 The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, translated by Lionel Giles, Ma, 19 May 2004 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Sun Wu in his book SSU Ma Qin gives the following biography of Sun Tzu 1. Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Kai state. His Art of War brought him to the notice of Hou Lu. 2. King of Wu Hou Lu said to him, I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test? Sun Tzu replied, you may. Hou Lu asked, May the test be applied to women? The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 ladies out of the palace. Sun Tzu divided them into two companions and placed one of the king's favorite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands and addressed them thus, I presume you know the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand. The girls replied, Yes, Sun Tzu went on. When I say eyes front, you must look straight ahead. When I say left turn, you must face towards your left hand. When I say right turn, you must face towards your right hand. When I say about turn, you must face right round towards your back. Again the girls assented, the words of command having been thus explained. He set up the howards and battle axes in order to begin the drill. Then to the sound of drums, he gave the order right turn, but the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said, If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame. C-H-A-P-T-R-1, introduction six, so he started drilling them again and this time gave the order left turn, whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzu, if words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame, but if his orders are clear and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers. So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion and when he saw that his favorite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message. We are now quite satisfied as to our general's ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded. Sun Tzu replied, having once received his majesty's commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of his majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept. Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded and straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the king saying, your soldiers, sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined and ready for your majesty's inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire. Bid them go through fire and water and they will not disobey. But the king replied, let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As for us, we have no wish to come down and inspect the troops. Thereupon Sun Tzu said, the king is only fond of words and cannot translate them into deeds. After that, Holu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how to handle an army and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the Chu state and forced his way into Ying, the capital. To the north, he put fear into the states of Kai and Qin and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the king, about Sun Tzu himself, this is all that SSU Ma Qin has to tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant. Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor's death and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu and in his preface we read, Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war. Three it seems likely, then, that Pin was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation. Unless the story was invented in order to account for the name, the crowning incident of his career, the C-H-A-P-T-E-R-1, Introduction 7, crushing defeat of his treacherous rival Pang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter VSS. 19, notes, to return to the elder Sun Tzu, he is mentioned in two other passages of the Shikai, in the third year of his reign 512 BC. Holu, King of Wu, took the field with Su Hsu I. E, Wu Yun and Po Pei, and attacked Chu, he captured the town of Shu and slew the two princes' sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a dissent on Ying the capital, but the general Sun Wu said, the army is exhausted, it is not yet possible, we must wait. After further successful fighting, in the ninth year 506 BC, King Holu addressed Wu Tzu Hsu and Sun Wu, saying, formerly, he declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. It's the time right now, the two men replied, Chu's general Su Chang, four is grasping and covetous, and the princes of Tang and Sai both have a grudge against him. If your majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over Tang and Sai, and then you may succeed. Holu followed this advice, beat Chu in five-pitch battles, and marched into Ying. 5. This is the latest data which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage. 6. From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other, Kaofan, seven who was employed by the Qin State, Wang Tzu, eight in the service of Kai, and Sun Wu in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war. It is obvious enough that SSU Ma Qin at least had no doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage. And with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the Wu Yue Chan Qiu, which is supposed to have been written by Kao Ye of the first century AD. The attribution is somewhat doubtful, but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, based as it is on the Shikai and expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun Wu will be found, for what it is worth, in Chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are, 1. Sun Wu was first recommended to Hou Lu by Wu Tzu HSU. 2. He is called a native of Wu. 3. He had previously lived the retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. The following passage occurs in the He Lan An Tzu, when sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind. It is impossible even for a Sun Wu to encounter the foe. CHAPTR1. Introduction 8. Assuming that this work is genuine and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it, we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu. For He Lan An Tzu died in 122 BC. Many years before the Shikai was given to the world, Liu Hsang, 8 minutes 9 BC, says, The reason why Sun Tzu at the head of 30,000 men beat Qiu with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined. Tang Ming Xi informs us that the surname Sun was bestowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by Duke Qing of Kai 547 minutes 490 BC. Sun Wu's father Sun Ping rose to be a minister of state in Kai, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Chang Qing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of Tai Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering that Sun Pin's victory over Wai was gained in 341 BC, may be dismissed as chronological impossible. Once these data were obtained by Tang Ming Xi, I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is the short preface written by the great Cao Cao or Wai Wu Tai. For his addition of Sun Tzu, I shall give it in full. I have heard that the ancients used bowls and arrows to their advantage nine the Xu Chu mentions the army among the eight objects of government. The Ai Qing says, army indicates firmness and justice, the experienced leader will have good fortune. The Shi Qing says, the king rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshaled his troops. The Yellow Emperor tagged the completter and Wu Wang all used spears and battle axes in order to sucker their generation. The SSU Ma Fa says, if one man slays another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain. He who relies solely on war-like measures shall be exterminated. He who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Chai Ten on the one hand and Yan Wang on the other. Eleven in military matters. The sage rule is normally to keep the peace and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting. But the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. Sun Su was a native of the Kai state. His personal name was Wu. He wrote the art of war in 13 chapters for Hou Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Chu state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Kai and Qin in awe. A hundred years and more after his. Nine day attached strings to wood to make bows and sharpened wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to keep the empire in awe. 10 the son and successor of Hou Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by Kuchin. King of Yue in 473 B.C. Seapost, 11 King Yan of HSU, a fabulous being of whom son Hsing Yan says in his preface. His humanity brought him to destruction. C.H.A.P.T.R.1 Introduction 9. Time. Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu. 12 in his treatment of deliberation and planning. The importance of rapidity in taking the field. 13 clearness of conception and depth of design. Sun Su stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions. And while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked its essential reports. That is the motive which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King Hou Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of ISS. 15. In which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed. In the bibliographic section of the Han Shu, there is an entry which has given rise to much discussion. The works of Sun Su of Wu in 82 Pin or chapters. With diagrams in 9 Chu An, it is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to S.S.U. Ma Qin, or those we possess today. Chang Xu Chi refers to an addition of Sun Tizu's Art of War of which the 13 chapters formed the first Chu An, adding that there were two other Chu An besides. This has brought forth a theory that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Su. We should call them apocryphal, similar to the Wen Ta, of which a specimen dealing with the 9 situations 14 is preserved in the Tum Tain, and another in Hou Xin's commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Hou Lu, Sun Su had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pai H. Sun, the author of the Sun Su Hsu Lu, backs this up with a quotation from the Wu Yue Chen Chu, the King of Wu Sum and Sun Su, and asked him questions about the Art of War. Each time he set forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him. As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Su might be included. The fact that the handshake mentions no work of Sun Su except the 82-peen, whereas the Sui and Tang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to the 13 chapters is good proof, Pai H. Sun thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82-peen. Without pinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the Wu Yue Chen Chu, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pai H. Sun, we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between SSU Maqin and Panku, there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Su, and the 82-peen may very well represent a collected addition of these lumped together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely ignored by him 15. Twelve the passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the two Shu, and may be an interpolation. It was known, however, to Chang Xu Chi of the Tang dynasty and appears in the Tai Ping Yulan. Thirteen Sao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. Two, perhaps especially of SS. Eight. Fourteen C chap. XI. Fifteen on the other hand, it is noteworthy that Wu TZU which is not in six chapters has 48 assigned to it in the Han Qin. Likewise, the Cheng Yang is credited with 49 chapters, though not only in one only. In CHAPTR1, Introduction 10, two Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states, Why Wu Tai strung together Sun Mu's art of war, which in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Sao Qing's preface. This, as Sun Hsing Yan points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it, on the whole. This theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the SSU Kuchuan Xu says, The mention of the 13 chapters in the Shikai shows that they were in existence before the Han Qi, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of the original work. Two Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken as proof. There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the time of SSU Ma Qin practically, as we have them now. But the work was then well known he tells us in so many words. Sun Tzu's 13 chapters and Wu Kai's art of war are the two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here. But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that that Sao Chuan, the greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the Shikai, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the following disposition by Ye Xu Yi H. Xin. 16. It is stated in SSU Ma Qin's history that Sun Wu was a native of the Kai State and employed by Wu, and that in the reign of Hou Lu he crushed Chu. Entered Ying and was a great general, but in so's commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that so's commentary need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. But so has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying Kao Xu. 17. Sao Kui. 18. Xu Qiwu and Qiunxiqiu. 19. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given in their due order about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the minister Pei 20 is incredible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed over. In point of literary style, Sun Tizu's work belongs to the same school as clan TZU. 21. Liu Tao. 22. And the YUIHYU-23 and may have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end of the spring. The case of very short works, one is tempted to think that Pei might simply mean leaves. 16. A. Xie of the Sun Dynasty 1151-1223. 17. He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins. 18. C. Chapter 7. SS. 27. And Chapter 11. SS. 28. 19. C. Chapter 11. SS. 28. Xie Wenchu is the abbreviated form of his name. 20. I. Yi. Po Pei. C. Auntie. 21. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine. Though large additions have been made by later hands. Clan Cheng died in 645 BC. 22. C. Infra. Beginning of introduction. 23. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of another work. Why that chapter should be? Singled out, however, is not clear. C. H. A. P. T. R. 1. Introduction 11. An autumn or the beginning of the Warring States period 24, the story that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. From the flourishing period of the Chu Dynasty 25 down to the time of the spring and autumn, all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals for conducting external campaigns did not then exist. It was not until the period of the six states 26 that this custom changed. Now, although Wu was an uncivilized state, it is conceivable that so should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general, and yet held no civil office. What we are told, therefore, about Jiang Chu 27 and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Hou Lu's experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and incredible. Ye Xu Yi Hsin represents SSU Ma Qin as having said that Sun Wu crushed Chu and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression left on the reader's mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant, but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the shikhai either that Sun Su was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po Pei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to the Dash and enterprise of Fu Kai. Hou Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent part in the same campaign. Chen Chen's son of the Sun dynasty has the note. Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their arts, but the fact that he does not appear in the Tsou Qiuan, although he is said to have served under Hou Lu's King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. He also says, the works of Sun Wu and Wu Kai may be of genuine antiquity. It is noticeable that both Ye Xu Yi H Sin and Chen Chen's son, while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in SSU Ma Qin's history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of the HSU Lu fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Chen Chen's son really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in favor of the high antiquity of our 13 chapters. Sun Tzu, he says, 24 about 480 BC. 25 that is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chu Keng. 26 in the 3rd century BC. 27 SSU Ma Jiang Chu, whose family name was Tain, lived in the latter half of the 6th century BC. And, is also believed to have written a work on war. C. Shikai, C.H. 64, an infra at the beginning of the introduction. C.H.A.P.T. R1, Introduction 12, must have lived in the age of Qing Wang 519 minutes 476, because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chu. Qin and Han dynasties, the two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Kai and He Lan Nan Tzu. Both of them important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known to have taken place in 381 BC. It was to him, according to Liu H. Zhang, that Sheng Shen delivered it so Qiun, which had been entrusted to him by its author 28 now the fact that quotations from the art of war, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different epochs. Establishes a very strong interior to them all. In other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th century BC. Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the archaic or holy obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the HSU Liu, and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Ye Shui H. Xin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early part of the 5th century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the contrary, and it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus in 13 SS I, there is an unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land tenure, which had already passed away by the time of Menchus, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form 29 the only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried on between the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the Chu dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 BC. On this I shall touch presently, but once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its being other than a bona fide production are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after, that it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Ye Shui H. Sin's theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a practical soldier closely acclaimed it with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in this study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards the end of the Chan Qi period. Are we not bound, in spite of the silence of the Zou Qiulan, to accept SSU Ma Qin's account in its entirety, in view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume. 28 C. Legg is Classics. Vao. V. Pro Gom Le Pi. 27. Legg thinks that the Zou Qiulan must have been written in the 5th century, but not before 424 BC. 29 C.M.E.N.C.I.U.S.3. 1. 3. 13 minutes 20. C.H.A.P.T.R.1. Introduction 13. That the records he drew upon for Sun Wu's biography were false and untrustworthy. The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objecting on to the chronology involved in this story as told in the Xikai, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in V.I.S.S.21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of UA exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. The other is in X.I.S.S.30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the S.H.U.A.I. Jan, I should answer, yes, for the men of Wu and the men of UA are enemies, yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and UA. So much has been observed by Pai I.H. Sun, but what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of S.S.U. Ma Qin's narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential advisor to Hou Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the capture of Ying in 506, Xiu and not UA was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Xiu and Wu, had been constantly at war for over half a century, 30 whereas the first war between Wu and UA was waged only in 510. 31 and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Qiu. Now Qiu is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were written at a time when UA had become the prime antagonist of Wu. That is, after Qiu had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found useful. 30 when Wu first appears in the Chen Qiu in 584. It is already at variance with its powerful neighbor. The Chen Qiu first mentions UA in 537. That's so Qiuan in 601. 31 this is explicitly stated in that so Qiuan. 32, 2. CHAPTR1. Introduction. Accession of Hou Lu. Hou Lu attacks Qiu, but is dissuaded from entering Ying. The capital. Qikaiem, another attack on Qiu. Wu makes a successful attack on UA. This is the first war between. Qiu invades Wu, but is singly defeated at Yu-Chan. Hou Lu attacks Qiu with the aid of Tang in Sai. Decisive battle of Po-Qiu and capture of Yin. UA makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is beaten by Qin Hou Lu sends Fu Chai to attack Qiu. Qiu Qin becomes King of Lu-Ai. Wu attacks Yue, but is defeated by Qiu Qin at Sui Lai. Hou Lu, Fu Chai defeats Qiu Qin in the great battle of Fo-Qiu and enters the. Qiu Qin renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu, Su Hsu, Qiu Qin invades Wu in the absence of Fu Chai. Further attacks by Yu-Ai on Wu. Qiu Qin lays siege to the capital of Wu. Final defeat and extinction of Wu. Descendants quoted above from B.I. It says, 21 hardly strikes me as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which state Yue does not appear to have scored any notable success against Wu. Hou Lu died in 496 so that if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496 when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Qiu. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu's name with Hou Lu, it might equally well have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473. When Yu-Ai was once again becoming a very serious menace 32, we may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point, the negative testimony of that so Qiu in far outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the Shikai, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-Yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu Hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the latter being an alien was not rewarded with an office in the state. How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Hou Lu's reign. It made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified with that campaign, that first perhaps only in the sense that his brain conceived and planned it, afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him. Thirty-two there is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language used in Xi. SS-30, CHAPTR-1, Introduction 15, in conjunction with Wu Yuen, 33 Pol Pei and Fu Kai. It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzu's life must. He based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Hou Lu's accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense millitary activity which marked the first half of the Prince's reign 34 if he rose to be a general at all. He certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witness Wu's sudden collapse in the following year. He lays attack at this critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end. Rather than the beginning of Hou Lu's reign, the story of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron, or to have taken part in the death struggle with Yue, which began with the disaster at Suli. If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's most illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. 1.2 the text of Sun Wu. I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tizu's text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the 13 chapters of which SSU Ma Qin speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day and can only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing Yan says in his preface, During the Qin and Han Dynasty, Sun Tizu's art of war was in general used amongst military commanders, but they seemed to have treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity. Vesit came about that why Wu was the first to write a commentary on it. As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that Cao come tampered with the text, but the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of editeans which appeared from that time onwards so great, especially during the Tang and some dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed. 33 with Wu Yuan himself, the case is just the reverse. Asperius treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. Here we have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have been widely known to fame in the 5th century. 34 from So Chuan, from the date of King Kao's accession 515, there was no year in which Chuan was not attacked by Wu. CHAPTR1 Introduction 16 To creep in towards the middle of the Sun period, by which time all the chief calmmentaries on Sun Tzu were in existence. A certain Kai Tai Pao published a work in 15 Qilin entitled Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of 10 writers. There was another text with variant readings put forward by Qiufu of Ta Hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period. But in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing Yan tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no longer put into circular Tian. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Kai Tai Pao's edition. Although no actual copy of that important work was known to have survived, that, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzu which appears in the war section of the Great Imperial Encyclopedia printed in 1726. The Kuchin Tu Shu Kai Cheng, another copy at my disposal of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the 11 philosophers of the Chu and Qin Dynasties 1758. And the Chinese printed in Captain Kowthrop's first edition is evidently a similar version, which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing Yan 1752-1818, a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu. 35 accidentally discovered a copy of Kai Tai Pao's long lost work. When on a visit to the library of the Huoyin Temple 36 appended to it was the I Shuo of Cheng Yu Hsing, Mentian in the Tengchi, and also believed to have perished. This is what Sun Hsing Yan designates as the original edition or text, a rather misleading name. For it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzu and its pristine purity. Kai Tai Pao was a careless compiler and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly discovered work, were still extant. One buried in the Tum Tain, two used great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the Tai Ping Yu Lan Encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the Yu Lan takes us back to the year 983, and the Tum Tain about 200 years further still, to the middle of the Tang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing Yen, acting under government instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own account, because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his editors had handed down. The government ordered that the ancient edition of Kai Tai Pao should be used, and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Ninhu, the governor Pi Qiua, and HSI, a graduate of the 2nd degree, had all devoted themselves to. 35 Preface at Fin. My family comes from Lo An, and we are really descended from Sun Tzu. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestors' work from a literary point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long have we been enjoying the blessings of peace. 36 Ho Yin is about 14 miles from Tang Clan on the eastern border of Shanxi. The temple in question is still visited by those about the ascent of the western sacred mountain. It is mentioned in a text as being situated five li east of the district city of Huoyan. The temple contains the Huoshan tablet inscribed by the Tang Emperor Hsu in Suong 713-755. CHAPTR1 Introduction 17 this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for military men. The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing Yan's commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing Yan and only one co-editor Wu Zhenxi. They took the original edition as their basis and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as the ISHUO succeeded in restoring a very large number of doubtful passages and turned out on the whole. What must be accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzu's original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the standard text. The copy which I have used belongs to a reissued dated 1877. It is in 6 Nuvosal, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 Nuvosal.37 it opens, with a preface by Sun Hsing Yan largely quoted in this introduction, vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life and performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its favor. This is followed by Tsao Kung's preface to his edition and the biography of Sun Tzu from the Shikai, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu Hsing's ISHUO, 38 with author's preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, compiled by Pi H Sun. As regards the body of the work, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the various commentaries appertaining to it. Arranged in chronological order, these we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one, 1.3 the commentators. Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long, distinguished role of commentators, which would do honor to any classic. Wu Yan Hsing remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways. One, South-South or Tsao Khen, afterwards known as Wai Wu Tai Ad, 155 minutes 220, there is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this extraordinary man, whose biography in the San Qiu Chi reads like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the line talk of South-South, and South-South will appear. Wu Yang H-Tzu says of him that he was a great captain who measured his strength against Tung Chou, Lu Pu and the Tuyuan, father and son, and banquished. 37 see my catalog of Chinese books Luzak and Co. 1908, no, 40, 38 this is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu, CHAPTR1, introduction 18, them all, whereupon he divided the empire of Han with Wu and Xu, and made himself king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by Y on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all his calculations ready. Those generals who made use of them did not lose one battle in 10. Those who ran counter to them in any particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to flight. Sao Keng's notes on Sun Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern commander known to history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere literature. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less in need of a commentary than the text itself 39. Two, Meng Xun, the commentary which has come down to us under this name is comparatively meager, and nothing about the author is known. Even his personal name has not been recorded. Tai Tai Pao's edition places him after Qialin, and Kaocang Wu also assigns him to the Tang dynasty. Forty, but this is a mistake. In Sun Hsing Yen's preface, he appears as Meng Xie of the Liang Dynastai 502-557. Others would identify him with Meng Kang of the 3rd century. He is named in one work as the last of the commentators, the others being Wai Wu Tai, Tumu, Shen Hao and Qialin. Three, Lai Qiuan of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military tactics. One of his works has been in constant use down to the present day. The Tang Qi mentions lives of famous generals from the Qiu to the Tang dynasty as written by him 41 according to Kaocang Wu, and the Tainai Co-catalod. He followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs considerably from those now extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point, and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes from Chinese history. Four, Tuyu died 812 did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the Tang Tain, the encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution which was his life work. They are largely repetitions of Cao Kang and Meng Xie, besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient commentaries of Wang Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar arrangement of Tum Tain, he has to explain each passage on its merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own explanation does not agree with that of Cao Kang, whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the 10 commentators, he was added to their number by Kai Tain Pao, being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu. Five, Tu Mu 800-852 is perhaps the best known as a poet. A bright star even in the glorious Galaxy of the Tang period. We learn from Keio Kamu that although he had no practical experience of war, he was extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was moreover well-read in the military history of them. 39cf, catalog of the Library of Fan Family at Ningpo. His commentary is frequently obscure, it furnishes a clue, but does not fully develop the meaning. 41hc, Tum Cao, ch. 221, 41 it is interesting to note that M Pellet has recently discovered chapters 1. 4 and 5 of this lost work in the grottoes of the Thousand Buddhas. C-B-F-E-O, T. 8, Noss, 3-4, P. 525, ch-A-P-T-E-R-1, Introduction 19, Chan Qiu and Chan Q-O eras. His notes, therefore, are well worth attention. They are very copious and replete with historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus summarized by him. Practice benevolence and justice, but on the other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency. He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the Thousand Years, which had elapsed since Sun Tzu's death would, upon examination, be found to uphold and corroborate. In every particular, the maxims contained in his book, Tzu Wu's somewhat spiteful charge against Cao Kung has already been considered elsewhere. 6, Chen Hao appears to have been a contemporary of Tzu Mu. K. O. Kung Wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzu because Cao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and subtle, and that of Tzu Mu on the other too long-winded and diffuse. Lu Yang H. Tzu, writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Cao Kung, Tzu Mu and Chen Hao the three chief commentators on Sun Tzu, and observes that Chen Hao is continually attacking Tzu Mu's shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of his predecessors. 7, Xiulin is known to have lived under the Tang dynasty, for his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the Tang Shu, and was afterwards republished by Kai H. C. of the same dynasty together with those of Meng Xie and Tu Yu. It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too. Perhaps the least valuable of the 11. 8, Mei Yao Chen 1002-1060, commonly known by his style as Mei Shang Yu, was, like Tzu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great Yu Yang H. C. Yu, from which we may call the following. Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to the task. My friend Shang Yu has not fallen into this mistake, in attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzu's work. He does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare, that the author is not concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties, 42 nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the minister of war 43 again. Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically treated. The sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his 42 the Aisha, the Shang and the Chu, although the last name was nominally existent in Sun Tzu's day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old military organization had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other explanation of the passage. 43 C Chu Li, 29, 6 minutes 10, CHAPTR1, Introduction 20, Own Commentary, May Shang Yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three great commentaries, and for a great deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant reason to thank my friend Shang Yu, making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship. I am inclined to endorse this favorable judgment, and would certainly place him above Chen Hao in order of merit. 9 Wang Hsi, also of the Sun dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao Chen, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of Cao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Cao Kung Wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzu, filling up Lakinie, and correcting mistakes 44. 10 Huyen Hsi of the Sun dynasty, the personal name of this commentator is given as above by Chen Chao in the Tum Che, written about the middle of the 12th century. But he appears simply as Hoshi in the UHAI, and Ma Tuan Lin quotes Cao Kung Wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Chen Chao's statement, otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one Houchu Fei, the author of a short treatise on war, who lived in the latter part of the 11th century. Hoshi's commentary in the words of the Tainai Co-catalog contains helpful additions here and there, but is chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken in adapted form from the dynastic histories and other sources. 11. C-H-A-N-G-Y-U The list close with that commentator of not great originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator is based on that of Cao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand, and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chen Yu, it is safe to say that much of Cao Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sun history, the Tung Cao, or the UHAI, but it finds a niche in the Tung Chi, which also names him as the author of the lives of famous generals. 45. It is rather remarkable that the last named four should all have flourished within so short a space of time. Cao Kung Wu accounts for it by saying, During the early years of the Sun dynasty, the empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. But when Cao Yuanhao's rebellion came 1038 to 42, and the frontier generals were defeated time after time, the court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became the 44 Tung Cao, CH. 221. 45 disappears to be still extent. C. Wiley's notes, P. 91 new edition. CHAPTR1. Introduction 21-Vold amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun, Su and our dynasty belong mainly to that period 46. Besides these 11 commentators, there are several others whose work has not come down to us. The Sui Xu mentions four, namely Wang Ling often quoted by two U as Wang, Su, Zhang, Su, Shan. Chi Hsu of Y, 47 and Shen Yu of Wu. The Tang Xu adds Sun Hao and the Tung Chi Hsiao Kai, while the two Xu mentions a Ming commentator. Huang Zhenyu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Kai Tai Pao and Kai Hsie. Mentioned above, 1.4 appreciations of Sun, Su. Sun, Su has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China's greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsindy. 196 BC. 48 Feng, ID. 34 AD. 49 Lu Meng, D. 219. 50 and Youfei 1103 to 1141.51 the opinion of Cao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsindy highest place in Chinese military annals has already been recorded 52 still more remarkable. In one way is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsindy the father of Su Tung Po, who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun, Su. The following short passage by him is preserved in the UHAI. 53 Sun Wu saying that in war one cannot make certain of conquering. 54 is very different indeed from what other books tell us. 55 Wu Kai was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu. They both wrote books on war and they are linked together in popular speech as Sun and Wu. But Wu Kai's remarks on war are less weighty. His rules are rougher and more crudely stated. And there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzu's work, where the style is terse. But the meaning fully brought out. The following is an extract from the impartial judgments in the Garden of Literature by Cheng Hu, 47A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the San Qiu Qi, CH. 10. 52 the few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of equating themselves with Sun, Su or not. Behindhand in their praise, in this connection, I may perhaps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets of the present work were submitted previous to publication. Many of Sun Wu's maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day. And no, 11 in Chapter 8 is one that the people of this country would do well to take to heart. CHAPTR1 Introduction 22 Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men's training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the Lan Yu, the I Ching and the Great Commentary, 56 as well as the Writings of Menches, H Sun Clang and Yang Chu. All fall below the level of Sun Tzu. CHU HSI, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism. Although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical works, language of this sort, he says, encourages a ruler's bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism. CHU HSI 1.5 Apologies for War accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on Earth. We are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern state can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What would the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal states, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one. It is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the empire. No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Hokai stands out conspicuous in the period when Qin was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years which follow the breakup of the Qin dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hxin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of South-South dominates the scene and in the establishment of the Tang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Lai Ximin afterwards, the Emperor Tai Tzu was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Lai Qing. None of these generals need fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment from Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistent in Lai Pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending warfare on principle that I have thought it worthwhile to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following by SSU Ma Qin shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price. 56 that so Chu An, C-H-A-P-T-E-R-1, introduction 23 military weapons are the means used by the sage to punish violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublesome times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to sucker those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger, when he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him, when angry, his poison sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his being, what then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without any appreciation of reliant values, who can only bark out their stale formulas about virtue and civilization, condemning the use of military weapons. They will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonor and the loss of her rightful heritage, or at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement, yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed within the state, so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the empire. All one can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious 57. The next piece is taken from Tumu's preface to his commentary on Sun Tzu, or may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. It was the profession of Cheng Yu and Zhan Qi, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the marketplace, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of traitors, this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war, for the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed. Hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of wicked people and to give comfort and relief to the good. Cai Sun asked Zhan Yu, saying, Have you, sir, acquired your military aptitude by study? Or is it innate? Zhan Yu replied, It has been acquired by study. 58, how can that be so? said Cai Sun, Seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius. It is a fact, replied Zhan Yu, I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the Great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far. 57, as H I H Cai, C H. 25, Fall, by 58 C F. Shikai, C H 47. C H A P T R 1. Introduction 24. Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the civil and the military and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say, but at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shame-faced manner if any are bold enough to discuss the subject. They are at once set down as eccentric individuals of course and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles. When the Duke of Chu was ministered under Chang Lang, he regulated ceremonies and made music and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning. Yet when the barbarians of the river Hulai revolted, 59 he sallied forth and chastised them when Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu and a meeting was convened at Chiakoo. Sixty he said, if Pacific negotiations are in progress, war-like preparations should have been made beforehand. He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Chi, who cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great sages had no knowledge of military matters? We have seen that the great Chu HSI held Sun Tzu in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the classics. Our master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wai, said, I have never studied matters connected with armies and battalions. Sixty-one replying to Kang Wen-su, he said, I have not been instructed about buffed coats and weapons. But if we turn to the meeting at Chiakoo, we find that he used armed force against the men of Lai so that the Marquis of Chi was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, they ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words, If I fight, I conquer. Sixty-two and Jan Yu also said, The sage exercises both civil and military functions. Sixty-three can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or received instruction in the art of war. We can only say that he did not specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching. Sun Hsing-Yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar strain. Confucius said, I am unburst in military matters. Sixty-four he also said, If I fight, I conquer. Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of state ceremonial. Sixty-five and CHAPTR1, Introduction 25, must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words I am unburst in must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems must learn the art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who was employed by Wutsu Hsing-Yen, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence, the remark added by Confucius, If I fight, I conquer. The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduced the example of Kaokula, who poured over his father's books to no purpose. 66 as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly cherry of allowing mere novices to botch their work. 67 weapons are baneful 68 and fighting perilous and useless unless a general is in constant practice. He ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle 69. Hence, it is essential that Sun Tizu's 13 chapters should be studied. H Xianglang used to instruct his nephew Kai 70 in the art of war. Kai got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome. The consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke H Xiang of Song and Qingyan of HSU were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated and extorted oath. 71 and also of his having left the Sun state in disguise, 72 can we then recklessly arraign Sun's suit for this regarding truth and honesty. 66 C-310 SS 11 Notes 67 This is a rather obscure allusion to the Tso Chuan, where Tsu Chan says, If you have a piece of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up. Dipliography 2 SSU Ma Fa in one Chuan or five chapters, wrongly attributed to SSU Ma Jiang Chu of the 6th century BC. Its date, however, must be early as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met within its pages. C-Shikai CH 64 SSU Kuchuan Chu CH 99 F1 One remarks that the oldest three treatises on war, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu and SSU Ma Fa are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military, the art of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of soldiers, in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general, three L-I-U-T-A-O in six Chuan or 60 chapters, a tributeto Lu Wang or Lu Shang, also known as Taikang of the 12th century BC 73, but its style does not belong to the era of the three dynasties. Lu Ti Ming 550 minutes 625 AD mentions the work and enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery cannot have been later than Sui Dynasty, for Y-Li-O-T-Z-U in five Chuan, attributed to Y-Li-O-Fourth Cint, BC, who stood wide under the famous Q-I-Ku Tzu. The work appears to have been originally in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring States period. It has been furnished with a commentary by the well-known son philosopher Chang Tsai, five S-A-N-L-U-E-H in three Chuan, a tributeto Wang Shikam, a legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang Di, 187 BC, in an interview on a bridge. But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the Qin or Han period. The Han Emperor Quang Wu 25 minutes 57 AD apparently quotes from it in one of his proclamations, but the passage in question may have been inserted later on. 73 C-310, SS-27, notes. Further details on Taikun will be found in the Shikai, C-H. 32 Adenith. Besides the tradition which makes him a former minister of Chu-H Xin. Two other accounts of him are there given, according to which he would appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Wen Wang, station by Bibliography 27 in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Song period 420 minutes 478 AD or somewhat earlier, 6 L-I-W-E-I-K-U-N-G-W-E-N-T-U-I in three sections, written in the form of a dialogue between Tai Tzu and his great general Lai Qing. It is usually ascribed to the latter. Competing authorities consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war. 7 Lai Qing ping fa not to be confounded with the foregoing is a short treatise in eight chapters, preserved in the tum tain, but not published separately. This fact explains its omission from the SSU Ku Chu-Han Chu, 8 Wukai Qing in 1 Chu-Han, attributed to the legendary minister Feng Hu, with exegetical notes by Kung Sun Hong of the Han Dynasty D. 121 BC and set it up in eulogized by the celebrated general Ma Long-di. 300 AD Yet the earliest mention of it is in the Sang-Chi. Although a forgery, the work is well put together, considering the high popular estimation in which Chu Ko-Liang has always been held. It is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are 1 the Shi Liu-Zi 1 Chu-Han, preserved in the Yang Lo-Tai-Tai-N, 2 Chiang Yuan 1 Chu-Han, and 3 HS-I-N Shu 1 Chu-Han, which steals wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine. Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive sections devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found useful. The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve mention. To these, of course, must be added the great catalog of the Imperial Library, SSU Ku Chu-Han, Sun Tzu Mu Tai Yao 1790, CH, 99, 100. The previously mentioned works are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the SSU Ku Chu-Han, Shu Chi Ming Mu Lu, CH, 9, Fall, 22 SQQ, Chapter 2, Laying Plans, Xiao Kang, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. Sun Tzu said, The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence, it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors to be taken into account in one's deliberations when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are, one, the moral law to heaven, three earth, for the calm manor, five method and discipline. It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by moral law a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by morale, were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in SS. Thirteen, the moral law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. Two, you quotes Wang Tzu as saying, without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle. Without constant practice, the general will be wavering in a resolute when the crisis is at hand. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng Shi refers to the hard and the soft, waxing and waning of. 29, CHAPTDR2, LAYINGPLANS30. Heaven, Lang HSI, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is the general economy of heaven, including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds and other phenomena, hate, birth comprises distances, great and small, danger and security, open ground and narrow passes, the chances of life and death. Nine, the commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are one, humanity or benevolence, two, uprightness of mind, three, self-respect, self-control or proper feeling for wisdom, five, sincerity or good faith. Here wisdom and sincerity are put before humanity or benevolence and the two military virtues of courage and strictness substituted for uprightness of mind and self-respect, self-control or proper feeling. Ten, by method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army and the control of military expenditure. Eleven, these five heads should be familiar to every general. He who knows them will be victorious. He who knows them not will fail. Twelve, therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison. In this wise, thirteen, one which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the moral law, i.e. is in harmony with his subjects, cf, ss, five, two which of the two generals has most ability, three with whom lie the advantages derived from heaven and earth, css, seven, eight, four on which side is disciplined most rigorously enforced. Two mu alludes to the remarkable story of South-South-Ad. 155 minutes 220, who was such a strict disciplinary in that once. In accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn. However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. South-South's own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt. When you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed. If it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death. Five which army is stronger, chaptr2, layngplans31 morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-Chan puts it, freely rendered, he has pirit decor and big battalions. Six on which side are officers and men were highly trained. Two you quotes Wang Tsu as saying, without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle, without constant practice, the general will be wavering in the resolute when the crisis is at hand. Seven in which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment. On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished. Fourteen, by means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. Fifteen, the general that harkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer, let such a one be retained in command. The general that harkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it will suffer defeat, let such a one be dismissed. The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Hou Lu, King of the Wu State. Sixten, while heeding the profit of my counsel avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. Seventeen, according as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans. Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the bookish steric. He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles. Four, as Chang Yu puts it, while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all in sundry, you must be guided by the ac'teons of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare. On the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the moral. Because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself commander in chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said, who will attack the first tomorrow, I are Bonaparte. Bonaparte, replied Lord Uxbridge, well, continued the Duke, Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects. And as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are? One, Aitun, all warfare is based on deception. One, one words on Wellington, by Sir W. Fraser, C.H.A.P.T.E.R. II, L.A.Y.I.N.G.P.L.A.N.S. 32. The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Call. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many millet are equalities, was especially distinguished by the extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe. 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable. When using our forces, we must seem inactive. When we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. When far away, we must make him believe we are near. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy, thane disorder, and crush him. All commentators, except Chang Yu, say when he is in disorder, crush him. It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war. 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. 22. If your opponent is of caloric temper, seek to irritate him, pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogance. Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him. 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao Chen has to note. While we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out. The Yu land has lure him on and tire him out. If his forces are united, separate them. Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the commentators. If sovereign and subject are in accord, put the vision between them. 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 25. His military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple air the battle is fought. Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Let's do many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat. How much more no calculation at all? It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. 3. Waging war Cao Khan has the note, he who wishes to fight must first count the cost, which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means. 1. Sun Tzu said, In the operations of war, where there are in the field of Dao San swift chariots, as many heavy chariots and a hundred thousand male clan soldiers, the swift chariots were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for the attack, the heavy chariots were heavier and designed for purposes of defense. Mai Chiwen, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and not of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of foot soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift chariot was a companion by 75 foot men and each heavy chariot by 25 foot men so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions. Each consists of two chariots and a hundred men with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li. 2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time. The expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and some spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day, such as the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long and coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 33. CHAP to the R3. W-A-G-I-N-G-W-A-R-34. 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. 6. Sao Kung, Lai Chiwen, Meng Shi, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao Chen have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shi says, haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure. Protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train. Wang HSI evades the difficulty by remarking, lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people. True cleverness ensures against the occurrence of such calamities. Shang Yu says, so long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilate orinous. Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious, but lengthy operations, what he does say is something much more guarded. Namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish. If only because it means impoverishment to the Na Tian, in considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius' Comptator will inevitably occur to the mind, that general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is true, led to canny, but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favor. Six, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. Seven, it is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context. Whereas the rendering, he who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits, is distinctly pointless. CHAP to the R3, W-A-G-I-N-G-W-A-R-35. Eighth, the skillful soldier does not raise a second levy. Neither are his supply. Lagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time, that is, being a little ahead of your opponent, has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat. Ninth, bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. The Chinese word translated here as war material literally means things to be used and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impediment of an army apart from provisions. Ten, poverty of the state exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an invitation may be necessary for the sense and we get no help from them there. The Chinese word Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the husband men sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way? Except because the state or government is too poor to do so. Eleven, on the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up. And high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. Wang HSI says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory. Sao Kan understands it of an army that has already crossed the frontier. Twelve, when their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. Thirteen, fourteen, with this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare. And three tenths of their income will be dissipated. Two Mu and Wang HSI agree that the people are not malted not of three tenths, but of seven tenths of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Hoshi has a characteristic tag, the people being regarded as CHAP to the R3. W-A-G-I-N-G-W-A-R-30-60 essential part of the state and food as the people's heaven. Is it not? Write that those in authority should value and be careful of both. While government expenses for broken chariots, worn out horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draft oxen and heavy wagons will amount to four tenths of its total revenue. Thiftun, hence a wise general, makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to 20 of one's own. And likewise, a single pickle of his proven er is equivalent to 20 from one's own store. Because 20 cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload to the front. A pickle is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds 65.5 kilograms. Sixten, now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy. They must have their rewards. Tu Mu says, rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy. Thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight. Each on his own account. Seventeen, therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. Eighteen, this is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. Nineteen, in war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. As Hoshi remarks, war is not a thing to be trifled with. Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce. Twenty, plus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate. The man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. Chapter Four Attacked by Strategium One, Sun Tzu said, in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact, to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, two, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it. To capture a regimen, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them, the equivalent to an army corps according to SSU Ma Fa consisted nom and ally of twelve thousand five hundred men. According to Cao Kung, the equivalent of a regimen contained five hundred men. The equivalent to a detachment consists from any number between one hundred and five hundred and the equivalent of a company contains from five to one hundred men. For the last two, however, Shang Yu gives the exact figures of one hundred and five respectively. Two, hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese general. Mouk's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at Sudan, was won practically without bloodshed. Three, thus the highest form of generalship is to bop the enemy's plans. Perhaps the word bop falls short of expressing the full force of the Chinese word which implies not an attitude of defense whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another but an active policy of counterattack. Houshie puts this very clearly in his note when the enemy has made a plan of attack against us. We must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first. The next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into which the China of his day was split up. Thirty-seven, C-H-A-P-T-E-R-Four. A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-S-T-R-A-T-A-G-E-M Thirty-eight, the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field when he is already at full strength. And the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. Four, the rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. Another sound piece of military theory had the Boers acted upon it in 1899 and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Maeve King, or even Ladysmith. It is more than probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war will take up three whole months. It is not quite clear what the Chinese word here translated as mantlets described. Sao Kung simply defines them as large shields, but we get a better idea of them from Lai Chuan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman testudo ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Chen Hao. Si Su Pratou, 14, the name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the movable shelters, we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within. Covered over with raw hides and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called wooden donkeys and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the defense and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Five, a general, unable to control his irritation will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants. This vivid simile of Sao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-4 A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-S-T-R-A-T-A-G-E-M-39 we are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. Six, therefore, the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting. He captures their cities without laying siege to them. He overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. Xie Lin notes that he only overthrows the government, but there's no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed father and mother of the people. Seven, with his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the empire and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning and thus, the weapon not being blunted by use. Its keenness remains perfect. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. Eight, it is the rule in war if our forces are ten to the enemy's one. To surround him, if five to one, to attack him, straight way, without waiting for any further advantage. If twice as numerous to divide our army into two, two mu takes exception to the saying. And at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. T.S. Aukong, however, gives a clue to Santizu's meaning. Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way. And the other for some special diversion. Changyu thus further elucidates the point. If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions. One to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear if he replies to the frontal attack. He may be crushed from behind, if to the rearward attack. He may be crushed in front. This is what is meant by saying that one part may be used in the regular way. And the other for some special diversion. Two mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an irregular. Just as concentrating it is the regular strategical method. And he is too hasty in calling this a mistake. Nine. If equally matched, we can offer battle. Maiqilun, followed by Hoshie, gives the following paraphrase. If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able general will fight. If slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-4. A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-S T-R-A-T-A-G-A-M-40. The meaning we can watch the enemy is certainly a great improvement on the above. But unfortunately, there appears to be no very good authority for the variants. Changyu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal. A small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalance by superior energy and discipline. If quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Ten. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. Eleven. Now the general is the bulwark of the state. If the bulwark is complete at all points, the state will be strong. If the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak. As Lai Qiulun tersly puts it, gap indicates deficiency. If the general's ability is not perfect, I. E. If he is not thoroughly versed in his profession, his army will lack strength. Twelve. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army. Thirteen. One by commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. My Qiulun adds to comment. It is like tying together the legs of a Thor Albred so that it is unable to gallop. One would naturally think of the ruler in this passage as being at home and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse and quote the saying of Taicum, a kingdom should not be governed from without. An army should not be directed from within. Of course, it is true that during an engagement or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole and give wrong orders. Fourteen. Two by attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldiers' minds. Sao Kang's note is freely translated. The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct. You can't handle an army in kid gloves. And Chang Yu says humanity and justice are the principles on which to govern a state but not an army, opportunism and flexibility. On the other hand, our military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an army to that of a state understood. Thifton. Three by employing the officers of his army without discrimination. That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-4. A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-S-T-R-A-T-A-G M-41 through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers that follow Mei Yao Chen here. The other commentators refer not to the ruler as an SS. Thirteen. Fourteen. But to the officers he employs. But as Thu Yu says, if a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be enthrused ted with a position of authority. Two Mu quotes, the skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action. The covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death. Sixten. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army and flinging victory away. Seventeen. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory. One he will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. Chang Yu says, if he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive. If he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive or the defensive. Two he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly as Lai Chuan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying more satisfactorily by applying the art of war. It is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says with a superior force, make for easy ground with an inferior one, make for difficult ground. Three he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. Four he will win who prepared himself waits to take the enemy unprepared. Five he will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. Two Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying, it is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions but to decide on battle it is the function of the general. It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central authority. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-4 A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-S-T-R-A-T-A-G-M-42 A-Tun Hence the saying, if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. Mai Chiu incites the case of Fu Qin, Prince of Qin who in 383 AD marched with a vast army against the Qin emperor when wore not to despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as H-C-N and He-Lin Cheng. He boastfully replied, I have the population of eight provinces at my back infantry and horsemen to the number of one million. Why? They could dam up the Yangtze river itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear? Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei river and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat if you know neither the enemy nor yourself you will succumb in every battle. Cheng Yu said knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive. He adds attack is the secret of defense. Defense is the planning of an attack. It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root principle of war. Chapter 5 Tactical Dispositions Cao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of this chapter marching and counter marching on the part of the two armies with a view to discover oring each other's condition. Tu Mu says it is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions and your condition will remain secret which leads to victory. Show your dispositions and your condition will become patterned which leads to defeat. Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can secure success by modifying his tactics to meet those of the enemy. 1. Sun Su said the good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands but the opportune idea of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's parts. 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat. Chang Yu says this is done by concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks and taking unremitting precautions but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 4. Hence the saying one may know how to conquer without being able to do it. 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics. Ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. I retain the sense found in a similar passage in SS. 1 minutes 3 in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they give he who cannot conquer takes the defensive is plausible enough. 43. CHAPTR5 T-A-C-T-I-C-A-L-D-I-S-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N-S-44 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength. Attacking. Asu. Parabundance of strength. 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth. Literally, hides under the 9th earth which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment so that the enemy may not know his whereabouts. He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost hides of heaven. Another metaphor implying that he falls on this adversary like a thunderbolt against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the commentators. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves on the other a victory that is complete. 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acne of excellence. As Sao come remarks the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated to foresee the event before the action has begun. Mai Chiwen alludes to the story of Han H. Xin who went about to attack the vastly superior army of Kao which was strongly entrenched in the city of Cheng and said to his officers gentlemen we are going to annihilate the enemy and shall meet again at dinner. The officers hardly took his words seriously and gave a very dubious assent but Han H. Xin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem whereby as he foresaw he was able to capture the city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. 9. Neither is it the acne of excellence if you fight and conquer in the whole empire says well done. True excellence being as Tu Bu says to plan secretly to move Sorepti Tiaosli to foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood. Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that the world's core stump and finger fail to plumb. 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength. Autumn hair is explained as the fur of a hair which is finest in old tum when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers. To see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight. To hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-5 T-A-C-T-I-C-A-L-D-I-S-P-O-S-I-T-I-O-N-S-45 Hoshi gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick hearing Wu Heol who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone. Lai Chu who at a distance of 100 paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard seed and Xi Klang a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito. 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins but excels in winning with ease. The last half is literally one who conquering excels in easy conquering. Mei Yao Chen says he who only sees the obvious wins his battles with difficulty. He who looks below the surface of things wins with ease. 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. Tu Mu explains this very well in as much as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light. The world as large knows nothing of them and he wins no reputation for wisdom in as much as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed. He receives no credit for courage. 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Shen Hao says he plans no superfluous marches. He devises no feudal attacks. The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu one who seeks to conquer by sheer strength. Clever though he may be at winning pitch battles is also liable on occasion to be vanquished whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. A council of perfection as Tumu truly observes position need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army. 15. Thus it is that and more the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory Hoshidus expounds the paradox in warfare first lay plans which will ensure victory and then lead your army to battle if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone victory will no longer be assured. CHAPTER 5 TACTICALDISPOSITONS46 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law and strictly adheres to method and discipline thus it is in his power to control success. 17. In respect of military method we have firstly measurement secondly estimation of quantity thirdly calculation fourthly balancing of chances fifthly victory eighthly measurement owes its existence to earth estimation of quantity to Miesjurmen calculation to estimation of quantity balancing of chances to calculation and victory to balancing of chances it is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese the first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's strength and to make calculations based on the data thus obtained we are thus led to a general weighing up or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own if the latter turn the scale then victory ensues the chief difficulty lies in third term which in the Chinese some commentators take as a calculation of numbers thereby making it nearly synonymous with the second term perhaps the second term should be thought of as a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength on the other hand Tu Mu says the question of relative strength having been settled we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play posture seconds this interpretation but weakens it however it points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers 19 a victorious army opposed to a routed one is as a pounds weight placed in the scale against a single grain literally a victorious army is like an i20 ounces weighed against a shoe 1 24th of an ounce a routed army is a shoe weight against an i20 point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force flush with victory has over one demoralized by defeat leg in this note amentious i2 9 2 makes the i2 be 24 Chinese ounces and corrects Chu hc statement that it equal 20 ounces only the light Chu and of the Tang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu hsi 20 the onrish of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep chapter six energy one Sun Su said the control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers that is cutting up the army into regiments companies etc with subordinate officers in command of each two mu reminds us of Han H sin's famous reply to the first Han emperor who once said to him how large an army do you think I could lead not more than 100,000 men your majesty and you asked the emperor oh he answered the more the better to fighting with a large army under your command is no eyes different from fighting with a small one it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals three to ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect we now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tizu's treatise the discussion of the Cheng and the Kai as it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms or to render them consist and fly by good English equivalents it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentator's remarks on the subject before proceeding further Mai Chuan, facing the enemy as Cheng making lateral diversion is Kai Xie Lin, in presence of the enemy your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion but in order to secure victory of normal maneuvers must be employed Bei Yao Chen, Kai is active Cheng is passive passivity means waiting for an opportunity activity beings the victory itself Hoshie, we must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed and vice versa thus Cheng may also be Kai and Kai may also be Cheng he instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin who when marching ostensibly against Lin Chen now KOI 47 CHAP to the R6 energy 48 in Shanxi suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs utterly disconcerting his opponent Qin Hanshu CH3 here we are told the march on Lin Chen was Cheng and the surprise man Uver was Kai Shang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words military riders do not agree with regard to the meaning of Kai and Cheng Su 4th sent BC says direct warfare favors frontal attacks indirect warfare attacks from the rear Cao Kung says going straight out to join battle is a direct operation appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver Mai Wai Kung 6th and 7th sent had says in war to march straight ahead is Cheng turning movements on the other hand are Kai these riders simply regard Cheng as Cheng and Kai as Kai they do not know that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle C infra SS 11th a comment on the Tang emperor tide soon goes to the root of the matter a Kai maneuver may be Cheng if we make the enemy look upon it as Cheng then our real attack will be Kai and vice versa the whole secret lies in confusing the enemy so that he cannot fathom our real intent to put it perhaps a little more clearly any attack or other operation is Cheng on which the enemy has had his attention fixed whereas that is Kai which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter if the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be Kai it immediately becomes Cheng 4th at the impact of your army maybe like a grindstone dashed against an egg this is affected by the signs of weak points and strong 5th in all fighting the direct method may be used for joining battle but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory Cheng Yu says steadily develop indirect tactics either by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear a brilliant example of indirect tactics which decided the fortunes of a campaign was lord robert's night march round the pay war codle in the second afghan war one 6th indirect tactics efficiently applied are inexhaustible as heaven and earth unending as the flow of rivers and streams like the sun and moon they end but to begin anew like the four seasons they pass away to return once more to you and Cheng you understand this of the permutations of Kai and Chen but at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of Cheng at all unless indeed we suppose with Cheng Yu age seen that a clause relating to it has fallen out of the text of course as has already been pointed out the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations that they cannot really be considered a part here we simply have an expression in figurative language of the almost infinite resource of a great leader 141 years in India chapter 46 chap to the r6 energy 49 7 there are not more than five musical notes yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard eight there are not more than five primary colors blue yellow red white and black yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen nine there are not more than five cardinal taste sour accurate salt sweet bitter yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted 10 in battle there are not more than two methods of attack the direct and the indirect yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers 11 the direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn it is like moving in a circle you never come to an end who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination 12 the onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course 13 the quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim the chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator tumu defines this word as the measurement or estimation of distance but this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile in ss 15 applying this definition to the falcon it seems to me to denote that instinct of self-restraint which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment together with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived the analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective when the victory went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun Nelson Cooley waited until he was within close range when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships 14 therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset and prompt in his decision the word decision would have referenced to the measurement of distance mentioned above letting the enemy get near before striking but i cannot help thinking that sun meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom short and sharp cf mind hc's note which after describing the falcon's mode of attack proceeds this is just how the psychological moment should be seized in war chap to the r6 energy 50 15 energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow decision to the releasing of a trigger none of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent crossbow until released by the finger on the trigger 16 amid the turmoil and tumult of battle there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all amid confusion and chaos your array may be without head or tail yet it will be proof against defeat may yal chen says the subdivisions of the army having been previosly fixed and the various signals agreed upon the separating and joining the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible your formation may be without head or tail your dispositions all topsy-turvy and yet a route of your forces quite out of the question 17 simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline simulated fear postulates courage simulated weakness postulates strength in order to make the translation intelligible it is necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original saukong throws out a hint of the meaning in this brief note these things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's condition but tumul is the first to put it quite plainly if you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on you must first have perfect discipline if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy you must have extreme courage if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over confident you must have exceeding strength eitun hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of sub-division see supra ss one concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy the commentators strongly understand a certain chinese word here differently than anywhere else in this chapter thus tumul says seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make no move the enemy will believe that we are really afraid masking strength with weakness is to be affected by tactical dispositions chang yu relates the following anecdote of khao su the first hand emperor wishing to crush the h sung new he sent out spies to report on their condition but the h sung new forewarned carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses and only allowed in firm salt deers and emaciated cattle to be seen the result was that spies one and chp to the r6 energy 51 all recommended the emperor to deliver his attack luching alone opus posed them saying when two countries go to war they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity this is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy and it would be unwise for us to attack the emperor however disregarding this advice fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at 19 thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances according to which the enemy will act saokong's note is make a display of weakness and want to mu says if our force happens to be superior to the enemies weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on but if inferior he must be led to believe that we are strong in order that he may keep off in fact all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him note the following anecdote of sun pin a descendant of sun wu in 341 bc the kai state being at war with why sent thangkai and sun pin against the general pangchuan who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later sun pin said the kai state has a reputation for cowardice and therefore our adversary despises us let us turn this circumstance to account accordingly when the army had crossed the border into wide territory he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night 50,000 on the next and the night after only 20,000 pangchuan pursued them hotly saying to himself i knew these men of kai were cowards their numbers have already fallen away by more than half in his retreat sun pin came to a narrow defile what he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark here he had a tree stripped of its bark and inscribed upon it the words under this tree shall pangchuan die then as night began to fall he placed a strong body of archers and ambush nearby with orders to shoot directly they saw a light later on pangchuan arrived at the spot and noticing the tree struck a light in order to read what was written on it his body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows and his whole army thrown into confusion the above is tumus version of the story the shi kai less dramatically but probably with more historical truth makes pangchuan cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair after the rout of his army he sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at it 20 by holding out baits he keeps him on the march then with a body of picked men he lies and wait for him with an invitation suggested by lai ching this then reads he lies and wait with the main body of his troops 21 the clever combat it looks to the effect of combined energy and does not require too much from individuals chap to the r6 energy 52 tumus says he first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk afterwards he takes individual talent into account and uses each man ac according to his capabilities he does not demand perfection from the untowented hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy 22 when he utilizes combined energy his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones for it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground and to move when on a slope if four-cornered to come to a standstill but if round shape to go rolling down sal kong calls this the use of natural or inherent power 23 thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height so much on the subject of energy the chief lesson of this chapter in tumus opinion is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes great results he adds can thus be achieved with small forces chapter seven weak points and strong chang yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows chapter IV on tactical dispositions treated of the offensive and the defensive chapter V on energy dealt with direct and indirect methods the good general acclaims himself first with the theory of attack and defense and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods he studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points for the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defense and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above methods hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on energy one sun su said whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy will be fresh for the fight whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted two therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him one mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at all one three by holding out advantages to him he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord or by inflicting damage he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near in the first case he will entice him with a bait in the second he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend for if the enemy is taking his ease he can harass him once he call henderson's biography of stonemall jackson 1902 ed vow to p 490 53 ch a pter 7 w e a k p o i n t s a n d s t r o n g 54 this passage may be cited as evidence against meyal chan's interpretation of iss 23 if well supplied with food he can starve him out if quietly encamped he can force him to move five appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend march swiftly to places where you are not expected six an army may march great distances without distress if it marches through country where the enemy is not saokong sums up very well emerge from the void qd like a bolt from the blue strike at vulnerable points shun places that are defended attack in unexpected quarters seven you can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended lang hsi explains undefended places as weak points that is to say where the general is lacking in capacity or the soldiers in spirit where the walls are not strong enough or the precautions not strict enough where relief comes too late or provisions are too scanty or the defenders are variants amongst themselves you can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked ie where there are none of the weak points mentioned above there is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later clause tumu chenhao and may yal chen assume the meaning to be in order to make your defense quite safe you must defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked and tumu adds how much more than those that will be attacked taken thus however the clause balances less well with the proceeding always a consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the chinese chang yu therefore seems to come near the mark in saying he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the top most heights of heaven civ ss seven making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him this being so the places that i shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend he who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts is being so the places that i shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack hate hence the general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack an aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell ch apt r seven w a k p o i n t s a n d s t r o n g 55 nine o divine art of subtlety and secrecy three we learn to be invisible through you inaudible literally without form or sound but it is sent of course with reference to the enemy and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands 10 you may advance and be absolutely irresistible if you make for the enemy's weak points you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy 11 if we wish to fight the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch all we need to is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve tumu says if the enemy is the invading party we can cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return if we are the invaders we may direct our attack against the sovereign himself it is clear that sun sue unlike certain generals in the late boar war was no believer in frontal attacks 12 if we do not wish to fight we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground all we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way this extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by chia lin even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch my chewing says we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions and tumu finally clenches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes one of chew koh lian who in occupying yang ping and about to be attacked by ssu ma i suddenly struck his colors stopped the beating of the drums and flum opened the city gates showing only a few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground this unexpected proceeding had the intended effect for ssu ma i suspecting an ambush actually drew off his army and retreated what sun sue is advocating here therefore is nothing more nor less than the timely use of bluff 13 by discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves we can keep our forces concentrated while the enemies must be divided the conclusion is perhaps not very obvious but chang yu after may yal chen rightly explains it thus if the enemy's dispositions are visible we can make for him in one body whereas our own dispositions being kept secret the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter 14 we can form a single united body while the enemy must split up into fractions hence there will be a hole pitted against separate parts of a hole which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few ch apt r7 w a k p o i n t s a n d s t r o n g 56 fifth tune and if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one our opponents will be in dire straits 16 the spot where we intend to fight must not be made known for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points several different points several different points several different points several different points several different points several different points shared and once explained the reason of general grand's victories by saying that while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do he was thinking most of what he was going to do himself and his forces being thus distributed in many directions the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few 17 for should the enemy strengthen his ban he will weaken his rear should he strengthen his rear he will weaken his ban should he strengthen his left he will weaken his right should he strengthen his right he will weaken his left if he sends reinforcements everywhere he will everywhere be weak in Frederick the great's instructions to his generals we read a defensive war is apt to betray us into two frequent detachment those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point while those who are better acquainted with their profession having only the capital object in view guard against the decisive blow and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater they turn numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks numerical strength from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us the highest general ship in call Henderson's words is to compel the enemy to disperse his army and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn maintain knowing the place and the time of the coming battle we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight what Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march and afterwards to affect the junction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength among many such successful junctions which military history records one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blutcher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo 20 but if neither time nor place be known then the left wing will be impotent to sucker the right the right equally impotent to sucker the left the van c-h-a-p-t-e-r-7 w-e-a-k-p-o-i-n-t-s-a-n-d-s-t-r-o-n-g-57 unable to relieve the rear or the rear to support the van how much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart and even the nearest are separated by several li the chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army a band sink towards a given rendezvous in separate columns each of which has orders to be there on a fixed date if the general allows the various detachments to proceed at haphazard without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail Shang Yu's note may be worth quoting here if we do not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day on which they will join battle our unity will be forfeited through our preparations for defense and the positions we hold will be insecure suddenly happening upon a powerful foe we shall be brought to battle in a flurry condition and no mutual support will be possible between wings vanguard or rear especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and high most divisions of the army 21 though according to my estimate the soldiers of ua exceed our own in number that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory i say then that victory can be achieved the last for these brave words the long feud between the two states ended in 473 bc with the total defeat of Wu Baikuchin and its incorporation in ua this was doubtless long after son tizu's death with his present assertion compare i v s s for chang yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy which he does goes on to explain in the chapter on tactical dispositions that is said one may know how to conquer without being able to do it whereas here we have the statement that victory can be achieved the explanation is that in the former chapter where the offensive and defensive are under discussion it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared one cannot make certain of beating him but the present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of ua who according to son tizu's calculations will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle that is why he says here that victory can be achieved 22 though the enemy be stronger in numbers we may prevent him from fighting scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success an alternative reading offered by chi lin is no beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure 23 rouse him and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity chang yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to chaptr 7 wak poin tsandst rong 58 my low or the reverse he instances the action of chou ku liang who sent the scornful present of a woman's headdress to ssu ma ai in order to gold him out of his fabian tactics force him to reveal himself so as to find out his vulnerable spots 24 carefully compare the opposing army with your own so that you may know where strength is super abundant and where it is deficient cf iv ss 6 25 in making tactical dispositions the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them the piclency of the paradox evaporates in translation concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility see super ss 9 is showing no sign of what you mean to do of the plans that are formed in your brain conceal your dispositions and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies from the machinations of the wisest brains tumu explains though the enemy may have clever and capable of fighters they will not be able to lay any plans against us 26 how victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics that is what the multitude cannot comprehend 27 all men can see the tactics whereby i conquer but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved i everybody can see superficially how a battle is one what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the battle 28 do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances as Wang hsi safely remarks there is but one root principle underlying victory but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in number with this compare call Henderson the rules of strategy are few and simple they may be learned in a week they may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams but such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon 29 military tactics are like unto water for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards 30 so in war the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak like water taking the line of least resistance chapt r7 wak poin tsand st rong 59 31 water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing 32 therefore just as water retains no constant shape so in warfare there are no constant conditions 33 he who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning may be called a heaven born captain 34 the five elements water fire wood metal earth are not always equally predominant that is as Wang hsi says they predominate alternately the four seasons make way for each other in turn literally have no invariable seat there are short days and long the moon has its periods of waning and waxing cf vss 6 the purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the one of fixity and war by the changes constantly taking place in nature the comparison is not very happy however because the regularity of the fee known of which Sun Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in war chapter eight maneuvering one Sun Tzu said in war the general receives his commands from the silver aim to having collected an army and concentrated his forces he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp Chang Yu says the establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field and he quotes a saying of wood su chap one adenates without harmony in the state no military expedition can be undertaken without harmony in the army no battle array can be formed in an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented as saying to Wu Yuen as a general rule those who are waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe three after that comes tactical maneuvering then which there is nothing more difficult I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Sao Kung who says from the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over against the enemy the tactics to be pursued are most difficult it seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sally forth and encamped and Qin house no gives color to this view for levying concentrating harmonizing and entrenching an army there are plenty of old rules which will serve the real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations to you also observes that the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favorable position the difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct and misfortune into gain 60 chp to the r8 maneuvering 61 this sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatic expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond this is how it is explained by make it appear that you are a long way off then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent to mou says who winked the enemy so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed host she gives a slightly different turn although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of movement signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two famous passages across the alps that of hanny bow which laid Italy at his mercy and that of Napoleon 2000 years later which resulted in the great victory of merengue four plus to take a long and circuitous route after enticing the enemy out of the way and those starting after him to contrive to reach the goal before him shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation two mou sites the famous march of kaoshi in 270 bc to relieve the town of au which was closely invested by a chin army the king of kao first consulted lian po on the invisibility of attempting a relief but the latter thought the distance too great and the intervening country too rugged and difficult his majesty then turned to kaoshi who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march but finally said we shall be like two rats fighting in a hole and the pluckier one will win so he left the capital with his army but had only gone a distance of 30 li when he stopped and began throwing up entrenchments for 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications and took care that spies should carry the intelligence to the enemy the chin general was overjoyed and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the hand state and that's not actually part of kao territory but the spies had no sooner departed than kao she began a force march lasting for two days and one night and arrive on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position on the north hill before the enemy had got wind of his movements a crushing defeat followed for the chin forces who were obliged to raise the siege of oil in all haste and retreat across the border five maneuvering with an army is advantageous with an undisciplined multitude most dangerous i adopt the reading of the tongue time sheng yu h scene and the two shu since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make sense the commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable or they may be dangerous it all depends on the ability of the general six if you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage the chances are that you will be too late on the other hand to detach chp to the r8 maneuvering 62 a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores some of the chinese text is unintelligible to the chinese commentators who paraphrase the sentence i submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm being convinced that there is some deep seated corruption in the text on the whole it is clear that sun su does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies cf info ss 11 7 plus if you order your men to roll up their buff coats and make force marches without halting day or night covering double the usual distance at a stretch the ordinary days march according to tumu was 30 li but on one occasion when pursuing liu pay south south is said to have covered the incredible distance of 300 lie within 24 hours doing a hundred li in order to rest in advantage the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy eight the stronger man will be in front the jaded ones will fall behind and on this plan only one tenth of your army will reach its destination the moral is as south kong and others point out don't march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage either with or without impedimenta maneuvers of this description should be confined to short distances still while jackson said the hardships of force marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle he did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions it was only when he intended a surprise or when a rapid retreat was imperative that he sacrificed everything for speed one nine if you march 50 li in order to outmaneuver the enemy you will lose the leader of your first division and only half your force will reach the goal literally the leader of the first division will be torn away 10 if you march 30 li with the same object two-thirds of your army will arrive in the tongue time is added from this we may know the difficulty of maneuvering 11 we may take it then that an army without its baggage train is lost without provisions it is lost without basis of supply it is lost I think Sun Tzu meant stores accumulated in depots but to you says fodder and the like shang you says goods in general and Wang hsi says fuel salt foodstuffs etc one c call Henderson opus sit fell ip 426 chap to the r8 maneuvering 63 12 we cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors 13 we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country its mountains and forests its pitfalls and precipices its marshes and swamps 14 we shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides ss 12 minutes 14 are repeated in chap xi ss 52 15 in war practice the simulation and you will succeed in the tactics of terrain deception of the enemy especially as to the numerical strength of his troops took a very prominent position to 16 whether to concentrate or to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances 17 let your rapidity be that of the wind the simile is doubly appropriate because the wind is not only swift but as me yiao chan points out invisible and leaves no tracks your compactness that of the forest Meng shi comes nearer to the mark in his note when slowly marching order and ranks must be preserved so as to guard against surprise attacks but natural forests do not grow in rows whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or compactness bei tun in raiding and plundering be like fire cf shi ching iv 3 4 6 fears as a blazing fire which no man can check is a movability like a mountain that is when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge you or perhaps as to you says when he is trying to entice you into a trap 19 let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night and when you move fall like a thunderbolt 2 u quotes a saying of ty come which has passed into a proverb you cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lighting so rapid are they likewise an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried 2 for a number of maxims on this head c marshal to ren longmans 1907 p 29 chp to the r8 maneuvering 64 20 when you plunder a countryside let the spoil be divided amongst your men sun sue wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all when you capture new territory cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery shenhao says quarter your soldiers on the land and let them so implanted it is by acting on this principle and harvesting the lands they invaded that the chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions such as that of pan keo who penetrated to the caspion and in more recent years those of fu kang and insult sum tang 21 ponder and deliberate before you make a move chang yu quotes why liao su is saying that we must not break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing general cf the seven comparisons in iss 13 22 he will conquer who has learned the artifice of deviation c supra ss 3 4 such is the art of maneuvering with these words the chapter would naturally come to an end but there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on war now lost but apparently extend at the time when sun sue wrote the style of this fragment is not noticeable different from that of sun sue himself but no commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness 23 the book of army management says it is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any information about this work may yao chen calls it an ancient military classic and wang hsi an old book on war considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before sun t zoos time between the various kingdoms and principalities of china it is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at some earlier period on the field of battle implied though not actually in the chinese the spoken word does not carry far enough hence the institution of gongs and drums nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough hence the institution of banners and flags chp to the r8 maneuvering 65 24 gongs and drums banners and flags are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point chang yu says if sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same object the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man 25 the host thus forming a single united body is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone or for the cowardly to retreat alone shuang yu quotes are saying equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders tumu tells a story in this connection of wukai when he was fighting against the chin state before the battle had begun one of his soldiers a man of matchless daring sallied forth by himself captured two heads from the enemy and returned to camp wukai had the man instantly executed where upon an officer ventured to remonstrate saying this man was a good soldier and ought not to have been beheaded wukai replied i fully believe he was a good soldier but i hadn't beheaded because he acted without orders this is the art of handling large masses of men 26 in night fighting then make much use of signal fires and drums and in fighting by day of flags and banners as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army chenhao alludes to lai clang pie's night ride to hou yang at the head of 500 mounted men they made such an imposing display with torches that though the rebel leader she ssu meng had a large army he did not dare to dispute their passage 27 a whole army may be robbed of its spirit and more says chang yu if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time its onset will be irresistible now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off and then strike it is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit lai qian and others tell an anecdote to be found in its soul qian year 10 ss one of south qi a protege of duk chwang of lu the latter state was attacked by kai and the duke was about to join battle at chang chou after the first roll of the enemy's drums when south said not just yet only after their drums have beaten for the third time did he give the word for attack then they fought and the men of kai were utterly defeated questioned afterwards by the duke as to the meaning of his delay south qi replied in battle a courageous spirit is everything now the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit but with the second it is already on the wane and after the third it is gone altogether i attacked when their chp to the r8 maneuvering 66 spirit was gone and ours was at its height hence our victory mootsu chap foreput spirit first among the four important influences in war and continues the value of a whole army a mighty host of a million men is dependent on one man alone such as the influence of spirit a commander in chief may be robbed of his presence of mind chang yu says presence of mind is the general's most important asset it is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic stricken the great general lie chang add 571 649 has a saying attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array it must include the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium 28 now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning always provided i suppose that he has had breakfast at the battle of the trebia the romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting whereas hanibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure see livy 21 live date lv 1 and 8 by noon day it has begun to flag and in the evening his mind is bent only on returning to camp 29 a clever general therefore avoids an army when its spirit is keen but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return this is the art of studying moots 30 disciplined and calm to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy this is the art of retaining self-possession 31 to be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling to be well fed while the enemy is famished this is the art of husbanding one's strength 32 to refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order to refrain from attacking an army drawn up and calm and confident array this is the art of studying circumstances 33 it is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy nor to opus pose him when he comes downhill 34 do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen 35 do not swallow bait offered by the enemy my chi lan and two mu with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned by the enemy Chen Hao and Chiang Yu carefully point out that the saying has a wider application CHAP to the r8 maneuvering 67 do not interfere with an army that is returning home the commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way and is therefore too dangerous and opus ponent to be tackled Chiang Yu quotes the words of Han H sin invincible is the soldier who had his desire and returneth home words a marvelous tale is told of south south's courage and resource in ch one of the san qiu kai in 198 ad he was besieging chang hsu and jang when liu pao sent reinforcements with a view the cutting off south's retreat the latter was obliged to draw off his troops only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies who regarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself in this desperate plight south waited until nightfall when he bore the tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it as soon as the whole army had passed by the hidden troops fell on his rear while south himself turned and met his pursuers in front so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated south south said afterwards the brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate position hence i knew how to overcome them 36 when you surround an army leave an outlet free this does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape the object as tumu puts it is to make him believe that there is a road to safety and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair tumu adds pleasantly after that you may crush him do not press a desperate fold too hard shenhao quotes the saying birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth chang yu says if your adversary has burned his bolts and destroyed his cooking pots and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle he must not be pushed to extremities hoshi illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of yen ching that general together with his colleague to chum why was surrounded by a vastly superior army of kittens in the year 945 add the country was bare and desert like and the little chinese force was soon in dire straits for one of water the wells they bore ran dry and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture they ranks thin rapidly until it lasts fuyen ching exclaimed we are desperate men far better to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into captivity a strong gale happened to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust to chum why was for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final attack but luckily another officer laishu chang by name was quicker to see an opportunity and said they are many and we are few but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible victory will go to the chp to the r8 maneuvering 68 strenuous fighter and the win will be our best ally accordingly fuyen ching made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through the safety 37 such as the art of warfare chapter nine variation in tactics the heading means literally the nine variations but a sun sue does not appear to enumerate these and as indeed he has already told us vss six minutes 11 that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable we have little option but to follow wang hsi who says that nine stands for an indefinitely large number all it means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree i do not know what saocum makes these nine variations out to be but it has been suggested that they are connected with the nine situations of chapt x i this is the view adopted by chang yu the only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost it's a position to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some weight one sun sue said in war the general receives his commands from the silver collects his army and concentrates his forces repeated from seven ss one where it is certainly more in place it may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter two when in difficult country do not encamp in country where high roads intersect join hands with your allies do not linger in dangerously isolated positions the last situation is not one of the nine situations as given in the beginning of chap x i but occurs later on the bid ss 43 qv chang yu defines this situation as being situated across the frontier in hostile territory my chiwen says it is country in which there are no springs or wells flocks or herds vegetables or firewood shielding one of gorges chasms and precipices without a road by which to advance in hemden situations you must resort to stratagem in desperate posity on you must fight three there are roads which must not be followed 69 chapt r9 the a r i a t i o n i n t a c t i c s 70 especially those leading through narrow defiles says lai chiwen where an ambush is to be feared armies which must be not attacked more correctly perhaps there are times when an army must not be attacked shenhao says when you see your way to obtain a rival advantage but are powerless to inflict the real defeat refrain from attacking for fear of overtaxing your men's strength towns which must not be beseeched cf 3 ss fort south kong gives an interesting illustration from his own experience when invading the territory of hsu 2 he ignored the city of hua pi which lay directly in his path and pressed on into the heart of the country this excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than 14 important district cities shang yu says no town should be attacked which if taken cannot be held or if left alone will not cause any trouble hsun ying when urged to attack pi yang replied the city is small and well fortified even if i succeed in taking it it will be no great feat of arms whereas if i fail i shall make myself a laughing stock in the 17th century sieges still formed a large proportion of war it was tyrant who directed attention to the importance of marches counter marches and maneuvers he said it is a great mistake to waste men and taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province one positions which must not be contested commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed this is a hard saying for the chinese with their reverence for authority and why liao tzu quoted by two mu is moved to exclaim weapons are baleful instruments strife is antagonistic to virtue a military commander is the negation of civil order the unpalatable fact remains however that even imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity for the general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops five the general who does not understand these may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country yet he will not be able to turn his no ledge to practical accounts literally get the advantage of the ground which means not only securing good positions but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible way chang yu says every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural features and also gives scope for a certain variability of one marshal to ren p 50 c h a p t e r 9 the a r i a t i o n i n t a c t i c s 71 plan how it is possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind six so the student of war who is unburst in the art of war of varying his plans even though he be acquainted with the five advantages will fail to make the best use of his men she lind tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action namely if a certain road is short it must be followed if an army is isolated it must be attacked if a town is in a powerless condition it must be besieged if a position can be stormed it must be attempted and if consistent with military operations the rulers commands must be obeyed but there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages for instance a certain road may be the shortest way for him but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it he will not follow that road the hostile force may be open to attack but if he knows that it is hard pressed and likely to fight with desperation he will refrain from striking and so on seven hence in the wise leader's plans considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one says Sao Kham the opposite state should be always present to your mind Pate if our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes Tu Mu says if we wish to rest an advantage from the enemy we must not fix our minds on that alone but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us and let this enter as a factor into our calcula tians nine if on the other hand in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to season advantage we may extricate ourselves from misfortune Tu Mu says if I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position I must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy if in my councils these two considerations are properly blended I shall succeed in liberating myself for instance if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of affecting an escape the nervousness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter attack and use the advantage thus gain to free myself from the enemy's toils see the story of Sao Tsao 7 SS 35 notes 10 reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them ch a p t r 9 v a r i a t i o n i n t a c t i c s 72 Shia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury some of which would only occur to the oriental mind and ties away the enemy's best and wisest men so that he may be left without counselors introduce traders into this country that the government policy may be rendered feudal full man intrigue in deceit and thus so dissension between the ruler and his ministers by means of every artful contrivance caused deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women Shang Yu after Wang Hsi makes a different interpretation of Sun Su here get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury and he will submit of his own accord and make trouble for them to move in this phrase in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be make for the enemy affecting their possessions or as we might say as sets which he considers to be a large army a rich exchequer harmony amongst the soldiers punctual fulfillment of commands these give us a whip hand over the enemy and keep them constantly engaged literally make servants of them to use says prevent the from having any rest hold out specious alarmist and make them rush to any given point Meng Shi's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of cause them to forget peen the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse and hasten in our direction 11 the art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemies not coming but on our own readiness to receive him not on the chance of his not attacking but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable 12 there are five dangerous faults which may affect the general one recklessness which leads to destruction bravery without forethought as Sao Kung analyzes it which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull such an oppinion says Chang Yu must not be encountered with brute force but may be lured into an ambush and slain cf wu su chap iv not in it in estimating the character of a general men are want to pay exclusive attention to his courage forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should possess the merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly and he who fights recklessly without any perception of what is expedient must be condemned ssu ma fa to make the incisive remark simply going to one's death does not bring about victory chapt r9 the ri at i o n i n t a c t i c s 73 to cowardice which leads to capture sao kung defines the chinese word translated here as cowardice as being of the man whom timidity prevents from advancing to season advantage and wang hsi adds who is quick to flee at the site of danger meng shi gives the closer paraphrase he who is bent on returning alive this is the man who will never take a risk but as sun su knew nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks tai kung said he who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster in 404 add lu you pursued the rebel hewan hsu and up the yonks and fought a naval battle with him at the island of chang hong the loyal troops numbered only a few thousands while their opponents were in great force but hewan hsu and fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome had a light bolt made fast to the side of his war junk so that he might escape if necessary at a moment's notice the natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly clenched and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fire ships all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray hewan hsu and's forces were routed had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping chang yu tells a somewhat similar story of kao ying kai a general of the chin state who during a battle with the army of qiu in 597 bc had a bolt kept in redness for him on the river wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across three a hasty temper which can be provoked by insults qiu mu tells us that yao hsing when opposed in 357 ad by huang mei teng chang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refuse to fight teng chang said our adversary is of a caloric temper and easily provoked let us make constant sallies and break down his walls then he will grow angry and come out once we can bring his force to battle it is doomed to be our prey this plan was acted upon yao hshang came out to fight was lured as far as san yun by the enemy's pretended flight and finally attacked in slain for a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame this need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a defect in a general what sun su condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports the thin skin man who is stunned by a problem however undeserved may yao chen truly observes though somewhat paradoxically the seek after glory should be careless of public op in ion five over solicitude for his men which exposes him to worry and trouble here again sun su does not mean that the general is to be careless of the welfare of his troops all he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sack rifficing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his ch a p t r 9 v a r i a t i o n i n t a c t i c s 74 men this is a short-sighted policy because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat or at best the prolongation of the war which will be the consequence a mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city or to reinforce a hard pressed attachment contrary to his military instincts it is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve latismith in the south african war were so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose and in the end relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment in favor of a part an old soldier of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war tried once i remember to defend him to me on the ground that he was always so good to his men by this plea had he but known it he was only condemning him out of san tizu's mouth 13 these are the five besetting sins of a general ruin is to the conduct of war 14 when an army is overthrown and its leaders slain the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults let them be a subject of meditation chapter 10 the army on the march the contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in ss one then by this heading one sun su said we come now to the question of encamping the army and observing signs of the enemy pass quickly over mountains and keep in the neighborhood of valleys the idea is not to linger among barren uplands but to keep close to supplies of water and grass cf mutsu ch3 abide not in natural ovens i e the openings of valleys chang yu tells the following anecdote wu tu chang was a robber captain in the time of the later han and mayun was sent to exterminate his gang chang having found a refuge in the hills mayun made no attempt to force a battle but seized all the five horrible positions commanding supplies of water and forage chang was soon in such a desperate plight for one of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender he did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of valleys to camp in high places not on high hills but on nose or hillocks elevated above the surrounding country facing the sun to who takes this to mean facing south and chen howe facing east cf info ss 11 13 do not climb heights in order to fight so much for mountain warfare three after crossing a river you should get far away from it in order to tempt the enemy to cross after you according to tsao come and also says chang yu in order not to be impeded in your evolutions 75 ch a pter 10 t h e a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 76 the tum tine reads if the enemy crosses a river etc but in view of the next sentence this is almost certainly an interpolation for when an invading force crosses a river in its onward march do not advance to meet it in midstream it will be best to let half the army get across and then deliver your attack my chill and alludes to the great victory won by han h sin over lung chiu at the y river turning to the chin han shu ch 34 foul six verse oh we find the battle described as follows the two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river in the night han h sin ordered his men to take some 10 thousand sacks filled with sand and construct the dam higher up then leading half his army across he attacked lung chiu but after a time pretending to have failed in his attempt he hastily withdrew to the other bank mung chiu was much elated by this unlooked for success and exclaiming i felt sure that han h sin was really a coward he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn han h sin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags thus releasing a great volume of water which swept down and prevented the greater portion of lung chiu's army from getting across he then turned upon the force which had been cut off and annihilated it lung chiu himself being amongst the slain the rest of the army on the further bank also scattered and fled in all directions five if you are anxious to fight you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross for fear of preventing his crossing six more your craft higher up than the enemy and facing the sun c supra s s two the repetition of these words in connection with water is very awkward chang yu has the note said either of troops marshalled on the river bank or of boats anchored in the stream itself in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun the other commentators are not at all explicit to not move upstream to meet the enemy two mu says as water flows downwards we must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a river for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood shu ko wu who has remarked that in river warfare we must not advance against the stream which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of us there is also the danger noted by other commentators that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us so much for river warfare c h a p t e r 10 t h a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 77 seven in crossing salt marshes your sole concern should be to get over them quickly without any delay because of the lack of fresh water the poor quality of the herbage and last but not least because they are low flat and exposed to attack eight if forced to fight in a salt marsh you should have water and grass near you and get your back to a clump of trees lai chiwen remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees while tumu says that they will serve to protect the rear so much for operations in salt marshes nine in dry level country take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear tumu quotes taikung as saying an army should have a stream or a march on its left and a hill or tumulus on its right so that the danger may be in front and safety lie behind so much for campaigning in flat country ten these are the four useful branches of military knowledge those namely concern with one mountains two rivers three marshes and four plains compare napoleon's military maxims no one which enabled the yellow emperor to vanquish for several sovereigns regarding the yellow emperor meyao chen asks with some plausibility whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of huangtai having conquered four other emperors the shikai ch one adenates speaks only of his victories over yin tai and qi yu in the liu tau it is mentioned that he fought 70 battles and pacified the empire south kung's explanation is that the yellow emperor was the first to institute the fetal system of vassals princes each of whom to the number of four originally bore the title of emperor my chiwen tells us that the art of war originated under huangtai who received it from his minister fanghu 11 all armies prefer high ground to low high ground says meyao chen is not only more agreement and salubrias but more convenient from a military point of view low ground is not only damp and unhealthy but also disadvantageous for fighting and sunny places to dark 12 if you are careful of your men ch apt r 10 t h e a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 78 south kung says make for fresh water and pasture where you can turn out your animals to graze and camp on hard ground the army will be free from disease of every kind chang yu says the dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak of illness and this will spell victory 13 when you come to a hill or a bank occupy the sunny side with the slope under right rear plus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground 14 when in consequence of heavy rains up country a river which you wish to forward is swollen and fleck with foam you must wait until it subsides 15 country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between deep natural hollows a ladder defined as places enclosed on every side by steep banks with pools of water at the bottom can find places defined as natural pens or prisons or places surrounded by precipices on three sides easy to get into but hard to get out of tangled thickets defined as places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used plagmiers defined as low lying places so heavy with mud as to be impassable for chariots and horsemen and crevices defined by meyao chen as a narrow difficult way between beatling cliffs tumu's note is ground covered with trees and rocks and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls this is very vague but chi elin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass and chang yu takes much the same view on the whole the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the rendering defile but the ordinary meaning of the chinese in one place is a crack or fissure and the fact that the meaning of the chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile make me think that sun sue is here speaking of crevices ch a p t e r ten t h e a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 79 should be left with all possible speed and not approached 16 while we keep away from such places we should get the enemy to approach them while we face them we should let the enemy have them on his rear 17 if in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country ponds surrounded by aquatic grass hollow basins filled with reeds or woods with thick undergrowth they must be carefully routed out and searched for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking chang yu has the note we must also be on our guard against traitors who may lie in close covert secretly spying out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions a tune when the enemy is closed at hand and remains quiet he is relying on the natural strength of his position here begin son t zoo's remarks on the reading of signs much of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like jen that empowers aids to scouting 19 when he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle he is anxious for the other side to advance probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge us if he came close up to us says to move and tried to force a battle he would seem to despise us and there would be less probability of our responding to the challenge 20 if his place of encampment is easy of access he is tendering abate 21 movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is a band sing saokong explains this as felling trees to clear a passage and chang yu says every man sends out scouts to climb high places and observe the enemy if a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving and shaking he may know that they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's march the appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious to use explanation borrowed from saokong is as follows the presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and fearing pursuit has constructed these hiding places in order to make us suspect and ambush it appears that these screens were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come across ch a p t r 10 t h e r m y o n t h e m a r c h 80 22 the rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade chang yu's explanation is doubtless right when birds that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath startle beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming 23 when there is dust rising in a high column it is the sign of chariots advancing when the dust is low but spread over a wide area it betokens the approach of infantry high and sharp or rising to a peak is of course somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust the commentators explained the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots being heavier than men raise more dust and also follow one another in the same wheel track whereas foot soldiers would be marching in ranks many abreast according to chang yu every army on the march must have scouted some way in advance who on sighting dust raised by the enemy will gallop back and report it to the commander in chief cf jen baton powell as you move along say in a hostile country your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him figures dust rising birds getting up glitter of arms et cetera one when it branches out in different directions it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood a few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping chang yu says in apportioning the defenses for a canton man light horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its circumference hence the small quantity of dust and its motion 24 humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance as though they stood in great fear of us says to move their object is to make us contemptuous and careless after which they will attack us chang yu alludes to the story of time tan of the kai mo against the yen forces led by kai chi in ch 82 of the shi kai we read time tan openly said my only fear is that the yen army may cut off the noses of their kai prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us that would be the undoing of our city the other side being informed of this speech at once acted on this suggestion but those within the city were enraged at seeing their fellow countrymen thus mutilated and fearing only less they should fall into the enemy's hands were nerve to defend themselves more obstinately than ever once again time tan sent back convert ed spies who reported these words to the enemy what i dread most is one aides to scouting p 26 c h a p t r 10 t h e a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 81 that the men of yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town and by inflicting this indignity on our forefathers caused us to become faint hearted forth with the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in them and the inhabitants of kai mo witnessing the outrage from the city walls web passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight their fury being increased tenfold time tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise but instead of a sword he himself to a manic in his hands and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors while the ranks were filled up with their wives and con cubines he then served out all the remaining rations and bade his many their fill the regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight and the walls were manned with the old and weaker men and with women this done envoys were dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender where upon the yen army began shouting for joy time tan also collected 20 000 ounces of silver from the people and got the wealthy citizens of kai mo descended to the yen general with the prayer that when the town capitulated he would allow their homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated tai chi in high good humor granted their prayer but his army now became increasingly slack and careless meanwhile time tan got together a thousand oxen decked them with pieces of red silk painted their bodies dragon like with colored stripes and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their tails when night came on he lighted the ends of the rushes and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls backing them up with a force of five thousand warriors the animals manning with pain dashed furiously into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay for their tails acted as torches showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came into contact in the meantime the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths and now threw themselves on the enemy at the same moment of frightful dinner rolls in the city itself all those that remain behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronze vessels until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar terror stricken the yen army fled in disorder highly pursued by the men of Kai who succeeded in slaying their general kai chain the result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some 70 cities which have belonged to the Kai state violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat 25 when the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle 26 peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot the reading here is uncertain laiqiuan indicates a treaty confirmed by chp to the r10 thermyo and thmer ch82 oaths and hostages wang hsi and chang yu on the other hand simply say without reason on a frivolous pretext 27 when there is much running about every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner and the soldiers fall into rank it means that the critical moment has come 28 when some are seen advancing and some retreating it is a lore 29 when the soldiers stand leaning on their spears they are faint from one of food 30 if those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves the army is suffering from thirst as tumu remarks one may know the condition of a whole army from the behavior of a single man 31 if the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it the soldiers are exhausted 32 if birds gather on any spot it is unoccupied a useful fact to bear in mind when for instance as chen howe says the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp plumber by night betokens nervousness 33 if there is disturbance in the camp the general's authority is weak if the banners and flags are shifted about sedition is the foot if the officers are angry it means that the men are weary tumu understands the sentence differently if all the officers of an army are angry with their general it means that they are broken with fatigue owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them 34 when an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food in the ordinary course of things the men would be fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass and when the men do not hang their cooking pots over the camp fires showing that they will not return to their tents you may know that they are determined to fight to the death i may quote here the illustrative passage from the hu han shu ch 71 given an abbreviated form by the pay wen yang fu the rebel wang qiu of liang was besieging the town of chen sang and huang fu sung who was in supreme command and tongue chou were sent CHAPTER10 against him the latter pressed for hasty measures but some turned the deaf ear to his council that last the rebels were utterly worn out and began to throw down their weapons of their own accord some was not advancing to the attack but chou said it is a principle of war not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating host sun answered that does not apply here what i am about to attack is a jaded army not a retreating host with disciplined troops i am falling on a disorganized multitude not a band of desperate men thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his colleague and routed the enemy wang qiu being slain 35 the sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file 36 two frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his because when an army is hard pressed as two who says there is always a fear of mutiny and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress because in such case discipline becomes relaxed and unwanted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty 37 to begin by bluster but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers shows a supreme lack of intelligence i follow the interpretation of saokong also adopted by laiqiu and to mu and chang yu another possible meaning set forth by to you sheo lin mei tao chan and wang hsi is the general who is first tyrant nickel towards his men and then in terror less they should mutiny etc this would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments 38 when envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce to mu says if the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice either because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason but it hardly needs a sun suit to draw such an obvious inference 39 if the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection saokong says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush ch a p t r 10 t h e a r m y l n t h e m a r c h h 84 40 if our troops are no more in number than the enemy that is amply suffy xin it only means that no direct attack can be made literally no martial advance that is to say cheng tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed and stratagem resorted to instead what we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength keep a close watch on the enemy and obtain reinforcements this is an obscure sentence and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it I follow laiqiuan who appears to offer the simplest explanation only the side that gets more men will win fortunately we have changyu to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself when the numbers are even and no favorable opening presence itself although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack we can find additional recruits amongst our subtlers and camp followers and then concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy contrived to snatch the victory but we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us he then quotes from why laiqiu ch 3 the nominal strength of mercenary troops may be one hundred thousand but their real value will be not more than half that figure 41 he who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them qianhao quoting from the zhouchuan says if bees and scorpions carry poison how much more will a hostile state even a puny opponent then should not be treated with contempt be treated with contempt be treated with contempt be treated with contempt be treated with contempt be treated with contempt be treated with contempt 42 if soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you they will not prove submissive and unless submissive then will be practically used less if when the soldiers have become attached to you punishments are not enforced they will still be unless 43 therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity but kept under control by means of iron discipline yensu bc 493 set of ssu ma jiangchu his civil virtues endeared him to the people his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe cf wu su ch 4 in it the ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness this is a certain road to victory 44 if in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced the army will be well disciplined if not its discipline will be bad 45 if a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed chap t r 10 t h e a r m y o n t h e m a r c h 85 2 mu says a general ought in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority respected so that when they come to face the enemy orders may be executed and discipline maintained because they all trust and look up to him what sun su has said in ss 44 however would lead one rather to expect something like this if a general is always confident that his orders will be carried out etc the game will be mutual changyu says the general has confidence in the men under his calm man and the men are docile having confidence in him thus the gain is mutual he quotes a pregnant sentence from why lie old sue c h 4 the art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty doubts vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army chapter 11 terrain only about a third of the chapter comprising ss ss 1 min 13 deals with terrain the subject being more fully treated in c h x i the six calamities are discussed in ss 14 minutes 20 and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desilatory remarks though not less interesting perhaps on that account one sun su said we may distinguish six kinds of terrain to wit one accessible ground may yal chen says plentifully provided with roads and means of calm communications to entangling ground the same commentator says net like country venturing into which you become entangled three temporizing ground ground which allows you to stave off or delay four narrow passes five precipitous heights six positions at a great distance from the enemy it is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification a strange lack of logical perception is shown in the china man's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross divisions such as the above to ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called access i b l e three with regard to ground of this nature be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots and carefully guard your line of supplies 86 ch apt r 11 terrain 87 the general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly as to you says not to allow the enemy to cut your communications in view of napoleon's dictum the secret of war lies in the communications one we could wish that sun sue had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in is s 10 7 it says 11 call henderson says the line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being just as the dualist who finds his adversaries point menacing him with certain death and his own guard astray is compelled to conform to his adversaries movements and to content himself with warding off his thrusts so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army to then you will be able to fight with advantage for ground which can be abandoned but is hard to reoccupy is called entangling five from a position of this sort if the enemy is unprepared you may sally forth and defeat him but if the enemy is prepared for your coming and you fail to defeat him then return being impossible disaster will ensue six when the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move it is called temporizing ground two move says each side finds it inconvenient to move and the situation remains at a deadlock seven in a position of this sort even though the enemy should offer us an attract I bait to you says turning their backs on us and pretending to flee but this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position it will be advisable not to stir forth but rather to retreat thus enticing the enemy in his turn then when part of his army has come out we may deliver our attack with advantage eight with regard to narrow passes if you can occupy them first let them be strongly garrison and await the advent of the enemy because then as to you observes the initiative will lie with us and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy one see pencey's the napoleon one or no forty seven to the science of war chap two ch apt r 11 terrain 88 9 should the army forestall you in occupying a pass do not go after him if the pass is fully garrison but only if it is weekly garrisoned 10 with regard to precipitous heights if you are beforehand with your adversary you should occupy the raised and sunny spots and they're wait for him to come up salcom says the particular advantage of securing heights and the files is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy for the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to cvi ss two shang you tells the following anecdote of pay h sing chin add 619 minutes 682 who was sent on a punitive expedition against the turkic tribes that night he pitched his camp as usual and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill nearby pay h sing chin however paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible the same night a terrific storm came on which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over 12 feet the recalcitrant officers were amazed at the site and owned that they had been in the wrong how did you know what was going to happen they asked pay h sing chin replied from this time forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions from this it may be seen chang yu continues that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting but also because they are immune from disastrous floods 11 if the enemy has occupied them before you do not follow him but retreat and try to entice him away the turning point of life shi min's campaign in 621 add against the two rebels two chin ti king of eisha and wang shi chong prince of cheng was his seizure of the heights of wu lao in spike of which two chin ti persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in lo yang was defeated and taken prisoner see chou tan ch 2 fall 5 verse and also ch 54 12 if you are situated at a great distance from the enemy and the strength of the two armies is equal it is not easy to provoke a battle the point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and weary some march at the end of which as to you says we should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen and fighting will be to your disadvantage 13 these six are the principles connected with earth or perhaps the principles relating to ground see however iss 8 ch apt r 11 terrain 89 the general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them 14 now an army is exposed to six several calamities not arising from natural causes but from faults for which the general is responsible these are one flight two in subordination three collapse four ruin five disorganization six routes 15 other conditions being equal if one force is hurled against another 10 times its size the result will be the flight of the former 16 when the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak the result is in subordination two moussites the unhappy case of time puh s i n tang shu ch 148 who was sent to why an 821 ad with orders to lead an army against wang ting su but the whole time he was in command his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt and openly flouted his authority by writing about the camp on donkeys several thousands at a time time puh was powerless to put a stop to this conduct and when after some months have passed he made an attempt to engage the enemy his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction after that the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat when the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak the result is collapse saokong says the officers are energetic and want to press on the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse 17 when the higher officers are angry and insubordinate and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment before the commander in chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight the result is ruined wang h6 note is this means the general is angry without cause and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head chaptr 11 to reign 98 to him when the general is weak and without authority when his orders are not clear and distinct why lie old su ch4 says if the commander gives his orders with decision the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice if his moves are made without vacillation the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty general baden powell says italicizing the words the secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell in the clearness of the instructions they receive three cf also would su ch3 the most fatal defect in the military leader is difference the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men to who says neither officers nor men have any regular routine and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner the result is utter disorganization 19 when in general unable to estimate the enemy's strength allows an inferior force to engage a larger one or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank the result must be routes shang yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues whenever there is fighting to be done the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy cf the primmy ordains of caesar de bello galico v 28 44 at ali i 20 these are six ways of courting defeat which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained the responsible post c supra ss 13 21 the natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally shen hao says the advantages of weather in season are not equal to those connected with ground but a power of estimating the adversary of controlling the forces of victory and of shrewdly calculating difficulties dangers and distances constitutes the test of a great general 22 he who knows these things and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice will win his battles he who knows them not nor practices them will surely be defeated 23 if fighting is sure to result in victory then you must fight even though the ruler forbid it if fighting will not result in victory then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding three aides to scouting p 12 ch apt r 11 terrain 91 cf 8 ss 3 fin huang shi keng of the chin dynasty who is said to have been the patron of chang liang and to have written the san lu has these words attributed to him the responsibility of setting an army in motion must evolve on the general advance and retreat are controlled from the palace brilliant results will hardly be achieved hence the godlike ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's causelit kneel down to push the chariot wheel this means that it matters lying outside the zanana the decision of the military commander must be absolute chang yu also quote the saying decrease from the son of heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp 24 the general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace it was wellington i think who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign is the jewel of the kingdom a noble presentiment in few words of the chinese happy warrior such a man says hoshe even if he had to suffer punishment would not regret his conduct 25 regard your soldiers as your children and they will follow you into the deepest valleys look upon them as your own beloved sons and they will stand by you even unto death cf iss six in this connection tumu draws for us an engaging picture of the famous general wukai from whose treatise on war i have frequently had occasion to quote he wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel and shared every hardship with his men one of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess and wukai himself sucked out the virus the soldier's mother hearing this began wailing and lamenting somebody asked her saying why do you cry your son is only a common soldier and yet the commander in chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore the woman replied many years ago or will perform the similar service for my husband who never left him afterwards and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy and now that he has done the same for my son he too will fall fighting i know not where my chiwan mentions the vikon of chu who invaded the small state of h-style during the winter the duke of shan said to him many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold so he made a round of the whole army comforting and encouraging the men and straight way they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk chapt r11 terrain 92 26 if however you are indulgent but unable to make your authority felt kindhearted but unable to enforce your commands and incapable moreover of quelling disorder then your soldiers must be likened to spoiled children they are useless for any practical purpose my ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you they would not be afraid of the enemy too mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219 ad when lumeng was out copying the town of changling he had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force nevertheless a certain officer serving under his banner who happened to be a fellow townsman ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain lumeng considered that the fact of his being also a native of junan should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline and accordingly he ordered his summary execution the tears rolling down his face however as he did so this act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe and from that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up 27 if we know that our own men are in a condition to attack but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack we have gone only halfway towards victory that is saokong says the issue in this case is uncertain 28 if we know that the enemy is open to attack but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack we have gone only halfway towards victory cf 3 ss 13 1 29 if we know that the enemy is open to attack and also know that our men are in a condition to attack but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable we have still gone only halfway towards victory 30 hence the experienced soldier once in motion is never bewildered once he has broken camp he is never at a loss the reason being according to two mu that he has taken his measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand he does not move recklessly says chang you so that when he does move he makes no mistakes 31 hence the saying if you know the enemy and know yourself your victory will not stand in doubt if you know heaven and no earth you may make your victory complete my chewing sums up as follows given a knowledge of three things the affairs of men the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth victory will invariably crown your battles chapter 12 the nine situations one sun su said the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground one dispersive ground two facile ground three contentious ground four open ground five ground up intersecting highways six serious ground seven difficult ground eight hemden ground nine desperate ground two when achieved in this fighting in his own territory it is dispersive ground so called because the soldiers being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction in their advance observes to move they will lack the valor of desperation and when they retreat they will find harbors of refuge three when he has penetrated into hostile territory but to no great distance it is facile ground my chewing and whole she say because of the facility for retreating and the other commentators give similar explanations to move remarks when your army has crossed the border you should burn your boats and bridges in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home 93 CHAPTER12 THENINESITUATIONS94 four ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side is contentious ground two move defines the ground as ground to be contended for saokong says ground on which the few in the week can defeat the many and the strong such as the neck of a pass instance by laiqiuan thus thermopoly was of this classification because the possession of it even for a few days only meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time cf wu su ch v adinit for those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten there is nothing better than a narrow pass when lu clang was returning from his triumphant expedition to turkistan in 385 ad and had got as far as i hope laden with spoils liang hsi administrator of liangchu taking advantage of the death of fuqin king of chin plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province dong han governor of khao chang counseled him saying lu clang is fresh from his victories in the west and his soldiers are big oris and meddlesome if we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert we shall be no match for him and we must therefore try a different plan let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the cow who pass thus cutting him off from supplies of water and when his troops are prostrated with thirst we can dictate our own terms without moving or if you think that the pass i mentioned is too far off we can make a stand against him at the i wu pass which is nearer the cunning and resource of su fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions liang hsi refusing to act on this advice was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader five ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground there are various interpretations of the chinese adjective for this type of ground sao keng says it means ground covered with a network of roads like a chess board hoshu suggested ground on which intercommunication is easy six ground which forms the key to three contiguous states sao keng defines this as our country adjoining the enemies and a third country determinists with both veng shi instances the small principality of cheng which was bounded on the northeast by kai on the west by chin and on the south by chu so the he who occupies it first has most of the empire his command the belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies is a ground of intersecting highways ch apt r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 95 seven when an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear it is serious ground long hsi explains the name by saying that when an army has reached such a point its situation is serious eight mountain forests or simply forests rugged steeps marshes and fens all country that is hard to traverse this is difficult ground nine ground which is reached through narrow gorges and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men this is hemden ground 10 ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay is desperate ground the situation as pictured by saokong is very similar to the hemden ground except that here escape is no longer possible a lofty mountain in front a large river behind advance impossible retreat chen house says to be on desperate ground is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house two mu quotes from laiching a vivid description of the plight of an army dust and trapped suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy a ravine on the left a mountain on the right a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots carried in slings no passage open in front retreat cut off behind no choice but to proceed in single file then before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene advancing we can nowhere take a breathing space retreating we have no haven of refuge we seek a pitched battle but in vain yet standing on the defensive none of us has a moment's respite if we simply maintain our ground whole days and months will crawl by the moment we make a move we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear the country is wild destitute of water and plants the army is lacking in the necessaries of life the horses are jaded and the men worn out all the resources of strength and skill and availing the past so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of 10 000 all means of offense in the hands of the enemy all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves in this terrible plight even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons how could they be employed with the slightest effect students of greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the sicilian expedition and the agony of the athenians under niches and the monstonese cthusodides seven 78 sqq 11 on dispersive ground therefore fight not on facile ground halt not on contentious ground attack not chap t er 12 th eni and es i t u a t i o n s 96 but rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first so it's how come my chiwan and others however suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us thought that it would be sheer madness to attack in the sun suh su lu when the king of wu inquires what should be done in this case sun suh replies the rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side if a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy beware of attacking him lure him away by pretending to flee show your banners and sound your drums make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose frail brushwood and raise a dust confound his ears and eyes detach a body of your best troops and place it secretly in ambuscade then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue 12 on open ground do not try to block the enemy's way because the attempt would be futile and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks there are two interpretations available here i follow that of chang yu the other is indicated in sao kung's brief note draw closer together i see that a portion of your own army is not cut off on the ground of intersecting highways join hands with your allies or perhaps form alliances with neighboring states 13 on serious ground gather in plunder on this light shun has the following delicious note when an army penetrates far into the enemy's country care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment follow the example of the hand emperor kowt su whose march into chin territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables noda benny this was in 207 bc and may well cause us to blush for the christian armies that entered peking in 19 o' lad thus he won the hearts of all in the present passage then i think that the true reading must be not plunder but do not plunder alas i fear that in this instance the worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment tumu at least has no such illusions he says when encamped on serious ground there being no inducement as yet to advance further and no possibility of retreat one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides and keep a close watch on the enemy in difficult ground keep steadily on the march or in the words of eight ss two do not encamp 14 on hemden ground resort to stratagem saokong says try the effect of some unusual artifice and to you amplifies this by saying in such a position some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances and if we can succeed in diluting the enemy the peril may be escaped this is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to castlinum and to all appearances entrapped by the dictator fabius the stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which time tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before c9 ss 24 notes when night came on bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy the strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the romans that they withdrew from their position and Hannibal's army passed safely through the defile see polybius 3 93 94 livy 22 1617 on desperate ground fight for as cheer Lynn remarks if you fight with all your might there is a chance of life whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner 15 those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear more literally caused the front and rear to lose touch with each other to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad the officers from rallying their men 16 when the enemy's men were united they managed to keep them in disorder 17 when it was to their advantage they made a forward move when otherwise they stopped still may yalchen connects this with the foregoing having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained if there was no advantage to be gained they would remain where they were hey tun if asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack i should say begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear then he will be amenable to your will opinions differ as to what sun su had in mind saokong thinks it is some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending to muses the three things which an enemy is anxious to do and on the ac accomplishment of which his success depends are one to capture our five horrible positions to the ravage our cultivated land three to guard his own communications our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless cf three ss three by boldly ch a p t r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 98 seizing the initiative in this way you will once throw the other side on the defensive mountain rapidity is the essence of war according to tumu this is a summary of leading principles in warfare and he adds these are the profoundest truths of military science and the chief business of the general the following anecdotes told by hoshe shows the importance attached to speed by two of china's greatest generals in 227 ad mengta governor of h sincheng under the y emperor wen tai was meditating defection to the house of shu and had entered into correspondence with qiu kou lian prime minister of that state the y general ssu mai was then military governor of wang and getting wind of mengta's treachery he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import ssu mai's officers came to him and said if mengta has leaked himself with wu and shu the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move ssu mai replied mengta is an unprincipled man and we ought to go and punish him at once while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask then by a series of forced marches he brought his army under the walls of h sincheng within a space of eight days now mengta previously said in the letter to qiu kou lian wang is 12 oli from here when the news of my revolt reaches ssu mai he will at once inform his imperial master but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken and by that time my city will be well fortified besides ssu mai is sure not to come himself and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling the next letter however was filled with consternation though only eight days have passed since i threw off my allegiance an army is already at the city gates what miraculous rapidity is this a fortnight later h sincheng had fallen and mengta had lost his head si cheng shu ch1 f3 in 621 add mai cheng was sent from qui qiu and ssu qiuan to reduce the successful rebel h si o h sin who had set up as emperor at the modern qing chu fu and hu pei it was autumn and the yangs being then in flood h si o h sin never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges and consequently made no pre-parations but lai qing embarked his army without loss of time and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation mai qing replied to the soldier overwhelming speed is of paramount importance and he must never miss opportunities now is the time to strike before h si o h sin even knows that we have got an army together if we seize the present moment when the river is in flood we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it c7 ss 19 notes this is the great principle in war even if he gets to know of our approach he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to ch a p t r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 99 oppose us that's the full fruits of victory will be ours all came about as he predicted and h si o h sin was obliged to surrender nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffered the penalty of death take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness make your way by unexpected routes and attack on guarded spots 20 the following are the principles to be observed by an invading force the further you penetrate into a country the greater will be the solidarity of your troops and thus the defenders will not prevail against you 21 make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food cf supra ss 13 laichiun does not venture on a note here 22 carefully study the well-being of your men for well-being wang hsi means pet them he were them give them plenty of food and drink and look after them generally and do not over tax them concentrate your energy and hoard your strength chen recalls the line of action adopted in 224 bc by the famous general wang qin whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the first emperor he had invaded the chu state where a universal levy was made to oppose him but being doubtful of the temper of his troops he declined all invitations to fight and remain strictly on the defense side in vain did the chu general try to force a battle day after day wang qin kept inside his walls and would not come out but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men he took care that they should be well fed sharing his own meals with them provided facilities for bathing and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogenous body after some time had elapsed he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves the answer was that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and long jumping when wang qin heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits he knew that their spirits have been strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting by this time the chu army after repeating their challenge again and again had marched away eastwards in disgust the chin general immediately broke up his camp and followed them and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter shortly afterwards the whole of chu was conquered by chin and the king fu chu led into captivity keep your army continually on the move in order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are it has struck me however that the true reading might be linked your army together chu pter 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 100 and devise unfathomable plans 23 throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape and they will prefer death to flight if they will face death there is nothing they may not achieve chang yu quotes his favorite why liold su ch 3 if one man were to run amok with a sword in the marketplace and everybody else tried to get out of his way i should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards the truth is that a disperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength chang yu says if they are in an awkward place together they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it 24 soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear if there is no place of refuge they will stand firm if they are in hostile country they will show a stubborn front if there is no help for it they will fight hard 25 thus without waiting to be marshaled the soldiers will be constantly on the cleave without waiting to be asked they will do your will literally without asking you will get without restrictions they will be faithful without giving orders they can be trusted 26 prohibit the taking of omens and do away with superstitious doubts then until death itself comes no calamity need be feared the superstitious bound into saucy doubts and fears degenerate into cowards and die many times before their deaths two mu quotes wang shi kang spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army for fear the soldier's mind should be seriously perturbed the meaning is he continues that if all doubts and scruples are discarded your men will never falter in their resolution until they die 27 if our soldiers are not overburdened with money it is not because they have a distaste for riches if their lives are not unduly long it is not because they are disinclined to longevity shang yu has the best note on this passage wealth and long life are things for which all men have a natural inclination hence if they burn or fling away valuables and sacrifice their own lives it is not that they dislike them but simply that they have no choice sun su is slyly insinuating that as soldiers are but human it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way chaptr 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 101 28 on the day they are ordered out to battle your soldiers may weep the word in the chinese is snivel this is taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears alone those sitting up be doing their garments and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks not because they are afraid but because as saokong says all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die we may remember that the heroes of the iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion shang yu alludes to the mournful parting at the eye river between chinko and his friends when the former was sent to attempt the life of the king of chin afterwards first emperor in 227 bc the tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines the shrill blast is blowing shelly the burn your champion is going not to return one but let them once be brought to bay and they will display the courage of a chu or a qi she was the personal name of qi and chu a native of the wu state and contemporary with sun su himself who was employed by kung su clan better known as holu wang to assassinate his sovereign wang liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banklet he succeeded in his attempt but was immediately hacked to piece by the king's bodyguard this was in 515 bc the other hero referred to saokui or zao mo performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier in 681 bc lu have been thrice defeated by kai and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory when saokui suddenly seized hewin kung the duke of kai as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest none of the duke's retainers dared to move a muscle and saokui proceeded to demand full restitution declaring the lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker state hewin kung in peril of his life was obliged to consent whereupon saokui flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as change color as was to be expected the duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain but his wise old count seller clan chun pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitch battles 29 the skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai jian now the shuai jian is a snake that is found in the chang mountains one jiao's biographical dictionary no 399 chaptr 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 102 shuai jian means suddenly or rapidly and the snake in question was doubtless so-called owing to the rapidity of its movements through this passage the term in the chinese has now come to be used in the sense of military maneuvers strike at its head and you will be attacked by its tail strike at its tail and you will be attacked by its head strike at its middle and you will be attacked by head and tail both 30 asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai jian that is as meyao chen says is it possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other just as though they were part of a single living body i should answer yes for the men of wu and the men of uar enemies cf di ss 21 yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right the meaning is if two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril how much more should two parts of the same army bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow feeling yet it is notory ooze that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation especially in the case of allied armies 31 hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground these claimed devices to prevent one's army from running away recall the Athenian hero sauffins who carried the anchor with him at the battle of platia by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot c herodotus ix 74 it is not enough says sun su to render flight impossible by such mechanical means you will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose and above all a spirit of sympathetic cooperation this is the lesson which can be learned from the shua ijan 32 the principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach literally level the courage of all as though it were that of one if the ideal army is to form a single organic whole then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at waterloo as the worst he had ever commanded meant no more than that it was deficient in this important ch apt r 12 th eni and e s i t u a t i o n s 103 particular unity of spirit and courage had he not foreseen the belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background he would almost certainly have lost the day 33 how to make the best of both strong and weak that is a question involving the proper use of ground may out chen's paraphrase is the way to eliminate the differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features of the ground that's reliable troops if posted in strong positions will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain the advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage call henderson says with all respect to the textbooks and to the ordinary tactical teaching i am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions and to the immense advantages that are to be derived whether you are defending or attacking from the proper utilization of natural features to 34 that's the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man willy nilly by the hand to mou says the similarly has reference to the ease with which he does it 35 it is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy upright and just and thus maintain order 36 he must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances literally to deceive their eyes and ears and thus keep them in total ignorance saokong gives us one of his excellent apoptems the troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning they may only rejoice with you over their happy outcome to mystify mislead and surprise the enemy is one of the first principles in war as have been frequently pointed out but how about the other process the mystification of one's own men those who may think that sun sue is over emphatic on this point would do well to recall henderson's remarks on stonewall jackson's valley campaign the infinite pains he says with which jackson sought to conceal even from his most trusted staff officers his movements his intentions and his thoughts a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless et cetera et cetera three in the year 88 ad as we read in ch 47 of the who hand shoe pan kale took the field to the science of war p 333 three stonewall jackson vol i p 421 ch a pter 12 th eni n e s i t u a t i o n s 104 with 25 000 men from cotton and other central asian states with the object of crushing your can the king of kutcher replied by dispatching his chief commander to sucker the place with an army drawn from the king domes of when sue kumo and why to totaling 50 000 men pan kale summoned his officers and also the king of cotton to a council of war and said our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy the best plan then is for us to separate and disperse each in a different direction the king of cotton will march away by the easterly route and i will then return myself towards the west let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then start pan kale now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken alive and the king of kutcher was thus informed of his plans much elated by the news the latter set off at once at the head of 10 000 horsemen to bar pan kale's retreat in the west while the king of when sue rode eastward with 8 000 horse in order to intercept the king of cotton as soon as pan kale knew that the two chieftains had gone he called his divisions together got them well in hand and a cock crow hurled them against the army of jarcan as it lay encamped the barbarians panicked stricken fled in confusion and were closely pursued by pan kale over 5000 heads were brought back as trophies besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and valuables of every description dark and then capitulating kutcher and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces from that time forward pan kale's prestige completely overwrought the countries of the west in this case we see that the chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy 37 by altering his arrangements and changing his plans lang hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge chang yu in a quotation from another work says the axiom that war is based on deception does not apply only to deception of the enemy you must deceive even your own soldiers make them follow you but without letting them know why by shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose 38 at the critical moment the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him he carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand literally releases the spring cvss 15 that is takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return like a chang yu who sunk his ships after crossing a river shen hao followed by qia chapt r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 105 lin understands the words less well as puts forth every artifice at his command 39 he burns his boats and breaks his cooking pots like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep he drives his men this way and that and nothing knows whether he is going to muses the army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering 40 to muster his host and bring it into danger this may be termed the business of the general sun sue means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's hearts know how he returns again and again to this point among the warring states of ancient china desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today 41 the different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground chang yu says one must not be high bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics and the fundamental laws of human nature these are things that must most certainly be studied 42 when invading hostile territory the general principle is that penetrating deeply brings cohesion penetrating but a short way means dispersion cf supra ss 2043 when you leave your own country behind and take your army across neighborhood territory you find yourself on critical ground this ground is curiously mentioned in eight ss too but it does not figure among the nine situations or the six calamities in chap x1's first impulse would be to translate a distant ground but this if we can trust the commentators is precisely what is not meant here may yal chen says it is a position not far enough advanced to be called facile and not near enough to home to be dispersive but something between the two language ssi says it is ground separated from home by an interjacent state whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it hence it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly he adds that this position is of rare occurrence which is the reason why it is not included among the nine situations when there are means of communication on all four sides the ground is one of intersecting highways 44 when you penetrate deeply into a country it is serious ground when you penetrate but a little way it is facile ground ch a pter 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 106 45 when you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear and narrow passes in front it is hemden ground when there is no place of refuge at all it is desperate ground 46 therefore on dispersive ground i would inspire my man with unity of purpose this end according to tumu is best attained by remaining on the defensive and avoiding battle cf supra ss 11 on facile ground i would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army as tumu says the object is to guard against two possible contingencies one the desertion of our own troops to a sudden attack on the part of the enemy cf 7 ss 17 veyao chen says on the march the regiments should be in close touch in an encampment there should be continuity between the fortifications 47 on contentious ground i would hurry up my rear this is south kong's interpretation chang yu adopts it saying we must quickly bring up our rear so that head and tail may both reach the goal that is they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart may yal chen offers another equally plausible explanation supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position and we are behind him we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession chen howe on the other hand assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own ground quotes vi ss one where sun sue warns us against coming exhausted to the attack his own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed if there is a favorable position lying in front of you detach a picked body of troops to occupy it then if the enemy relying on their numbers come up to make a fight for it you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body and victory will be assured it was thus he adds that kaoshi beat the army of chen cp 57 48 on open ground i would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses on ground of intersecting highways i would consolidate my alliances 49 on serious ground i would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies the commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder not as one might expect to an unbroken communication with a home base on difficult ground i would keep pushing on along the road 50 on hemden ground i would block any way of retreat chp tr 12 th eni and es it u a t i o n s 107 men she says to make it seem that i meant to defend the position whereas my real intention is to burst subtly through the enemy's lines may yiao chen says in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation lang hsi says fearing less my men be tempted to run away tumu points out that this is the converse of seven it says 36 where it is the enemy who is surrounded in 532 ad cow hewin afterwards emperor and canonized as shen wu was surrounded by a great army under ur chu keo and others his own force was comparatively small consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30 feet the lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together gaps being left at certain points but cow hewin instead of trying to escape actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together as soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught on desperate ground i would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives to you says burn your baggage and impedimenta throw away your stores and provisions choke up the wells destroy your cooking stoves and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive but must fight to the death may yiao chen says the only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it this concludes what sun su has to say about grounds and the variations corresponding to them reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated sun su begins abruptly in eight s s two to the numerate variations before touching on grounds at all but only mentions five namely nos seven five eight and nine of the subsequent list and one that is not included in it a few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap ix and then chap x sets forth six new grounds with six variations of plan to match none of these is mentioned again though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no four in the next chapter at last in chap x i we come to the nine grounds par excellence immediately followed by the variations this takes us down to s s 14 in s s 43 minutes 45 fresh definitions are provided for nos five six two eight and nine in the order given as well as for the 10th ground noticed in chap eight and finally the nine variations are enumerated once more from beginning to end all with the exception of five six and seven being different from those previously given though it is impossible to account for the present state of sun tzu's text a few suggestive facts may be brought into prominence one chap eight according to the title should deal with nine variations whereas only five appear two it is an abnormally short chapter three chap x i is entitled the nine grounds several of these are defined twice over besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations for the length of the chapter is disproportionate being double ch a p t r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 108 that of any other except a x i do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts beyond the general conclusion that sun tzu's work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands chap eight is obviously defective and probably out of place while x i seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere 51 for it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when sir rounded to fight hard when he cannot help himself and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger shang yu alludes to the conduct of pan kale's devoted followers in 73 ad the story runs does in the hu han shu ch 47 when pan kale arrived at shan shan clan the king of the country received him at first with great politeness and respect but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change and he became remiss and negligent pan kale spoke about this to the officers of his suite have you noticed he said that clang's polite intentions are on the wane this must signify that envoys have come from the northern barbarians and that consequently he is in a state of indecision not knowing with which side to throw in his lot that surely is the reason the truly wise man we are told can perceive things before they have come to pass how much more than those that are already manifest they're up on he called one of the naives who have been assigned to his service and said a trap for him saying where are those envoys from the hsung new who arrived some day ago the man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth pan kale keeping his informant carefully under lock and key then summoned the general gathering of his officers 36 in all and began drinking with them when the wine had mounted into their heads a little he tried to rouse their spirits still further by addressing them thus gentlemen here we are in the heart of an isolated region anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great exploit now it happens that an ambassador from the hsung no arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared should this envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the hsung no our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert what are we to do with one accord the officers replied standing as we do in peril of our lives we will follow our commander through life and death for the sequel of this adventure c chap 12 s s one notes 52 we cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are ac clanted with their designs we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country it's mountains and forests it's pitfalls and precipices it's marshes and swamps we shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides chap t er 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 109 these three sentences are repeated from 7 s s 12 minutes 14 in order to emphasize their importance the commentators seem to think i prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words with regard to local guides sun soon might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong either through their treachery or some misunderstanding such as livy records 22 13 Hannibal we are told ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of castanum where there was an important pass to be occupied but his carthaginian accent unsuited to the pronunciation of latin names caused the guide to understand castanum instead of castanum and turning from his proper route he took the army in that direction the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived 53 to be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not be fit a warlike prince 54 when a warlike prince attacks a powerful state his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces he overraws his opponents and their allies are prevented from joining against him Meitiao Chen constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much effective by the Chinese in attacking a powerful state if you can divide her forces you will have a superiority in strength if you have a superiority in strength you will overall the enemy if you overall the enemy the neighboring states will be frightened and if the neighboring states are frightened the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her the following gives a stronger meaning if the great state has once been defeated before she has had time to summon her allies then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces Chen Hao and Changyu take the sentence in quite another way the former says powerful though a prince may be if he attacks a large state he will be unable to raise enough troops and must rely to some extent on external aid if he dispenses with this and with overweening confidence in his own strength simply tries to intimidate the enemy he will surely be defeated Changyu puts his view thus if we recklessly attack a large state our own people will be discontented and hang back but if as will then be the case our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us 55 hence he does not strive to ally himself with all in sundry nor does he foster the power of other states he carries out his own secret designs keeping his antagonists in awe the train of thought as said by Lai Chuan appears to be this secure against a combination of his enemies he can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs his prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships ch apt r 12 t h e n i n e s i t u a t i o n s 110 thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms this paragraph though written many years before the chin state became a serious menace is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous six chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under shi huang tai changyu following up his previous note thinks that sun su is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation 56 he still rewards without regard to rule wood su ch 3 less wisely says let advance be rewarded and retreat be heavily punished issue orders literally hang or post up without regard to previous arrangements in order to prevent treachery says wang hsi the general meaning is made clear by cell comes quotation from the ssu ma fa give instructions only on citing the enemy give rewards when you see the serving deeds cell comes paraphrase the final instructions you give to your army should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up changyu simplifies this into your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand and qia lin says there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements not only is there danger in letting your plans be known but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man cf supr ss 34 57 confront your soldiers with the deed itself never let them know your design literally do not tell them words i e do not give you reasons for any order or mansfield once told a junior colleague to give no reasons for his decisions and the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge when the outlook is bright bring it before their eyes but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy 58 place your army in deadly peril and it will survive plunge it into desperate straits and it will come off in safety ch apt r 12 111 these words of sun su were once quoted by han h sin an explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles already out alluded to on p 28 in 204 bc he was sent against the army of kao and halted 10 miles from the mouth of the ching h sing pass where the enemy had mustered in full force here at midnight he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry every man of which was furnished with a red flag their instructions were to make their way through narrowed defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy when the men of kao see me in full flight han h sin said they will abandon their fortifications and give chase this must be the sign for you to rush in pluck down the kao standards and set up the red batters of han in their stead turning them to his other officers he remarked our adversary holds a strong position and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander in chief for fear i should turn back and escape through the mountains so saying he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10 000 men and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the river tie seeing this maneuver the whole army of kao broke into loud laughter by this time it was broad daylight and han h sin displaying the generalismos flag marched out of the pass with drums beating and was immediately engaged by the enemy a great battle followed lasting for some time until at length han h sin and his colleague chang nai leaving drums and banner on the field fled to the division on the river bank where another fierce battle was raging the enemy rushed out to pursue them in two dealt to pursue them in two dealt to pursue them in two dealt to pursue them in two dealt to pursue them in two dealt to pursue them in two dealt to ch apt r 12 th eni n s it uat i o n s 94 for ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side is contentious ground too much defines the ground is ground to be contended for saocung says ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong such as the neck of a pass, instanced by Lai Chuan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. C.F., Wu Tzu, C.H., the Adonite, for those who have to fight in the ratio of 1 to 10, there is nothing better than a narrow pass, when Lu Klang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 AD, and had got as far as I hold, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang Chu, taking advantage of the death of Fu Qin. King of Qin plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Cao Chang, counseled him, saying, Lu Klang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are big oris and meadowsum. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan, that is hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Cao Wu Pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving, or if you think that the pass I mentioned is too far off, we can make a stand against him at the Ai Wu Pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Su Fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions. Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this type of ground. Cao Kung says it means ground covered with a network of roads, like a chessboard. Hoshi suggested, ground on which intercommunication is easy. 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states. Cao Kung defines this as, our country adjoining the enemies and a third country determinists with both. Meng Xi instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north east by Kai, on the west by Qin, and on the south by Chu, so that he who occupies it first has most of the empire at his command. The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies, is a ground of intersecting highways. 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious. 8. Mountain forests, or simply forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens, all country that is hard to traverse. This is difficult ground. 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men. This is hand in ground. 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay. It's desperate ground. The situation, as pictured by Cao Kung, is very similar to the hand in ground except that here escape is no longer possible. A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible. Retreat blocked, Chen Hao says, to be on desperate ground is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house. Two Mu quotes from Lai Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped. Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides. It falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together, and the chariots carried in slings. No passage open in front. Retreat cut off behind. No choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy's overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing space. Retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain. Yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by. The moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild. Destitute of water and plants. The army is lacking in the necessaries of life. The horses are jaded and the men worn out. All the resources of strength and skill unavailing. The past so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of 10,000. All means of offense in the hands of the enemy. All points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves. In this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect? Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition and the agony of the Athenians under Nishas and the monstenes. C. Thucydides 7, 78, S. Q. Q. 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not. C. H. A. P. T. E. R. 12. T. H. E. N. I. N. E. S. I. T. U. A. T. I. O. N. S. 96. The rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. So Tsao Kung, Mai Chuan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, thought that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, when the king of Wu inquires what should be done in this case. Sun Tzu replies, the rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him, lure him away by pretending to flee, show your banners and sound your drums, make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose. Trail brushwood and raise a dust, confound his ears and eyes, detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue. 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy s way, because the attempt would be futile and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Tsao Kung s brief note. Draw closer together. I see that a portion of your own army is not cut off. On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies, or perhaps form alliances with neighboring states. 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. On this, Lai Chun has the following delicious note. When an army penetrates far into the enemy s country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Cao Tzu, whose march into Qin territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables. Note of Benny, this was in 207 BC, and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 19-0 AD. Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not plunder, but do not plunder. Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says, when encamped on serious ground, there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of retreat. One ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. Or, in the words of 8, he says, 2, do not encamp, 14, on hemmed in ground, resort to stratagem. Cao Kung says, try the effect of some unusual artifice, and 2U amplifies this by saying, in such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in diluting. This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casillinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which time Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. C9, SS, 24, notes, when night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2,000 oxen, and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. A strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed safely through the defile. C. Polybius, 3, Mandi 3, 94, Livy, 22, 16, 17, on desperate ground, fights. 4, as Chialin remarks, if you fight with all your might, there is a chance of life, whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner. 15, those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear, more literally, caused the front and rear to lose touch with each other, to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions, to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. 16, when the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder. 17, when it was to their advantage, they made a forward move, when otherwise, they stopped still. May Yalchen connects this with the foregoing. Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained. If there was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were. 18, if asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array, and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say, begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear. Then he will be amenable to your will. Opinions differ as to what Sun Su had in mind. Cao Kung thinks it is some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending. 2, Mu says, the three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the AC accomplishment of which his success depends. R, one to capture our far-vorable positions. 2, the ravages are cultivated land. 3, to guard his own communications. Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions, and thus render him helpless. C, F, 3, S, S, 3, I boldly, C, H, A, P, T, E, R, 12. T, H, E, N, I, N, E, S, I, T, U, A, T, I, O, N, S, 98, seizing the initiative in this way. You at once throw the other side on the defensive. 19, rapidity is the essence of war. According to 2, Mu, this is a summary of leading principles in warfare, and he adds, these are the profoundest truths of military science. And the chief business of the general, the following anecdotes told by Ho Xie, shows the importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals. In 227 AD, Meng Ta, governor of Hsincheng under the Y Emperor Wen Tai, was meditating defection to the House of Xu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu Koliang, prime minister of that state. The Y general SSU Mai was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly imports. SSU Mai's officers came to him and said, if Meng Ta has leaked himself with Wu and Xu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move. SSU Mai replied, Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask. Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsincheng within a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu Koliang, Wan is 12 O Li from here. When the news of my revolt reaches SSU Mai, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, SSU Mai is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about. The next letter, however, was filled with consternation. Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city gates. What miraculous rapidity is this? A fortnight later, Hsincheng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. In 621 AD, Lai Qing was sent from Qichu and SSU Qilin to reduce the successful rebel Hsio Hxin, who had set up as emperor of the modern Qing Chu Fu and Heupai. It was autumn, and the yangs being then in flood, Hsio Hxin never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Lai Qing embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Lai Qing replied to the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsio Hxin even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. C7, SS, 19, notes, this is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to. CHAPTER12, T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-99, oppose us, thus the full fruits of victory will be ours. All came about as he predicted, and Hsio Hxin was obliged to surrender. No way stipulating that his people should be spared, and he alone suffered the penalty of death. Take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack on guarded spots. 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force. The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. CF, SUPRO, SS. 13. My Cheon does not venture on a note here. 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men. For well-being, Wang Hsi means, pet them, hewer them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Chen recalls the line of action adopted in 224 BC by the famous general Wang Qin, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Chu State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remain strictly on the defense side. In vain did the Chu general try to force a battle. Day after day, Wang Qin kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well-fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. He answer was that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and long jumping. When Wang Qin heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch, and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time, the Chu army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Qin general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Chu was conquered by Qin, and the Qing Fu Chu led into captivity. Keep your army continually on the move, in order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be linked your army together. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12, T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-100, in devise unfathomable plans. 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Shang Yu quotes his favorite Y-Li-O Tzu-C-H. 3. If one man were to run a mock with his sword in the marketplace, and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is that a disperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. Shang Yu says, if they are in an awkward place together, they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it. 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard. 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the cleave vive. Without waiting to be asked, they will do your will. Literally, without asking, you will get. Without restrictions, they will be faithful. Without giving orders, they can be trusted. 26. Prohibit the taking of omens and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. The superstitious, bound into saucy doubts and fears, degenerate into cowards and die many times before their deaths. 2. Mu called Huang Shikang, spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldier's mind should be seriously perturbed. The meaning is, he continues, that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they die. 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches, if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. Chang Yu has the best note on this passage, wealth and long life are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice. Sun Su is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way. 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep. The word in the Chinese is snivel. This is taken to indicate more genuine grief than tears alone. Those sitting up be doing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. Not because they are afraid, but because, as Sao Keng says, all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die. We may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the eye river between Qin Kou and his friends. When the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Qin afterwards, first emperor in 227 BC, the tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines. The shrill blast is blowing, shilly the burn. Your champion is going, not to return. One, but let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a QI. Chu was the personal name of Chu and Chu, a native of the Wu state and contemporary with Sun Siu himself, who was employed by Kang Siu Klang, better known as Hou Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to piece by the King's bodyguard. This was in 515 BC. The other hero referred to, Sao Qiyort, Sao Mo, performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 BC. Lu had been thrice-defeated by Kai and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory when Sao Qiyu suddenly seized Huyen Kung, the Duke of Kai. As he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest, men of the Duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Sao Qiyu proceeded to demand full restitution. Declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker state, Huyen Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Sao Qiyu flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be expected, the Duke wandered afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his wise old count, Seller Clan Chung, pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three-pitch battles. 29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the S.H.U.A.I. Jan. Now the S.H.U.A.I. Jan is a snake that is found in the Chang Mountains. 1. Zhao's Biographical Dictionary. No. 399. C.H.A.P.T.E.R. 12. T.H.E.N.I.N.E.S.I.T.U.A.T.I.O.N.S. 102. S.H.U.A.I. Jan means suddenly or rapidly, and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of military maneuvers. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail. Strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head. Strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head, and tail both. 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the S.H.U.A.I. Jan. That is, as Mei Yao Chen says, is it possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other? Just as though they were part of a single living body, I should answer, yes, for the men of Wu and the men of U.A.R. Enemies, C.F., V.I., S.S., 21. Yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. The meaning is, if two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow feeling? Then it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies. 31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground. He's claimed devices to prevent one's army from running away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the Battle of Platea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. C. Herodotus, I.X. 74. It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the SHUAI Jan. 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. Literally, level the courage of all as though it were that of one. If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo, as the worst he had ever commanded, meant no more than that it was deficient in this important. C.H.A.P.T.E.R. 12. T.H.E.N.I.N.E.S.I.T.U.A.T.I.O.N.S. 103. Particular, unity of spirit and courage. At enough foreseeing the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day. 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak. That is a question involving the proper use of ground. May Yal Chen's paraphrase is, the way to eliminate the differences of strong and weak, and to make both serviceable is to utilize accidental features of the ground. That's reliable troops if posted in strong positions will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. C.H.A.L. Henderson says, with all respect to the textbooks and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking from the proper utilization of natural features. 2. 34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. 2. Mu says, the simile has reference to the ease with which he does it. 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy, upright and just, and thus maintain order. 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, literally to deceive their eyes and ears, and thus keep them in total ignorance. 37. Cao Khun gives us one of his excellent apoptems. The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning. They may only rejoice with you over their happy outcome. To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy is one of the first principles in war, as have been frequently pointed out. But how about the other process, the mystification of one's own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on this point would do well to recall. Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Bally campaign, The Infinite Pains, he says, with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless, etc., etc. 3 in the Year 88 ad, as we read in CH. 47 of the Hu Han Shu, Han Cao took the field to the science of war, P. 333. 3 Stonewall Jackson, Val. I.P. 421. C.H.A.P.T.E.R. 12. T.H.E. and I.N.E.S.I.T.U.A.T.I.O.N.S. 104. With 25,000 men from Conten and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkhan, the King of Kutcher replied by dispatching his chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the King Dom's of Wen Su, Khumo, and Y2, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Cao summoned his officers and also the King of Conten to a council of war and said, our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of Conten will march away by the easterly route, and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then start. Pan Cao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcher was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Cao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen Su rode eastward with 8,000 horsemen or dare to intercept the King of Conten. As soon as Pan Cao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, and a cock crow hurled them against the army of Yarkhan, as it lay in camps. The barbarians panic stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Cao. Over 5,000 heads were brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkhan then capitulating, Kutcher and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Cao's prestige completely overawed the countries of the west. In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy. 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, Mang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice. He keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says, the axiom that war is based on deception does not apply only to deception of the enemy. He must deceive even your own soldiers, make them follow you, but without letting them know why. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand, literally releases the spring CVSS. 15. That is, takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return, like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river, Qianhao, followed by Chia, CHAPTER12, T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-105 Lin, understands the words less well as puts forth every artifice at his command. 39. He burns his bolts and breaks his cooking pots, like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep. He drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whether he is going. Tu Mu says, the army is only cognizant of orders to advance or retreat. It is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and conquering. 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger, this may be termed the buisiness of the general. Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns again and again to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today. 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground. Shang Yu says, one must not be high bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground. The expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics and the fundamental laws of human nature. These are things that must most certainly be studied. 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is that penetrating deeply brings cohesion. Penetrating but a short way means dispersion. Cf. Supra. Ss. 20. 43. When you leave your own country behind and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. This ground is curiously mentioned in 8. Ss. 2. But it does not figure among the nine situations or the six calamities in chap. X1's first impulse would be to translate a distant ground. But this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Neyal Chen says it is a position not far enough advanced to be called facile and not near enough to home to be dispersive. But something between the two. Lang Hsi says, it is ground separated from home by an interjacent state whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there quickly. He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the nine situations. When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-106. 45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on their rear and narrow passes in front, it is hemden ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. This N, according to Tumu, is best attained by remaining on the defensive and avoiding battle. C-F-S-S-S-11. On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. As Tumu says, the object is to guard against two possible contingencies. One, the desertion of our own troops. Two, a sudden attack on the part of the enemy. C-F-7. S-S-17. Mei-Yao Chen says, on the march, the regiments should be in close touch. In an encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications. 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. This is Cao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying, We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal. That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei-Yao Chen offers another equally plausible explanation. Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession. Chen Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes Vi. S-S-1, where Sun Tzu warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed. If there is a favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy it. Then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and victory will be assured. It was thus, he adds, that Cao Xi beat the army of Qin, C-P. 57. 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances. 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base. On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road. 50. On hemmed and ground, I would block any way of retreat. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-107. Meng Xi says, to make it seem that I meant to defend the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy's lines. Mei Yao Chen says, in order to make my soldiers fight with desperation. Wang Hsi says, fearing lest my men be tempted to run away. Qi Mu points out that this is the converse of seven. It says, 36, where it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 AD, Cao He-Lun, afterwards emperor and canonized as Shen Wu, was surrounded by a great army under Er Chiu Kao and others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2,000 horse and something under 30 feet. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Cao He-Lun, instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught. On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. Tu Yu says, burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death. Mei Yao Chen says, the only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it. This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about grounds and the variations corresponding to them. Revealing the passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultry and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in eight. As says, two to enumerate variations before touching on grounds at all, but only mentions five, namely NOS. Seven, five, eight and nine of the subsequent list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of CHAP, by X and then CHAP. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. Four in the next chapter, that last in CHAP. XI, we come to the nine grounds par excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down to SS, 14. In SS, 43 minutes 45, fresh definitions are provided for NOS. Five, six, two, eight and nine in the order given, as well as for the tenth ground noticed in CHAP. Eight, and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more from beginning to end. All, with the exception of five. Six and seven, being different from those previously given, though it is impossible to account for the present state of Santizu's text. A few suggestive facts may be brought into prominence. One CHAP. Eight, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. Two, it is an abnormally short chapter. Three CHAP. XI is entitled the nine grounds. Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. For the length of the chapter is disproportionate. Being double. CHAPTR12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-108. That of any other except IX. I did not propose to draw any inferences from these facts. Beyond the general conclusion that Santizu's work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands. Chap. Eight is obviously defective and probably out of place. While XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere. 51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when served rounded to fight hard when he cannot help himself and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. Shang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Kao's devoted followers in 73 AD. The story runs thus in the Wuhan Shu CH. 47. When Pan Kao arrived at Shan Shan. Clan. The king of the country received him at first with great politeness and respect. But shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Kao spoke about this to the officers of his suite. Have you no ties? He said that Clan's polite intentions are on the wane. This must signify that envoys have come from the northern barbarians and that consequently he is in a state of indecision. Not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason the truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to pass. How much more then? Those that are already manifest. Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service and set a trap for him. Saying where are those envoys from the H-Sung knew who arrived some day ago? The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Kao keeping his informant carefully under lock and key. Then summoned the general gathering of his officers. Thirty-six in all and began drinking with them when the wine had mounted into their heads a little. He tried to rouse their spirits still further by addressing them thus. Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the H-Sung know arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the H-Sung know, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do? With one accord, the officers replied, standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and death. For the sequel of this adventure, C-Chap 12 SS 1 Notes 52, we cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are ac-clinted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country. It's mountains and forests. It's pitfalls and precipices. It's marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. C-H-A-P-T-E-R 12, T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S 109. These three sentences are repeated from seven. SS, 12 minutes 14, in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think, I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy Records 22. 13, Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of Casunam where there was an important pass to be occupied, but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casunam instead of Casunam, and turning from his proper route. He took the army in that direction. The mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived. 53, to be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not be fit a warlike prince. 54, when a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overraws his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. May Tao Chen constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much effective by the Chinese in attacking a powerful state. If you can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength. If you have a superiority in strength, you will overall the enemy. If you overall the enemy, the neighboring states will be frightened, and if the neighboring states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her. The following gives a stronger meaning. If the great state has once been defeated before she has had time to summon her allies, then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces. Chen Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in quite another way. The former says, powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops and must rely to some extent on external aid. If he dispenses with this and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated. Chang Yu puts his view thus, if we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if as will then be the case, our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy. The other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us. 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all in sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. The train of thought, as said by Lai Chuan, appears to be this, secure against a combination of his enemies. He can afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs. His prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-110 thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. This paragraph, though written many years before the Qin state became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous six chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Xihuang Tai. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness, and haughty isolation. 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule. Wu Tzu, C-H. Three less wisely says, let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished. Issue orders, literally, hang or post up without regard to previous arrangements. In order to prevent treachery, says Wang HSI, the general meaning is made clear by Cao Kung's quotation from the SSU Ma Fa. Give instructions only on siding the enemy. Give rewards when you see the serving deeds. Cao Kung's paraphrase, the final instructions you give to your army should not correspond with those that have been previously posted up. Chang Yu simplifies this into your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand. And Qia Lin says, there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements. Not only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment. And you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. CF, Supra, SS, 34, 57, confront your soldiers with the deed itself, never let them know your design. Literally, do not tell them words. I, E, do not give your reasons for any order. Warb Mansfield once told a junior colleague to give no reasons for his decisions. And the maxim is even more applicable to a general than to a judge. When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes. But tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy. 58, place your army in deadly peril and it will survive. Plunge it into desperate straits and it will come off in safety. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12 T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-111 These words of Sun, Supra, once quoted by Han H. Sin in explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already outlooted to on P. 28, in 204 BC, he was sent against the army of Kale and halted 10 miles from the mouth of the Qing H-Sing Pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2,000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrowed defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. When the men of Kale see me in full flight, Han H. Sin said, they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Kale standards and set up the red batters of Han in their stead. Turning then to his other officers, he remarked, our adversary holds a strong position and is not likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander in chief. For fear I should turn back and escape through the mountains. So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the river Tai. Seeing this maneuver, the whole army of Kale broke into loud laughter. By this time it was broad daylight and Han H. Sin, displaying the generalismos flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time until at length Han H. Sin and his colleague Chang Nai, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men. But the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2,000 horsemen to play their parts. As soon as they saw the men of Kale fall lowering up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the Kale army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags struck them with terror, convinced that the Han had got in and overpowered their king. They broke up in wild disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the route, killing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Yuh himself. After the battle, some of Han H. Sin's of fighters came to him and said, In the art of war we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear and a river or marsh on the left front. This appears to be a blend of Sun, Tzu and Taikum, C9SS, 9, and note, you, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory? The general replied, I fear you gentlemen have not stood wide the art of war with sufficient care. Is it not written there, plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety, place it in deadly peril and it will survive. Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the military classic, swoop down on the marketplace and drive the men off to fight. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12, T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-112. This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun, Tzu. If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general deband-aid and it would have been impossible to do anything with them. The officers admitted the force of his argument and said, These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of. C-Chan Han Shu, C-H-34, F-F-4, 5, 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. Danger has a bracing effect. 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. Sao Kung says, Fane's stupidity by an appearance of yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the meaning clear if the enemy shows an inclination to advance. Lure him on to do so. If he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his intention. The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack. 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, I understand the first four words to mean accompanying the enemy in one direction. Sao Kung says, Unite the soldiers and make for the enemy, but such a violent displacement of characters is quite indefensible. We shall succeed in the long run literally after a thousand li in killing the commander-in-chief. Always a great point with the Chinese. 62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies. These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. CF. The border warden of Lanyu 3. 24. Who may have had similar duties. When this half was returned to him within a fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through and stop the passage of all emissaries, either to or from the enemy's country. CHAPT R-12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-113. 64. Eastern in the council chamber show no weakness and insist on your plans being ratified by the silver aim so that you may control the situation. May Yao Chen understands the whole sentence to mean. Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations. 65. If the enemy leaves the door open, you must rush in. 66. Forstall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear. CF. Supro. SS. 18. And suddenly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. Chen Hao's explanation if I managed to seize a favorable position. But the enemy does not appear on the scene. The advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore to occupy a position of importance to the enemy must begin by making an artful appointment. So to speak with his antagonist and control him into going there as well. May Yao Chen explains that this artful appointment is to be made through the medium of the enemy's own spies who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to give them. Then having cunningly disclosed our intentions we must manage though starting after the enemy to arrive before him 7. SS. 4. We must start after him in order to ensure his marching dither. We must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to May Yao Chen's interpretation of SS. 47. 67. Walk in the path defined by rule. Xia Lin says victory is the only thing that matters and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons. It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority for the sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, one is battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. 2. Mu says conform to the enemy's tactics until a favorable opportune idea offers. Then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove to SS. 68. At first, then, exhibit the coiness of a maiden until the enemy gives you an opening. Afterwards, emulate the rapidity of a running hair and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-12. T-H-E-N-I-N-E-S-I-T-U-A-T-I-O-N-S-114. As the hair is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly apt pairs felicitous. But of course, Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean you must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hair. But this is rightly rejected by 2 Mu. Chapter 13. The Attack by Fire. Rather more than half the chapter SS. 1 Minus 13 is devoted to the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics. 1. Sun Tzu said there are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp. So 2 Mu, Mai Chuan says, set fire to the camp and kill the soldiers when they try to escape from the flames. Pan Keil sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan Shan CXI. SS. 51. Note. Found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsang knew the mortal enemies of the Chinese. In consultation with his officers, he exclaimed, Never venture. Never win. 1. The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night. When they will not be able to discern our numbers, profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely. This will cool the King's courage and cover us with glory. Besides ensuring the success of our mission, the officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Keil then fell into a passion. It is today. He cried that our fortunes must be decided. The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid. And everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors. All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Keil ordered 10 of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks. It being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted an ambush gate at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting a rose on the front. One unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger's cubs. 115. C-H-A-P-T-D-R 13. T-H-E-A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-F-I-R-E 116. And rear of the H sound new, who rushed out palmel and frantic disorder. Pan Keil slew three of them with his own hand. While his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Keil, dividing his thoughts, said with uplifted hand, although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit. This satisfied QOH son and Pan Keil, having sent for clan, King of Shan Shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Keil took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's sons as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tuku, Wuhan Shu, C-H, 47, FF, 1, 2. The second is to burn stores, two mousses, provisions, fuel and fodder, in order to subdue the rebel Liu's population of Kaingden. Cal King recommended Wen Tai of the Sui Dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely successful. The third is to burn baggage trains, an example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao's wagons and impediment by Cao Cao in 200 AD. The fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines, two mousses that the things contained in arsenals and magazines are the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing, C, F-7, SS, 11, the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy, Tuyu says in the tum tine, to drop fire into the enemy's camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines. Two, in order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. Cao Cao thinks that traders in the enemy's camp are referred to, but Chen Hao is more likely to be right in saying, we must have favorable circumstances in general, not merely traders to help us. Xie Lin says, we must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather. The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. Two mousses suggest as material for making fire, dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc. Here we have the material cause. Cheng Yu says, vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-Thirton. T-H-E-A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-F-I-R-E-117. Three, there is a proper season for making attacks with fire and special days for starting a conflagration. Four, the proper season is when the weather is very dry. The special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the sieve, the wall, the wing or the crossbar. These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the 28 stellar mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus. For these four are all days of rising wind. Five, in attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments. Six, one when fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp. Respond at once with an attack from without. Seven, two if there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet. Bid your time and do not attack. The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution. Eight, three when the force of the flames has reached its height. Follow it up with an attack. If that is practicable, if not, stay where you are. Sau Kung says, if you see a possible way, advance. But if you find the difficulties too great, retire. Nine, four if it is possible to make an assault with fire from without. Do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. CHAPTER 13 T-H-E-A-T-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-F-I-R-E-100-A-10 Garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks. So Wang Fu Sun called his officers together, and said, in war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. The commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, VSS. Five, six and ten. Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once. Thus emulating the achievement of Tain Tan, CP-90, that same evening, a strong breeze sprang up. So Wang Fu Sun instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and Wang Fu Sun, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight. Hu Hanshu, CH, 71, 10, 5 when you start a fire, be the windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward. Chang Yu, following to you, says, when you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it. If you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success. A rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu. If the wind is in the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy. 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. Cf. Lao Tzu Sing. A violent wind does not last the space of a morning. Tao Te Ching. Chap. 23. Mei Yao Chen and Wang Hsisei. A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule. The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent. 12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known. The movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. Tu Mu says, We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch for the days on which wine will rise before making our attack with fire. Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently. We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar attacks from them. 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence. Those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-III T-H-E-A-T-T-A-C-K-B-Y-F-I-R-E-119 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his. The longings, Cao Kung's note is, We can merely obstruct the enemy's road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores. Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the reason. Chang Yu concludes why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu C-H 4. Speaks thus of the two elements. If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marshlands thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire. 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise. For the result is waste of time and general stagnation. This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. Cao Kung says, Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day, and to Wu, if you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will end Tzu for several reasons. However, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao Chen alone, whose words I will quote, those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic misures. That is to say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got. Sixth in, hence the saying, the enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead. The good general cultivates his resources. Two mu quotes the following from the San Lu, C.H. Two, the warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption. If rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected. Seventeen, move not unless you see an advantage. Use not your troops unless there is something to be gained. Fight not unless the position is critical. Sun Su Mei at times appeared to be overcautious, but he never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao teaching. C.H. Six, nine, I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive. I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot. Eighth, no ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen. No general should fight a battle simply out of peak. C.H.A.P.T.E.R. 13. T.H.E.A.T.T.A.C.K.B.Y.F.I.R.E. 120. Nineteen, if it is to your advantage, make a forward move. If not, stay where you are. This is repeated from X.I.S.S.17. Here I feel convinced that it is an interpolation, for it is evident that S.S. Twenty ought to follow immediately on S.S.S. Eighteen, twenty, anger may in time change to gladness, vexation may be succeeded by content. Twenty-one, but a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being. The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying. More can the dead ever be brought back to life. Twenty-two, hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of Kaution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. Chapter Fourteen, The Use of Spies One, Sun Tzu said, Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people, and a drain on the resources of the state. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. C.F. Pi, I.S.S. S.S. One, Thirteen, Fourteen, There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. C.F. Tao Ti Ching, C.H. Thirty, where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note, We may be reminded of the saying, On serious ground, gather in plunder. Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways? The answer is that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to forage on the enemy only means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being unobtainable. Supplies from home cannot be dispensed with, as many as 700,000 families will be impeded in their labor. May Yao Chen says, Men will be lacking at the plow-tail. The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts. Each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the state by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tumu tells us that their cottages were built and a well sunk to be used by all in common. C2, SS, 12, Note In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family, the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected. 121, CHAPTR 14 T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S-122 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's conditions simply because one grudges the outlay of 100 ounces of silver in honors and emoluments. For spies is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exhortium if spies were actually mentioned at this point. It's the height of inhumanity. Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by averting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war outweighs brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's condition and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose. When every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity. 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. This idea that the true object of war is peace has its root in the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back is 597 BC. These memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Chu State. The Chinese character for prowess is made up of the characters for the state and the spirit cessation of hostilities. Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth, 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge. That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions and what he means to do. 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits. It cannot be obtained inductively from experience. To Mu's note is, knowledge of the enemy cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-14. T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S-123 nor by any deductive calculation. Mai Qiun says, quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude are susceptible of exact mathematical determination. Human actions cannot be so calculated. 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Mei Al Chen has rather an interesting note. Knowledge of the spirit world is to be obtained by divination. Information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning. The laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation. But the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone. 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes. One local spies. Two inward spies. Three converted spies. Four doomed spies. Five surviving spies. 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called Divine Manipulation of the Threads. It is the Silver Ain's most precious faculty. Promwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders, had officers-styled scoutmasters, whose business it was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy, two scouts and spies, etc. and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves thus gained. 1. Nine. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. 2. Mu says, in the enemy's country, win people over by kind treatment and use them as spies. 10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. 2. Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in this respect. Worthy men who have been degraded from office. Friman Alts who have undergone punishment. Also, favorite concubines who are greedy for gold. Men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions. 1. AIDs to scouting. P. 2. CHAPTR 14. T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S-124. 11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes. By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy's service and inducing them to carry back false information as well as to spy and turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, H-S-I-O-S-E-H-C-N says that we pretend not to have detected him. But contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition. But that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously SS. 21. SQQ. Hoshi notes three occasions on which converted spies were used with conspicuous success. One by Tain Tan in his defense of Kaimou-si Supra. P. 92 by Kaohsiung is marched to OUCP. 57 and by the Wiley Fan Choo in 260 BC. When Lee and Poe was conducting a defensive campaign against Chen, the king of Kaoh strongly disapproved of Lee and Poe's cautious and dilatory CHAPTER-14. 12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. 2. U gives the best exposition of the meaning. We ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report, and the NMI will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. 3. His spies will thereupon be put to death. As an example of doomed spies, Ho-shi mentions the prisoners released by Pan Kaoh in his campaign against Yarkhan. 4. CP. 132. He also refers to Tang Qin, who in 630 AD, was sent by Tai Tsung to law the Turkish Khan Chi lie into fancied security, until Lai Qing was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenge themselves by killing Tang Qin. But this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the new Tang history CH. 58. Fao, 2 and CH. 89. Fao. 8. Respectively that he escaped and lived on until 656. Lai Kai played a somewhat similar part in 203 BC, when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Kai. He has certainly more claim to be described a doomed spy, for the King of Kai being subsequently attacked without warning by Han H Sin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Lai Kai. Ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive. 13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the NMI's camp. CHAPT R-14. T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S 126. 14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. Tu Mu and Mei Yao Chen point out that the spy is privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping tent. Man should be more liberally rewarded, and no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. Tu Mu gives a graphic touch. All communication with spies should be carried mouth to ear. The following remarks on spies may be quoted from Teren, who may perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander. Spies are attached to those who give them most. He who pays them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody, nor should they know one another. When they propose anything very material, secure their persons or have in their possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. 2. 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. Mei Yao Chen says in order to use them, one must know fact from falsehood and be able to discriminate between honesty and double dealing. Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along the lines of intuitive perception and practical intelligence. Tu Mu strangely refers these 2. Marshall Teren P. 311 Attributes to the spies themselves before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of their experience set and skill. But he continues, A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers. It takes a man of genius to penetrate such so that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage. 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and strafe rewardness. Chang Yu says, When you have attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity. Then they will work for you with all their might. 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. Mei Yao Chen says, Be under guard against the possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy. Eighten, be subtle, be subtle, and use your spies for every kind of business. C. F. V. I. S. Nine, 19 If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. Word for word. The translation here is, If spy matters are heard before our plans are carried out, et cetera, Sun Tizu's main point in this passage is, whereas you kill the spy himself as a punishment for letting out the secret, the object of killing the other man is only, as Chen Hao puts it, to stop his mouth and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tumu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to death. For the spy would certainly not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him. 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants. The aides to camp, literally visitors, is equivalent, as Tuyu says, to those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with information, which naturally nieces Citi's frequent interviews with him, and doorkeepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these, as the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these important functionaries can be won over by bribery. C-H-A-P-T-E-R-14. T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S-128. 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out. Temp Ted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed, lest they will become converted spies and available for our service. 22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. Tuyu says, through conversion of the enemy's spies, we learn the enemy's condition, and Chang Yu says, we must tempt the converted spy into our service because it is he that knows which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain and which of the officials are open to corruption. 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Chang Yu says, because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be deceived. 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on app-pointed occasions. 25. He end the name of spying in all its five varieties as knowledge of the enemy, and this knowledge can only be derived in the first instance from the converted spy. As explained in SS, 22 minus 24. He not only brings information himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage. Hence, it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality. 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty, Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 BC. Its name was changed to Yin by Pan Keng in 1401, was Dudlai Qin, better known as Aiyin, the famous general and statesman who took part in Chang Tang's campaign against Qi Qili. Who had served under the Aisha. Likewise, the rise of the Qi dynasty was due to Luya, Lu Xiang rose to high office under the tyrant Qi Huixin, whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as Taikang, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the Liu Tao, who had served under the Yin, C-H-A-P-T-E-R-14, T-H-E-U-S-E-O-F-S-P-I-E-S-129. 27. Hence, it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results. Two Mu closes with a note of warning, just as water, which carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great results is oft times the cause of other destruction. Spies are a most important element in water because on them depends an army's ability to move. She cruise says that an army without spies is like a man with ears or eyes.