 The next item of business is a statement by Jenny Gilruth on rail accident investigation branch report into Carmont passenger train derailment. The minister will take questions at the end of her statement and so there should be no interventions or interruptions. I call on Jenny Gilruth minister. On Wednesday 12 August 2020, the 06.38 am high speed train 1T08 from Aberdeen to Glasgow derailed as it struck debris on the track close to Carmont in Aberdeenshire. Today, the rail accident investigation branch has published its final report into the events leading up to and during this tragic and shocking crash. Before I outline the report findings to Parliament, I would ask Parliament to remember the three people who tragically lost their lives that day—the train driver, Brett McCulloch, the conductor, Donald Dinney and a passenger, Christopher Stuchbury. Brett McCulloch was only 45 and had moved from Kent to make his life in Aberdeenshire. He had been a train driver for six years and he was very popular at the Aberdeen depot. Donald Dinney was 58. His RMT branch in Aberdeen paid tribute to him as someone who lit up the room with funny stories and wit. Christopher Stuchbury was 62. He came from Aberdeen and was an integral member of the charge towing team as well as a volunteer at a specialist palliative unit. All three were beloved family men who were sadly missed by their friends, relatives and colleagues. On behalf of everyone in the Scottish Government and I am sure in this chamber I want to share my profound condolences to those men's families and friends for their loss. I have offered to meet all of the families at any time now or in the future whilst appreciating that nothing I can say as Minister can possibly erase their grief. The derailment that day also resulted in injuries, some of them serious to six passengers and staff. I want to convey my sympathies to everyone affected and hurt. That includes the wider local community and the railway family. All three men came from the local area. Indeed, Brett McCulloch lived just 15 minutes away. The shock of the impact of this accident was widely and keenly felt and I know it continues to be so. The publication of today's report is yet another painful reminder of the heart-rending events of that dreadful day, but I hope that it will also help to provide at least some explanation for what exactly happened. On the morning of 12 August 2020, there were thunderstorms with associated extreme heavy rain in southern Aberdeenshire. Weather records indicated at the time between 0,500 hours and 0,900 hours around 52 millimetres of rain fell in the Karmad area, which is about 90 per cent of the average total rainfall for the whole of August at that location. The 0,638-hours high-speed train from Aberdeen to Glasgow had been stopped just south of Cormand due to a line blockage near Lawrence Kirk. The train was in the process of returning to Stonehaven when it derailed. The rail accident investigation branch, or the RAIB, is the independent body appointed by the UK Government to investigate railway accidents. I thank the staff of the RAIB who undertook the work for their careful and thorough approach to the investigation and the clarity of their findings and recommendations. The report's main finding is that the train derailed because it struck debris that had been washed onto the track from a drainage trench during recent extreme rainfall. The report states that the drainage system and associated earthworks, which had been installed between 2011 and 2012, had not been constructed in accordance with the original design. That meant that the drainage system was not able to safely accommodate the water flows that morning. The investigation concluded that, had the drainage system been installed in accordance with the design, it would have been capable of safely accommodating the flow of surface water. However, as installed, the drainage system was unable to do so. It is clear that the drainage system and associated earthworks and how they were constructed were the cause of the accident, the train derailment being the tragic consequence. One of the RAIB's most important findings is that there was nothing in the way that Brett McCulloch was driving the train that caused the accident. He was driving within the rules and the instructions that were given to him. The refurbished high-speed train that derailed at Carman was fully compliant with legal requirements to operate. However, since it was designed and constructed, railway standards have continued to change and to improve, reflecting lessons learned from just this sort of investigation. The report states that a train built to the most recent crash-worthy standards would have had a number of design features that are intended to improve the safety of passengers. Whilst we cannot be certain about what could have happened in the hypothetical situation of different rolling stock in the same accident, the report does state that the body shells of the coaches generally performed well in the accident. However, the RAIB considers it more likely than not that the outcome would have been better if the train had been compliant with modern crash-worthiness standards. In respect of the driving cab, the rail accident investigation branch reports that the speed of impact was significantly beyond the collision speeds for which even modern cabs are designed to provide protection for occupants. Some of the RAIB's key findings relate to the approach taken by the operations team. The investigation found evidence that the Scotland route control team, which is operated by network rail employees, was under severe workload pressure that morning due to the volume of concurrent weather-related events in Scotland. Despite the severe nature of disruption to Scotland's railway infrastructure that morning, no additional resource had been obtained for the control room. A senior management goal command structure to give oversight and direction had not been established to relieve the pressure on the controllers. Controllers had not been given information, procedures or training that would have enabled them to effectively manage a complex weather event, like that experienced on 12 August 2020. No instruction was given by route control or the signaler that train 110.08 should be run at a lower speed on its journey between Carmint and Stonehaven. Rail is still a complex mix of devolved and reserved competencies. The Scottish Government is responsible for specifying and funding the operation of ScotRail and the Caledonian sleeper trains and for specifying the funding and outputs from Network Rail in Scotland, but rail safety is overseen by the statutory railway safety regulator, the Office of Rail and Road. It will now discharge its statutory duty of ensuring that those who are responsible for implementing the RAIB's recommendations take appropriate responsive action. Although the Scottish Government funds Network Rail in Scotland, its accountability continues to rest with the UK Government. I therefore written today to the UK Government Secretary of State for Transport Grant Shaps seeking an urgent meeting to discuss the report's findings in detail and what that means for both Governments. I know that Network Rail in Scotland will wish to engage constructively on the report's findings. There must also be a role for ministers in ensuring that never again will we see a repeat of that dreadful day at Carmint. Three people dying as a result of the Carmint derailment was three people too many. Although rail remains the safest form of transport, we must seek to learn the lessons from this incident to further improve the safety of all who work and travel on the railways in Scotland. To ensure that we take appropriate steps and quickly, I am announcing today that Transport Scotland will convene a steering group to take forward implementation of the recommendations about safety performance in accidents of older rolling stock, including HST rolling stock on ScotRail. Because of their crucial role in both driving and maintaining these trains, I can give an undertaking to Scotland's rail unions and employees that we will involve them in this important activity alongside rail industry representatives and the safety bodies. The RAIB report establishes the factual circumstances of the accident, but it does not apportionably. The Office of Rail and Road is undertaking a parallel joint investigation along with Police Scotland and the British Transport Police, which will be reported to the Procurator Fiscal later this year. That will give prosecutors time to consider questions of criminal prosecutions and a fatal accident inquiry. Those are matters for the Lord Advocate acting independently. However, I want to conclude by giving the undertaking. We will continue to work with industry partners, the trade unions and the UK Government to deliver improvements to make our railways safer and more resilient to the challenges of adverse weather events. Finally, I give a solemn assurance that the Scottish Government will do everything in our power to urge everyone responsible for safety on our transport networks to make them more resilient and safer for all passengers and employees. We cannot and must not allow a repeat of the terrible karma to tragedy. The minister will now take questions on the issues raised in her statement. I intend to allow around 20 minutes for questions after which we will move on to the next item of business. I would be grateful if members who wish to ask a question were to press their request to speak buttons now. I thank the minister for advance sight of her statement and I welcome the announcement of a steering group. I hope that she will keep us informed about its work. The report into the Carment Rail Tragedy makes for sobering reading. We should remember that, while this is about failures of systems and lessons that can be learned, it is fundamentally about the loss of three lives. The conductor, Donald Dinney, train driver, Brett McCulloch and passenger Christopher Stochbury. There were six other people on the train on August 12, 2020, and they were injured when it hit debris, mainly gravel and derailed. The source of the debris was a drain that had been put in by Carillion, but not in accordance with the design. Had they stuck to the original design, the tragedy may not have happened. Can the minister confirm whether Network Rail Scotland has checked all other Carillion-constructed drainage systems to ensure that there were no potential issues elsewhere on the network? The RAIB also said that, despite knowing about the threat, Network Rail had not sufficiently recognised that its existing measures did not fully address the risk from extreme rainfall events, so areas of significant weakness had not been addressed. What has the minister done about that? Finally, the driver did not have a seatbelt. That does seem extraordinary. It seems to me that that should be standard. Does the minister agree? I thank Graham Simpson for his question. He covers a number of different areas. First of all, to reflect on the stadium group, I will keep members informed of that. I have written to Opposition spokespeople on the back of the head of the statement. In terms of the injured people who were involved in the crash, he alluded to the drain being the cause of the crash itself. I have confirmed with Network Rail that they have checked all drains that were installed or any maintenance work that was carried out by Carillion. That was done at the time of the crash itself. Even before the accident at Carmon, project teams had apparently started to review historical projects. Those who are up to 10 years old—if you think about the age of the stream—would have been at the time over 10 years old, to ascertain whether a health and safety file, if required, had been accepted by the national records group and stored appropriately. Network Rail has undertaken that work, and I received another assurance from Alex Hines regarding that matter just earlier this morning. On the second point, Mr Simpson raises about the weaknesses in the existing fleet. I think that he mentioned some of the challenges around network rail responsibilities. I cannot instruct Network Rail because it is accountable to the UK Government, however. Scotland's railway has established a permanently staffed weather desk position. That came into operation shortly after the event itself. Network Rail has informed the RAIB that suitably qualified people will have been recruited to cover that position, and I am told that it is a better example of both organisations, Scotland Rail and Network Rail, working together. In light of the likelihood that climate change, as we know, is going to exacerbate some of those risks further, Network Rail has decided to commission two task forces to advise on the ways in which it could improve its understanding of earthworks. One was chaired by Lord Robert Mayer and the other by Dame Julia Slingo, and it also considered how it could improve the management of its earthwork portfolio to better understand the risk of rainfall. I raised that issue with Alex Hines again earlier today and was given an assurance that Network Rail is now using technology to even look, for example, at hillsides across the country to try and ascertain and to predict when events like that might happen in the future. Additionally, Network Rail, I am told, is walking the lines of Scotland's railways to try and ascertain in the future where some of those risks might appear. I also gave an undertaking in terms of action that I have taken to establish at a steering group. I recognise that there are cross-devolved and reserved competencies here, but I am interested in getting a resolution to ensure that this never happens again. I look forward to working constructively with the UK Government on this, recognising the horrific nature of what we are discussing today. Finally, Mr Simpson raised a point about seatbelts. I am told that research undertaken by the rail safety and standards boards optimised driving cab design for delivering protection and collision into driver protection in a collision found that, although there are no technical or operational problems for seeing that present to prevent the fitment of driver protection, there may be a challenge regarding ensuring maintenance and driver acceptance of a viability assessment. At this moment in time, it is not a requirement. I am not ruling it out in the future, but there are no requirements at this moment in time for any modern trains for drivers to have seatbelts fitted, but the RAIB has recommended that the RSSB review its previous research on fitting secondary impact protection devices for train drivers in light of the circumstances at Carmont. I will give him an undertaking that we will take the necessary steps from 1 April, of course, if the recommendations from that research conclude that seatbelts would be an appropriate response. Again, that probably requires wider discussion with the trade unions and employees, too. Thank you, all our thoughts are with the loved ones of those who died in this tragedy. This is a sobering report for Carillion Network Rail and the entire rail industry. Investigators found that warnings were ignored and that systemic failures caused this derailment. There is a word for that negligence. The drainage system did not work, Carillion did not construct it to designer standards, network rail processes were not followed, ScotRail staff were insufficiently trained, there was no suitable arrangements to restrict the speed of the train despite the conditions. In light of this, can I ask the minister directly, does she still have confidence in the managing director of Scotland's railways and the leadership of the ScotRail Alliance? Because, as left, the train drivers union do not. As left are also calling for ageing high-speed trains to be phased out by August next year. Can the minister tell us when these trains will be withdrawn from service? It is for the Lord Advocate to consider prosecutions and a fatal accident inquiry, but it is for ministers here and at the UK level to decide whether there should be a full public inquiry. Does the minister believe that there is a case for a full public inquiry to ensure that lessons are fully learned and that this can never happen again? Three points that he raises. He used a word to it, so I am not going to repeat, because he will understand that there are legal proceedings that may follow from the next report, which is yet to publish, so I would not want to comment on the outcome of that. The first question that he raises regarding the position of senior officials, I think at this moment in time. I know why Aslee feels very strongly about this, and in fact I met with Kevin Munday only yesterday and we discussed some of the content of the issues that Mr Bibby has raised here. I do not think at this moment in time that it is the time to be calling for resignations, however I recognise and understand why Aslee feels very strongly about this. As I mentioned, the Office on Rail and Road's parallel joint investigation with Police Scotland and the British Transport Police is going to report to the Procurator Fiscal and that will allow prosecutors to consider those questions of criminal prosecutions and also whether or not there will be a fatal accident inquiry. As I mentioned in my statement matters for the Lord Advocate, Mr Bibby asked me to commit to a public inquiry. I do not want to prejudge the outcome of that inquiry or that investigation first. A public inquiry may well flow from that, but it is not for me as minister to prejudge the outcome at this stage, nor would it be for me to pre-empt the outcome of that process. Mr Bibby asked a question regarding the HSTs, and I am aware that this was raised at First Minister's questions. It is important to remember that the trains in question were safe to be running. They are older trains, undoubtedly. They met the standards and the requirement at the time when they were built. We now need to look at that stock and ensure that a disaster like this never happens again. The first way that we do that is by working with the trade unions. I spoke to Mr Lindsay about that yesterday. We will come to looking at a date in the future in which we may be able to remove some of those trains from service, but I need to convene that steering group, and I need to look forward to what that would mean for the current fleet of trains and what that would mean for the viability of rail travel in Scotland, just now, recognising that we are, to some extent, quite reliant on the current HSTs that are in operation at this moment in time. However, I give him an undertaking that that steering group will absolutely look at working with the trade unions, and hopefully with the UK Government, and with Network Rail and with ScotRail to ensure that we deliver on the safety improvements that are needed and that our rolling stock is up to scrap and that it also provides the protection and a level of security for staff, but also for passengers. Audrey Nicholle, to be followed by Liam Kerr. May I begin by extending my condolences to the families of Brett McCulloch, Donald Diney and Christopher Stochbury. Some of the findings in this investigation report are challenging to take on board, and some of the things that the RAIB found seem so straightforward and obvious. It's hard to believe that they were not in place. The minister mentioned some of the changes brought in since 2020. Can she provide more detail on those and how they might be helping to make Scotland's railways safer now? I can understand why members think that the report is very challenging to read in terms of some of the findings. I certainly found it very challenging a fortnight ago to sit through a presentation from the RAIB on the draft findings from the report. I do want to try to provide some level of reassurance. I know that, since the accident took place, Network Rail has put into effect a range of changes. It installed, for example, a new drainage system at Carmint to seek to prevent another wash-out in the same location, and it also installed guardrails to help to keep the rail trains in line on the approach to the bridge itself. It has improved its rules and its standards relating to the control of train movements during extreme weather events, and it has also introduced a new process on how it manages its response to safety recommendations and a programme of audits to check the correct implementations of risk controls. However, I want to work further with Network Rail on some of those changes and what they mean for real safety. Scotland recognises, of course, that real safety is ultimately a reserved matter to the UK Government. Liam Kerr will be called by Jackie Dunbar. I would like to echo the condolences and sentiments of colleagues from across the chamber. The Carmint tragedy and its needless loss of life must never happen again. The report identifies that the age of the train and its design features contributed to the severity of the crash. Neil Bibby asked a very good question, and, respectfully, I'm not sure we heard an answer. Can the minister tell me, is there a break clause in the contract between the Roscoe and ScotRail for the HSTs? Regardless, when does the newly nationalised ScotRail intend to replace all class 43 sets on its network with new trains to modern standards? I thank Mr Kerr for his supplementary question, and I note again his condolences to the family's affected. On the specific question, he asked regarding a break clause. I'm not cited on that, I can certainly find that information for him. With regard to the high-speed trains themselves, though, it is important to reflect that, although those trains were older, the refurbished high-speed train that derailed at Carmint was fully compliant with legal requirements to operate. However, since it was designed and constructed railway standards have moved on, in terms of the train operator, which is in this case ScotRail, it has the statutory duty to ensure that the trains they operate are safe. It is the statutory duty of the Office of Rail and Road as a regulator to oversee that duty with enforcement if necessary. I know that the Office of Rail and Road are going to monitor the work that is being undertaken to address the recommendations of the rail accident investigation branch. That duty, of course, is going to pass to the new public owned and controlled ScotRail on 1 April, as Mr Kerr alludes to. We have been absolutely clear in the Scottish Government. I will work with the industry, with unions, with employees and real safety bodies to take forward the implementation of all recommendations that are relevant to our obligations and responsibilities. I'm sorry that I can't give Mr Kerr a date right now, but I have committed to convening a steering group and we absolutely need to see action on this issue. I agree with him on that wholeheartedly. Jackie Dunbar, to be followed by Mercedes Bielva. Thank you, Presiding Officer. I can also add my condolences and thoughts to everyone affected. Clearly, many of the recommendations relate to matters for reserved bodies and related to reserved powers on rail safety. Does the minister know how the UK Government has responded to the RAIB's report and what role and power does she have to ensure that Network Rail will implement all the findings and recommendations that arise from it urgently? It is really for the UK Government to explain how it will respond. As far as I am aware, I do not think that the UK Government has yet made a public statement. I may be wrong on that. As I did set out, the responsibilities involving reserved and devolved areas are complex, but I am keen to ensure that we take a collaborative approach to deliver the changes that the RAIB is recommending. I am keen to engage with the Transport Secretary to agree how we do this, which is why I wrote to Grant Chaps this morning, to encourage him to work with me on taking forward those recommendations. Network Rail's response to the RAIB report shows that it too is taking its responsibilities here seriously, but Network Rail is not accountable to me, so it is really important that we have that cross-government working on this matter. The recommendations will now be reviewed urgently by the ORR to determine how best they will be progressed. The ORR, as I have mentioned, is the statutory authority on rail safety and on all recommendations agreed for implementation, which will be monitored by the ORR, rather for all operators. However, I am keen to work collaboratively with the UK Government on this, recognising and understanding the different roles and responsibilities that both our Governments play here, but it is absolutely essential that we guard against something like this happening every again. For that to work, we will have to work collaboratively. The tragedy has highlighted the need for a safe and resilient railway, yet there are plans to cut thousands of safety-critical jobs at Network Rail, and the First Minister earlier today failed to give a commitment that there will be no compulsory redundancies when ScotRail enters public ownership. Will the Minister take action to ensure that Network Rail cuts are scrapped and give a guarantee of no compulsory redundancies at ScotRail? I am happy to give Mercedes Villalaba an undertaking that I will meet with Network Rail, and I would not seek to see any job cuts in Scotland of any nature, but network rail are not accountable to me, so I am limited in what I can do in this regard. I would like to raise this matter with the UK Government directly, and any cuts to jobs in Scotland are not acceptable. Mercedes Villalaba raised the issue of no compulsory redundancies. We have not yet ruled that out, as the Government will know that, but what I have been doing for the past four weeks is meeting directly as a group with the trade unions and then individually for the last two weeks to better understand their negotiating positions in any future pay settlements. That has not yet been taken off the table because we have not yet arrived at a deal. I am hopeful that we will do that in the future, but I do not want to prejudge that. That is part of the negotiation process with the rail unions, but I have to say that the conversations that I have had with them, particularly in light of the announcement about a national conversation on Scotland's railways future, have been really positive and they have been really keen to work with the Government. I welcome that dialogue. I think that it is really essential, as we move forward, that the Government works with the rail unions to deliver a railway for the people of Scotland, which works. John Mason, to be followed by Beatrice Wishart. The minister has indicated that there will be certain work being carried on, investigations by different bodies and individuals going forward. Can she spell out exactly what will happen next and any timescale, if it is possible, around that? Network Rail and operators will review the recommendations and enter into discussions with the ORR on their delivery, for example, on timescales. Some of the recommendations need a great deal of technical input, so design developments for rolling stock, modification costing, and therefore some of those can and will be implemented immediately, whilst others, of course, will need a bit more time. I set out in my statement the next steps in terms of the role of the Office of Rail and Road and that of the Crown Office and the Lord Advocate. I am also aware of the call by ASLA for a public inquiry, which has been mentioned previously, and at an appropriate time. That will of course be considered. I am very keen that we get all members in and I would be grateful if we could pick up the pace. I call Beatrice Wishart to be followed by Eleanor Whitton. I, too, would wish to associate myself and the Scottish Liberal Democrats with the comments from the minister and other colleagues in offering condolences to the family and friends of those who lost their lives and sympathies to those who were injured on 12 August 2020. We welcome the creation of the steering group to look at HST trains and the other recommendations that will cover in its remit that the minister has announced, and we welcome any information on a timetable being available as soon as possible as to its work. In the knowledge that more frequent and extreme storms are likely to occur, will the Scottish Government be working with Network Rail to ensure that extra provision is provided to inspect the network and which will provide reassurance to passengers and staff of safety of trains? I thank Beatrice Wishart for her question. First of all, she asked a question regarding the steering group and timescales. I am not able to give timescales to her right now. I would like to speak to the trade unions first of all and to get partners involved in the UK Government, Network Rail, Scotland Round the Table first of all, to give her that information. I know that Mr Simpson asked for further information on that, and I will be more than happy to share that with her once the group has been convened and actions agreed. She mentioned some of the challenges around adverse weather events in the future, and as we know, climate change is going to have a continued impact on our transport network. I think that I touched upon that in my statement, but we were talking about a significant amount of rainfall on the morning of 12 August 2020. I think that the rain that fell that day was a very unusual circumstance. The Met Office analysis indicates exceptionally high level of rain falling between 10 to 6 in the morning and 9 o'clock when the rain itself derailed. Early action has already been taken by Network Rail to better understand and react to extreme weather events and to improve the risk management of earthworks. I spoke to that in response to a previous member's question. She asked a question regarding greater provision. I would be more than happy to raise that with Network Rail. I do not want to prejudge again the outcome of the steering group. There are a lot of factors that intersect here in terms of climate change, adaptation and how we look at our rolling stock, and how we future-proof that for greater safety improvements. I hope that that gives us an assurance that that will be looked at by the steering group in due course. I would be more than happy to update her with further detail as and when that is agreed. Eleanor Whitham, to be followed by Mark Ruskell. My thoughts, too, are with everybody impacted by this tragedy. Rare incidents in Scotland are rare but we should not underestimate the impact any derailment or incident has on drivers, other on-board staff and passengers' wellbeing. Some of the findings of the report, which are really quite harrowing to read, relates to the crashworthiness of the trains and especially the glass in the windows. Can the minister say what more can be done to make sure that the trains that people work and travel in are as safe as they can be? Some of the recommendations, as I think I mentioned, need a bit more research to explore how best we are going to implement them. Already research has been undertaken into driver seat belts. As I think I mentioned to Graham Simpson, the ORR is going to consider how best to achieve a good outcome for these, along with input from train operators. There may be some interim argument for arrangements, rather for modifications to rules implemented until some recommendations are fully implemented, but this is going to be for the industry to guide or for the ORR to decide upon. Some of the findings, as Eleanor Whitman alluded to, are very hard to read. They are harrowing, particularly the findings relating to the windows and the effect of shattered glass in particular. This is a good example of where there are no easier, obvious solutions, because one conclusion might be to strengthen and change the glass configuration in trains, but we also know that the glass needs to be able to be broken in certain circumstances, too. However, we cannot shy away from this task, and I am clear that the Scottish Government, which takes responsibility for rolling stock after 1 April, will play its full part in determining what changes need to take place and quickly. The minister has already mentioned climate adaptation. I was wondering whether she could expand on that a little, particularly in terms of how capital investment will help that adaptation, and the issue around training and support for rail workers to operate modern forecasting systems to enable us to better track and understand how extreme weather events are unfolding in real time. We fund Network Rail to carry out its operations in Scotland, and as part of our high-level agreement, climate adaptation is built into that. Events at Carmont, as we know, are a sharp reminder of the need to adapt our transport network to the effects of severe weather. We know that climate change is only going to increase, and the report itself notes that climate change has made heavier rainfall more likely to occur, so a storm of a particular duration and intensity now has a shorter return period. However, notwithstanding the progress being made in decarbonising the transport network adaptation of existing infrastructure needs to happen, Network Rail has implemented changes, as I have spoken to today, in both their infrastructure operations and in terms of weather management, to enhance and improve transport resilience during severe weather and, of course, to continue to implement changes to make the railway safe for all users. Action has also been taken by Transport Scotland, who have identified the need for climate change mitigation and adaptation as a central plank in the recently published national transport strategy, which sets out the vision for the next decades. However, I hope that Mr Ruskell has an undertaking of how seriously the Scottish Government is taking this matter. I am sure that it will be addressed in further detail by the steering group in due course. The Stonehaven derailment is a tragedy that must never be repeated. We know that the north-east has been badly affected by severe weather events in recent months. I know that the minister has touched briefly on that, but what assessment has been made of the rail infrastructure following those events and what measures have been implemented by the Scottish Government to mitigate the effects of flooding and landslides in future, including improved disaster recovery? I thank Tess White for her question. She raised the number of issues regarding some of the changes that have been implemented, primarily as she will recognise some of the changes that have been installed relating to network real responsibility. I will come on to those in a moment. I recognise some of the challenges here with regard to the area of Scotland that she represents and the damaging periods of poor weather that we have had in recent weeks and months that have impacted on people's lives. Network rail has installed a new drainage system that I spoke to with improved capacity and features intended to stop another wash-out from a happening. That was installed in 2020 to replace the 2011-12 system prior to the railway reopening after the derailment itself. It has also installed guardrails, both up and down lines, on the approach to bridge 325 when the track was relayed after the accident. That protection includes gathering rails and on the down line extends beyond the site on the wash-out. As she asked about Scottish Government actions, Scotland's railway has established a permanently staffed weather desk position to monitor weather conditions and advising controllers on the necessary precautionary actions. I mentioned that in my response to Graham Simpson, which is leading to better team-working between network rail and ScotRail staff, and of course that will pass to the Scottish Government from April 1. Blanket speed restrictions in areas have been introduced without earthworks on the at-risk list from September of 2020. As we know, no instruction was given to the driver that day to slow down, so consideration of introducing more regular speed restrictions has been a major part of the action that network rail have taken forward. The minister has answered quite a lot of questions around the environmental impacts that we are seeing around the rail network, so I will not go into that again and ask her to rehash them. I want to ask her what sort of action she is asking the network rail to ensure so that something that does not ever occur again in the future. I am keen to meet with network rail students to discuss this further. I mentioned in my response to Graham Simpson that I met with Alex Hynes earlier today for a very short call to discuss some of the report's findings. I am keen to meet with network rail in more detail to establish a better understanding of where it sees its priorities going forward from the report. The report itself has 300 pages in total. It is a substantial piece of work. The RIIB undertake it over a number of months, so I do not want to jump to conclusions with regard to recommendations for network rail at this stage. Of course, network rail has no responsibility to report to me in this Parliament, but they report to UK Government ministers. Recognising some of the challenges here in terms of reserved and devolved competencies, I would not like to sketch out what I see for network rail in terms of the actions that it needs to take forward. That is for the Office of Rail and Road, of course, to enforce in terms of the recommendations that are the regulator, and I would expect that it will be working with network rail on that. I would also expect that network rail would certainly be welcome to engage with the steering group along with ScotRail and along with UK Government representation, because I think that it is absolutely vital that we have all partners at the table and, of course, the trade unions ensuring that we get it right, and we put in place the recommendations from this report to ensure a disaster like that that happened at Carmont never happens again. Thank you. That concludes the ministerial statement. Relaxed in investigation branch report into Carmont passenger train derailment.