 I think we're going to start bang on time. I'm Stephanie Flanders, head of economics and government at Bloomberg, and this is the fiscal panel, fiscal expansion and welcome return or ticking bomb. I guess we've had a long time when governments could borrow a lot more but pay much less overall in debt servicing costs. We've had this extraordinary period after the global financial crisis where certainly across Europe debt ratios roughly doubled, but in every case their cost of debt servicing as a share of GDP had actually gone down over that time. I think we've also during that time not really faced any tension in responding to economic major economic crisis between fiscal and monetary policy. They were both pointing in the same direction and in the last 12 months both of those things have changed and we are back to what some would call a more normal time for fiscal policy. It's certainly a very different time and it's been a very challenging time as governments try and face a trade off between responding to cost of living crisis but also not making the central bank's job any harder. We're going to try and get straight into some of the implications of this particular period for fiscal policy, short and long term, but I'm going to try not to have too much time thinking about the immediate outlook since that's been the topic of so many other sessions in and around Davos. We have a superb panel if I just start from the far end of the stage, Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. Next to him, the European Commissioner for the Economy, Barlogin Theloni, Gita Gopinath, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the Ministry of Finance of Thailand, Aachom Tempeitayab Pesit. Gita Gopinath, can I start with you? Responding to what I just said, how do you see that trade off today between monetary and fiscal policy? I think we tend to always say there are no trade offs and how have countries responded? Which countries have done well in handling that difficult balance? So we are in a unique time because of inflation. I mean, this is the fact that we have the kind of inflation that we hadn't seen, and we saw that particularly in 2022 we see it coming down some now, but it is still high. And so that's what generates the tension between monetary policy and fiscal policy. And while we have inflation and we need to bring inflation down, we also have the issue that there is high prices, again last year particularly, but it continues into this year, high prices for energy, high prices for food, which then calls for fiscal policy to provide support to the most vulnerable in society. So you have an inflation problem you have to deal with, but you're still hit with shocks, like food shocks and energy shocks that require fiscal policies to step up, and that's what's making the current conjuncture particularly difficult. And what's important to keep in mind, though, is inflation has helped a little bit with on the debt story. So if you look at what happened to public sector debt globally in 2020, it went up to around 99% of GDP. And now it's come down to around 91% of GDP. And that's because of a combination of the recovery, but also because of the inflation inflating away some of that debt. Now, at 91%, it's still around 8 percentage points higher than what it was pre-pandemic. So there is still a debt problem that countries have to deal with, but inflation and the recovery has reduced the size of that increase in the debt. In terms of what countries need to do to manage this difficult trade-off right now, I would say fiscal policy has to accomplish three things, which is one, it should be consistent with bringing inflation down, which means at the minimum it should not be expansionary at the overall level. Again, because of the fact that we've had a lot of pandemic-specific measures being taken off countries, countries have been able to actually accomplish that. They've been able to accomplish that we can provide support to our population for energy reasons or food reasons because we've taken off some of the pandemic measures. So this is not the classic kinds of fiscal consolidation that we haven't seen yet. The second thing that fiscal policy should keep in mind is indeed to make sure that you are protecting the most vulnerable and they need to do that. Again, when it comes to food and energy, these are very important fundamental essentials for households. You need to provide support for that. And the last thing is it's absolutely essential at this time to have a sound and communicate a sound medium-term fiscal framework with clarity on bringing down debt at a time and building up buffers in the medium term. Minister, do you see a difference in the trade-off that you faced or that emerging market economies have faced? In many ways they've done better in the past year. Certainly most of the major emerging market economies have done better than we might have expected. I think it's quite different because we are more cautious about running the fiscal policy and the monetary policy as well. But actually for the past two years, three years actually, during the pandemic, the monetary policy and fiscal policy is working closely. We are working closely and we are thankful for the monetary policies to allow fiscal to do more work. In our case, for two years, we have borrowed 1.5 trillion taibagh, but actually it's not the biggest borrowing in the world. I think because we carefully look at how in the future we can pay this debt. At the same time, how we get this 1.5 trillion is that we expand our debt ceiling according to the... ...in order to give more fiscal space for the government from 60% to GDP to 70%. That's by our definition, but our debt performance is now... ...by our definition is 60%, which is still in line with the old ceiling. By the definition, our public debt is only 55%, I think, which is not high. But after two years, I think it's not only monetary policy has to do more work, but the fiscal policy has become normalized as well because we go back to work on how we pay back the debt. So there are two things. One is whether the government will still keep spending. I think this is important because in Thailand there's a backlog of capital investment, particularly for the infrastructure. So we set at least 20% of our national budget for capital expenditure. So the fiscal policy in terms of the budget policy is the expansion. But the thing is we have to minimize our deficit because we have been running deficit for almost 20 years. So it's time now that we should put our budget deficit down to below 3%. But how we do that is on the other side is the revenue collection. The revenue collection is important. We have to expand our tax base. Right now we should not be able to talk about the personal income tax because it has been very low already. The corporate income tax is low, but what we can do is the expansion to more digital tax. Electronic service, for example, and getting more people and more startups to be in the system. So that's what we are doing right now. So the fiscal policy, okay, we still spend, but with the less deficit by increasing our revenue up to... because in the past, our revenue collection to GDP is declining from almost 20% down to the 13%. So this is our job that we have to increase our capacity in terms of the revenue collection in order to finance all the project. But the other thing is, as I said, the backlog of the infrastructure, which now we are not focusing on the physical infrastructure, but more on the digital infrastructure as well as the innovation infrastructure. How we finance? So some of the project, which is a large-scale project, has been granted to the private sector in the form of their PPP. So more and more projects to the private sector in order to share the cost between the government and the private sector. Commissioner Gentiloni, is this year going to be... I've talked about how some of the measures we've been able to handle the trade-off in many ways by removing exceptional measures that were taken, the sort of one-off fiscal supports. And it's harder to do that this year. Is this going to be the toughest year for European governments? Well, we had a lot of tough, toughest years. It's always going to be tougher next year. I think we had a three or four-year stress test for our economists. On the COVID crisis, it was a love affair between monetary and fiscal policy, completely in line. I remember, in March, we decided to gather fiscal support and extraordinary purchase programme from the ECB in the very same days. Now, of course, the situation is completely different, inflation. I fully share that the target is to avoid that fiscal policy compete with monetary policy. We should complete it. Easy to say, not so easy to put in practice. Why? Because we already had the need to leave the universal support that we had during the COVID pandemic and go to a more targeted form of support. We had, for the first time in Europe, common programmes, the next generation EU that are financing investments. But then the war and the COVID and the energy crisis changed a little bit the picture. I think we should be aware of the fact that this crisis is affecting all the world in geopolitical terms. But on economic terms, Europe and the emerging economies, the global south, if you want, are more affected than other advanced economies from this crisis. So the challenge now, in my view, are mainly two, if we want to have this good coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. First, how we are able to avoid that the expenditure and the measures to address the energy crisis remain universal and time unlimited measures. This could be a danger just to make you an example we spent at the EU level in 2022, 1.3% of our budget on energy prices related measures. If you look to the draft budgetary plan for 2023, this 1.3 goes down to 1%. But this decrease is based on the assumption that is in the draft budgetary plans of member states that you will gradually phase out these measures, limit them, go to more targeted measures. If this doesn't happen, if we continue the measures that we have in place, the overall burden will be 2%. So we will go from 1.3% in 2022, not decreasing to 1%, but increasing to 2%, which means with the more moderate level of growth that we will have next year in the European Union, that the period that we had in 2021 and 2022 of reduction of deficit and debt after the skyrocketing increase of the COVID crisis could be under pressure. So this is our first issue and we discussed also yesterday with finance ministers. It is not easy to phase out these measures of course from a social point of view, but the longer you keep them and you keep them universal, the riskier their phasing out is. Because these measures were only also useful to curve inflation in some countries, but when you phase out them, if you make this too far in the coming months, if you keep them in place for a too long time, when you will phase out, you could have a spike again in inflation. So we have to phase out them, make them more targeted, as easy as the budget plans quite soon. And this is a political challenge. I know very well that it's easy to preach this from Brussels. It's a little bit more difficult to implement this from the different governments in different member states. Second challenge is that we need to keep a good level of public investments in strategic areas. And this is what for me is very encouraging, looking to the budget that we have for 2023, is that public investment is not decreasing. It is increasing. It is exactly the opposite of what happened after the financial crisis when we had five or six years of continuously decreasing public investments. Because we need the other component of this difficult situation is that, yes, we have inflation, yes, we have to support the vulnerable, but we have also to continue to support our transition investments. Otherwise, the disadvantage that we have in Europe in terms of energy prices will last for long. And to go further with this disadvantage, we have to increase our capacity on the green transition, etc. Here, I have an optimistic picture because I see that there is an awareness in the union to keep our, also thanks to the common programs, of course, to keep our investments for the strategic future goals strong. And this is good. I want to get into how fiscal policy can still be used for some of those long-term investment priorities. But, Raghuram Rajan, you no longer have the burden of being a central bank governor. Just at the most sort of basic level, Peter's mentions that actually inflation has made it a little bit easier to see debt stocks fall in nominal terms. Of course, again, completely basic. The cost of borrowing has gone up. How do you think fiscal policy makers should be thinking about fiscal policy as a tool given these two things? Absolutely. So let's start with why spending was so easy, the coordination you talked about. Part of it was that central banks had anesthesized bond markets with QE programs. Long-term rates didn't move much as borrowing picked up. The problem is some of it was hidden. What central banks are doing is buying long-term debt, financing it with overnight money. When you put the balance sheet of the central bank together with the government balance sheet, what that effectively means is over the period of QE, governments have actually reduced the maturity of their debt, made it much more interest sensitive. Perhaps the outlier here is Japan, where the Bank of Japan holds 50% of government debt, which means as interest rates pick up in Japan, you will see the consolidated balance sheet being hit significantly. Already the Fed is actually making negative income on its balance sheet, which means the dividends the Fed pays to the government, 83 billion I think was in good times, is going to come down to zero and actually look negative. That doesn't mean the government has to replenish the central bank, but it does mean that the consolidated balance sheet is much less long-term than we thought. So higher interest rates hit harder earlier in many of these countries. Of course the other problem is that the size of the debt has gone up tremendously over the last few years. That's actually an interesting issue, which is why has fiscal discipline broken down? One argument is we've had all these extraordinary crises and that is true, but we've had three once in a lifetime crises in the last 20 years. The global financial crisis, we've had the pandemic and now of course the consequences of the war. Part of the problem that's going on is clearly there is a fractured political consensus in many industrial countries. I mean that is part of the reason the US overspent. Every constituency got a share of the spending simply because they couldn't make choices. So forget targeted spending, it's universal plus in the sense that what you had was banks which should have suffered losses during the pandemic, did suffer any losses. Why? Because you had the paycheck protection program which went to the small and medium firms correctly, but then it went out to the back door directly to the banks to repay the loans. So in some sense we've bailed out everybody, right? And that is the problem. Spending today is highly untargeted including the energy spending that is the spending on power that is happening in Europe. How do we bring it back sort of under control? I think Mr Gentiloni expressed concern here. Now what does that mean for the longer term? It means that fiscal and monetary will remain more in conflict rather than coordination going forward. Central banks are clearly determined to bring inflation down but with spending still high plus the prospect of spending not becoming more targeted over time does imply that inflationary expectations, inflationary consequences will be higher for longer. So I mean I guess the bottom line is how does this impact government budget since we're talking fiscal? I think what matters is the level of real interest rates going forward. The slowing in growth because of de-globalisation, because of China slowing down, et cetera, because of aging populations will certainly dampen long-term core real interest rates, right? That's one reason. Aging mixed effects. I think Goodheart and Pradhan make a good case but there have been counter arguments. So we don't know how aging will impact long-term real interest rates. But what is clear is the inflation premium will add to long-term real interest rates if there's conflict between fiscal and monetary. So net effect is certainly if we can get inflation under control, nominal rates will come down, unclear what will happen to real rates if we don't get the consensus. Last point I will make, there's a lot of need for green investment. We heard again that countries need to do more of it. The real question is who's going to bear the burden of green investment? The more you focus on incentive structures given by the government, subsidies here, subsidies there, what that does is put the burden on the public sector balance sheet. The more you focus on regulation, carbon tax or emission controls and so on, the more it comes on the private sector. Right now it seems, certainly in the US, the consensus is it's too hard to put it on the private sector, it goes on the public sector balance sheet. We just saw the inflation reduction act full of incentives of one kind or the other. So I think this is yet another place where fiscal needs to think very hard. Given the breakdown in consensus, given the fracture, are we going to take the easy route and not impose some of the costs of the transition on the private sector? Take it all on the public sector balance sheet, which means the public sector balance sheet has yet more burdens going forward, which means yet more premium in unexpected places. Rugby's put a lot of things on the table. Can I just come back to you, Paolo Gentiloni, just because obviously in the first part of what he was saying, the fact that the tension is actually going to get worse between the fiscal and the monetary. I mean, obviously you feel that most intensely in the zone where fiscal and monetary are most segregated. Do you think, I mean, is Europe ready for the continued tension that comes from the ECB following its mandate but the build up that we've seen in borrowing over these years at much lower rates? Whether you, of course, is very flexible, so the capacity of adaptation is extraordinary. We have a difficult to put it diplomatically decision making process, but we have also a lot of capacity of adaptation. So, honestly, I'm not expecting big tensions provided that we are able to address the issues that I was mentioning so that we are able to move these measures in support to energy in a more targeted way. This is what all the European institutions are preaching for. It's not the ECB that is saying we need to have more targeted measures and the European Commission saying the opposite. We are working together in the same direction. Results are mixed because it is not easy at all. And then also, and I repeat this, because of the asymmetry of the impact of this crisis, because it is true, of course, that we have to move on energy measures leaving this universal plus approach that you are referring to. But it is also true that we have a competitive disadvantage on energy prices. We are talking a lot about the IRA. This is good. But the competitive challenge for our industry is coming, first of all, on the disadvantages on energy prices. IRA is coming a little bit on top of this. And it is a real challenge for Europe, for the EU, because being very strong and advanced on regulation, we were very demanding on regulation for the green transition, for the fit for 55, for the car industries and whatever. If you have this pressure on regulation, that is a pressure on the private sector, mostly. And at the same time this disadvantage, you could have a competitiveness concern, which is what we are discussing now in Europe. Just to get back to the fiscal, I mean you say it's hard to make decisions. The Commission has proposal, wants to have new proposals for the fiscal, for the stability and growth back, for the fiscal rules going forward, but there's no written proposal yet for governments to discuss, so why not? Well, the way in theory is clear. We are working to build a consensus on our proposal, and after reaching this consensus, which is in our plan, possible in March, this is what we are working for, then we will come with legislative proposal and concrete proposals, which will take time. You know, if you have a political consensus in the period between this consensus and the final approval of legislative changes, the Commission could exercise its power of interpretation, as always, of the rules. The point is that we are not yet having this consensus, so we are working. And you don't expect to have a written proposal before March, though? Well, we will make proposals when Member States will have reached a decent level of consensus. We don't need unanimity, but we need a large, large consensus. I wonder what your response was to some of what Rugbyl was saying, both on the long-term prospect for rates, but also this emphasis that perhaps we haven't heard so much from the IMF on the consolidated balance sheet and the sensitivity now of government borrowing to interest rate rises. So, you know, I do agree with Rugbyl that we have moved into a period where the expectation is from citizens is that fiscal policy will be used to address the problems that they are facing with. And so there's a more eager sense on deploying fiscal resources and to do that even through deficit spending, I think, has certainly become more popular. Debt levels are also high, so I think those two factors move in the direction of saying that real interest rates in the future could be higher than what we've had in the past. But there are the most standard forces that still weigh in the opposite direction. We have inequality, which keeps interest rates low. Demographics, yes, I think there could be a turning point when demographics actually works in the other direction and raises the rates, but I don't think we're there yet. It still moves in the direction of keeping interest rates low. And so it's hard at this point that when you do the analysis and look at the different factors that drive interest rates to say that while we have, you know, good reason to believe that interest rates, real interest rates will be significantly higher than what it was pre-pandemic. I think there's uncertainty there, but not a strong sign that it's going to move much higher. On the part that Raghu made, I think it made a very interesting point about whether we're going to remain in this conflict for a while and whether that's going to have implications for inflation expectations and so on. Well, I think we can take some comfort that as of now I don't see that dynamic playing out, which is, you know, we do see, we are seeing with monetary policy interest rates going up with the tightness that we've seen. We are seeing inflation expectations behaving in a very well-anchored fashion. Short-term inflation expectations are coming down. So yes, we haven't really tested the limits of that tension yet. I think it is still the case because a lot of the old measures were coming off that, you know, in Europe, for instance, that you can do the additional measures in terms of energy transfers and energy subsidies. Without having an actual overall increase in the fiscal deficit. So I think that that has helped so far, but that tension can come up. But again, right now it's not something that we see. And the last point I would make is I guess maybe compared to the past when, you know, the markets were relatively sanguine about additional debt being put on the markets. I think what we've seen is investor risk sentiment at this point is much more sensitive to fiscal packages that then seem inconsistent with bringing inflation down. We saw that most stockly for the UK, but we're seeing that for other countries in the world too. So there is a little more disciplining that's coming from markets too, which I think would help again maybe support the prevalent view, which is that, yes, we need to help. We need to help our vulnerable population. We need to help, you know, in some cases, a large swath of the population, but we really cannot be driving up deficits and doing a lot of deficit spending at this time. Just briefly, I mean, but on something like the fiscal monitor, which is incredibly useful document that the IMF produces with all of the yardsticks for looking at countries and particularly debt servicing costs. I just wonder, have you done enough to sort of draw attention to what Raghu was talking about, the sort of hidden gearing that's built up for government debt, for the consolidated debt, where you can look and it says, you know, average maturity of government debt is X and it looks quite reassuring. And in the footnotes perhaps it says there's now this interesting issue related to QE. Yes, no, that's right. If you look at the consolidated government's balance sheet, which combines the central bank and the Treasury, then yes, we've certainly moved towards the maturity has shortened because of all of the purchases that were made by the central bank on the market. But it remains the case that when we worry about sharp swings in interest rates, the component that's saying the behavior, the pieces of public debt, which are not the central, what are not being held by the central bank, are still important drivers of it. So, you know, we can have central banks have income losses and, you know, as long as there's confidence in the currency and as long as you're not to, you know, people are not going to show up and worry about the ability to convert $1 to $1 and inflation is not expected to explode. It's a different, the way that these two pieces of the balance sheet affect the economy are still different. I guess as long as investors don't decide to worry about it, but at the moment it seems to be different. Minister, we also mentioned the most fundamental thing for the long term calculation is what we think is going to happen to long term interest rates going forward. What are the assumptions that you're making? Have you reassessed the outlook for global interest rates? Well, actually the central bank and the Ministry of Finance are working together, as I said. So actually every year we have to agree upon, you know, the inflation target. For this year it's between the 1 to 3 percent, which I think is manageable. Some people say that why domestic interest rates in Thailand are so low and when they raise the interest rates are so minimal. But that's because of the one thing that we just recover, beginning to recover and will be faster and faster because of the tourism industry that making our growth. So there we also worry about, you know, how business will get back to work. So on the other hand it's becoming the cost of the business as well. So I think our inflation is not coming from the overall consumption or overall demand, but basically from the cost side. And our policy is how to get the energy efficiency in using the energy and the fertilizer that we use more organic fertilizer. That's part of the thing that we have to agree that what is our target, okay? Looking for the long term, I think of course that we assess the central bank have been closely monitoring the outlook and the expectation of the interest rate or inflation in the long term. But as I said, we are looking more on the long term growth. We need growth and not only for income of the people but our competitiveness as well. So I think the fiscal policy, as I said, we are still on the expansionary path and some of the public investment, as I said, we need to accelerate at this time. But how this project, this investment will not be affecting the fiscal burden. The other thing is there, you know, by the fiscal discipline law that the government has been limited how to spend, you know, not over spending in the case of the unnecessary spending. What we spent during the past two years, basically on the cash-hand-out program and the sum of stimulus package, giving daily allowance for the people to spend. That's sort of the very popular for the people but right now it has been face out. All of the unnecessary, all kind of the populist policy has been face out. The other thing is also, you know, our discipline is there. You cannot use the advance, the expenditure. For example, you spending now and pay back by the government budget in the next fiscal year. That will limit to 30% or 32%. Because otherwise that, you know, any government like to spend more on the populist policy that prohibited in the law. Thank you. Again, we've got a few minutes for questions and I know there's people in the audience who will have good questions. Yes, if you just wait for the microphone. Thank you very much. My name is Hatib Basri. I'm the former Minister of Finance of Indonesia. I think the scaring effect of the pandemic will require the design of the fiscal policy more into this inclusive growth. This is inevitable. But we do understand that the rising costs of fund will also prevent the emerging economies. So in this case I think it is important to look at about the quality of spending rather than talking about increasing the budget. That's exactly what Indonesia did. We maintained the budget deficit. It's stipulated in our law should be less than 3%. And then we could reduce the debt to GDP but at the same time we could protect the vulnerable groups. I think we might take a couple more on that. Yes. Thank you very much. My name is Aya Khrfan. I'm a global shaper from Jordan. I'm Manhub. And I have a question because you know Jordan has been facing a lot of economical challenges surrounding the refugee crisis. Now with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict also which has basically caused an increase in the price of imports. So causing disruptions in the supply chain. When looking at fiscal policies I would really like to know more about how can we improve the quality of public spending. You said something really important about having sometimes public spending that is a bit not well targeted. So how can we improve the quality of public spending especially in things related to climate adaptation. And in other words how can we make public spending more performance oriented. Thank you. Okay. Take this one and then we'll come back. I'm a journalist from Italy. It's a question for Professor Rajan. The theme that you've been talking about the fractured society has been present since fault lines. But then now we see the U.S. government spending lots of money including Inflation Redaction Act etc. What's your assessment of the impact of this big spending on reducing the fractures in U.S. society? I don't know whether Geetha did you want to respond on the or anybody else want to respond on the quality of public spending. Yes. This is a clearly very important issue and for several countries in the world and particularly so for emerging developing economies that there is a lot that they can gain in terms of fiscal space if they are able to do more in terms of the quality of the spending that they have. But also in terms of raising sufficient tax revenue. I think on both counts there is a lot that can be done. What we have seen is the use of digital public infrastructure has actually been very helpful in this matter when we look at countries who have actually been able to target their spending much better. Being able to having digital identity having using digital infrastructures to be able to make cash transfers is has been is one way in which they've raised the effectiveness of the welfare schemes that they have. It's also been very helpful to ensure you have more tax collection. So on both those counts that's one particular area in which that pays off. But more generally I think countries need to pay closer attention to where they spend and also like I said in terms of increasing the tax base for a lot of these countries the tax basis is too narrow. And they would have to increase that too. So these are the measures that would be needed. Do you want to respond on that. Sure. By the way just on the issue of refugees I certainly think one of the things we need to do far better is how to assimilate refugees into the labor force while they're in a particular country that would reduce the fiscal burden a lot. But how to do it in an effective way without creating more social conflict domestically is a really important question. I mean many countries just put them on a on a camp and prevent them from doing anything and then they become a burden and then they become a public policy concern. But is there a way that you could use their talents in effective ways on the issue of has a spending sort of ameliorated fractures. I mean certainly growth lifts a lot of boats and the spend the growth from the spending has been been positive. You know the U.S. unemployment rate is really low. So a lot of people who are on the margins have have come back in. But I think there is really a question of capabilities of the labor force and it's not so much jobs but good jobs which they're looking for and are they capable of the good jobs that are being being created. And this is where I think there's a much bigger question. I think there are lots of initiatives certainly in the United States on upskilling on making you know communities disadvantaged communities capable of of you know they're their students sort of reaching higher level jobs. There's a lot of computer training going on a lot of automation lots of experiments. But is spending making a difference there. I'm not so sure where I do worry is the tendency towards saying the spending has to be on our people. So there's a protectionist element certainly in the inflation reduction act which is very very concerning. And what is the particularly problem today is protectionism is is sort of disguised by security concerns. So yes we need to bring chips home but we also need to bring clean production home. I mean the two don't don't necessarily have the same impact on security chips. Yes. Clean clean energy probably not. And that is where global cooperation would be much more needed in centers for domestic production. Probably you know you don't want to reduce that. That kind of distinction I see less often that to my mind does more global damage in the guise of helping local jobs. We've basically run out of time. I just wanted to ask briefly maybe the commissioner but also others. You're thinking about the long term investment challenges and all the challenges that we have the tensions and the difficulties of fiscal policy we've talked about. The one thing that people tend to say can be put into a separate category as a long term investment need is the funding of the green transition. Raghu said a little bit about it. Who should who should bear the burden. Do you think there is a case for treating that differently and having separate borrowing instruments. If you're the European Union or a separate way of thinking about those long that long term investment challenge. Yes there is a case and will you persuade Germany. I think there is a case and for the first time we have also we are also experiencing in Europe a way because back to the quality of public expenditure. Of course we have been proposing this the European institution have been proposing this for years and years and years. But now since a couple of years this request is recommendation from the European institution have money attached to this which is the money of a common funding. And I think that we never had such a big level of expenditure on future oriented investment with different level of quality. Of course but I think extremely important. And also in the discussion you were referring to our fiscal our fiscal rules. We are addressing the necessity to incentivize future oriented investments. Well I don't want to enter in the in the ways it's not a classical golden rule which is very controversial in Europe. But it is a way so to say you are gaining time if you change the quality of your public expenditure in favor of future oriented investment. So the issue I think for the first time since many many years in Europe is connected to real incentives and real advantages for countries that are moving properly. We had plenty more to discuss but we have no more time so thank you very much. I will only record that we won't get complaints for talking about national stereotypes. But it was the Italian European Commissioner who talked about a love affair between fiscal and monetary policy on this panel. Thank you very much everybody.