea. But actually the second, I don't know whether the second part has been really realized between the two parties over the years. Actually separation of the history issue from the security cooperation has not been so much successful. That's the point I'd like to raise on this Korea-Japan relation. But on the other, I don't know whether Japan has a keen interest in having cooperation with Korea. Actually over the past several months I've been to Japan and then I have found a drastic decrease of Japanese interest in having cooperating with South Korea very much. Despite the fact we need, there are some areas of cooperation between the two parties, North Korea, rise of China, and alliance. So those things have not been real discussed among these two countries. So I don't know what will the role of the United States actually in mediating the two countries. So Yuki, on Korea-Japan relations, what's the view from Japan? Kang seems to think or a feeling that he gets, the sense that he gets from his visits and meetings with other colleagues in Japan and government officials, they're not interested in engaging or working with South Korea. What's the view in Japan right now on this issue? And secondly, this is an easy way to put it, just putting the blame on the other side is one way to handle this. But we've seen examples in South Korea where leaders make unpopular decisions. What's holding Prime Minister Abe back from doing this if at all, if anything at all on that side? Or can he do some things differently? Is there something going on? What's going on in Japan that could be influencing this? So from a Prime Minister Abe's perspective, December 2015 Comfort Woman Agreement was that unpopular decision. That he made. He got fired, he got heavily, heavily criticized from his own support base, but then outside of that spectrum too. And I'm just trying to explain Japanese government's logic here that it's not Japanese government's job to make sure that PAKUNHE government consults about this agreement with the opposition party. Honestly. So basically, for Japan, when it comes to Comfort Woman issue, as emotional as it is, it was, they actually moved on it from their previous position that Asian women fund established by Prime Minister Murayama back in 1990s was that mechanism for that compensation. By agreeing to another fund that's also funded by Japanese, partly funded by Japanese government, was that extra step that it took? And what do they get in return after the administration changed in Seoul? You have a new South Korean president who campaigned on revising that agreement and who actually put together a private advisory council to consult this issue. And at the end of the road, he didn't come out to completely append that. But then those first couple of steps that the current administration took was really can push the other administration and his people over the edge. So when I think Khan mentioned about not the interest in working with South Korea on a different issue is decreasing. But I think we need to put a qualify here. There is a general weariness, general weariness or lack of decreasing interest in doing something together with this current president and his administration because they just fundamentally do not trust the political inclination of this particular president. And they'll see what's in store after President Moon's term is over. But this kind of cements that Japanese pervasive impression that they don't, basically South Korean political leaders do not hesitate to use this to gain political points. And so in a sense, is it ideological driven? Is it partisan driven? I don't know the source of that. But that's at least, that's at least I think how Tokyo has been looking at this episode flow. And then as I went, Khan mentioned the Objekim Summit, I was just thinking, oh my gosh, that's like 20 years ago. And that this often gets lost in literally translation. But then in the last 20 years, like Japan and South Korea has actually done a lot together. And that part has never been highlighted. And what I'm actually worried about is there is emotional issue. And I think de facto, Japan and South Korea actually really did have taken a two track approach. That while there's this emotional issue about history, political leaders could go at it, but then business community were very close. They always worked together very closely. Defense sectors were really close. They were very stable. And what I'm worried about in the recent month of this back and forth, which I don't really fully understand, I think, Konken and Lime maybe. But what I see now is this two important sectors that work to stabilize the relationship and help the two countries to kind of weather this political epsom flows and political tension. They're having issue among themselves now. So that's actually my concern. And particularly with China, North Korea, rise of China, those are all very close. It takes both business and defense to really kind of being able to continue to dialogue, continue to come up with a more positive agenda to work toward. And that's just not happening right now. So I think that's the reality we have. That's the reality we have. And I wish it were not the case, but I do think that those two important sectors that really work to stabilize the relationship are really deeply affected by this. So from Japanese perspective, we can say forgiveness reconciliation. But from Korean side, we have added another one, apology, forgiveness, then reconciliation. So apology is the weakest part we have with Japan. We keep demanding the ban to make an apology on the previous, the instant during the colonial period. And then I always quote Germany. So compare Japan to Germany. So actually, maybe that could be the things we can expect from the, from the administration, same thing. Okay, before we go to questions, Ryan had one last time. I just had a question for the two of you, if I can ask, play the role of a questioner. From a objective standpoint, it seems like the breakdown in relations between Korea and Japan are bad for Japan, strategic agreement, bad for Korea, strategic agreement, bad for the United States, strategic agreement. I understand politics are a separate issue, but from a strategic sense, is there any role that would be helpful for the United States to play at this moment? So actually, I would go back to, that's an excellent question because part of the, part of the kind of a current deteriorating situation is, if you recall during the Pakunin administration and Abe administration, they were still not really communicating all that well at the political level, but the forcing function was President Obama forced two of them in the same room by doing the trilateral summit. And that was a major forcing function, where, which we don't have right now. No. I agree. Actually, it must be done at the political level, that's why I said, the upcoming G20 meeting in Tokyo could be the kinds of turning points in having a better relation between the two countries, as well as the Charlotte cooperation. But actually, the other thing, maybe after the Hanoi summit, maybe it's a working group can get together. We have a bilateral working group meeting with the United States, U.S. Korea. Actually, that will be held maybe tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. But actually, we used to have a trilateral coordination and oversight group. So that was very effective mechanism to sustain the agreement we made with, among ourselves, and with North Korea. So maybe we have to think, revisit the trilateral. We used to have that kind of mechanism, but it's gone. But we have to think about revival. Maybe U.S. could highlight, because actually after mass, there's Hanoi summit, we need to have a common plan, because actually, we were shocked. Japan was shocked, because of some, there's a lack of communication and consultation. Why don't we have a trilateral? It would upset China very much, because it's forming kinds of virtual trilateral alliance in North East Asia. But anyhow, maybe that's the way to strengthen the trilateral coordination, and maybe to minimize the political impact upon the policy issues. Okay, let's go to some questions, and we'll take three, start over here, and then move on that way. Start with this young lady in the front. Hello, I'm Jiwon Kim from Asan Institute, working at the Anti-Consul. I have a question to Dr. Choi. You've talked about that it's time for South Korea to have bilateral talk with the U.S. and North Korea, then multilateral talk. But as we have seen that did not see the tangible outcome in the Hanoi summit, I think it would take some time to solve the denuclearization problem, which is the first priority of South Korea and North Korea in the U.S. But at the same time, the China still cares about the denuclearization issues about North Korea, and Japan also have the abduction issues. So my question is when would be the right time to South Korea having a multilateral talk to Japan and China included, or should South Korea have to have a bilateral talk with China and Japan, and what would be the wise action for South Korea? Thank you. Okay, this gentleman first, and then the gentleman in the back. Thank you very much. Benjamin Tula, retired diplomat. My question is related to two issues raised in the previous panel. The first was the desirability of continuing talks at a level lower than the top leadership level, including at the expert level. And the second one was the likelihood of a visit by Chairman Kim to Washington sometime in the next year or so. And my question is against this background, what do you think is the desirability and likelihood of the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and the North Korean capital? Thank you. So your first, were there two questions or just one? Oh, on the liaison office, okay, I got it now. I understand, right. Oh, Steve Winters, independent consultant. I heard a comment from someone that said, oh, Xi Jinping has more important issues on his mind than 20 million people in North Korea. Probably true, which would be Belt and Road Initiative, which is gigantic and rising power versus existing power, but it appears that North Korea is some kind of wild card or key card in this whole configuration. So what my question is from the experts, how do you think, assume the whole thing doesn't blow up into a war or something, but if it shakes out, how will the configuration be in terms of the grand strategy of Belt and Road? For instance, Russia's trying to build pipelines right through the peninsula because they wanna develop their Asian part and China's got their ideas. South Korea's trying to get out of China's economic grasp with their Southern strategy and Japan. Japan is trying to fight the Belt and Road, US is fighting Belt and Road. So it seems somehow in that shakeout, it's gonna be key which way North Korea is configured when it finally all settles down. So any predictions or any thoughts on that, of how people are planning now for that outcome? So the first question was on the conditions under which South Korea will go, take the multilateral approach. The second question was, what role the liaison office can play as things progress on the North Korea question? And then the third question was on the Belt and Road. How does North Korea play into the Belt and Road calculation for Beijing? So who wants to go first? Okay, about this sequence or when the multilateral approach is going to be appropriate. I don't think Moon Jae and other ministry has a strong appetite for multilateral talks, frankly speaking. They like to buy that talk. So take a look at this. So what kinds of multilateral talks the Moon Jae administration has been pursuing? Nothing, bilateral talks with the United States, bilateral talks with North Korea, bilateral talks with China and Russia. Nothing else, of course. The Moon Jae has been to APEC, USM, all these multilateral talks, but actually still especially on North Korean issue. Very reluctant to have a bilateral, more players, more complicated, more outside influence. So they like to compartmentalize each bilateral talks from each other until it feels secure and strong in itself. So that's why he has been emphasizing South Korea's initiative, South Korea's leadership in having any kinds of relations with North Korea. But at the end of the day, if you wanna talk about the peace regime or peace treaty is unavoidable to have bilateral, like actually at least the multilateral talks, US, China, and both Korea, technically speaking. Japan, Russia wants to be part of it, but legally speaking, not possible, not politically, but legally, legally. But could be consulted, but that's the- It's an important distinction though, legally versus- Legally, yeah, I told you, I'm incorrect this one. About the liaison office, actually the effectiveness of the liaison office is conditioned by the political commitment or any kinds of grandiose agreement could be made between the two, I mean the US and North Korea. Otherwise, having a liaison office, nothing. There must be issues to be discussed. The liaison office would facilitate the dialogue and communication between the two parties. So we need to have what I call big deal or grandiose peace, or bold approach, big deal. I don't know what kind of word we're not going to use. Anyhow, without that, it is no use to have liaison office. About this, North Korea can play the one belt, one road. It seems to me that one of the main reasons Kim Jong-un actually improved his relations with China is taking into account this, to actually, to get out of, first of all, to get out of international isolation. China appeared to be the best partner for North Korea in helping North Korea get out of international isolation. Maybe he can play the OVOA against Indo-Pacific strategy to a certain degree. So he is taking this two card, maybe he, like his grandfather did during the 60s, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union could benefit North Korea very much. So maybe if North Korea gets out of international isolation and becoming part of the international community, that would create some kinds of different configuration of a strategic landscape in East Asia. Having better relations with the United States, that means North Korea doesn't need to be, doesn't need to rely on China that much. Somebody actually mentioned that North Korea has access to the US market. Wow, he can say that. Wow, the US market, now we can have market status, the kinds of things. So it's possible. But who knows what will happen? Still reluctant to remain isolated and be relying on China, maybe China keep pumping in resources to the regime of local round. I think I'll just respond to the one Belt and Road Initiative. I mean, Japan is not exactly 100% going heads and heads against anymore. And then it's in the context of improving Japan's relationship with China. In a strange way, in this country, it's like administration is a bilateral approach on trade, kind of brought China and Japan closer together almost. It's really kind of driven by, well, we're both suffering under the same president, so can we actually come away and then actually what the both leaders decided to do is to compartmentalize the issue. Because there are issues out of sovereignty in East China Sea that they will never agree. But I think for the moment, I think two leaders have decided to focus on what two countries can actually do together. So they, I think they made them, when Prime Minister Abe was in China last time, they did come up with an agreement that the Japan somehow do work with China on some of the projects that Belt and Road Initiative. Case by case basis, but even if it's case by case basis, it's a considerable shift from where Japan started, where it didn't have anything to do with it to begin with. So I would not be surprised if Japan starts to follow a similar case by case approach with the AIIB project, kind of facilitating more Asian Development Bank and AIIB to do some of the project, partially funding the project together. So those economic cooperation, I think they're a bigger room for Japan to reach out to China and then basically create the win-win situation for both countries. What extent is that pasturing as opposed to a strategic shift? I think it's more of a, I don't call it a strategic shift because I think at the end of the day, the bottom line, prime importance for Japan in terms of foreign policy principle is a robust US-Japan alliance. But I don't know if, depending on how, not only this administration in this country, but then how the follow-on administrations characteristic turns out to be, that is one of the big debate that's occurring in Japan, which is that, is this America First or America Alone approach? Is this just anomaly and then completely attached to this president? Or is this some of the, is this kind of, does this kind of represent some of the irreversible trend that's happening within this country that produces a leader that reflects that value? So. Okay. On the Belt and Road, you guys have any views? Well, if I could, I'll just briefly offer a thought to Benjamin's question about liaison offices. I, as a former Foreign Service officer, I see value in the idea. If for no other reason than having a vehicle through which to clarify intentions when events occur. To do it in real time, rather than relying upon a cumbersome process through the New York channel where we play a game of telephone and the message breaks down in between Pyongyang and Washington. So, I don't think that it needs to necessarily be ambitious or grand in scale, but let's crack the door open and see what happens. We also, we have the presence of State Boroy in the audience who's been doing a lot of work over the course of his career on diplomacy and opening up diplomacy in hard places. And so, if he cares to comment, I'm sure we'd all benefit from his thoughts. And to Stephen's question about the Belt and Road Initiative, China, the United States, Japan. I mean, my sense is that Kim Jong-un will have an incentive following Hanoi to show that he does not have dependence upon President Trump for his path forward. And the three easiest areas for him to focus his attention are Seoul, Moscow and Beijing. Seoul, because of its alliance with the United States and the issues that we've discussed here, I think it's somewhat difficult for there to be a lot of run room in the near term to gain the type of economic assistance that he would desire. Moscow has its own limitations, just by virtue of the fact that it's Russia. And China has a appetite for natural resources that North Korea happens to have in abundance. And so I do think that of all three of the countries along North Korea's periphery, China would be the most attractive of those options and have the greatest throw weight to throw out the issue. Right? We'll do one more round. In the back, this young lady right here. Hi, I'm Asan Young fellow working at Hudson Institute, Soyeon Lee. Resultly, the United States and South Korea decided to cancel original joint military exercise and change to scale down week-long military exercise. I think it sends a strong signal to the diplomatic process between North Korea and United States will continue. However, since Chinese government has been advocating freeze for freeze, like dual-track approach, what does it mean, like the decision mean, to Xi Jinping and Trump administration? Okay, right here. Thank you for the panel. Hi, Xi Zhou. I'm a former counselor specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing before. Well, my question goes to Mr. Sway and Ms. Haes. So Mr. Sway mentioned that in, actually, Chinese government prefer a balance between the international structure in East Asia, which I totally agree. So my question goes to you, too, would be with the situation of current Japanese and South Korean situation, which actually China has a unprecedented close relation. I'll say warmer relationship with Japan. Is it in Chinese government's favor to see the situation between, I mean, escalating conflict between the South Korean government and Japanese government? And what is the reason, irrational, behind this perspective of Chinese government? Thank you. My question goes to Michael and to Ryan and Yuki. How much information do you think the Chinese and the Japanese government has that is very accurate on what's happening in Pyongyang? They know everything. They know everything. Let's go. So, you know, the first question, I thought we covered that, but in any case, it was asked, so let's see, maybe we didn't cover it, or I didn't cover it as well. On the joint exercise, and then the second question was about, how does Japan-Korea relations, well, what does China think about that? And then final one, which was what I thought you were going to talk about before you asked that question, but it's good that that question was asked. And then the, what does Japan and China know? About Pyongyang. Yeah, about Pyongyang, right. So, who wants to go first? Yes, I'll start. Yeah, we touched on this issue of the military exercises. I mean, the Chinese clearly want to see a continued suspension of the U.S.-South Korean military exercises as a confidence-building measure and as an enticement for the North Koreans presenting this as something that should be reciprocated. And the North Koreans have, to some degree, I think from the Chinese point of view, reciprocated. And this goes all the way back to the original freeze for freeze, which the North Koreans have stopped testing. And that is a sort of quid pro quo from the Chinese point of view that exists. And now we have to go beyond that. Now we have to have something that moves beyond that that will be reassuring to North Korea from the Chinese point of view again. So, North Korea needs to, the United States needs to provide some kind of rational, reasonable security assurances to North Korea, not ask for the moon. And that's what the North Koreans said the United States asked for at Hanoi. And of course, the United States came back and said, well, actually we didn't ask for that. I mean, else, so you've got this lack of, apparent lack of communication. So the Chinese want to be able to clarify that in some way to be able to continue to move forward. And they certainly want to see the movement of a piece, moving forward on the peace regime side and suspension of exercises is all part of that. It's all part of that. Of course, I want to see it go much further. But I would argue that Chinese don't want to see necessarily this, as I said before, this sort of completely imbalance the other side of the equation. Right now, I think they see the need to have more assurances to move forward. And then you'll get some gradual denuclearization. But they don't want the denuclearization situation to stop. I don't believe they want to see North Korea gradually give the impression that it's being accepted by the international community as a nuclear power. So they definitely want to see movement in that direction. And I think, I mean, that's the problem we have right now. How do you get that movement? I mean, I could talk about that. The Chinese, I think, I was just thinking about this, everybody's talking. The Chinese have two major objectives in mind moving forward, it seems to me. And they're pretty obvious. They don't want the North Koreans to do anything provocative. They will upset the apple cart. And they don't want the U.S. to do anything provocative. They're just going to upset the apple cart. And the question is, how are they going to get that? How are they going to do that? Well, on the North Korea side, I think they're believing that they can add to that. That is to say, they can increase the likelihood North Korea doesn't provoke anything by strengthening their relationship with North Korea. And particularly doing that on the economic front. So that they are seen increasingly by North Korea as a really critical element in the North Korean ability to move forward on its economic desires and on reassuring the United States and Japan and South Korea, et cetera, et cetera. So that is really important for the Chinese to be able to do that. And for the United States side, of course they want to be able to tell the United States, well, the North Koreans, they're playing ball. They're moving along here. But they also want to maintain the capability of China to work with South Korea, possibly even Japan, but more so South Korea, to maintain that movement on the peace front so that the United States would increasingly be isolated. If the United States opts for a hard-line position, South Korea is not going to go along. And maybe possibly even Japan might not go along, don't know. But they would want to keep South Korea in that position so that Moon keeps on moving forward so that the U.S. potentially would be isolated if it tries to really shift to a hard-line position. So maintaining those kinds of relations with these other powers, I think, is really important for China at this point. I'm sorry I've already said too much. So that sort of speaks to this Japan-South Korea situation that was one of the questions. Sure, the United States does not want to see Japan and South Korea in lockstep position in terms of the security relationship about China. That is to say in supporting the United States position. They want to see some light there. And I think they see South Korea as less committed to the U.S. position vis-a-vis China, which is this kind of proto-containment position and seeing the Chinese as a source of all evil and sort of moving forward in an effort to try and contain the Chinese. South Koreans are less the least oriented in that direction. The Japanese, now under Abe in recent months, they are also not buying into this. I don't believe the Japanese are committed to the kind of zero-sum approach to China that the Trump administration seems to be pushing. So the Japanese, they want to keep a close alliance, but they don't want to sign on completely for what Trump's after. The Japanese are interested in BRI. The Japanese are interested in AIIB, as we know. The Japanese are interested in maintaining that economic tie with the Chinese. And that from the Chinese point of view is a very big asset. And they don't want to lose that asset in dealing with the Japanese. So they don't want the Japanese, they'd like the Japanese and South Koreans to be together in dealing with North Korea in a way that's supportive of the Chinese position, but they don't want them together endorsing the U.S. position on China. So that basically. And as far as how much they know about what goes on in Pyongyang, I have no idea. Well, if I could maybe take a whack at Chungmin's question. I think the Chinese have greater confidence in their understanding of North Korean intentions now than they did a year ago. They've had four opportunities to meet with Kim Jong-un at the leader level. They have renormalized some of the channels that exist between Beijing and Pyongyang. And so while it may be difficult for us in Washington to speculate about what they do and don't know, I think we can reach a reasonable conclusion that they have greater confidence that whatever their judgment is, is strengthened relative to what it was a year ago. So I'll just respond to Chungmin's how much do I think Japanese government knows of North Korea? I'm going to follow yours of them. I'm thinking things like I have no idea. I mean, the reason why I say that is if you ask me that question even like five years ago, it would have been a little bit different because Japan does have a fair amount of North Korean origin population living in Japan. There is a financial transaction going on. But then as Japan tightens its own unilateral economic sanction vis-a-vis North Korea, that little sliver of the window that they could have gotten the information about what's happening in North Korea that is independent of what they're informed by South Koreans and United States or something by China, that window is really shrinking and there's no Mr. X back in the Coismares, you know this, who kind of taken an ownership of it to go between, be a secret, go between the Japanese government and not just government, but political circle and North Korean regime either. So that's why I would say my answer would have been different five years ago. Okay. Kang, I wanted to ask about South Korea's role. President Moon recently had this discussion at the National Security sort of council. Some briefing that was given recently about the meeting with Minister of Unification, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defense. I think you touched on this. What's the next step for South Korea in sort of breaking out of the impasse? What does President Moon think is what does he think the next steps need to be from South Korea's point of view? Does China factor into this? It seems to me that there are two steps South Korean government can take. First, actually have a consultation with the United States to have a debriefing on the summit. And then they can discuss about what kind of steps and measures they're going to take. That's one way. The other way, as they did last year, they can send a special envoy to Pyongyang again. Maybe Chong Yong, Ambassador Chong and some other people would come to Pyongyang and then also verify what they discussed with Trump and also find out what their strategy and their approach and then maybe in a position to so-called mediate between the two parties. But before that, I like to have South Korean government own concept and roadmap of denuclearization. It seems to me that we have not clearly, so Moon Jae-in has not clearly set forward what do they mean by denuclearization. He said, completed denuclearization was a scope of denuclearization. What's the process of denuclearization? No. They have not specified yet. Maybe to facilitate the talks between the United States and North Korea, South Korea must have its own concept and roadmap of denuclearization. So that should become, South Korea should become a major player, not mediate as Pompeo mentioned in previous session. Second about the actually combined joint military exercise, I think we have given up too much to all. Because actually we just stopped to bring in the strategic asset during the exercise. But actually we scaled down the joint military exercise and then now what I was told by media, they are going to have the command post exercise not bring in the real force. Now for the past whole year we have not mobilized bring in stationing, integrating and onward movement all these forces. Actually the soldiers and the U.S. American soldiers in South Korea, they don't have experience in doing such things at all. So that actually downgrade our military preparedness. Of course I do not want to see the use of force under any time but actually we need to maintain reliable level of military preparedness. But still the President Trump has said is expensive if you don't pay, we are not going to have that kind of exercise. That actually disturbed actually the conservative like myself very much. So actually President Trump regards alliance in only in terms of money. But alliance is more than money. It's about the public good. The backbone for the peace, stability and prosperity as well. If United States weakens its alliance commitment actually that actually give less economic or business opportunity from in the region. I'd like to come back to the Korea-Japan relation. Actually we have to understand the Korean sentiment about this issue. Of course it's a sentiment. First actually about the forced labor issue. It's done by the grand jury. Nothing to do with the administration. If grand jury actually came to the final ruling actually the objective grant has to respond to that the ruling. That's the reality. But anyhow we have to be able to overcome these issues in a more mature way. Of course December 2015 agreement has some problems. Why I just commented. Why just we wasted three years to get this kind of agreement. It's quite similar what we agreed with Japan. Not no single step further. But anyhow what's done is done. Put the past behind us and then maybe we have with Japan like some politicians actually denies the basic spirit of the agreement we made Japan in 2015. That provoked Korean public and politicians and gave another opportunity to boost himself or herself in domestic politics. So I hope get a more positive response coming from Tokyo as well as the other part of Japan. Thank you. Okay so I think that's about as much time as we have. I just want maybe end on a note that Chungmin did it. What do you think is going to happen one line in the next 5, 6 months not 12 months but 5, 6 months. Are we going to get another summit between US and North Korea? What do you think Mike? In the next 5 to 6 months? No. I think we will continue to have expert working level. Actually this result of the Hanoi summit could actually provide a window for at least for the defense folks in Tokyo and Seoul to start repairing the relationship. But there will be a possibility to have some between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un. Okay, right. Okay that's all for now. Thanks.