 Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen and welcome to Bly Street. I'm Michael Fully Love, the Director of the Institute and I'm pleased to welcome you all to the fourth Owen Harries lecture this year to be delivered by our inaugural Distinguished European Fellow Jean-Davide Levite. Before I introduce Jean-Davide I'd like to acknowledge Owen Harries and we're delighted that Owen and his wife Dorothy were able to join us for the lecture named in Owen's honour. Owen is a dear friend to many of us at the Institute. His career has examined foreign policy from all angles, the Academy and as a practitioner he was an advisor to the Fraser government, he served as Australia's ambassador to UNESCO. In 1985 along with Irving Crystal Owen founded the National Interest which is one of the most important journals in our field. When I was appointed Executive Director of the Institute I wanted to recognise Owen's remarkable contribution to our field and his decade-long association with the Institute as a non-resident fellow and my Chairman Frank Lowey agreed that we should establish the Owen Harries lecture. The Harries lecture is an annual address by a prominent commentator on global affairs. Previous lecturers have included the US diplomat Kurt Campbell the principal author of The Pivot to Asia, Steve Hadley who was National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush and Ambassador Shyam Saran the former head of the Indian Foreign Ministry. This year the Harries lecture is associated with a new Lowey Institute initiative, our Distinguished European Fellowship. We've established this fellowship because we take the view that Europe matters to Australia. The Australian debate is dominated by discussion of the United States and Asia and to some extent this is inevitable and of course it is desirable to know as much as we can about our great ally and our own region in which we must make our way. But Europe is also important. Developments in Europe whether Putin's invasion of Crimea or annexation of Crimea, the euro crisis or Brexit have ripple effects all around the world. We are as Australians heir to a European civilization. European values inform our institutions and our culture. Europe is a vitally important economic partner. The continent is our second largest trading partner and our largest source of foreign investment. Europe is also an increasingly important strategic partner with real interests in Asia and the Pacific. So this fellowship will bring European perspectives to Australia. It exposes this leader every year to the work and staff of the Institute and gives the fellow the opportunity to contribute to the Australian policy debate through media appearances, meetings with Australian leaders and a number of public speeches such as this one. We hope that our fellows leave not just as ambassadors of the Institute but ambassadors of Australia. Let me take the opportunity to thank everyone involved in running the fellowship in particular, Sam Rogovine, Louisa Fitzgerald and Tara Piena. Ladies and gentlemen, we could not have chosen a better person to be our inaugural distinguished European fellow than Jean-Divide Levite and I am personally very grateful that he has agreed to accept this invitation. Jean-Divide is one of France's best thinkers on foreign policy and one of France's most distinguished practitioners of foreign policy having served three French presidents. Jean-Divide joined the French Foreign Service in 1970 and was posted early in his career to Hong Kong and Beijing. He held senior positions in the ministry including permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, assistant secretary for Asia and undersecretary for cultural and scientific cooperation. He was the senior diplomatic advisor to presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy and also served President Valérie Giscard de Stang. Between 2007, Jean-Divide served in the United States, first as permanent representatives to the United Nations in New York and then as French ambassador to the United States during the Iraq War. In fact, as Jean-Divide was just telling me, he was in Washington in that period when the Congress resolved to rename French fries, Freedom Fries, which is obviously deserving of a congressional resolution. As an aside, that seemed like a crazy development at the time, but now in the Trump era, I have to say that feels like a very innocent age. If only that was as low as American politics sinks these days. Jean-Divide will speak to us about the French perspective of a world of shocks and disruptions, but of course a French perspective is by definition a global perspective. France is a global power with global capabilities. It takes a strategic view of the world. It has deep interests in Asia and the Pacific. Both Australia and France are allies of the United States and so it makes sense for us to come together and share our perspectives on the state of the world. Please join me in welcoming, ladies and gentlemen, the 2016 Owen Harry's lecturer, Jean-Divide Levite. Thank you very much, Michael, for these very kind words and ladies and gentlemen. It's really a privilege for me to be with you in Sydney today. I'd like to express deep gratitude for this invitation to my friend, Michael. I'd like to thank Sam and the Lowy team for the wonderful organization of my visit. I'd like to acknowledge also as you did, Michael, the chairman of the Lowy Institute, Mr. Frank Lowy, who's made a remarkable contribution to this country through his business and his philanthropy. And lastly, I'd like to acknowledge, as you did, Owen Harris, after whom this lecture is named. Mr. Harris has made an enormous contribution to both the practice and study of international relations. Owen, it was a pleasure to meet you and it is an honor to follow, as you said, Michael Kurt Campbell, Stephen Eile, my friend, and Shiam Saran in delivering this annual lecture. Well, dear friends, in the coming weeks and months, the U.S. and many European countries will elect new leaders. A common feature of the electoral campaigns on the way is the rise of populist movements. In the U.S., as you mentioned, with Donald Trump, but also with Bernie Sanders in Europe with the Brexit vote in the U.K., as well as the rise of populist movements in Italy, in France, in the Netherlands, now in Germany, and of course in Hungary and in Poland. Why? Why this rise of populism, which doesn't exist, if I understand well, in Australia or in India or Brazil or other democracies? It seems to me that the key reason is the same in the U.S. and in Europe. People, both in the U.S. and in Europe, have a feeling that their leaders have lost control of a transformed world. And they want new leaders with one mission, give us back our sovereignty, give us back control on our borders, our economies and our destinies. So let's first have a look to the transformation of the world over the past decades to see if this perception of loss of control corresponds to reality. And then let's consider what the U.S. and Europe could do to provide constructive answers to these feelings of lost control. Yes, indeed, the world has been transformed. After World War II and for decades we lived in the bipolar world. History was mostly immobile, frozen by the Cold War. The U.S. was in charge of the free world and under their protection, the European community was slowly building a common destiny. Then history started to move. To move again and since then, at least that's my analysis, we have entered a totally different world every 10 to 12 years. So the first question is, okay, when did history started to move again? My answer is 1979. Why 1979? Because on that year, four key events started the movement of history again. The first big event was in February, the fall of the Shah in Iran. Suddenly the U.S. lost their key allies in the Middle East and, of course, with Khomeini, we had a totally new situation which I call political Islam. It's a brand new development in the Middle East. The second big event of 1979 is, of course, the consequence of the first one. It's the second oil shock. And at this moment, the U.S. was described with Carter as losing ground, a weakened power, not only because of the economy and the oil shock, but because of the Iran crisis, the hostage crisis. The third big event in 1979, which has nothing to do with the other two, occurred at the end of the year. It is the beginning of the economic reforms by Thanksgiving in China. At the moment, nobody noted today, we understand that it was a huge starting point of something big. And the fourth big event which occurred in 1979 occurred on Christmas day when the Soviet armies invaded Afghanistan. So these are the four events. And on that year, what strikes me is that the U.S. was considered on the decline because of the Iran crisis and Carter and his difficulties. And the Soviet Union was on the rise because of the invasion of Afghanistan, but also because of its actions with the Cuban troops in Angola, in Ethiopia. So that's 1979. We move ten years fast forward, 1989. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall is destroyed. And it marked a sudden emergence of a totally new world with four major consequences. First, it is of course the end of the bipolar world. And the beginning of what I would call a unipolar decade. That is, without a war, the U.S. became the only superpower, the hyper power. Second, it is the end of communism. It is the end of one century of ideologies. And, well, you may say no, there is North Korea, there is Cuba. Okay. But elsewhere, only market economy rules. Third, it is in a way the beginning of globalization. Why? Because suddenly in the eastern part of Europe, the borders are open. And after ten years of economic reforms, China emerges as a key economic actor. And this new development is helped by two revolution. The first is the IT revolution. The second one, which is not noticed often, but I think it's very important, is the container revolution. Because suddenly, not suddenly, but in only few years, it costs much less and it goes much faster to transport goods from China or elsewhere to our consumer countries. So that's number three. And of course, number four, fourth consequence of this crumble of the iron curtain, it's for Europe. When we started the European Union in 1958, we were six countries representing 180 million citizens. On the other side of the iron curtain, we had the Soviet Empire with 300 million citizens. After this turning point of 1989, suddenly the situation is different. Russia today is 142 million. And the EU, until the day the UK leaves us, is more than 500 million citizens representing 28 countries. So in strategic terms, it is for us a totally new and I should say positive situation. So in a way, the US and the EU, for the US and for the EU, this is what I would call the beginning of a golden decade. In the US, the eight years of President Clinton are years of economic growth and of uncontested international leadership. The US, as Madeleine O'Brien used to say, is the indispensable nation. And in Europe, the wildest dreams of the continent are fulfilled. We are united in peace and in democracy. It becomes a reality. So economic integration makes a decisive progress with the birth of the Euro. Russia under Yeltsin is a rather erratic, but all in all a positive partner for the West. The West leads, the West inspires the world and global organizations. Globalizations makes decisive progress with in particular the establishment of NAFTA, Mexico, the US and Canada in 1994. So that's the second period we moved away from the bipolar world to the unipolar decade. Let's move now fast forward 12 years later. We are in 2001. 2001, 9-11. 9-11, Al Qaeda destroys the twin towers of New York and the Pentagon. I was, as you said, Michael, the French ambassador to the UN at the time. I saw the destruction of the twin towers from the windows of my office. It remains in my heart for the rest of my days. And we have to understand the reaction of the American people. Suddenly, they were the hyper power, the unique superpower, but they discovered that their extreme vulnerability, only less than 20 terrorist armed of cutters, destroyed the twin towers and the Pentagon. And this triggered two wars in Afghanistan, in Iraq, which in a way demonstrated the limits of the American military power to frame the work and spread democracy. In parallel, elsewhere in the world, well, after 10 more years of economic reforms, China emerges as a key power. In 2001, again, China joins WTO, the World Trade Organization, followed as a resurgent country by Russia and the Putin, but also joined by India, Brazil, the Bricks are born. And I would say it's the beginning of a multipolar decade. What I mean by that is the U.S. is still by far the most powerful country, but it must take into account the views of the emerging global actors. And in 2007, 2008, with the subprime crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, American financial leadership, of course, is severely tested. So we move again 10 more years and we are today. And today, I would say, again, we enter a totally new, different world. A world with which first is more complex. What I mean by that is that beyond the U.S., beyond the EU, beyond the Bricks, you have the rise of the rest. What I mean by that is Australia, Indonesia, Korea, Nigeria, Mexico, others want to be heard at the table where decisions are taken. The G20 is born. Second, it seems to me that this new world we are in today is apolar. It's not any more bipolar, unipolar, multipolar. It is apolar. What I mean by that is that the U.S. is, as you know, in a phase of relative disengagement from world affairs. It no longer wants to be the world's cup. At the same time, the EU is totally absorbed by our own problem. And the Bricks don't want to be in charge of crises like the one of Syria. Number three, this new world is marked by contested international rules. Two countries, Russia and China, in different ways, want a kind of revenge over history. They act in different ways, but both challenge the world order enshrined in the UN Charter with their actions in Ukraine and in the South China Sea. Number four, this new world is marked also by what I would call a growing fragmentation. We see it in Europe, in our political lives. The bipartisan rule of our democracies is no more. Now, in most countries, you have three or four competing parties. But it is true also inside our countries, some of our countries in the UK, you have Scotland demanding from time to time to become independent. It's the same in Spain with Catalonia. And of course, fragmentation in the EU means Brexit with a vote which occurred on June 23rd. But it is in the Middle East, of course, that we see fragmentation in its most frightening way, with the implosion of Iraq, with the implosion of Syria, with the implosion of Yemen, with the implosion of Libya. And so from the years of the war in Somalia, we have learned that when the state structures disappear, it's nearly impossible to rebuild them. And that's exactly what we risk today with these wars in the Middle East. And fifth and finally, it seems to me that this world displays the economic and social consequences of what the IMF describes as the risk of a secular economic stagnation, which fuels these populist movements in our countries in the US and in Europe against globalization. And in particular, against key regional trade deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic TTIP negotiation. So that's how I see the world today after these sequences. So ladies and gentlemen, now in this new and dangerous context, what can our leaders do? What should our leaders do? Of course, much will depend on the result of the coming elections. But if in the US, the most experienced candidate, and you see what I mean, is elected, in my view, we will see an America more engaged in world affairs. And in Europe, if we don't have a negative result on the referendum on December 4th in Italy, if in France a reformist candidate is elected, and I will not give names, if I will give a name in Germany, Angela Merkel is re-elected, then in my view, we may have a positive political context for decisive actions to fix the weaknesses of the European construction. So let's start with Europe. Of course, the Brexit negotiations will absorb a lot of time and energy. And I don't anticipate easy discussions. This is a diplomatic understatement. It will be quite bloody in my view. But at the same time, the risk of a further dislocation of the EU will represent a huge incentive for the leaders of the 27 countries to act through more intergovernmental cooperation and to take bold initiatives in two directions. First, a growing integration of the eurozone. If, as I said, France adopts the long-awaited, too long-awaited structural economic reforms, which are promised by most candidates in our presidential elections, then I'm sure that Germany will be ready to accept the proposal to set up a strong institution to fully coordinate national fiscal and structural policies within the eurozone by creating a finance minister of the euro area, a finance minister of the euro area, with the authority to manage a euro area convergence fund evolving towards a real euro budget. If we do that, my conviction is that the European countries like Poland or Hungary, which don't belong yet to the euro area and which are going to lose their mentor with the UK through the Brexit negotiation, these countries, Poland, Hungary, others will want to join the heart of the European project, that is, the eurozone. The second necessary initiative, in my view, is about security. For decades, the EU was considered by millions of Europeans as the best protection against the excesses of globalization. Today, it is the exact opposite. Today, the EU is considered as an aggravating factor because of its importance to confront the threat represented by mass migration from the Middle East, from Northern Africa. So, at their last summit meeting, the 27 leaders without the UK decided to deal with this problem as their number one priority. On October 1st, a European border guard agency was established with strong capacities and an ambitious mandate to control the external borders of the EU to be in a position to maintain the Schengen area without borders. Now, a word about the role of our democracies to protect the values which are at the core of our vision of the world order and are enshrined in the UN Charter. We have to accept that what I call the golden decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Empire will never come back. We have to accept that the world will remain more complex, more fragmented, full of uncertainties and shocks. But I'm convinced that our Western democracies have a unique role to play to make it a better place. For that, we need more engagement from the US and from the European countries, and we need an ambitious dialogue between them and all other key actors, including Australia. To give you just an example of what we should do, I'll take Syria. It is today the most dangerous crisis in the world, one which may lead to a direct confrontation between Russia and the US. There will be no military solution. We need a bold initiative, and here in Sydney, I'd like to build on what Australia and France achieved 25 years ago in Cambodia. It happens that I had the privilege of working closely on this issue with a man I respect and admire. I'm former Australian Foreign Minister, Garrett Evans. Building on what we did together in Cambodia and for Cambodia, we could put in place a free-level negotiating process on Syria. The first level of this negotiation would allow representatives of all Syrian political forces without links to terrorist organizations to meet in Geneva or elsewhere to discuss the future of their country, and in particular, a new constitution with precise responsibilities for the Sunni majority and for the different minorities. The second level would allow the regional powers, that is to say Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, to meet and discuss their necessary contribution to the end of this conflict. The third level would be composed of the P5 or the five permanent members of the secret council or P5 plus one with Germany, the group which negotiated the nuclear Iran deal, which is in my view a very good deal. Undoubtedly, this group of P5 plus one will have to invite at the table the three regional powers, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and use all their capacities and talents to convince the three regional powers to work together and not against each other through their involvement in the Syrian crisis. Beyond Syria and more generally, I consider that we need ad hoc coalitions to address today's crisis. We have one for Ukraine, the so-called Normandy format with Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. We need one on Libya with representatives of Arab countries and European countries. We need one on the Sahel crisis with the participation of countries of the region and from Europe. Last but not least, we need the leadership of our democracies to show the way forward in addressing the challenges of the world economy confronted with unprecedented dangers and of the even greater danger of climate change. And here again, we need an engaged America. It's of crucial importance to have the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiation Agreement ratified soon by the Congress. And to conclude the Transatlantic Negotiation, the future of globalization would be in great, great danger if the protectionist forces in our countries were in a position to kill these two key regional accords. In conclusion, dear friends, I'd like to emphasize two personal convictions. First, because America is no longer in the dominant position it was 20 years ago, the type of control exercised by the West in the Clinton era is no longer possible. Therefore, it's absolutely necessary that countries like Australia and France play their full role in the construction of a better and safer world. And if the new leaders elected in the U.S. and in some European countries demonstrate this leadership, this vision, this determination that are so necessary, no doubt the populist movements will slowly lose ground in America and in Europe. Yes, indeed our world is transformed with the rise of new powers. It is more complex, more uncertain, but I'm certain I'm convinced that with bold initiatives, our democracies working in cooperation with other powers, other key actors can make it a better place. I'm convinced that our publics, I'm convinced and will convince, sorry, our publics that globalization is still the best way forward. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sure you'll agree that was a really magnificent speech. It combined a tour-horizon, a clear-eyed examination of modern history with a realistic sense of what is achievable, but also an optimism that I think is characteristic of Eugène David. So it had both the breadth, but also the specificity in some of those proposals. We have about 15 minutes for questions. There's lots of things I would like to ask you, but as you're the Distinguished European Fellow, I want to start with one or two questions on Europe before I offer my friends in the audience an opportunity to ask you something. Let me ask you first of all about Russia. This week, I think Mr. Putin cancelled his state visit to York capital to Paris, and we know about the way Russia is comporting itself in Europe and in Syria and elsewhere. How should the West deal with Mr. Putin? And does Australia have any dog in that fight? I start with Australia. You don't have a dog in the fight about Ukraine and the former Russian Empire with problems in Ukraine, but not only in Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere. But I think that we can discuss, negotiate with President Putin. I say that because I had the experience of the war in Georgia in 2008. At the time, as you said, Michael, I was the senior diplomatic advisor of President Sarkozy. And it happened that the two leaders, Putin and Sarkozy, were at the same time in the Olympic Stadium of Beijing for the inauguration of the Olympic Games. And Russia took advantage of this situation to discreetly send troops in Georgia, in the way Georgia. So it was the starting point of a tough discussion between the two leaders. And Sarkozy decided to go to Moscow to discuss with Prime Minister Putin at the time and President Medvedev. And we obtained that the troops, the thousands of Russian troops, which went in Georgia in August, were totally withdrawn by October. So yes, in my view, it is possible to discuss, negotiate with President Putin. In fact, I think that he has a dream to rebuild in a way the Russian Empire as it was during the great days of Catherine the Great. But there are rules. There is a UN charter. And for us, there are paramount. Does it mean that we will be in a confrontation permanently? No, we have to find a way forward because after all, we need each other. I do think that there will be a brilliant future for the Russian economy only if the European countries can work with Russia in a positive way. And for that, we need to find a solution in Ukraine first. Let me ask you secondly about China, an European countries approach to China. Sometimes it feels from this part of the world that Europe takes a one-dimensional view of China. China is an economic opportunity. It's a business partner. But European capitals don't see China in a three-dimensional way as a strategic actor and a country that is increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. Is that correct? Is the European view of China developing, do you think? Well, I respectfully disagree with you. Of course, geography is important and we are not close to China, but we don't ignore the rise of China. It is, at the same time, very positive and a bit threatening. I mentioned the dream of the Russians to rebuild the Russian Empire in a way. Maybe, if I may, I would say there is a dream in China which is to regain the status which was the one of China as the Middle Empire, surrounded by barbarian kingdoms whose role was to send in the past, unvoiced to the court of the emperor to pay tribute and go back to their countries illuminated by the Chinese civilization. In a way, I would say, that's my personal comment, that in the mind of maybe many Chinese leaders, that is exactly the meaning of what is happening in the South China Sea. It's not about fish or oil. It's more about the rise of China which want to be recognized as above. And of course, there is international law. There is the UN Charter. There has been a decision by a tribunal. So it's very important that we maintain a positive dialogue with Chinese leadership. And I can tell you that for European leaders, even if trade is important, we consider that the world order is at stake also in Asia. And we want to be a positive actor to help maintain the world order as it is enshrined in the UN Charter. Okay. Who would like to ask Mr. Levite a question? Yes, I'll go to Greg Medcraft and then Tom Switzer. Thanks, John. David, an excellent speech. Thank you. I do hope that your view of the world is correct. I'd probably summarize it as half glass full, which is good. I'd actually love to see that as what happens. But I mean, the issue of populism, I mean, we do have it in this country. It was exhibited in the last election here. And I guess what I see is that if you want the losers in the system, which we keep talking about, are now in power through social media and the 24 hour news cycle. And I guess the danger of all of this is that they're not necessarily going to be convinced what may seem to be a rational thing about globalization. Don't you think that that is still going to be a, how do you convince those people who feel they've lost out? And you've got to convince them in a, you know, in basically a way that they can believe it. No, as you say, they don't believe the current system is working for them. Yeah. And that's exactly what is happening in the U.S. In fact, I will not go in the details of the electoral campaign, but clearly part of the American population considers that globalization was bad. NAFTA was bad. Opening the borders was a mistake. And you don't change a minor in the mine of the Appalachian mountains into specialists of computing. So it's a transition. But if you look at the polls in the U.S., you see that the majority still believes that globalization is positive. And so that's where I say if we have a new president of the U.S. more engaged in world affairs, demonstrating U.S. leadership and determination, then hopefully this populist movement will recede. In Europe, it's a different story. In Europe, it's our borders. Well, in the U.S. also, it's a Mexican wall. Okay. But in Europe, as I said in my intervention, most people considered that the construction of the European Union was providing for the first time in our long history. We are in the longest period of peace in Europe since the Roman Empire. So it's not bad. But it's not enough. And for millions of people, Europe was a shield against the excesses of globalization. And through these waves of migrants coming from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Africa, suddenly it's the opposite because we don't control enough our borders. So this is the number one priority, as I said. We'll do our best. We are slow because, of course, Europe is 28 countries, tomorrow 27. So it's compromise. But as I said, the agency which has been created on 1st of October is a new development, promising. That is, now from now on, if Greece cannot control its islands and the wave of migrants is starting again, then you have 1500 border guards well equipped under the leadership of one man who can decide to send them to protect and help Greece. It's a beginning. But it's good because it goes in the good direction. If we can give the impression to the European voters that okay, we learned the lesson. Now we are determined to provide strong, determined answers to the challenges of today and tomorrow. Then I think we may see a decline of populist movements. Thank you. Tom Switzer, the host of Between the Lines on Radio National, which we all listen to here at the Institute. Thanks, Michael. Ambassador, something different. Could you please reconcile your different positions on the two major Western military interventions in the Middle East during the past 15 years? The French government opposed the intervention in Iraq in 2003, which culminated in the demise of a brutal, thuggish regime opening up a strategic vacuum for Sunni jihadists. And yet eight years later, the French government supported the intervention in Libya, which brought down another brutal, thuggish regime, which created a strategic opening for Sunni jihadists. Why no for Iraq and why yes for Libya. First, we are not, and we were not, as a matter of principle against a military action in Iraq. If I may, I would like to remind this audience that we were with 10,000 troops, members of the coalition which pushed out of Kuwait, the Iraqi troops during the days of Saddam Hussein, a coalition led by the U.S. under George H. Bush, 41, as they say in Washington. So why not again in 2003? Because we negotiated, I was the negotiator of resolution 1441 in New York, a resolution which paved the way to the return of inspectors in Iraq. And they did return. And their mission was very simple to identify where, where the stocks of arms of mass destruction and obtain their destruction. And their mission was underway. And half of the inspectors were American. And so the resolution that was adopted said, let's have the inspectors do their job, they report back to the secret counsel. If Saddam Hussein refuses to cooperate, we have a second discussion in the secret counsel and we decide what we have to do. As you know, there were some impressions in Washington. The inspectors had no time to send reports about their mission. It was not accomplished. It was halfway. They had, they had discovered nothing. And nonetheless, without waiting, and without a second resolution, the U.S. decided to go to war. We were not, as a matter of principle, against military action. We were against military action because we wanted to wait for the reports of the inspectors. We wanted to wait for a common decision as for the first action against Saddam Hussein, a decision of the secret counsel. What happened in Libya in 2011 is different. It was Arab, Arab Springs and there was a revolt in Benghazi, one, a city of one million people, which spread very rapidly in the whole country. And Gaddafi started to bomb his own population with planes, helicopters, tanks. So the question was, should we on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea quietly wait or should we do something? And President Sarkozy, Prime Minister Cameron, others decided that we could not stay put and see these massacres. But before action, we considered that we needed first a call from the Libyan people. And it came with the transition council, which was formed in Benghazi. Second, we needed a call from the Arab League. We got it. Third, we needed a mandate from the security council. We got it. And fourth, we needed a coalition with Arab countries to demonstrate that it was not a crusade of Europe against an Arab country, but it was the determination of a coalition to block the massacres, to stop the massacres by a bloody dictator. And we had in our coalition Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. So what went wrong? It started well. The war was a success, but unfortunately Gaddafi was killed. He was killed. Why? Because we could not have troops on the ground. That was the condition of the security council. So we were protecting from above. Second, after his death, there was a new government, moderate. They organized free and fair elections. The parliament got a moderate majority. And that was a good beginning. Unfortunately, slowly, it was transformed into a mess because the militia were not disbanded and so on. So what went wrong is not the war, but the lack of international action to help a new government. And here I'd like to conclude with Cambodia again because what we did in 1991 in Cambodia was also a very difficult negotiation because you had the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese troops. So we had to disintegrate these actors. You had confrontation between Beijing and Hanoi and so on. We succeeded. But we didn't stop at that. We said, okay, and then we will put the whole country, Cambodia, into the trusteeship of the United Nations. And the United Nations will deploy troops and specialists in economy and so on to help the refugees to come back to their country, to disarm the military factions and to organize free and fair elections. And I think that's what we should have done in the security council. Unfortunately, I guess it was not possible because the conjunction of powers was not exactly the same. There was reluctance in the security council. But if we think of Syria, at some moment we will need this kind of international presence to help the different groups to calm down and rebuild their country. We probably have time for one more question. Just wait for the microphone if you would. It seems to me the best negotiations take place between parties who are rational and who know their own self-interest. It seems this makes it very hard to negotiate with anyone in the Middle East. Well, yes and no. I think that, as I said in my speech, you had the decays of construction of state structures. Of course, you have very ancient states like Egypt, okay. But Syria, Iraq, Jordan, in a way, are new states. So you had these decays of state structures. And I mentioned 1979 as a turning point because Iran has always been a great civilization and state. But the moment Khomeini became the leader, it added one religious dimension to the Iranian policy inside and outside. Suddenly Iran was not only an actor demanding its full role in the region, but it became the protector of the Shia where they were in the Arab countries. A majority of Shia in Iraq, a minority of Shia in Syria, and it started with the civil war in Lebanon. And Lebanon, we know it, it was a protectorate from France. We had built institutions where you had a repetition of power between the Christian president, the Sunni prime minister, the Shia president of the parliament. All this was a bit shaky, but it worked until the day the civil war started and slowly the Shia Hezbollah, with the support of Iran, was transformed into the most powerful power in the country, a state within a non-state. That's the result. Then you had the war in Iraq and democracy is America. America gave power to the Shia and because it's the majority. So thank you, America should say, Khomeini. But unfortunately in Iraq democracy means the rule of the majority and nothing for the minorities. So the Kurds are more or less independent and the Sunni are in revolt and now under the control most of them of ISIS. And then you had the Arab Spring and when there were peaceful demonstrations in Syria from the Sunni population, 70% of our population demanding a bit more representation, the answer from Bashar al-Assad was bullets, massive clings. And it started the war. In my view, the more complex and difficult situation is by far Syria. There is a way for Lebanon, there is a way forward for Iraq, but Syria it will be very long difficult to rebuild not only a peaceful environment, but state structures adapted to the new situation and at the same time protecting the minorities, which is key for a peaceful future for this country. And that's why we need the involvement of external powers, the free regional powers, because they are fighting proxy wars and they don't have the same priorities. If you take Turkey, the priority is the Kurds. For Turkey, the priority in Syria is the Kurds, the Kurds to make sure that they don't get a state in Syria and consequences inside Turkey. If you are Iran, what you want as a priority is to protect and maintain the Shia axis, Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Hezbollah. And if you are Saudi Arabia, your priority is to do whatever possible to curb the rise of Iran as the dominant power in the Middle East. So that's why we need the five permanent powers to exert pressure on these three regional powers so that they stop their proxy war inside Syria. That's a beginning. And then through dialogue, you may build new institutions where each component of Syria may feel that they are happy, but at least there is a future for the children in peace and democracy, hopefully. John David, I'm going to sneak in one last cheeky question if I can. And I'm driven to ask you this as a former permanent representative to the UN in New York. In the last few days, the Security Council has put forward a candidate to be the Secretary General, to be confirmed soon. Another European, Mr Gutierrez of Portugal, to the intense disappointment of at least one Australian. May I ask you, would you agree that Ban Ki-moon has been a weak Secretary General? And what are the chances that Mr Gutierrez can learn from his mistakes and be a strong Secretary General? I will not comment on Ban Ki-moon. I'm full of hope for Gutierrez. For two reasons. First, it is the first Secretary General who has been the leader of his country. He's been a very successful Prime Minister in Portugal. He has a lot of experience and the day you elect a former Prime Minister as the boss in the UN, it creates a new relationship between the Secretary General and his, if I may say, former colleagues, the leaders of the world. I remember at the end of a difficult period for Butros Gali, the U.S. decided to put a veto because he was a Secretary General, but he was acting as a General and not as a Secretary. That was the view of the U.S. Okay. So to be sure, to be comfortable, Kofi Annan was elected. He emerged as a very talented Gifted Secretary General, but he was a servant of the system, emerging as a General slowly, and he got the Nobel prize for that. Here we start with a strong leader, Gutierrez, and he has an equal relationship with all leaders because he has been himself for years and years a very successful Prime Minister in his country. The second reason why I think it's a very positive development is that for 10 years he's been the High Commissioner for Refugees, and I spoke at length of the tragedy of so many refugees. It's good to have somebody with his paternal experience, and I can tell you that he was a very talented and respected High Commissioner for Refugees. So as he was very successful in one body of the UN, I'm pretty sure that he will be even more successful as our new Secretary General. I say our because he is now the servant of 193 countries, but I'm pretty sure that he will act not as a servant, but as a leader showing the way. And the last comment because for a specialist of the UN, it was very interesting. There has been a new procedure which has been imposed by the General Assembly. In the past, the UN Security Council was really in charge of this election, and it was a selection, in fact, by the five permanent members because of the veto right. This time, the General Assembly has voted, including with the support of the five permanent, a totally new experience. That is, you had to declare officially that through your country that you were a candidate, and then you had to come to the UN General Assembly for a dialogue of two hours with all ambassadors. And during these two hours, each candidate, and there were a number of candidates, had to respond to answer questions presented by the ambassadors. And that's good because it creates a new transparency in this process which was, in my view, too opaque in the past. So yes, it's a moment of hope for not only the UN Secretary General. I know that some Australians may be disappointed, but I think it's good for the UN. We have former Prime Minister Guterres in charge of the Secretariat, and no doubt that he will get the support of not only the five permanent members, but even more the rest of the rest I described in my intervention because they feel that through this new procedure, he is theirs. He is their candidate because he has accepted to come and discuss with not the five permanent members, but all ambassadors. And so it's a moment of hope in this world of shocks and turmoil that I described. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, my Chairman's intention with the Distinguished European Fellowship is to bring European voices of clarity and knowledge to Australia. And our intention with the Harry's lecture is to hear from somebody who knows how power works and how relations between states works on what is a way forward for our, to make the world a safer and more prosperous place. And I hope you agree with me that Jean-Davide Lavit is the perfect person to achieve both of those ambitions. So please join me once more in thanking the Harry's lecturer, Jean-Davide Lavit.