 Good afternoon. Welcome to CSIS. I'm Sharon Squasone and I direct the proliferation and prevention program and it's my Pleasure to co-host this panel today with CSIS's Korea chair Victor Cha who also happens to be a panelist today and the National Committee on North Korea I'd like to introduce First Karin Lee who's the executive director of the National Committee on North Korea She'd like to say a few words about her program, and then I'll introduce the other speakers Karin Hello, everybody. I just wanted to have an opportunity to Thanks CSIS Sharon and Victor for co-hosting this event because That's why all you wonderful people are in this room. We're very very grateful to Patrick Morgan for Coming all the way from California to join us today. I had a particular interest in doing this program because I feel that in in Washington we get very swayed by the events of the moment for example what just happened on the president's President Carter's visit, but I actually think that what we're talking about today is is a fundamental issue in North Korea's Nuclear weapons program, and I'm really glad to have such renowned experts to talk about what to me is One of the nitty-gritty topics that eventually I hope will be discussed between the DPRK and other nations Just a short word on the National Committee on North Korea. We are an Organization that tries to improve the quality of information that is available about the DPRK often By working with people with considerable hands-on Experience inside the DPRK or working with North Koreans with that. I'll turn it back over to Sharon with my thanks Thank you. We are delighted today to have Patrick Morgan who will speak first For about 20 minutes, and then we'll have our other three panelists Respond to some of his remarks. Dr. Morgan is the tyranny chair of the peace and conflict program at The University of California at Irvine He's the author of many things including international security problems and solutions and also he contributed to this publication Which came out last October US strategy towards North Korea where we Helped co-author or at least feed some information to Joel Witt Bobby. Were you also part of that process? I think Yeah Following Pat we will have Victor Cha who is our Korea chair at CSIS He is also the director of Asian studies at Georgetown University in the Bush administration He was director for Asian affairs at the White House as well as the US Deputy head of the delegation to the six-party talks, and I'm sure you're all familiar with Victor's work Following Victor. We will have Bob Carlin Who is the co-chair of the National Committee on North Korea and is now a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and cooperation at Stanford? He I know Bob from State Department days, but he was also a senior policy advisor at Keto and an intelligence and research bureau at state also known as INR and Last but not least we will have Jofi Joseph Who is currently the senior advisor to the Under Secretary for arms control and international security at the State Department Ellen Tauscher? and Jofi has a Published widely and I guess we first came in contact with each other on the Hill Most recently he was the senior foreign policy advisor for senator Bob Casey But he also worked as a professional staff member on the foreign relations committee so we're delighted to have all of you and delighted to have this audience and I will Hand over to the floor to dr. Morgan one administrative note Please turn off your blackberries and cell phones and this session is on the record. Thank you as you wish Thanks very much I Should begin by saying I'm gonna talk as a deterrent specialist would never claim to be a North Korea specialist I spent a lot of time looking at Korean problems issues and I know lots of people who are Korean specialists Because I'm associated with something called the Council on US Korean security studies, which is headquartered here in Washington But I'm no expert say on North Korea, so But I would Also add that I Contributed as she mentioned to a study that Joel Witt put together Publication mostly by answering his questions. He would send me a question and I would answer So some of that showing up in print, you know And so what I'm gonna talk about doesn't exactly fit with that and so the panelists get to have to wrestle with some other things I'll say but For a crowd like this, I think I don't need to spend any time on how the United States got involved in extended deterrence Vis-a-vis North Korea or more generally just to mention very quickly that it's was a new thing for the United States After World War two and it's really initiated essentially by NATO Not long after that by the Korean War, so And the United States gets into extended deterrence by then building around a huge collection of allies and I should emphasize associates people are not formally allies governments that Considered worth protecting But also because in case of extended nuclear deterrence The Korean War was the key event in stimulating an enormous American emphasis in relying on nuclear weapons To a considerable extent to deter the Soviet bloc That included the Soviet bloc in the Far East as well as in Europe and that led very directly to having nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and stationed in Iraq and The use of nuclear threats so the United States introduced because of the Korean War an emphasis on nuclear weapons I Mentioned when I mentioned two other things which are important for what I'll talk about later on the first is that the United States build a whole network of alliances And they're often thought of in rather traditional terms and lots of their literature on alliances reflects very standard alliance theory and I've never liked that and Older I get the more uncomfortable I am with that and so I want to talk about how the United States really interested in alliances as Communities very different from the classic sort of very pragmatic practical kind of you have an alliance because You've got some common interest for a while That's not the way the United States wanted to build alliances and it was reflected in the fact that the North Atlantic Alliance was referred to relatively quickly as a community. So I'll talk about what that means The other thing is that the United States has also never been used interested in using alliances on the whole to do sort of classic Balancing in international politics The United States has thought in terms of constructing either globally or in various regions dominant even hegemonic coalitions That's how it likes to do international politics security management And that's how it's done it and extended deterrence is very much a part of it So that's the context within which I tend to put in my thinking about extended deterrence Now let me just turn quickly then to some of the things that I talked about in this It's cited in this thing. What are the functions of American extended deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia? I would list the following very quickly First of course protection for allies you want to deter attacks on allies. That's straightforward Secondly reassure them As you use extended deterrence the elements associated with extended deterrence like having nuclear weapons and Korea for a long time To reassure the allies about that and about their security situation thirdly That in turn becomes part of The structure of the region for security management, which the United States establishes That's what extended deterrence is ultimately about it's Sustaining helping sustain all of that Fourth constrain the allies the United States is used extended deterrence to try to limit the proliferation efforts of its allies to try to limit of the Conventional weapons uses by its allies in other words, it's trying to avoid the classic problem of being Trapped by your allies in some kind of conflict that you don't want to have You want to get involved into some kind of war so That's a standard function Next of course extended deterrence Lays the groundwork in many ways for American power projection power projection into Northeast Asia into East Asia and so And that's been central of course to a whole post World War two American national security approach next And something which is important to stress Extended deterrence the United States argues and I think correctly for the most part has By helping to create this security management arrangement For the different regions say in Europe or in Northeast Asia or in East Asia has also Allowed adjustments of substantial nature in the relative capacities of the states and societies To occur without sharply destabilizing consequence So that's usually referred to as as long as the United States has set up a management of East Asian security The way it has Japan can go from being a very Desperate country in terms still recovering from World War two into being the world's second largest economic system without Fundamentally disrupting everybody's sense of security in the air same thing that turns out to be true with China China has been benefiting from this United States makes this argument China has substantially altered its capabilities Is everybody really nervous not really in a classic international politics sense because? you have this Management system the sub management arrangement, which is underpinned by extended deterrence so Next Not only do want to reassure friends allies and so on you also want to Limit hedging against uncertainty hold down on certainties about security So you don't get hedging behavior because hedging behavior can lead to sudden improvements in military capabilities can lead to Poking around into maybe we ought to have nuclear weapons after all Etc and that can be very destabilizing so If you can curb hedging you can help allies to hold down their defense budget You can help them to hold down the political conflicts associated with that You can lay a better basis for your alliances building community So I would say those are the kinds of things that extended deterrence used to do it's not usually described that way And I would in turn place that as I say within this context that I mentioned earlier. That's How does the United States see alliances number one and number two? How does it do security management globally and regionally now let's talk about North Korea and again, I don't spend a lot of time on this part because It should be fairly straightforward North Korea Has a terrible deterrence problem It is a state with some very serious problems that leave it Potentially very vulnerable and it has worked very hard to try to find some way to have enough deterrence to not have those problems overwhelming and It's very much a product of the Korean War and the aftermath and then very much a product of North Korea's Finding after a while that it was attached to an economic system that did not produce as well Finding it was losing legitimacy in terms of comparisons with the South Finding it was not being able to keep up with the Joneses in terms of military capabilities Finding that its allies were no longer reliable, etc. It's had a sort of a catastrophic Alteration in its security situation when the United States has wanted to do is to apply coercion Against the North for a whole set of reasons one of them of course is Because it wants to deter any kind of North Korean direct attack But given what I've just said about the North that's increasingly rather improbable That you would have any kind of major effort by the North Koreans to attack So that's not something that you have to list is a great success for deterrence in recent years maybe earlier It was very helpful to have American deterrence operating on the peninsula including even extended nuclear deterrence I'd say now it's a success, but you know so so We've wanted to limit North Korea's Deterrence capability We do not like the idea that North Korea would have a capability to deter the United States from doing certain kinds of things against the North And we also don't want that kind of capability to be available for some kind of blackmail activity by the North We failed We want to sustain Through our efforts to contain North Korea our credibility for dealing with other countries of a similar sort We don't have much of a gain to show there either We've tried to halt and reverse the North Korea nuclear weapons program failure We have tried to prevent further proliferation in the region Taiwan South Korea Japan success And notice I run down a long list of things we've been trying to do and we haven't had much success to list What's left? sustain Regional security management in this case regional security management security management in Northeast Asia Everybody's very uncomfortable with that Solving the North Korean problem is considered in many ways the key to getting a decent sustaining North security management arrangement The one we've got has not been able to deal with that problem that leaves the Chinese uncomfortable with it leaves the Japanese somewhat uncomfortable It certainly leaves left the last Korean administration uncomfortable with it and so We've also tried to halt other kinds of unacceptable North Korean behavior selling missiles Selling certain kinds of technology related to nuclear weapons, et cetera failure The last one we might want to use extended deterrence for is something gets talked about a lot, which is what happens if what happens if North Korea collapses What do you do if the Chinese want to intervene? Can we deter that? That's totally unclear and it's not at all clear you could do it. It's not at all clear that Extended deterrence would help there especially if the intervention was relatively limited So that doesn't list for many successes How come? Why an extended deterrence worked well first? That's a long list of things to be trying to do That's really overload on extended deterrence Secondly, of course, we're out of sync with China on a solution and that's relevant to the point I want to make in just about two minutes. I'll come back to that that has not helped thirdly It's hard to have mount a credible threat that could lead to war when you're involved in two other wars So that's a problem fourth If you wanted to put together a coalition to apply a substantial amount of force against North Korea, who'd you go to? And South Korea's really don't want that kind of thing Japanese don't want to see that kind of thing Russians don't That's not a good Next I see virtually no credibility in a nuclear threat. I Don't think North Korea does really I don't think we have much credibility with regard to that aspect of deterrence extended nuclear deterrence I think in general this is because first of all if you're the But the leader in promoting nuclear non proliferation you do not want to have a use of nuclear weapons anyway including us And so the question is well, what if somebody else like North Korea used one? And I think the answer would be if we can possibly make that the last use we should rather than Imitate it, so I think it would be very difficult for policy makers to decide. Oh well We're gonna use nuclear weapons and much of the world I think expects that and if you then look at Obama and the nuclear posture review You find emphasis on all we have what we won't absolutely just our art. We won't absolutely say we won't use nuclear weapons, but we clearly want to continue to reduce the salience and Potential use of nuclear weapons. We want to continue shrinking And you're sort of saying things. Well, maybe under extraordinary circumstances. We like that kind of thing and finally That's the problem it's actually a burden in some ways if you have such an advantage in conventional forces terms It's very hard to legitimize using something else and that's unavoidable in our case I'll ask the thing I mentioned China before I want to say very quickly If you're a deterrence analyst and you're looking at the problem of how to deal with North Korea And you want to apply pressure on North Korea and you look at that situation carefully you look at the history you say You know the real problem is the real target of the deterrence has to be China And we're not targeting China and for a number of fairly obvious reasons not least of which is if You are responsible or trying to manage security in East Asia and especially in Northeast Asia That would hardly be a way to make the security situation look more pleasant more relaxed better handled All kinds of difficulties in doing that But in fact doing it the way we're doing it now is putting more and more pressure on North Korea Like you're trying to put a lot of pressure on a Taliban in Afghanistan and they've got a Fallback place. They've got an alternative supplier. They've got that's what North Korea is The Chinese supply aid they supply investments They facilitate the North sales of various kinds of products with the US doesn't want it sold etc so in effect We have tried hard to budge North Korea and we've had no success China has tried hard to budge North Korea with an alternative approach And I would say they can't show much success. The problem is if we don't get a success because of their efforts We get Some severe costs in terms of our values in terms of what we want if they don't get a success in Terms of our efforts. We're not doing what they say what has to be done They're not paying a huge price We're the ones paying the price Um So then what does this tell us about the use of extended deterrence? I would say first of all Extended nuclear deterrence is essentially irrelevant. No, it doesn't mean I want to say cancel it immediately get out of the business Etc. I extended nuclear deterrence as I'll explain in a minute can't quite I think do that but It's of no real use in terms of trying to curb North Korea's activities and the ways that we would like to see So it's not useful in sort of realistic terms Where it's still important is in symbolic terms and so I don't know how we get around that Comfortably unless we do it slowly and carefully and so what I recommend really is that we think about Detaching Extended nuclear deterrence from the North Korean problem Gradually and working with allies and so on on that in the context first of all of trying to find Adjustments in the regional security management arrangements That compensate for that in symbolic terms don't have the allies feeling ah This is the first step toward already seen that kind of thing in reactions and some of writings in Korea and in Japan about the nuclear posture review In addition we'd have to Wait see if we can get any adjustments in the positions of the Russians and Chinese if we're going to use deterrence Because we don't get any adjustments It's gonna have to be on a conventional level in terms of what we would be planning on using as military force And we would also have to be thinking about Essentially this we want to say it this way In order to get change in North Korea's behavior We need the Chinese help and the way to get the Chinese help is to threaten to do things Which will damage Chinese interests in Northeast Asia very substation that that's the only way to do it in deterrence terms and I Never like to analyze something like that by saying oh well Let's figure in the classic way saying well, let's figure out What are the costs and benefits the other side will perceive and what are I? Want to put the deterrence in the context that I described earlier. What's the kind of regional security arrangement? How would that how does extended deterrence? Nuclear anonymity fit into that and how would that all be affected by doing something like this? Because you can imagine what you could do. I mean supposing you said Fine, you're gonna continue supporting North Korea. We're going to cut every other kind of support We can no food no money No, Goyle or gasoline nothing you bear the expense of your policies. Oh That would be a scary thing to tell the Chinese that's that's not good in many ways Would that be good for Northeast Asian security? I kind of doubt it supposing you said the stuff You think it's all right for North Korea to have nuclear weapons. You won't do anything to prevent it You're gonna tell them not to have them, but you won't Why should we then? Not turn the soul and say look you got to be on the peninsula with a nuclear North Korea You're if you want to have nuclear weapons be fine with us turn to Japan and say well With the Chinese like that I kind of doubt it that would be a scary kind of thing say Would that be good for regional security and our general interest? No, it wouldn't see what I mean It's that's the way you have to work your way through this is if you don't have a way to reach China in terms of some of China's important interests Then you have to think very seriously about using some other approach I don't think you can just when we go at North Korea in the current situation and get anywhere so I endorse Working our way out of an extended nuclear deterrence and applying in any way in Northeast Asia and using whatever we can in that regard to help influence North Korea's decision-making and Rethinking how we would use deterrence, but because we want to use deterrence compelence in a broader context and we have to constantly keep that in mind Thank you. We have a lot to talk about Victor do you want to talk from there? Well, thank you. Thank you Sharon And it's a pleasure to be co-hosting this event with the National Committee and Non-proliferation program here at CSIS. I kind of feel like since I'm co-hosting I shouldn't speak very long because You're the host of a dinner party. You don't want to take the whole time giving the toast So I'll keep my comments pretty limited because I'd love to hear from both Bob and Jofi their comments And I'll make let's see three sets the first is on the whole question of reassurance and extended deterrence that Pat talked about The second is with regard to this question of Whether deterrence has failed with regard to North Korea And then the third is with regard to this question of what is the utility of? extended nuclear deterrence anymore in East Asia and in the region first on reassurance And extended deterrence clearly, you know reassurance is a big part of extended deterrence And I would I would agree with Pat that the US Vision and concept of the post-war alliances that are created in Europe and in Asia were about evolving to communities Not simply being just military alliances and extended deterrence is a critical part of those communities even if these alliances Evolve into being more than simply military alliances if you don't have that core with regard to extended deterrence It makes it very difficult to to evolve the relationship So how do you do reassurance? I mean what we have seen is that the United States has done reassurance in terms of the credibility of extended deterrence through many policy statements For example after the North Koreans did the first nuclear test in October 2006 and then the second nuclear test in May of 2009 It was I was part of the administration during the first test not part of the second after the first test The immediate plan of action was clear Which was to go out to the region to the allies to Japan and South Korea Also to go to China and Russia But the first two stops were Japan and South Korea and the first thing that our principal would do at this time It was Secretary Rice the first thing that she would do Is make very clear statements publicly about the continued credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence After the second nuclear test in May of 2009 I was not in the government then but I joked Well wasn't really a joke I mentioned to my wife that I know exactly what the administration is going to do they're going to send You know a high-level official in this case It was Deputy Secretary Steinberg out to the region to make very strong policy statements about the continued Credibility of extended deterrence in spite of these nuclear tests So that's a very important part of assurance is are these high-level policy statements Another important part of reassurance that we've seen developing more recently has been the focus on creating these very quiet But high-level dialogues Conversations between the United States and allies Japan and South Korea about extended deterrence about trying how about how to enhance extended deterrence We did some of these during the Bush administration, and I would imagine they're also doing these in the current administration And I always saw those Exercises as I mean it that the process of having that dialogue was as important as any Tangible policy action that came out of the dialogue. It was you know a big part of credibility is is constant statements of reassurance conveying intentions and That that process was important. So I think we've seen in both cases the creation of these dialogues with regard to extended insurance both at the track 1 and track 2 level And I think these have been somewhat successful because we have also seen other developments including the potential you know the zero option and statements that were even made before the Obama agenda on nuclear weapons In which the United States has made some pretty forward-leaning statements about no first use with regard to North Korea, and they have not had a major impact on credibility of perceived credibility of deterrence either in Japan or South Korea in September of 2005 The six-party joint statement as many of you know had a clause in it which stated that the United States The United States will not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons At the time it was considered a very important statement When the Russian delegation saw that we accepted this language for the state in statement They were shocked because they said that you know they had tried to get this from the United States throughout the Cold War But could never get it But again my point here is that Having these policy statements and these conversations these dialogues appears to have helped to at least maintain a semblance of Credibility with regard to US extended deterrence in spite of some of these no first use statements But I would add the caveat is You can do all these things, but allies will never feel comfortable. They will never feel comfortable with Statements of extended nuclear deterrence and one of the main reasons that's the case is because of something that in cognition, I mean not to get to Academic but in cognition theory is known as attribution error Right which is essentially this notion that when you are trying to reassure an ally The ally constantly fears it's going to be abandoned by you So anytime you take an action of reassurance So rice goes to Japan and South Korea after the nuclear test to say we are firmly committed to the defense Country extended nuclear deterrence the way allies perceive that is they perceive it as a positive statement But they perceive it as being Situationally motivated in other words, it's a positive statement. It registers as a positive statement But it's only because of the situation they were forced to do this the North Korea's just blew off a nuclear test I mean they were forced to do this On the other hand anytime the United States makes statements that might sound like it's less reassuring That might be inching away from the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence For allies that immediately registers as a Dispositional attribute in other words the United States, you know says they will not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons That's not situational that truly reflects American disposition So and this is a constant battle in the research reassurance game You are constantly seeing allies never feeling fully comfortable because what they deem to be positive statements are motivated by the Situation and those that are negative statements are seen as that's their real character. That's what they're really thinking That's their real disposition Okay, that's my first set of points the second is and because I'm a discussant I take no responsibility My points do not have to be coherent. I can just pick things that I won't say The second is with regards to the Pat's points about deterrence failure and North Korea And here, you know, I don't I don't disagree with them. I think There are you know, I think that there are things that the United States has proven to be pretty good at when it comes to Uses of force With regard to North Korea. I mean we've been pretty good at deterring a second Korean war, right? We've been pretty good at deterring an attack on Japan by the North Which some of you may not think is plausible But if you just listen to North Korean rhetoric, it's not something that you can if I was a Japanese security planner I would not take those statements lightly And we're also good at non deterrence things. I think we're Pat may disagree many in this room. I think we're pretty good at negotiating with North Korea I think we're pretty good at rewarding North Korea And I think we're pretty good at sanctioning North Korea Whether it's financial sanctions or the sanctions that have been on since the end of the Korean War I agree entirely Pat. We're not good at two things Unfortunately, we are not good at deterring Missile or nuclear tests, right? We are unable to deter their missile or nuclear tests I guess we could deter their missile tests if we started talking more about Declariatory statements with regard to missile defense But whenever I talked to anybody from who does missile defense, they don't want to go there I had a declaratory statement on missile tests and how you would defend against them and the second thing that we have not been good at deterring is The thing that we just saw a few months ago, which is limited conventional acts of aggression That don't lead to all-out war I Think everything that the United States and allies have been doing since the sinking of the China has been aimed at trying to deter further limited conventional provocations short of war But I don't think anybody sitting here can say they're fully confident That the combination of military exercising and financial sanctions will be enough to deter North Korea from another limited conventional provocation These are just two things that we haven't that we haven't been good at when it comes to deterring North Korea and then finally on the on the last set of points on the utility of Nuclear deterrence on the peninsula I don't know the answer. I mean, I don't know how to respond to Patrick's last point I don't know whether I agree or disagree with it what I will say is that a couple of things the first is Putting aside the question of whether Extended nuclear deterrence is still militarily necessary on the peninsula just putting aside that question I think as he alluded to there are very important symbolic ramifications of either Maintaining nuclear deterrence on the peninsula or not or not extending the nuclear umbrella The first is that with regard to North Korean Bob can speak to this as well If there were ever a point in which the United States would no longer Maintain nuclear deterrence or an extended nuclear umbrella over its allies We have no understanding of how the North Koreans would perceive this They could on the one hand perceive it as being a major act of conciliation on the part of the United States aimed at finally ending the Korean War And moving to something more along the lines of mutual security rather than competitive security On the other hand, they could view it as an admission of defeat By the United States and its allies And therefore give the North Koreans the false or misperceived confidence that they now exercise nuclear superiority on the peninsula Which could lead to all sorts of? misguided and Missintended coercive bargaining on the part of the North The second is the effect on allies if we don't have a nuclear umbrella over Japan or Korea Even if they feel that in terms of a military conflict, they could win Even if they still feel that they could win with conventional weapons It's difficult to imagine that this would not have a major impact on perceptions And I'm not just talking here about military perceptions, but The perceptions with regard to markets, right? We've all seen that whenever the North does something nuclear tests Chonan incident Markets in Asia basically don't move Right because as long the primary variable for markets is the American security commitment If you substantially change that security commitment by saying that we don't have Continue nuclear to hold a nuclear umbrella over our allies that would have I think more of an impact on markets In Asia than any new North Korean provocation and then the third point is I Agree with Pat we have to figure out a way But the I think the thing that concerns me most about North Korea and the percept they perception They have of their nuclear capabilities is that whatever we do we want to ensure that they do not feel More confident in their nuclear capabilities Because the more confident the North feels even if they're wrong the more confident they feel in their nuclear capabilities The less they will rely on their conventional deterrent and the less they rely on their conventional deterrent Anytime you have a potential escalation situation at any time you have a spark or a potential escalation situation What it creates for the North, you know in the deterrence literature it creates use or lose incentives Immediate use or lose incentives if they don't feel if they become increasing in reliance on their nuclear capabilities Regardless of how imperfect they may be And less reliant or they put less resources into their conventional deterrent Then you have a recipe for extreme destabilization and rapid escalation which I think all of us want to avoid on the peninsula Thank you. Thanks Victor and now the view from North Korea Not really Thank you. I am I'm happy to be here and that's all I'm gonna say cuz I only have ten minutes Normally I start with a it's always good to start with a joke but jokes take a long time So I'll just start with the opening line of one a priest a rabbi and the head of office 39 of the Central Committee walk into a bar Those of you who have read the Sanctions know what that's about This this summer I have to admit that I have been very Dispecting and it might be the heat, but it might also be a lot of the Silliness that I've seen in the newspapers about North Korea Some of it emanating From the city some of it other places And in fact, none of it is useful as this discussion has been thus far today So I I admit to you I was really prepared Not to like what dr. Morgan had to say I was convinced that it was going to be wrong and I'm delighted to say that I was wrong that Imagine my surprise When something Laying out the situation that exists today With a nuclear North Korea actually starts in the right place And what is the right place the right place is the admission the acknowledgement that yes, they are nuclear capable Yes, this has altered the landscape in Northeast Asia in ways We don't yet fully understand as Victor said there are a lot of questions out there and Maybe and this is where dr. Morgan made up. I think a Important contribution maybe there's something in this new situation which Given the fact that we're stuck with it isn't all bad And we might actually be able to turn it to our advantage now What does that mean? Well, you start with the notion that at least today extended deterrence Is probably much less relevant than it has ever been Vis-a-vis North Korea in fact, we don't really know if it was ever Effective against the North Koreans we assume that since there hasn't been a North Korean attack since June 1950 That that's due to extended deterrence. We won't know until we see the North Korean archives But I'm willing to take you know, I'll take the point The question is now what is the situation now that the North Koreans are nuclear capable and and May even have reached the point where they have some deliverable weapons How does that affect our use of? Deterrence vis-a-vis the North There might be two questions that we can ask ourselves To what extent and how has the North Korean possession of nuclear weapons? Altered this in the symbolism As well as the application of deterrence in Northeast Asia and I'd point out both Dr. Morgan and Victor both emphasized and I think they're right that deterrence has At least as much symbolic importance Psychological importance as it does real military application effect may be more of that Than the other which doesn't mean it's not important. It just means The content is different than what we might imagine second question to what extent and in what ways has North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons made Our nuclear deterrence actually more useful when it comes to negotiations Have we actually stepped Quite by accident, but actually stepped into a room Which is a little bit more hospitable in the long run to Negotiations on this issue than we might imagine Why is that again? We go back to the psychology and the symbolism of the nuclear deterrence and the fact that as Victor pointed out There have been several times in the past when this very issue has entered into US DPRK talks The North Koreans have said they wanted to see some change in the US the rhetorical US nuclear posture and So what did they get they got? In the agreed framework actually are the first negative security assurance Now the North Koreans knew that that wasn't worth anything really in terms of the nuclear threat But it symbolized a New us approach Larger diplomatic approach to North Korea and that was important to them so in a Modification of the rhetorical position and a negative security assurance was a big deal as Victor said I mean and in fact, we never really got it out of the Pentagon There was a lot of smoke and mirrors that that's to them Such that when it came out in in 2005 a lot of jaws dropped open like the Russians did How come it got so easy to do all of a sudden again? The North Koreans didn't believe the paper that wasn't the issue The issue is how does that? How is that useful? Because it's part of the terms of trade Between the US and North Korea when it comes to establishing a new political relationship in 1994 And during the agreed framework talks There was a very rough Week or so when I Can't remember why it was as a matter of fact, but anyway, we started fairly obvious and highly publicized Exercise off the coast of Korea and I think it involved Think it involved a carrier. I'm not positive now forget But anyway, the North Koreans were very exercised about And we were in Geneva talking to them and so we took some of them aside and said to them What's the problem we exercise all the time and the answer was we know you exercise all the time Why do you have to rub our noses in it? Why does it have to be so public? I think the same thing applies to deterrence and extended deterrence I think the North Koreans are much more capable of living with it as Long as we don't rub their noses isn't in it as long as it doesn't show up in a communicate We sign with the South Koreans. That's what they object to because they know Perfectly well that there's no way they can get us to furl the nuclear umbrella completely There's always going to be a missile in North Dakota or South Dakota Which can hit Pyongyang That's reality and they're used to living with that as a matter of fact as Dr. Morgan said our conventional capability is so crushing to the North Koreans that That that the nuclear threat is just sort of one existential step above that it really it really isn't By itself, I don't think so effective. I don't think the North Koreans as I said, I don't think they care about our actually removing the umbrella in fact and They might find it useful How can that be? Believe it or not the North Koreans do think strategically about their position in Northeast Asia Sometimes they think more strategically than We do And they like to look at the larger picture and where they fit and where they fit is not in the Chinese pocket they hope they hope and And a US presence in That regard is a useful thing and the extended deterrence is a sign in one sense of the commitment of the United States It's extended commitment to Northeast Asia. So they may sometimes complain and fuss about extended deterrence but Balanced against that is their sense that they need some Form important form of lasting American commitment in the region What can we therefore? accomplish In utilizing this extended deterrence directly with the North Koreans Well, we can't accomplish anything with it. I don't think if we don't Eventually engage in some sort of conversation with them because there are a lot of things we have to know about their concept of The utility of their nuclear weapons apart from their public statements Those are a good starting point, but it's not The entirety of the North Korean Thinking on this issue and unless we sit down and talk to them about it at length In depth We're not going to be able to figure out The danger points that Victor very rightly pointed out the points at which they may have misconceptions and the points at which they're willing to to Not to press on the nuclear issue not to use it for Compellants and in fact not to misuse the deterrence. So I think a What we have here in beginning to discuss deterrence And the continued effectiveness of US deterrence in East Asia it begins with a recognition of The fact that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state A lot of people shudder at that use of the term But if we if we manage to accept it, I use the word accept Advisely, I know that it raises hackles. So use another term, but if we manage to Recognize that we're going to have to live with it for a while and deal with the North Koreans on that basis I think that there's more room For the two sides to make a few steps important steps forward then might Seem to be the case at first at first blush Thanks, Bob Jofi, how does all this look through a? Sorry How does all this look through an arms control and non-proliferation lens? Sure Thanks for that Sharon you had asked me in preparing for this presentation to focus on how the Obama administration can square a seeming contradiction which is Remaining committed to the president's speech in Prague over a year ago where he laid out the peace and security of a world free of nuclear Weapons and at the same time remain committed to extended regional deterrence Not just in Northeast Asia, but in Europe and other regions where the US vital interests are at play And I'm going to try to see how we can square that seeming contradiction in my brief remarks Just to to remind everyone in April of 2009 the president laid out his nuclear weapons non-proliferation arms control agenda and He called for a world without nuclear weapons Reminding everyone that this vision would take patience and persistence and that no one in his administration Is under the illusion that such a world? Will come into reality anytime soon in the near future indeed the president said that it may not occur in his own lifetime What I think sometimes critics of the so-called Prague vision Miss is that the process of getting to a world of zero is as important If not more important than the ultimate end state of a world without nuclear weapons Reducing the role and salience of nuclear arms is an essential step in the path to zero And it can bring immediate security benefits to the United States and our friends and allies Even as nuclear weapons continue to exist The nuclear posture of you which was concluded earlier this year Reinforced this perspective through a number of steps aimed at reducing the role of nuclear weapons First it announced an important shift in a declaratory policy To emphasize that the United States will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons Against non nuclear weapons states that are state parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and that are in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations The NPR also established a recognition that the United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances Where it is necessary to defend our vital national interests Third and finally the NPR Established a decision to strengthen our conventional capabilities Such that the United States can reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non nuclear attacks and establish the objective of eventually Eventually making the turns of nuclear attack in the United States and our friends and allies the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal This commitment to reducing the saliency of nuclear weapons as we seek the eventual peace and security of the world free of nuclear weapons Does not conflict with our present-day commitment to maintain regional deterrence and enhance reassurance for our friends and allies including those in Northeast Asia This administration has put forth a very pragmatic view that so long as nuclear weapons exist The United States will undertake every effort to ensure our nuclear arsenal remains safe secure and effective At the same time as was promulgated in the nuclear posture review So long as regional nuclear threats remain to our forces allies and partners US deterrence will continue to require a nuclear component This approach applies equally in Northeast Asia as it does to other regions where US vital interests are at play I think a similar analogy is the debate that's happening right now in the Senate over ratification of the new start treaty the administration has been getting some flak from our friends in the progressive community because At the same time as we're moving forward in what we hope will be mutual strategic nuclear reductions with the Russian Federation, we're also taking steps to reinvigorate our commitment to the US nuclear weapons complex through a 10-year spending plan that significantly increases the resources necessary to Maintain our nuclear arsenal and we square that contradiction again with the recognition that Even though we're committed to eliminating the weapons. This process is going to take a long time and So long as nuclear weapons exist This president and this administration has a responsibility to ensure those weapons will work if we ever got forbid have to use them and I think the same issue is at play here in terms of a World without nuclear weapons and the concept of extended regional deterrence There is no contradiction there the process of step-by-step Productions in the numbers and roles of nuclear weapons which will be a challenging time consuming process Can only move forward so long as the United States and our allies Routine confidence in our existing security and deterrence arrangements So I'm not sure if I quite square the contradiction there, but I think We in the administration feel that we're intellectually consistent and that the Prague vision is consistent with Continuing commitments to our allies and friends in Northeast Asia. I know everyone is anxious to get to questions I'm going to stop my remarks there Thanks, Jofi While you are all gathering your thoughts, I might take the prerogative of the chair and ask a question or two Let me just remind you we have some microphones that will circulate around the room and Please state your name and your affiliation and out of respect for your colleagues make this a question rather than a comment I'm going to dive in and Query Bob you said That's his term about accepting North Korea's nuclear weapons I'm not a regional specialist. I deal more with arms control and non-proliferation and in non-proliferation we're constantly Beleaguered by this problem of discrimination in the field, right? So, you know, you accept India's nuclear weapons and you you you get a lot of flak What what would I'm assuming it's not tacit? Recognize I'm not not explicit recognition. What what would for you accepting North Korea's nuclear weapons be? I think the first Step would simply be to agree to talk to them about something other than nuclear weapons In other words, don't make it first foremost and only Item on the agenda It can be on the agenda They'll they'll make their statement will make their statement and then we'll see if there are other things to discuss But right now it seems to me that it's the sole focus and that's the problem I would you know the I Mean to me a very useful thing would be if We either at the track one or track two level could engage with a dialogue with North Korea on the Whole logic of nuclear deterrence to see whether they understand I mean this was done with the Soviets early on in the Cold War and That would be a useful thing because One of the things again that concerns me is that they may have very wrong conceptions of what is Their nuclear deterrent what constitutes their nuclear deterrent and that can create all sorts of problems in an escalation letter So the obvious political obstacle to that and I think it's a I think it's a very big one Is that the minute you start to do that even if you don't? explicitly or tacitly accept North Korea's nuclear weapons state the minute you engage in that dialogue Everybody's going to say you've accepted North Korea's a nuclear weapons state and that will have all sorts of ripple effects throughout the region Particularly among allies who will you know who will then draw a link between that and questions about? The credibility of us extended nuclear deterrent so I mean that's a policy box that I think it's it's that's difficult to get out of But from from an academic perspective you would want to have that conversation I would only quickly note that the challenge of talking to North Korea without having to nuclearization Front and center on the agenda is that it's a very very difficult for any US administration to engage in such talks unless that issue is front and center the reason why frankly we care about North Korea is because of what they've done in the nuclear field and Without that this wouldn't be high on the agenda for any administration Say very quickly repeat again. You have to always think in terms of the context within which the United States Puts this that is you don't you care about North Korea because of the proliferation Because the proliferation is damaging to the regional security management that the United States tries to provide And also to security management in other places. That's the real problem see and So I'm not sure I know I understand what Victor saying because it's it really would be very important to have Conversation with him and maybe have to do it attract to if it's possible, but that doesn't work very well with them compared to other people so Because Extended nuclear deterrence is very symbolic and you do have the kind of effect you mentioned So I think you're right then Joe you can't really just Talk with them about something else We really care about this So we can talk about other things, but this is the single most important thing because it isn't just us North Korea relations It's because the United States has a larger set of Fish it's frying that it's got to attend to and this is relevant to that So that's the problem I see see I don't see an easy way around that Unless you get the North Korea's Chinese tell them you've got to talk with the United States about nuclear weapons We can't you know, it's not gonna work out of it This is to me. This is the same problem. We had During the agreed framework talks we focused at the beginning like a laser on the nuclear issue And we were sputtering and slipping and sliding and not making a lot of progress and the reason was The nuclear issue is not a big problem for the North Korea's. It's a big problem for us They have other things they want to discuss. So how do you weave together? Our concerns and have them discuss absolutely they need to be addressed But the North Koreans have also a list of things and we need to be able to talk about those at the same time When you can get that balance It seems to me you you're more liable to get satisfaction on our end Rather than just telling them this is all we're going to talk about. I have an idea. Maybe we can just call it nuclear security Do I see questions Okay, I'm change on with Phoenix TV I have a question to Dr. Mr. Joseph it's about after visiting China Kim Jong-il say he said he wants to resume the six-party talk and how you see that and What the US should want and need to achieve if there's any six party Sure, I'll just say that you know a senior Chinese official is in Washington this week He's going to be meeting with a series of State Department officials tomorrow including Deputy Secretary Steinberg We're looking forward to learning what transpired in this visit of Kim Jong-il to China And we're just as eager as everyone else to find out what happened the The fact that It was reported that Kim Jong-il said he was ready to come back to six-party talks I mean would I take that as an encouraging sign? No, I Think we've been down this road too many times too many times And You know, I think for any who've been involved in this, you know You'll I mean the basically that the standard line is you'll you all believe it when I see it You know when I see the delegation arrive in Beijing and show up at the Dao Tai on time Then I'll believe it until then I won't believe it and then With regard to what the US agenda would be I mean in spite of this this debate or the discussion that we've just had I Think as Jovi said, I mean, you know, it's pretty clear what the priority of the administration is and has been Right now there is you know a still once there is a standing agreement negotiated in 2005 and 2007 That the North Koreans have not fully implemented. I Don't see any negotiations of a new agreement yet. So until that happens. This is the agreement that they must come back to At least that would be my reading of the US Thanks, I'm Chad O'Cow from the Center for Arms Control. This is a question for you Pat I'm just from a deterrent's point of view How did North Korea's nuclear weapons change things from the American and South Korean perspective? Because remember for a long time they've obviously had a lot of artillery that could do some very serious damage So I'd just like to see what you think the nuclear weapons how they make a difference. Thanks. I don't think they make much of a difference in terms of I think more they make a difference more in terms of what Victor's been talking about that is to the North Koreans understand what it means to have something like that kind of capability and be opposing people who are Trying to figure out a what that capability actually is and be whether you really know what you're doing and who Don't like you don't trust you That kind of thing and and the threat to soul is much more more central I think and Also in general the threat of having a war at all. I know public opinion polls on the peninsula show even after Jen up, you know Overwhelming sense that North Korea is awful and we This is terrific concern. I'm not going back through another serious war. Even if you win kind of thing and the prior administration in fact reflected a lot of that So put made the priority one of interacting with the North It was because you didn't get seem to get anywhere that you get the current administration saying they're not that they Are quite ready to if necessary have some kind of military confrontation so that I don't think The North has gained anything by getting the nuclear weapons And it has certainly made it harder And this was explained to get the other side not to want to insist certain things have to come first or else because They have the suspicion that the North is going to continue to try to extract And that's too bad. I would like to see honest conversations with the North and more serious effort at I wouldn't call it reconciliation but at least a substantial effort to once again go back toward providing North Korea with a lot of reassurance plus a lot of Positive incentives Most of the studies of deterrents suggest that deterrents works best when you couple it with some kinds of incentives If you can find a way to do that that doesn't Somehow weaken the impact of the threats themselves Then there are ways in which reassurances and so on can make a big difference The North screens are very hard to reassure. I mean given their attitudes given. There's their position, so I Don't want to make that easy, but they suggest it's easy at all But I don't see the nuclear weapons as themselves as substantially altering the negotiating position their leverage Their ability to blackmail and so on Okay, I think Victor wants to respond Well, you know I think I think it potentially North Korea, I mean their Nicollas could potentially change the equation And they'll probably people who I know there will be people who disagree with this but Suppose this ship, you know, they took down this ship last March, right? People wondered why did they do it? They killed what 40-something sailors, but they were trying to 48 But they're trying to kill everybody right over a hundred trying to take down the whole boat You know, why would they do this? Were they worried about retaliation? Did they not think that the United States and our okay would retaliate, you know with with something was basically an act of war, right? It was an act of war You know a one interpretation and if you're a national security planner, you have to take the worst case situation You're not gonna assume the best case is that they may have some sort of false sense that they are now a nuclear weapon state and therefore it invulnerable Unvulnerable invulnerable to any sort of retaliation, right? That dramatically changes the strategic equation in the region And that that would be very concerning now We don't know if that was one of the things that motivated them to prosecute an act of war But you cannot rule it out as a possibility and that would directly derive from their Preset or their perceived preset possession of nuclear weapons where they see themselves now as a nuclear weapons state Right here Hi, I'm kaho from NHK Japan My question is something about yesterday's declaration by the United States of the new set of sanctions I immediately remember what happened after Bda 2005 of Like North Koreans just setting off their nuclear tests after I remember after us declaring Sanctions against them. Do you see any bright outcome of this new set of sanctions for the new North Koreans to finally sit around the table for? Really discussing The nuclearization I fear that it's going to be a sign of new for them They they have to have for another set of publications What is your thought on that? Let me just respond You know, we see the sanctions announcement issued yesterday as a continuation of the two-track strategy. This this administration has pursued since the spring of 2009 Essentially tightening the pressure on North Korea what the sanctions yesterday announced did was Our the previous executive order that was in existence focused on North Korea's WMD and missile programs and the executive order announced yesterday as Layed out by Bob Einhorn and Stuart Levy is that it expanded the focus to include The various illicit activities conducted by North Korean entities Whether it be cigarette smuggling money laundering other activities that are designed to funnel revenue into North Korea's WMD programs To take into account those programs and try to tighten the squeeze to ensure that The North Korean regime is not able to continue using funds to further these WMD capabilities it It does not represent any fundamental shift in the approach of the administration rather we see it Morris a continuation Thank you, and John Caves National Defense University If I may two because one is a quick follow-up to some of the dr. Chass said and that would be that child Whether you think that the Chonin sinking is something fundamentally new type of provocation Or or does it just fit into the pattern of some very aggressive limited aggressive acts that North Korea has taken? periodically since the end of the Korean War original question was thoughts from the panel as to Whether South Korea is a continuing interest in investment in long-range strike weapons most recently 1500 kilometer cruise missile Says anything about the state of extended deterrence there and what contributions it might make to deterrence on the peninsula in general On the first question. I you know whether the China represents a new type of provocation by the north. I mean we have seen Provocations by the north in the past as you know EC 121 blue house raid Pueblo 8 5 8 KL 8 5 8 But I think what was to me at least most disturbing about this one was that We haven't had one of those in a while We haven't had one of you know a serious serious conventional provocation of this nature in in quite some time. I mean we've had skirmishes in the West Sea But we haven't had an attack on a on a on a ship and You know it does concern me that There this may be a new level of provocation and we can debate about what it's designed to do Right some may say it's designed to rattle everyone's cage and get Everybody to talk to the north blackmail in other words others may see it as a demonstration of basically new coercive bargaining leverage that the north feels it has Because it has capabilities now That particularly nuclear capabilities that it may not have had when it raided the blue house or took out Or took down the US spy plane in in the 19 late 1960s, so it does concern me that it is a new type of provocation and You know the I think the answer is something that the administration has tried to wrestle with which is you know How do you come up with a response that satisfies allies concerns? But also is strong enough to deter Another sort of provocation but not too strong that you start a war and that's you know, that's a very difficult hole to try to get the needle through and you know so You know falling on Jofi's comments. I mean I can't As implied in the earlier question I can't really fault the administration for pursuing The sanctions and the exercising that it's now the military exercising that it's now pursuing because I really don't think they have a choice and that they need to do it and On the second question, I think I'd say remember the American effort to Reach an agreement and an agreement was reached with the prior administration no administration on Shifting the combined forces command wartime combined forces command into South Korean hands company by South Korean plans to sharply escalate their military capabilities so that South Korea would be more in charge of its defenses and In that connection it makes a lot of sense for North Korea for South Korea then to Have relief from the missile controls that have existed Limiting the range of the missiles that they could develop And I just assumed that you know that That would go along with it in the end If they're really going to be much more centrally in charge of their national defense And they're living across the way from a serious set of Artillery capabilities that could damage the national capital And facing other kinds of North Korean missiles It's obvious that they would want to have this kind of additional capability and Precisely for deterrence purposes And so I've just assumed that that would go along with this now. It's been delayed, of course partly because of the incident incident and also because of a lot of pressure inside South Korea on this so Nervousness about The current deterrent situation Plus evidence, you know, they haven't been able to spend the money On so they're not meeting the budget targets just for the improvements. So They're not fully comfortable with making the shift. It's now delayed several years But I think the logic of it is that if you go down this road then that missile constraint Has to go away in the north and the south has to be developing missiles that give it more range Thanks, Chris Nelson Nelson important. Nice to see you Yeah, I wish I was taller and thinner but anyway Fascinating discussion because Please correct me if I'm wrong what I'm hearing is That we all agree. There's a ton of stuff. We got to talk to the norcs about You know, that's really important and it's strategic and it's perceptual and it's about nukes And it's about their sense of security and you know, what do they think of the latest inspector? Oh, novel. Yeah, a lot of stuff. That's very important We got to get on it But I'm also hearing from, you know, brother bater courtesy of the new york times on saturday or from jofy today That yeah, we got a lot of stuff to talk about we're not going to talk to them about anything until they get back And start performing on the agreements they made in 05 and 07 period end of conversation So, you know, we've got a hell of a problem here because we all agree we need to talk And yet there seems to be a very firm policy that we're simply not going to do it Until they go back and start doing stuff. So my question to you is Is this a bridgeable gap? Or are we stuck with this until or unless dear leader has gone to his reward? We find out if the brother-in-law is really the chief, you know, is less son really going to be the leader You know, are we in for two three four five more years of yeah, we need to talk but we're not going to do it Uh, and if not, uh, what can we do about it? Thanks Add to that we get somebody to comment on the fact that there was a story in the paper that the administration is beginning to think about some ways of talking with the north again, and I wondered if that was in fact a partial You know, what do I want to say a straw sent out there? Some kind of trial balloon or something just to see what the reactions would be around town around Among friends and allies out in japan, etc Um, and I don't know anything about that But I thought maybe somebody here who lives in this town would be able to suggest trophy is going to tell us I'm not that's right. He's going to I'm not going to get into that second question But um, you know in response to chris's question about whether there's There's some way to bridge that gap. I think there is I mean, it's important to keep in mind that the administration is not calling on the north koreans to Fully implement anything and everything in the 2005 and 2007 joint statements before we sit down and talk to them Of course not What we are saying though is that We don't find it sufficient simply for the north koreans to say we would like to restart the six party talks process Will you come back to the table? We would like to see some evidence that the north koreans are actually sincere about carrying out their denuclearization commitments Some sign that they're willing to go beyond just in your words Before we're ready to once again pursue this path of of talks with the north koreans The only thing I would add is We've seen this gap before We're all familiar with it. We've seen it in years past and Sooner or later it always managed to be bridged one way or the other and I would imagine in this case as well. I don't know when I don't know if it's two or five years or when but You know right now we have Two tracks which has been the military exercising and the sanctions And sooner or later you you're gonna have to have the third track which is some form of Dialogue or negotiation Um And you know the big You know the the the big question in terms of closing that gap is always that you have to give up Any of the first two in order to get the third? Right and that has always been one of the problems or the challenges For us policy whenever we've gotten into one well not one we when the north koreans have put us in one of these situations I wouldn't think that bad policy would be sustainable for A long time except that it has been since 2002 It's lasted a long time and i'm afraid it can last longer not because there aren't smart people in the Right places but because the politics uh of the situation not just in this country but in You know countries or allies just don't favor Um the right the right decisions and a sense of leadership coming to the fore It's not hopeless, but It's It's a good time uh to go fishing I think We're gonna take Oh two more questions. Let's take them together and then I think our time will be up So right in all the way in the back. We'll take both questions. Okay one after another Sure, timothy walton with delix consulting studies and analysis. My question is more oriented to dr. Morgan To clarify are you advocating that the u.s. Increased pressure and costs on china to facilitate negotiations in north korea If so, what mechanisms would you espouse and what effects you think the what effects do you think these could have on broader us security interests and concerns in Asia such as in the south china sea From voice of america. I have a follow-up question on u.s. Governance position on the resumption of the cispari talk to Mr. Joe feature sap You just mentioned that u.s. Government doesn't want the full implementation of all this agreement in 2005 2007 from north korea Then can you specify or elaborate what specific condition or what specific step or what specific sign do you want from north korea To actually resume this a negotiation or talk. Thank you I wouldn't I wouldn't say that I want to advocate it. I would just simply say It's very difficult to pursue a policy of using pressure sanctions threats and the like If the other side has resources that enable it to minimize the harm that those Either are inflicting or could inflict And that means you have to look again at your situation with that in mind and I Worry about the chinese attitude with regard to north korea. I understood in the past the chinese view which was at least in part that the kind of Attitude the united states was taking was fundamentally an infringement on national sovereignty Uh, and that's a very dangerous thing and I understand the chinese view and that I used to teach in china And I you know I heard the chinese talk along More recently. I've begun to worry that it is an extension of a general chinese view that The american security arrangements in east asia need to be sharply altered That's a much much more complicated thing that that is more important Than whether or not the north korean problem is solved That's solving it in some way that's compatible with american objectives is unacceptable to china That's a very different kind of thing and and I would Very much want to know much more about chinese views Before you would talk about whether you resort to some kind of pressure given the way the us has tried to manage east asian security Directly confronting and pressuring china would be unwise If the chinese themselves find This american Management it's unacceptable. Well, that opens up a whole different case Thanks, pat Just in response to the second question. I want to make sure that we're very clear The administration remains strongly committed to ensuring that the north koreans live up to the commitments of both the 2005 and 2007 joint statements and there's absolutely no hedge there Look the north koreans know what's expected of them. We have had talks going back to the last administration on The steps they need in order to carry out the commitments in those statements It's been repeated time and time again secretary clinton has spoken about this There should be no confusion about that and what we want to see from the north koreans is You know, not just simply an expression of wanting to return to talks But some signal that they are prepared in fact to carry out the commitments that they have made previously Do you have any last words from our panels? So let me thank you for a terrific session. It's really very interesting Thank you all for coming