 All right, we'll welcome everybody to the Lowy Institute and welcome to this conversation about Australian Defence Policy and AUKUS with Charles E. Dell, Levina Lee, and Justin Burke. I'm Sam Roggeveen, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute. I'll introduce our panel more formally in a moment, but as is customary, we begin by acknowledging the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and pay our respects to the elders past, present, and emerging. Well, it's no exaggeration to say that AUKUS has dominated the news here in Australia since President Biden and Prime Minister's Albanese and Sunak made their joint announcement in San Diego last Tuesday morning, our time. Australia, it was announced, will acquire three to five secondhand Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from the US and then eight new generation submarines designed and built with US and UK help to be known as SSN AUKUS. And incidentally, SSN is the accepted short form for nuclear-powered submarines. It's a term you might hear frequently from our panelists today. It stands for Ship Submersible Nuclear. The three leaders also announced Submarine Rotational Force West. From as early as 2027, the UK will rotate one SSN through the newly refurbished HMAS Sterling Naval Base in Western Australia, while the US will contribute four. It's fair to say that the announcement also came with a large dose of what marketing and advertising experts refer to as sticker shock, which is that shutter and lightheadedness that we all feel when we see a large number on a price tag. In this case, an estimated $268 to $368 billion Australian over 30 years. So the job for our panelists this afternoon is to discuss the merits of that spending, what sort of military equipment and how much military deterrence will Australia get for its investment. That's at least where we'll start this conversation, but I'll also throw the floor open to all of your questions later in the session. For now, let me introduce our panelists. Charles E. Dell is the inaugural Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. One of America's most renowned think tanks. He previously taught at the University of Sydney, where he was a senior fellow at the US Study Center. Prior to that, he was a professor of strategy and policy at the US Naval War College and served on the US Secretary of State's policy planning staff from 2015 to 2017. Welcome back to Sydney, Charlie. Dr. Levina Lee is a senior lecturer in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University. In 2020, she was appointed to the Council of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Levina is a non-resident fellow and that's a colleague of Charlie at CSIS and a non-resident senior fellow at the US Study Center in Sydney. Prior to joining Macquarie University, she was a political risk consultant with Control Risks Group. And last but not least, Justin Burke is the 2022 Michael and Deborah Thorley Scholar in International Security at the Lower Institute. He's also a non-resident fellow at Keel University in Germany. Justin's completing a PhD at Macquarie University on the uses of submarines in naval diplomacy. He has written for the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Center and other scholarly publications and he appears regularly in print and online in Australia and internationally. And I'm gonna take the opportunity, Justin, to begin with you as our true submarine expert on the panel today. I wanna ask what is it that, well, we hear nuclear-powered submarines described as the apex predators of the ocean. So tell us a little bit more about their capabilities. What is Australia getting? What will Australia be able to do that it has never been able to do before? Thank you for the question, Sam. Also allow me to thank you for your hospitality at the Lower Institute these recent weeks and to Charlie for hosting me at CSIS for the last three months in Washington. Of course, the Thorley Scholarship is an opportunity to immerse yourself in these places and to develop a little bit of knowledge about something and submarines has been the chosen topic. So to answer the question, I think that the issue of nuclear submarines for the Australian Navy is very new to the public but less of a new topic to the Australian Navy. It's a capability that matches and Australia's requirements, Australia's needs, Australia's geography, something that has been thought about for a long time but a particular will and a particular political configuration is the most recent change that we've seen. So that is to say Australia has been using diesel-powered submarines in a way that nuclear-powered submarines are traditionally used, transiting long distances, pushing through a lot of water. And so the view has been put to me that we have really reached the limits of the chemistry and the physics of what a conventionally-powered submarine can do and it was simply gonna be insufficient for our future needs. There is also the issue of needing to snorkel, which is to say coming up close to the surface to run diesel engines and suck down air. That is a detection risk. It's a risk that in the decades to come is going to be an unacceptable one and an unacceptable practice. And there are other aspects looking to the future with SSNs for Australia. So as well as the upgrades to the Collins class which we expect will be receiving Tomahawk land attack missiles, the Virginia class submarine is obviously, this will be a new capability for Australia that raises some interesting questions. But I think even further ahead when people start talking about an autonomous future, autonomous underwater vehicles, I think we really need to step up in terms of this power source because we need to be able to run this kind of mothership autonomous teaming. I think that's the future. And I think a nuclear powered submarine is really crucial to that. I don't think it's something that we could really contemplate with a conventionally powered submarine. Just to amplify this point, the issues really here, the advantages of nuclear power are range and endurance and it's really quite stark. I read a study myself just recently that for a nuclear powered submarine operating from say the West coast of Australia, the transit time to the South China Sea would be roughly a third of what it would be for a diesel submarine. And once it's on station in the South China Sea, it could operate for something like 70 or 80 days. Whereas the endurance of a diesel powered equivalent will be something in the order of two weeks or less. If I may jump in, it's a very popular kind of diagram that's done the rounds. It does omit the fact that Australia does pull into Singapore routinely, refuel and replenish. So it does have the ability to go further and to sustain on station for longer, but it is nonetheless true what you say. So the question we have to get to for the hours out is why that's important for Australia to have those kind of capabilities. But Charlie, let me first turn to you and ask you about the response in Washington to all of this. So we, as I said in the introduction, this has absolutely dominated the public conversation in Australia, including the, you know, splashed all over the front pages of our newspapers for days. What about in the United States and in Washington in particular beyond the direct, you know, policy and political circles that would naturally be involved in this? What has been the reaction? And then also as a follow-up, what's the, how would you describe the support level for AUKUS inside Congress? Because that's gonna be very important going forward, right? Yeah, so thanks for the question, Sam, but thanks very much to Lowy for hosting. It's terrific to be back here. I'm here for three and a half days only so I can pulse the very vibrant debate that we're seeing here in Australia because it's not actually been as much of a debate in the US thus far. A couple of different reasons. One, everything happens all at once. So the news cycle is sometimes drowned out by other things. We had a bank financial collapse pending that didn't happen. So the news story when it broke in the US last Monday was an enormous story for one day and then it's submerged if you allow me. We can play with this analogy all day long. The puns are out themselves, Jolly. They do indeed. Look, I prepared for this by re-rooting 20,000 leagues under the sea. So I am good to go, Sam. But it was a large story and for one day and then it's gone away. I would say a couple of further things on this. There is largely a wellspring of support for this from Washington, from industry, for people who read this, but there are lots of questions to be answered just like there are here. And one of the ones that we'll talk about, I'm sure, is the United States has its own naval requirements. They are set about how many things we need. SSNs, SSBNs, we can use lots of analogies here, but how many capabilities we need to meet the objectives that we set for ourselves as a country. So the question is, will we still have the ability to get them because we've not been meeting the objectives and will August now, will an infusion of investment by Australia, by the Brits and by the United States into the submarine industrial base support the requirements that we already have. So that's a question that I think is out there, but there's a larger part here that I think is resonating through the American public. Partially this comes via Ukraine, but I think it's a larger point at this stage too, that I think the American public by and large, despite the chest beating that you might see coming out of us and we have lots of that, of course, is acknowledged the fact that given the turn in geopolitical events, given the increasing concerns around Taiwan, given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, that the United States wants its most trusted and most capable partners to be stronger than they have been in the past. So I think there is a turn away from what used to be called simply American primacy. We are going to be stronger than everyone else combined. And now you're beginning to see a development of thinking that given the way things have evolved in the global environment, America needs and indeed wants its allies to be stronger than they have in the past. So that is, I think, actually boosting this decision around Washington and then more pervasively within the country too. Lavina Lee, this is not just a trilateral story, of course, it goes far beyond Australia, the UK and the US. Can you take us through regional reactions to AUKUS? Sure. AUKUS was originally announced about 18 months ago. So we were at that in process. We're now talking about the plans for the optimal pathway. And at that point in time, there were countries in our region that expressed some concerns about AUKUS. And principally they were Indonesia and Malaysia who have talked about concerns about nonproliferation. And recently, again, we had to reiterate those same concerns, but also concerns about the idea that in making this agreement that we might in fact be accelerating some kinds of arms race in the region. Now, there are a number of ways you can interpret this. So in one way, you could say that they could have actually made a lot more of a fuss about it. That in fact, whilst mentioning some of these concerns, they haven't actually been as loud and as consistent and vociferous as you might have expected. So I think we could actually take that as a positive sign that either we're doing the right kind of diplomacy. I think the first time around, it was a bit of a shock for everyone because there was all sorts of secrecy, obviously involved in making such an announcement. But the second time around, the government has been making a lot more efforts to in advance talk to their regional counterparts to reassure them. Now, one of the aspects of this deal that doesn't get talked about as much is the nuclear proliferation aspects. And if you're a nuclear proliferation expert or someone who's in that field, I think you would have concerns about AUKUS. And I say that as someone who actually supports the AUKUS deal, but it is relying on an exception within the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty that allows for nuclear propulsion. So it isn't banned under the NPT, but some would look at it as a kind of against the spirit of the NPT, even if it's not against the letter of the NPT. Now, I think Australia and the AUKUS partners have done a good job, I think, in reassuring the region that we're not about to start reprocessing uranium or enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium. We're not getting that technology. The fuel will be provided to us. We're not creating it ourselves. We won't have access to it. It will be in welded units that will last for the lifetime of the submarine, which is around 30 years. So we have to think about the waste aspect. Afterwards, that's a problem that we as a country have to think about, how we're going to deal with that. I think there are solutions. But in terms of the proliferation aspects, there will be some who will still say it's setting a precedent, that there might be other countries, especially other nuclear weapons states, who might think, all right, well, why don't we do the same thing? We might have an ally or a very close partner that might be advantageous for us to have a similar type of deal. Look, I think that the IAEA has come out, the director general, and said that he is very satisfied, in fact, of very glowing, about what Australia and the Orcas partners have done in terms of reducing proliferation risks. That's a very big positive. But I also think that, I think we just can't forget how unprecedented Orcas really is and the likelihood that there really is another nuclear weapon state out there who would be willing to sell, not sell, but share their crown jewels with another country. I would even wonder whether this no-limits partnership between Russia and China would also go that far. So this is a big deal. And so if we're talking about precedence, you still got to think about the likelihood that they will actually be followed through. And now your original question was about Southeast Asia. And what I would say, final comment about Southeast Asia is, it's kind of an open secret that Southeast Asians really respect power. So they're very respectful of the United States. I think they internalize the military modernization project that China is embarked on, which is the largest project of any country since World War II. They largely internalize it and accept it. And I think in terms of Orcas, they will internalize and accept it. And I think there are a number of Southeast Asian countries that don't say it vocally, but they're actually happy that we are taking steps to bolster the balance of power in this region. And I think there's an acceptance. They know very well that ASEAN is a diplomatic and institutional forum, but it is not capable of providing that balance. So they look to us and I think they will actually treat us better because we're more capable. They'll actually look to do more with us in terms of defence cooperation than they ever did before. So when we hear Indonesia express concerns about proliferation, we should read that as literally concerned about proliferation and not as a proxy for a broader doubts about the strategic aspects here and about Australia's growing military strength. I think that's the case. I mean, very recently, I'm not sure I can't tell you exact dates, but very recently we had announcements that Australia and Indonesia were moving forward to deepen their defence cooperation and this was in the shadow of a, I think maybe two weeks later, the August announcement was due. So I do think that they do have concerns, but I think those concerns can be placated and I think Australia, the UK and the US are doing as much as they can, I think, to do that. Charlie, you talked about a turn away from primacy towards helping allies to develop their military capabilities. That brings me to former Prime Minister Paul Keating's dramatic intervention last week in this national debate, which I know you familiarise yourself with. What's your response to the argument that America's, and I'm quoting Keating now, that America's geo-strategic priority is to contain China militarily economically, close quote, and that through AUKUS, Australia is effectively signing up to that ambition. I would say it was certainly a dramatic intervention that Mr. Keating made, whether or not it is an effective intervention we'll see as the debate plays out. Look, I actually think that you have to start by responding to that question from the point that Levina had just introduced, that this was a dramatic announcement, both 18 months ago and again last week, but it shouldn't be an altogether surprising one. The particulars the details are, because this is a fairly natural, I would say, response by three nations to an unprecedented expansion by China. Levina said the most explosive exponential growth since World War II. Over the past two decades, three decades, we have seen the Chinese economy grow. We've seen them plowing money into military modernization. We've seen 13 new submarines that the Chinese have put to sea over the past 15 years, several of which carry nuclear armed weapons, which Australia's will not. And we've seen not only a growing capability that is oftentimes opaque, right? You have to look pretty hard to understand what they're doing, because they try not to advertise everything that they're doing. That is one thing, but it's the use with which that force has been put. Growing capabilities of betting and expanding set of goals by China. Two increasingly, and this is the easiest argument in the world to make here in Australia, intimidate, coerce, lean on, and occasionally attack China's neighboring states. The security environment has deteriorated and has been destabilized because of the actions that China has taken. This is not surprising that there has been a response. It's surprising that's taken so long, I would say. So the fact that there is a dramatic response doesn't surprise me at all. One of the things that I look at when I'm watching how the press unfolds here about what's happened with AUKUS is that just like the American press, sometimes we get a little parochial, right? That you look at what is happening in Australia, absenting what's happening in larger contexts. Because Australia has in the midst of really ramping up what it's doing. We should note too that AUKUS is only one part of this, right? Your government is in the midst of the defense strategic review which will be released in a month's time. AUKUS is only a part of where that is going to go. But this idea that the environment in which you live has been badly destabilized is not a decision that Australia is alone in recognizing or responding to. The Japanese, a pacifist country, have just announced that they are doubling their defense budget. The Philippines are ramping up what they are doing. The South Koreans have decided that they're going to start talking with their old nemesis, the Japanese, because they're worried about what is happening in their environment. Same with the Indians. These are all a set of responses to the same set of stimuli, right? And increasingly aggressive use of Chinese capabilities. So this strikes me as not containment, but a natural response to what has been all in this. I mean, I think Penny Wong talks about this regularly as strategic equilibrium that Australia is looking for. Because at this point, you were talking about the Southeast Asians response to this writ large. The Philippines said in response to the AUKUS announcement last week that we were hoping that something like this begins to restore strategic equilibrium for us and therefore we welcome it. So this strikes me as a pretty natural, if dramatic response to what has been happening by China over the last two decades. I would say that with perhaps the exception of Mr. Keating, I doubt it would be controversial in Australia that we would respond with dramatic gestures of our own to the rise of Chinese military power. That seems completely natural, I would say to most observers. There is of course a different question about how we respond. And Paul Keating's foreign minister at the time, Gareth Evans has come out saying that this is a pretty dramatic shift from a doctrine focused on the defense of Australia to one back to a forward defense strategy. And I've argued myself in the past that capability can drive policy. What we have determines what we do. So if we buy submarines that are more or less expressly designed to operate thousands of kilometers to our north, then that's how we'll use them. So how do you respond to the argument that the capability in itself will drive Australia closer to American foreign policy objectives on Taiwan, for instance? Look, you have said like 15 different things there. So we would probably take each one at a time before we get to the covert deal that your government has signed up to with the US as we heard this morning from Hugh White. Look, let me start by answering that and then actually Justin I think can chime in as someone who knows the capability really well. When you were talking at the outset, Sam, about what do SSNs, right? It comes somewhat trippingly off the tongue. What do they give you? They give you range, they give you power, but they also give you stealth in a way that diesel submarines don't. And I think, so let me draw back to the strategic angle. I think that this is a bet amongst other things by not just Australia, but by the United States and the UK as well, that if they look back, if all of our governments look back over the past two decades, not very much has deterred China, right? China thinks that they are operating in a very permissive security environment. And if you have a permissive security environment, you keep going. Now, as Richard Marl said just last week, when you have a stealthier capability, it increases the questions for Beijing. Where are they? What do they have the ability to do? And before you continue taking not only assertive actions, but potentially quite aggressive ones, this increases the complexity of the cost-benefit analysis for Beijing. That is a good thing that we should want to increase. We should want to increase the questions that reside in Xi Jinping's mind before he decides to roll the dice in a horrible way, be it in Taiwan or somewhere else. And so the stealthiness of these capabilities, these SSNs is something that I think, and this is where we should probably get to the deterrence conversation. The bet here, at least as I read it, Sam, is that by bringing more capabilities online, not just for Australia, but increasing the capacity of all three of our nations, it creates more questions in Beijing's mind and begins to convince them that they are operating in a less permissive security environment, and that will ultimately stabilize the region more than it has been over the past decade. Yeah, it's an ongoing desire of mine for the Navy and for the submarine community to talk more about what they do so that we can understand and appreciate it, because I think that is affecting the kind of assumptions that people make. So the assumption that our current conventionally-powered submarines don't operate thousands of nautical miles away from our shores incorrect. They can, they do and have done. Australia's operated submarines for more than 100 years in all sorts of places, though, as I say, accounts of what they do and where they go are tightly held. Defence would say that the more they say about what submarines do, the less value they will have because obviously as much as Australian citizens, taxpayers and voters are interested, so are our adversaries. I would submit to them that they could do a little bit better. They could perhaps tell us a little bit more. And I look to the way our intelligence agencies, even in the last 10 years, have increased transparency and have worked to earn the social license of what they do by telling us a little bit more about what they do year to year might be a model that Defence could look at. Yeah, Lovina. So your original premise of the question was about containment, that Australia was buying into a containment strategy by the US. Now, I mean, that word is always bandied about, but it is a cold war term that I don't think applies in this current environment. I think what we're really trying to do in line with what Charlie's suggested already is it's about constraining China's options. It's not containment. China is the number one trading partner of a large number of states. I don't have the number, but a very large number of countries in the world have China as its major trading partner. We're not, I don't think Australia's ever suggesting that we're not going to trade with China. There might be selective decoupling going on in terms of high technology, in terms of critical supply chains, but it is selective. And the idea is not to contain China, but to shape its decisions. And as Charlie said, up until now, you can see, say for example, in a period where our relations with China, when I say our United States relations with China were still very good. When Obama was in power, there was a lot of conciliatory kind of moves in around 2009 when we had the GFC. And then from that point on, you can see the steady expansion of kind of aggressive behavior by China. And up until now, there hasn't really been a steady response to that. So I think this is about sending a signal to China that we're improving our capabilities. It sends a big signal about resolve that we are capable, but why are we doing this? I mean, it's such a dramatic announcement. You've got to, if you were China, you'd be, there's a good reason why they're making so many noises about it. So if it wasn't actually an important thing and I think a quantum leap in our defense capabilities and specifically our abilities towards long range strike, which we really don't have yet, we really have to develop that ability to deter with long range strike weapons. So this is just one step. SSNs are an important step for all the reasons that you've already spoken about in terms of their range, their stealth. You don't know where they operate. They can actually take out fleets. So they are a powerful tool. And I think this is Orcus Pillar one, but we've got Orcus Pillar two. And that's where I think we'll even see more in terms of this development of a long range strike capability. And that will be what will deter China. The surest pathway to war is if China actually thinks it's easy to do. So we're trying to make it not easy. Just before I open it up to the audience, I did wanna go a little bit deeper into Pillar two and Justin, maybe you can describe what that term is and what's involved. Yeah, certainly. So when Orcus was first announced, nuclear powered submarines was the first order of business. And then for reasons unclear to me, every other advanced defense capability under development was added. So I will miss some certainly, but hypersonics, counter hypersonics, unmanned underwater, quantum, cyber space, I think was added at one point. So that is to say, as part of this trilateral security pact, all of those other capabilities are on the agenda. Those of us who pay close attention were listening for any sign of that last week, and we did not hear it. I would suspect that we will not see a president and two prime ministers reunite on stage to announce any of the particular developments that happen. I think that there's a school of thought that says the combination of all of those other advanced technologies is as important, if not more important than nuclear powered submarines. I like to think that there's a lot of overlap. So I think that it's a matter that nuclear powered submarines and all of those technologies are going to be speaking to each other in all sorts of interesting ways in these coming decades. So I know that there's a piece of regulation in front of the House either last night or tonight to welcome the Secretary of State to Congress to report regularly on the implementation of AUKUS. And so that may be the forum in which we hear developments of that kind. And that reminds me, Charlie, I don't think we got to the question I asked earlier about congressional support for AUKUS. And in particular, the initial part of the submarine agreement for the transfer of Virginia-class boats will require congressional approval, right? Are there major sort of stumbling blocks towards that? Or does that look like smooth sailing to you? Yeah, no, look, this is, we did address it, but I'll underscore it a little bit more because if you're a submarine nerd, and I guess all of us are now, you're looking eagerly to be fact sheets that was released after this dramatic announcement. And one of the things that kind of jumped off the page of me was the sale of three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia, right? To help cover that looming capability gap that Australia has, right? Which was, by the way, foreshadowed when we had an Osmond, the ministerial meeting of between Penny Wong and Richard Marles and their American counterparts in December, one of the journos who was there asked, well, how is Australia gonna cover its capability gap? It's in front of us. The Collins class will not last. And Lloyd Austin, his US Secretary of Defense said, we will cover that gap. So that's the dramatic announcement that we saw. But the most important words in that, as you've rightly noted, were comma, pending congressional approval. And what I had said earlier was, we have requirements in the United States, right? About if we have set objectives, which we lay out explicitly in our national security strategy, and then in our explicit and public national defense strategy, here are the resources you actually need if you're going to achieve those objectives. And it goes all the way down into the weeds about this many attack-class submarines, this many ballistic, ballistic submarines. Zoomers. Zoomers, thank you, SSBNs. But the requirement currently that the United States operates under is that it will produce three submarines per year. Two attack-class, Virginia-class submarines, and one boomer. Due to a number of factors, but COVID looms largest here, we are not achieving either of those objectives. I think, depending on who you ask, we roll out. We only have two shipyards that produce submarines. One's up in Connecticut. The other is down in Virginia. We produce either 1.4 or 1.7 submarines per year. And so the pending congressional approval is, I think there is support, as we have seen from multiple letters and multiple members, and it's bipartisan, by the way, assuming that we hit not only that two submarines, two attack-class submarines per year, but go over that. And I think really what, one of the things that I take away from the surprise announcement last week, is it's the decision to invest by all of us in ourselves and in each other with the idea that this gets us to net positive way beyond what we're producing currently. Yes, Australia way down the road, Britain a little bit more quickly and America much more quickly. So that is the stumbling block about how quickly we can scale up before we begin delivering these to ourselves and to Australia. That's okay. Great. Let's, let me open it up. If you could raise your hand. Yes. Please, Trevor, please wait for the microphone. Trevor Rowe. My concern is that this announcement is dramatic, pardon me, and if I look forward a few years, I see elections here in Australia. I see elections in the United States and I see considerable uncertainty as to those outcomes. What impact could this have? Secondly, in Australia, I don't think the public's got any idea that we have a labor government here that's an interventionist government, big programs on welfare and the like, plus the existing military commitments alongside AUKUS now, but it's nine billion annually. It's gotta be found over three decades. Looks a challenge now. Obviously we don't know what the components are and how this will be done, private sector, partnership, whatever. But the point being, I don't think that's been sufficiently articulate in average Aussie doesn't like tax increases anyway. Same with the average American, by the way. No, more so. And we've got already a retrograde tax system, so we need tax reform as well. So this creates a lot of items on our agenda is both in the US and Australia. And so I've been to new reviews of what happens in the US and the longer term, what happens in Australia in the longer term, because I don't think this will look like what it looks like now in the longer term. Well, who would like to take that on? I could tackle, I'm not going to tackle that. I'll leave you and Justin to the American side of the equation. Look, I do think there's a lot of risks in this pathway. So they've done it in a way that at least we're purchasing off-the-shelf submarines. And as we know, we don't seem to be very good at one, deciding what we want when it comes to submarines, changing our minds, but also just delivering defense projects on time and on budget. So I think we're all in agreement that there's big risks here. Now, we might try and reassure ourselves that this is such a big deal that all three countries will be really wanting this to work because it's actually going to send a terribly, a terrible message to the region and to China I know governments don't like to mention the C word, but we've made this big announcement. We're talking about an exponential leap in our capabilities. If we can't actually do it, that actually signals that we're pretty weak. So I think all of our three countries will be putting as much resources into making this work as much as possible. Now, I do also think I agree with you when you think about the pipeline of the 368 billion initially when I heard that number I thought, what a strange way of announcing this to give you a forward number going into 2050 with so many moving parts that it's actually just an estimate. Nobody really knows how much it's going to cost. So I think in a lot of ways they probably made it sound worse than it might be. We don't know whether there'll be economies of scale that might make it actually less expensive than that but put that aside. I think that it's eminently possible that we don't necessarily, and you guys might disagree with me, we might end up with the three to five Virginia class boats and we might decide that we don't do the next stage. And that's a decision for future governments given their cost-benefit analysis of what money we really have at that point. If I can jump in too. Please. I'd say we actually have some data to begin answering your question, right? That we've had a change in government here and the new government is just as supportive as your prior government. We haven't had a change of government in the UK but you've had the change of leaders and then the change of leaders and then the change of leaders but they're all still supportive of it. The question mark here is obviously the United States because we haven't had a change in leadership or a change in government yet but we have looming elections in front of us. Look, I do not do horse race betting on the US and I'm not gonna tell you who's gonna win in 2024. What I can say about this is that, look, I'm the inaugural Australia chair at my institution but also anywhere in Washington. And I can tell you because I talk about Australia a lot obviously with the wrong accent that there is a wellspring of support right now for Australia at the likes I don't think I've ever seen before and it is bipartisan. That's important when we talk about this pending congressional approval. I'll also say at a larger level that Democrats on the left and Republicans on the right and particularly as you move further out to the extremes both want America to have more powerful and more capable very trusted allies oftentimes for very different reasons. And that is not necessarily going to give us the answer for whether or not AUKUS will be supported forever depending on who the president happens to be. We haven't seen any statements by any of the potential candidates about AUKUS but it does tell us that there's a lot of support for this. The final point I would say on the Australian side of the equation is when I've been listening to all the statements that have been made by political leadership here the one that struck me as quite resonant was the deputy prime minister who I think over the weekend had said look costs are large but we're also a very rational people. And when you're doing your assessments the one thing I think everyone agrees on is that our security has deteriorated suggesting that we need to pay into the system more to make sure that there's more stability in the region. And I would simply say in the US too there is a recognition especially with the war in Ukraine that we do not have enough of what we need to deter our adversaries. We have given an enormous amount to the Ukrainians who are using it valiantly and we don't have enough left. And so just the defense budget that was proposed by the president two days before AUKUS came out suggests an enormous amount of investment into our industrial capabilities to make sure that we have more armaments than we have right now. Can you look at the total gap left? Again, I can't predict idiosyncrasies. Andrea, just in the... Chris, one quick comment and then a question. I think that Australia shows its immaturity by continually harping on some big number for 30 years hence spending. In the US they take a much more mature view and look at things incrementally. They have a long-term estimate by all means but they don't assume it's all or nothing. They evaluate it every year, Congress reviews it and they change their mind as they go along. And I would say that yes, there's been a poor track record in Australia of achieving defense programs but often that's because the strategic environment has changed and the government has responded accordingly. My question though is rather than dwell on a big $268 billion, surely a much more important statistic is the 0.15% of GDP which represents over the 30 years and that actually compared with increasing our defense spending that's actually quite reasonable, wouldn't you agree? I would say the thought that comes to mind are two particular quotes. One is as was said of Australia many decades ago, Australia is a great country but there's too many journalists and not enough news. And I'm comfortable in saying that as a long-time journalist myself. So it's almost inevitable that a number like that is gonna be overly focused on. But the other quote that comes to mind is price is what you pay, value is what you get. It's a Warren Buffett quote. And so I come back to this notion of trying to understand better this indeed, it is a huge number but a huge strategic bonus as well. I acknowledge my shipmates from HMAS Adelaide who are here today. I was on an academic sea ride with them back in November. It's a program the Navy runs to make sure that academics and others can really see what happens with life in the Navy. And I think it gave me a particular appreciation for some of the awesome capabilities that we have and some of the fantastic people and platforms that we deploy all the time. And I think around this really large number there's an old narrative that Australia is somehow incapable or we're not up to it. Or it's gonna be dud subs all over again for those of you that are old enough to remember that phrase. And I think that it's time to grow up. It's time to say that it is a big number and it is a big capability and we can do it. It's a moment to really pull the sword out of the stone and I think there's a great resolve to see it succeed. So I think we should be confident. Lavina. Well, look, I think events like this are important in, I think the government so far hasn't necessarily made the case for why they're doing what they're doing. Why do we need to spend 0.15? I think we were speaking earlier about a lot of the announcements about how many jobs are being created or of industrial basis. That's all important. Don't get me wrong. It's not a bad thing for Australia to get another 20,000 jobs in South Australia and elsewhere. That's not a bad thing. But I think they need to make a stronger case for what they understand to be a deterioration in our strategic environment. I think, you know, whilst you don't want to be alarmist as to the risks of war in our region, the risks of war are real and we are in a period where we have a chance to deter that from happening. We, as we've mentioned earlier, we've looked at the steady expansion of Chinese military capabilities that are actually more extraordinary than, I think they've almost become normalized. We don't really even blink an eye when we hear about it anymore. But we've got to ask ourselves, what are they going to be using all of those capabilities for? And we have to listen to, I think, President Xi, when he talks about what he wants to use those military capabilities for. And I think maybe about three weeks ago, you had the head of the CIA report that the intelligence agencies, or his intelligence agency had gathered intelligence that Xi had said that his military should be ready to use its forces in Taiwan by 2027. So we should take these things seriously. And I think the government, even though they don't like to use the C word, there has to be a strong justification for spending this kind of money. And I think they need to make that justification a bit clearer. So let me play the devil's advocate briefly for all three of you. We can say the C word. And there is... China, just the devil's advocate. It's just China. And it's, again, as I said earlier, there's no question about the scale of the military buildup. It seems to be Mr. Keating only who is not concerned about that. And yet we're a long way away. One stat I often throw out in the public debate is that Beijing's closer to London than it is to Sydney. So why this for Australia? What is the argument for this as opposed to some other capability? Why would Australia take on the task of essentially defending our nation from the South China Sea rather than do it closer to our shores? Well, I think one of the ways that Navy would put it is that you can use submarines to defend your ports. You can use submarines to defend choke points a little bit further away. Or you can use submarines in operations where your adversary is. So if we're talking about China and we're talking about the potential of an amphibious attack across the Taiwan Strait, literally the most complicated, most risky military operation that you can commit to, one that China has never done, right? Then there is one type of capability that is really important there and that's undersea, that's submarines. So during my time at CSIS, I was adjacent to the excellent war game that was published by that organization and they made clear that attack submarines were one of two capabilities that were decisive in the United States being able to defend Taiwan. So it's plain as day what they're capable of. That is not to say that Australia has made any pre-commitments, but it is equally to say that Australia is strengthening itself so that it has options. The corollary would be to say to weaken ourselves, to forestall options would be quite cowardly in the circumstances. Not a pre-commitment, Justin, but it does imply that the security of Taiwan is a vital security interest for Australia. And many people believe so. Many people believe that a democracy of 25 million people in our region is something to defend and believe that the loss of credibility to America should it not defend or seek to defend or successfully defend that would affect us. Can I dive in? So first of all, I disagree with your point, Sam, that acquiring this capability is an implied commitment to Taiwan. The US-Australian alliance is a partnership. Partners work out what would be used. I take the deputy prime minister and your prime minister at the word when they say when there's an Australian flag hoisted over those, they have full control of where they are going. But let me step back for a second to make a broader point, I think, on this, because I think you've hit on a really key debate here about what is the correct posture orientation and therefore strategy for Australia. Is it just defensive Australia or is it something that looks a little bit more forward into the region? I would just say that there's an assumption that if you mind your own business and just have the ability to defend yourself, it shouldn't really matter what else happens. And that all this talk that we've been having about a deteriorating security environment, it looks really bad, but it probably won't affect Australia in any way, shape, or form. And I don't think that's true. In fact, I think we again have evidence for this that we've seen this. And again, look, I am a historian by training. I'm sorry if I evoke the 20th century, but we've run this play more than once before, where if you just seek to batten down the hatches, make yourself a little bit more prickly or spiky or a kind of like, right? We have lots of analogies here. You hope that you can weather the storm. That is not conducive, I don't think, to the environment or to the flourishing of a country's interest. Now again, I say I think because I am not Australian. I will say there's a different version of this debate that happens in America. And I will say that over and over again, we have run this tape before, not once but twice in the 20th century. And then inward looking, slightly hold your adversaries off a little bit, does not deter adversaries. And in fact, I would say from historical evidence, invites further aggression. I'll be there. Yeah, this idea that defensive Australia is where we should be. I find it hard to reconcile in the sense that we're a trading nation, 99% of our trade comes by sea. So I just, I thought of, maybe it's the hypothetical that we should think to ourselves. If we batten down the hatches, if for example, the United States chose to batten down the hatches as well, we would know that China would dominate this region. There is really no other possibility if the United States is not here, if the United States is not willing to play that role, that balancing role. We can play some part of that role but we really need the United States to be here. And we need to play our part as well. So I think the idea that we can simply just defend our territory, defend our near shores, that's not just where our interests lie. And I just invite you to think about if we did have a Chinese dominated region. Can we really assume that things just go on as normal, that we will just go on selling our iron ore to China? China will pay market price and not a price that they choose to pay or that we will be able to enact laws in our country about foreign interference without suffering some kind of coercive pressure from the outside. I think we have to think about these things that it's not just about defending our territory, our interests are much bigger than that and that we have to play our part in that. Otherwise we have to consider what life might be like. All right, we have time for a couple more. Brian at the front here, Andrea. Colin Clark, Indo-Pacific Bureau Chief for Breaking Defense. It looks like AUKUS is going to be even bigger than the Snowy scheme. Immigration has been a huge issue the last 10 years. You don't have the bodies for your own economy now and you need nuclear experts, you need highly trained welders, they're already 70,000 short of those. How is Australia going to do this? That's an excellent question. Justin might be outside my remit, I'm afraid. I mean, I don't have the answer to that. You've identified a really big challenge. And indeed, if you are to ask tough questions of AUKUS, it does come beyond this question of top line cost into opportunity cost. And so those people can be found and they can be trained and they can be welcomed into the country but they won't be doing all sorts of other productive useful things. And so it's undoubtedly a big challenge. It's one of the things we hope to hear more from the government about. I think when we're talking about AUKUS, it's a long-term plan. We've got 20, 30 years. You might be optimistic and you might think, okay, because there is a forward plan, then we can also, you know, the people who are going to man AUKUS SSN are probably in kindergarten. So there's a long period of time where we could potentially incentivize people to build those skills, go to the right universities to learn about physics and nuclear physics. I had a friend at university who was a physicist who did a PhD in physics and then finished his degree and had no job prospects. So I mean, this could be a really big deal for a lot of scientific communities in Australia. I know that's not necessarily answering your question but I think think about the fact that it is a long-term plan. So we do have the ability to plan ahead. I'll just say that I just came up from a couple of days in Canberra and the full attention and focus seems to be on the enormous endeavor that this is and whether or not it is yet translated into action plans and therefore budgets across a variety of agencies that haven't yet touched this. Obviously, defense has had a large part in this but because this is such a large uplift, immigration plays a role, as you were saying. Education, the Department of Education, the Department of Health, all of these departments and agencies will touch this in various forms, not to mention the state governments too if we're talking about the enormous bills that are going to start occurring today, they're about out in WA, no less down in South Australia too. So government seems to be focused on this but then pushing forward to make sure that it translates out into this and has the budgets and uplift is I think the work ahead. I'm sorry, we'll just keep it to one question. We have time for one more and I've noticed all the hands have been mailed up to this point, always a problem. Thank you very much for our final question. If you wait for the microphone. Just a simple question, the C word. What regarding the timing of Xi Jinping's visit to Russia? And his talk with Putin, what is the real motivation behind that? And what is the message that he's trying to project to the world about it? Well, we're a little bit off-orcus but if anyone wants to intervene on that one. No, okay. Look, this is the manifestation. My read of this is this is the manifestation of that no limits partnership that we heard about right before the Olympics and right before Russia invaded Ukraine. And as Russia has fared so much more poorly in this war than everyone thought they would, they have an ally, they have a friend and they have a backer. That's I think the message of that. In addition to Xi Jinping making a play that only he can help a peace plan, which by the way, it looks exactly like the peace plan that Putin himself would draft. That's what I take from the meeting that we just saw. In fact, we do have time for another one. Yes, please. Thank you. Lloyd Bromfield. Notwithstanding all the discussion about, you know, the finance, the politics, the workforce, et cetera, being a technologist, I want to go back to the basis of orcus and one of the principal benefits of a nuclear-powered submarine is stealth. Okay, we're talking now. This is technology now. In the decades to come, there's going to be development in sensing under the water. And I've seen at least one study that says the ocean is going to be transparent. So what's the utility of our nuclear-powered submarines then? Yeah, it's a phrase that has been around for a while and the oceans remain not transparent. You know, so that is to say, the oceans are a particular undersea environment, is a particular environment, unlike anything else that we understand. So you can have a radar going through air and it kind of can see things and show you. Undersea is completely different. There's levels of water, there's density, there's salinity, there's noise bouncing off things. It's incredibly complicated. I have heard some fanciful kind of things in the media in the last few days about how transparent the oceans are suddenly going to become. It's something that serious people look at and think about. Over decades, there's a contest between offensive and defensive and that will continue. So the submarines, as they are now, are not as they will be in the decades to come. But at the moment, and historically, for submarines, you know, stealth has been a key advantage and finding submarines, detecting them incredibly hard. And so we can expect that in the near future. But as I say, over the middle longer term, it will be a contest. So ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much. We've run out of time for today. We appreciate you coming as always and supporting the Lowy Institute's work. Plenty more events coming up. So please keep an eye on your email and on our website for the moment. Thank you very much for your attendance today and your interests. And we wish you a very good afternoon. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.