 Chapter 5 of an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds Having represented what belongs to all sorts of pleasures and pains alike, we come now to exhibit each by itself the several sorts of pains and pleasures. Pains and pleasures may be called by one general word, interesting perceptions. Interesting perceptions are either simple or complex. The simple ones are those which cannot any one of them be resolved into more. Complex are those which are resolvable into diverse simple ones. A complex, interesting perception may accordingly be composed either one of pleasures alone, two of pains alone, or three of a pleasure or pleasures and a pain or pains together. What determines a lot of pleasure, for example, to be regarded as one complex pleasure rather than as diverse simple ones, is the nature of the exciting cause. Whatever pleasures are excited all at once by the action of the same cause are apt to be looked upon as constituting altogether but one pleasure. The several simple pleasures of which human nature is susceptible seem to be as follows. One, the pleasures of sense. Two, the pleasures of wealth. Three, the pleasures of skill. Four, the pleasures of amity. Five, the pleasures of a good name. Six, the pleasures of power. Seven, the pleasures of piety. Eight, the pleasures of benevolence. Nine, the pleasures of malevolence. Ten, the pleasures of memory. Eleven, the pleasures of imagination. Twelve, the pleasures of expectation. Thirteen, the pleasures dependent on association. Fourteen, the pleasures of relief. The several simple pains seem to be as follows. One, the pains of privation. Two, the pains of the senses. Three, the pains of awkwardness. Four, the pains of enmity. Five, the pains of an ill name. Six, the pains of piety. Seven, the pains of benevolence. Eight, the pains of malevolence. Nine, the pains of the memory. Ten, the pains of the imagination. Eleven, the pains of expectation. Twelve, the pains dependent on association. The pleasures of sense seem to be as follows. One, the pleasures of the taste or palette, including whatever pleasures are experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst. Two, the pleasure of intoxication. Three, the pleasures of the organ of smelling. Four, the pleasures of the touch. Five, the simple pleasures of the ear independent of association. Six, the simple pleasures of the eye independent of association. Seven, the pleasure of the sexual sense. Eight, the pleasure of health or the internal pleasurable feeling or flow of spirits, as it is called, which accompanies a state of full health and vigor, especially at times of moderate bodily exertion. Nine, the pleasures of novelty or the pleasures derived from the gratification of the appetite of curiosity by the application of new objects to any of the senses. By the pleasures of wealth may be meant those pleasures which a man is apt to derive from the consciousness of possessing any article or articles which stand in the list of instruments of enjoyment or security and more particularly at the time of his first acquiring them, at which time the pleasure may be styled a pleasure of gain or a pleasure of acquisition, at other times a pleasure of possession. The pleasures of skill, as exercised upon particular objects, are those which accompany the application of such particular instruments of enjoyment to their uses, as cannot be so applied without a greater or less share of difficulty or exertion. The pleasures of amity or self-recommendation are the pleasures that may accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the acquisition or the possession of the good will of such or such a signable person or persons in particular, or as the phrase is, of being upon good terms with him or them, and as a fruit of it, of his being in a way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services. The pleasures of a good name are the pleasures that accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the acquisition or the possession of the good will of the world about him, that is, of such members of society as he is likely to have concerns with, and as a means of it, either their love or their esteem or both, and as a fruit of it, of his being in the way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services. These may likewise be called the pleasures of good repute, the pleasures of honour, or the pleasures of the moral sanction. The pleasures of power are the pleasures that accompany the persuasion of a man's being in a condition to dispose people by means of their hopes and fears to give him the benefit of their services, that is, by the hope of some service or by the fear of some disservice that he may be in the way to render them. The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief of a man's being in the acquisition or in possession of the good will or favour of the supreme being, and as a fruit of it, of his being in a way of enjoying pleasures to be received by God's special appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may also be called the pleasures of religion, the pleasures of a religious disposition, or the pleasures of the religious sanction. The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence, to which the sensitive beings we are acquainted with, under which are commonly included one, the supreme being, two, human beings, three other animals. These may also be called the pleasures of good will, the pleasures of sympathy, or the pleasures of the benevolent or social affections. The pleasures of malevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who may become the objects of malevolence, to which, one, human beings, two other animals. These may also be styled the pleasures of ill will, the pleasures of the irascible appetite, the pleasures of antipathy, or the pleasures of the malevolent or dissocial affections. The pleasures of the memory are the pleasures which, after having enjoyed such and such pleasures, or even, in some case, after having suffered such and such pains, a man will now and then experience at recollecting them exactly in the order and in the circumstances in which they were actually enjoyed or suffered. These derivative pleasures may, of course, be distinguished into as many species as there are of original perceptions from whence they may be copied. They may also be styled pleasures of simple recollection. The pleasures of the imagination are the pleasures which may be derived from the contemplation of any such pleasures as may happen to be suggested by the memory but in a different order and accompanied by different groups of circumstances. These may accordingly be referred to any one of the three cardinal points of time present, past or future. It is evident they may admit of as many distinctions as those of the former class. The pleasures of expectation are the pleasures that result from the contemplation of any sort of pleasure, referred to time-future and accompanied with a sentiment of belief. These also may admit of the same distinctions. The pleasures of association are the pleasures which certain objects or incidents may happen to afford, not of themselves, but merely in virtue of some association that they have contracted in the mind with certain objects or incidents which are in themselves pleasurable, such is the case for instance with the pleasure of skill when afforded by such a set of incidents as composed a game of chess. This derives its pleasurable quality from its association partly with the pleasures of skill as exercised in the production of incidents pleasurable of themselves, partly from its association with the pleasures of power. Such is the case also with the pleasure of good luck when afforded by such incidents as composed the game of hazard or any other game of chance when played at for nothing. This derives its pleasurable quality from its association with one of the pleasures of wealth to wit with the pleasure of acquiring it. Father on we shall see pains grounded upon pleasures. In like manner may we now see pleasures grounded upon pains. To the catalogue of pleasures may accordingly be added the pleasures of relief or the pleasures which a man experiences when after he has been enduring a pain of any kind for a certain time it comes to cease or to abate. These may of course be distinguished into as many species as there are of pains and may give rise to so many pleasures of memory of imagination and of expectation. Pains of privation are the pains that may result from the thought of not possessing in the time present any of the several kinds of pleasures. Pains of privation may accordingly be resolved into as many kinds as there are of pleasures to which they may correspond and from the absence whereof they may be derived. There are three sorts of pains which are only so many modifications of the several pains of privation. When the enjoyment of any particular pleasure happens to be particularly desired but without any expectation approaching to assurance the pain of privation which thereupon results takes a particular name and is called the pain of desire or of unsatisfied desire. Where the enjoyment happens to have been looked for with a degree of expectation approaching to assurance and that expectation is made suddenly to cease it is called a pain of disappointment. A pain of privation takes the name of a pain of regret in two cases. One, where it is grounded on the memory of a pleasure which having been once enjoyed appears not likely to be enjoyed again. Two, where it is grounded on the idea of a pleasure which was never actually enjoyed nor perhaps so much as expected but which might have been enjoyed, it is supposed had such or such a contingency happened which in fact did not happen. The several pains of the senses seem to be as follows. One, the pains of hunger and thirst or the disagreeable sensations produced by the want of suitable substances which need at times to be applied to the alimentary canal. Two, the pains of the taste or the disagreeable sensations produced by the application of various substances to the palate and other superior parts of the same canal. Three, the pains of the organ of smell or the disagreeable sensations produced by the effluvia of various substances when applied to that organ. Four, the pains of the touch or the disagreeable sensations produced by the application of various substances to the skin. Five, the simple pains of the hearing or the disagreeable sensations excited in the organ of that sense by various kinds of sounds independently as before of association. Six, the simple pains of the sight or the disagreeable sensations if any such there be that may be excited in the organ of that sense by visible images independent of the principle of association. Seven, the pains resulting from excessive heat or cold unless these be referable to the touch. Eight, the pains of disease or the acute and uneasy sensations resulting from the several diseases and indispositions to which human nature is liable. Nine, the pain of exertion whether bodily or mental or the uneasy sensation which is apt to accompany any intense effort whether of mind or body. The pains of awkwardness are the pains which sometimes result from the unsuccessful endeavour to apply any particular instruments of enjoyment or security to their uses or from the difficulty a man experiences in applying them. The pains of enmity are the pains that may accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious to the ill-will of such or such an assignable person or persons in particular or, as the phrase is, of being upon ill terms with him or them and in consequence of being obnoxious to certain pains of some sort or other of which he may be the cause. The pains of an ill name are the pains that accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious or in a way to be obnoxious to the ill-will of the world about him. These may likewise be called the pains of ill repute, the pains of dishonour or the pains of the moral sanction. The pains of piety are the pains that accompany the belief of a man's being obnoxious to the displeasure of the supreme being and in consequence to certain pains to be inflicted by his special appointment either in this life or in a life to come. These may also be called the pains of religion, the pains of a religious disposition or the pains of the religious sanction. When the belief is looked upon as well-grounded these pains are commonly called religious terrors. When looked upon as ill-grounded superstitious terrors. The pains of benevolence are the pains resulting from the view of any pains supposed to be endured by other beings. These may also be called the pains of good-will, of sympathy or the pains of the benevolent or social affections. The pains of malevolence are the pains resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be enjoyed by any beings who happen to be the objects of a man's displeasure. These may also be styled the pains of ill-will, of antipathy or the pains of the malevolent or disocial affections. The pains of the memory may be grounded on every one of the above kinds as well of pains of privation as of positive pains. These correspond exactly to the pleasures of the memory. The pains of the imagination may also be grounded on any one of the above kinds as well of pains of privation as of positive pains. In other respects, they correspond exactly to the pleasures of the imagination. The pains of expectation may be grounded on each one of the above kinds as well of pains of privation as of positive pains. These may also be termed pains of apprehension. The pains of association correspond exactly to the pleasures of association. Of the above list, there are certain pleasures and pains which suppose the existence of some pleasure or pain of some other person to which the pleasure or pain of the person in question has regard. Such pleasures and pains may be termed extra regarding. Others do not suppose any such thing. These may be termed self-regarding. The only pleasures and pains of the extra regarding class are those of benevolence and those of malevolence, all the rest are self-regarding. Of all these several sorts of pleasures and pains there is scarce any one which is not liable on more accounts than one to come under the consideration of the law. Is an offence committed? It is the tendency which it has to destroy in such or such persons some of these pleasures or to produce some of these pains that constitutes the mischief of it and the ground for punishing it. It is the prospect of some of these pleasures or of security from some of these pains that constitutes the motive or temptation. It is the attainment of them that constitutes the profit of the offence. Is the offender to be punished? It can be punished only by the production of one or more of these pains that the punishment can be inflicted. Chapter 6 Of Circumstances Influencing Sensibility Pain and pleasure are produced in men's minds by the action of certain causes. But the quantity of pleasure and pain runs not uniformly in proportion to the cause. In other words, to the quantity of force exerted by such cause. The truth of this observation rests not upon any metaphysical nicely in the import given to the terms cause, quantity, and force. It will be equally true in whatsoever manner such force be measured. The disposition which any one has to feel such or such a quantity of pleasure or pain upon the application of a cause of given force is what we term the degree or quantum of his sensibility. This may be either general referring to the sum of the causes that act upon him during a given period or particular referring to the action of any one particular cause or sort of cause. But in the same mind, such and such causes of pain or pleasure will produce more pain or pleasure than such or such other cause of pain or pleasure. And this proportion will in different minds be different. The disposition which any one has to have the proportion in which he is affected by two such causes, different from that in which another man is affected by the same two causes may be termed the quality or bias of his sensibility. One man, for instance, may be most affected by the pleasures of the taste. Another, by those of the ear. So also, if there be a difference in the nature or proportion of two pains or pleasures which they respectively experience from the same cause, a case not so frequent as the former. From the same injury, for instance, one man may feel the same quantity of grief and resentment together as another man, but one of them shall feel a greater share of grief than of resentment. The other, a greater share of resentment than of grief. Any incident which serves as a cause, either of pleasure or of pain may be termed an exciting cause. If of pleasure, a pleasurable cause. If of pain, a painful afflictive, or a dollar-rific cause. Footnote. The exciting cause, the pleasure or pain produced by it, and the intention produced by such pleasure or pain in the character of a motive, are objects so intimately connected that, in what follows, I fear I have not, on every occasion, been able to keep them sufficiently distinct. I thought it necessary to give the reader this warning, after which we found any such mistakes. It is to be hoped they will not be productive of much confusion. End footnote. Now the quantity of pleasure or of pain, which a man is liable to experience upon the application of an exciting cause, since they will not depend altogether upon that cause, will depend in some measure upon some other circumstance or circumstances. The circumstances, whatsoever they be, may be termed circumstances influencing sensibility. Footnote. Thus, in physical bodies the momentum of a ball put in motion by impulse will be influenced by the circumstance of gravity, being in some direction increased, in other diminished by it. So in a ship, put in motion by the wind, the momentum and direction will be influenced not only by the attraction of gravity, but by the motion and resistance of the water and several other circumstances. End footnote. These circumstances will apply differently to different exciting causes, in so much that to a certain exciting cause, a certain circumstance shall not apply at all, which shall apply with great force to another exciting cause. But without entering for the present into these distinctions, it may be of use to sum up all the circumstances which can be found to influence the effect of any exciting cause. These, on a former occasion, it may be as well first to sum up together in the conciseest manner possible, and afterwards to allot a few words to the separate explanation of each article. They seem to be as follows, one health, two strength, three hardiness, four bodily imperfection, five quantity and quality of knowledge, six strength of intellectual powers, seven firmness of mind, eight steadiness of mind, nine bent of inclination, ten moral sensibility, eleven moral biases twelve religious sensibility thirteen religious biases, fourteen sympathetic sensibility fifteen sympathetic biases sixteen antipathic sensibility seventeen antipathic biases, eighteen insanity nineteen habitual occupations twenty pecuniary circumstances twenty-one connections in the way of sympathy twenty-two connections in the way of antipathy twenty-three radical frame of body twenty-four radical frame of mind twenty-five sex twenty-seven rank twenty-eight education twenty-nine climate thirty lineage thirty-one government thirty-two religious profession footnote an analytical view of all these circumstances till some of them had been previously explained to search out the vast variety of exciting or moderating causes by which the degree or bias of a man's sensibility may be influenced to define the boundaries of each, to extricate them from the entanglements in which they are involved, to lay the effect of each article distinctly before the reader's eye is perhaps if not absolutely the most difficult task at least one of the most difficult tasks within the compass of moral physiology. Disquisitions on this head can never be completely satisfactory without examples. To provide a sufficient collection of such examples would be a work of great labour as well as nice tea. History and biography would need to be ransacked. A vast cause of reading would need to be travelled through on purpose. By such a process the present work would doubtless have been rendered more amusing. But in point of bulk so enormous that this single chapter would have been swelled into a considerable volume. Feigned cases, although they may upon occasions serve to render their general matter tolerably intelligible can never be sufficient to render it palatable. On this therefore as on so many other occasions I must confine myself to dry and general instructions. Discarding illustration although sensible that without it instruction cannot manifest half its efficacy. The subject however is so difficult and so new that I shall think I have not ill succeeded if without pretending to exhaust it I shall have been able to mark out the principal points of view and to put the matter in such a method as may facilitate the researchers of happier inquires. The great difficulty lies in the nature of the words which are not like plain and pleasure names of homogeneous real entities but names of various fictitious entities for which no common genus is to be found and which therefore without a vast and roundabout chain of investigation can never be brought onto any exhaustive plan of arrangement but must be picked up here and there as they happen to occur. End footnote One Health is the absence of disease and consequently of all those kinds of pain which are among the symptoms of disease. A man may be said to be in a state of health when he is not conscious of any uneasy sensations the primary seed of which can be perceived to be anywhere in his body. Footnote It may be thought that in a certain degree of health this negative account of the matter hardly comes up to the case. In a certain degree of health there is such a kind of feeling diffused over the whole frame such a comfortable feel or a flow of spirit as it is called as may with propriety come under the head of positive pleasure but without experiencing any such pleasurable feeling if a man experiences no painful one he may be well enough said to be in health. End footnote In point of general sensibility or as the phrase is is in any ill state of health is less sensible to the influence of any pleasurable cause and more so to that of any afflictive one than if he were well. Two. The circumstance of strength though in point of casualty closely connected with that of health is perfectly distinguishable from it. The same man will indeed generally be stronger in a good state of health than in a bad one but one man even in a bad state of health may be stronger than another even in a good one. Weakness is a common concomitance of disease but in consequence of his radical frame of body a man may be weak all his life long without experiencing any disease. Health as we have observed is principally a negative circumstance. Strength a positive one. The degree of a man's strength can be measured with tolerable accuracy. Footnote The most accurate measure that can be given of a man's strength seems to be that which is taken from the weight or number of pounds and ounces he can lift with his hands in a given attitude. This indeed relates immediately only to his arms which are most employed of which the strength corresponds with most exactness to the general state of the body with regard to strength and in which the quantum of strength is easiest measured. Strength may accordingly be distinguished into general and particular. Weakness is a negative term and imports the absence of strength. It is besides a relative term and accordingly imports the absence of such a quantity of strength to the person in question. Less than that of some person he is compared to. Weakness, when it is at such a degree as to make it painful for a man to perform the motions necessary to the going through the ordinary functions of life such as to get up, to walk, to dress on self and so forth brings the circumstance of health into question and puts a man into that sort of condition in which he is said to be in ill health. Footnote 3. Hardiness is a circumstance which, though closely connected with that of strength is distinguishable from it. Hardiness is the absence of irritability. Irritability respects either pain resulting from the action of mechanical causes or disease resulting from the action of causes purely physiological. Irritability in the former sense is the disposition to undergo greater or less degree of pain upon the application of a mechanical cause such as are most of those applications by which simple afflictive punishments are inflicted as whipping, beating and the like. In the latter sense it is the disposition to contract disease with greater or less facility upon the application of any instrument acting on the body by its physiological properties as in the case of fevers or of colds or other inflammatory diseases produced by the application of damp air or to experience immediate onnesiness as in the case of relaxation or chilliness produced by an over or under proportion of the matter of heat. Hardiness, even in the sense which it is opposed to the action of mechanical causes is distinguishable from strength. The external indications of strength are the abundance and firmness of no the muscular fibers. Those of hardness in this sense are the firmness of the muscular fibers and the elasticity of the skin. Strength is more peculiarly the gift of nature. Hardness of education if two persons who have had the one, the education of a gentleman the other that of a common sailor the first may be stronger at the same time that the other is the hardier. Four by bodily imperfection might be understood that condition which a person is in who at the stance distinguished by any remarkable deformity or once any of those parts or faculties which the ordinary run of persons of the same sex and age are furnished with who for instance has a hair lip, is deaf or has lost a hand. This circumstance like that of ill health tends in general to diminish more or less the effect of any pleasurable circumstance and to increase that of any afflictive one. The effect of this circumstance however admits of great variety in as much as they are a great variety of ways in which a man may suffer in his personal appearance and in his body organs and faculties all which differences will be taken notice of in the proper places. Footnote CB1 title, irreparable corporal injuries and footnote Five so much for circumstances belonging to the condition of the body we come now to those which concern the condition of the mind the use of mentioning these will be seen hereafter. In the first place may be reckoned the quantity and quality of the knowledge the person in question happens to possess. That is, of the ideas which he has actually in stores ready upon occasion to call to mind meaning such ideas as are in some way or other of an interesting nature that is, of a nature in some way or other to influence his happiness that of other men when these ideas are many and of importance a man is said to be a man of knowledge one few or not of importance ignorance Six by strength of intellectual powers may be understood the degree of facility which a man experiences in his endeavours to call to mind as well such ideas as have been already aggregated by stock of knowledge as any others which upon any occasion that may happen he may conceive a desire to place there it seems to be on some such occasion as this that the words parts and talents are commonly employed to this head may be referred the several quantities of readiness of apprehension accuracy and tenacity of memory strength of attention clearness of discernment amplitude of comprehension vividity and rapidity of imagination strength of intellectual powers in general seems to correspond pretty exactly to general strength of body as any of these qualities in particular does to particular strength Seven firmness of mind on the other hand and irritability on the other portion between the degrees of efficacy with which a man is acted upon by an exciting cause of which the value lies chiefly in magnitude and one of which the value lies chiefly in propinquity Footnote C Chapter 4 Value and Footnote a man may be said to be of a firm mind when small pleasures or pains which are present or near in a greater proportion to their value than greater pleasures or pains which are uncertain or remote Footnote one for instance having been determined by the prospect of some inconvenience not to disclose the fact although he should be put to the rack he perseveres in such resolution after the rack is brought into his presence and even apply to him and footnote of a narratable mind is the case Eight steadiness regards the time during which a given exciting cause of a given value continues to affect a man in nearly the same manner and degree as at first no assignable external event or change of circumstances intervening to make an alteration in its force Footnote the facility with which children grow tired of their playthings is an instance of unsteadiness the perseverance with which a merchant applies himself to his traffic or an author to his book may be taken for an instance of the contrary it is difficult to judge of the quantity of pleasure or pain in these cases but from the effects which it produces in the character of motive and even then it is difficult to pronounce whether the change of conduct happens by the extinction of the old pleasure or pain or by the intervention of a new one Footnote Nine By the bent of a man's inclinations may be understood the propensity he has to expect pleasure or pain from certain objects rather than from others a man's inclinations may be said to have such or such a bent when amongst the several sorts of objects which afford pleasure in some degree to all men he is apt to expect more pleasure from one particular sort than from another particular sort or more from any given particular sort than another man would expect from that sort or when amongst the several sorts of objects which to one man afford pleasure whilst to another they afford none he is apt to expect or not to expect pleasure from an object of such or such a sort so also with regard to pains this circumstance though intimately connected with that of the bias of a man's sensibility is not undistinguishable from it the quantity of pleasure or pain which on any given occasion a man may experience from an application of any sort may be greatly influenced by the expectations he has been used to entertain of pleasure or pain from that quarter but it will not be absolutely determined by them for pleasure or pain may come upon him from a quarter from which he was not accustomed to expected 10 the circumstances of moral, religious sympathetic and antipathetic sensibility one closely considered will appear to be included in some sort under that of bent of inclination an account of their particular importance they may however be worth mentioning apart a man's moral sensibility may be said to be strong when the pains and pleasures of the moral sanction footnote see chapter 5, pleasures and pains and footnote show greater in his eyes in comparison with other pleasures and pains and consequently exerts a stronger influence than in the eyes of the persons he is compared with when he is acted on with more than ordinary efficacy by the sense of honor it may be said to be weak when the contrary is the case 11 moral sensibility seems to regard the average effect or influence of the pains and pleasures of the moral sanction upon all sorts of occasions to which it is applicable or happens to be applied it regards the average force or quantity of the impulses the mind receives from that source during a given period moral bias regards the particular act on which upon so many particular occasions the force of that sanction is looked upon as attaching it regards the quality or direction of those impulses it admits of as many varieties therefore as there are dictates which the moral sanction may be conceived to issue forth a man may be said to have such or such a moral bias or to have a moral bias in favor of such or such an action when he looks upon it as being of the number of those of which the performance is dictated by the moral sanction 12 what has been said with regard to moral sensibility mutatismutandis to religious 13 what has been said with regard to moral biases may also be applied mutatismutandis to religious biases 14 by sympathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a man has to derive pleasure from the happiness and pain from the unhappiness of other sensitive beings it is the stronger the greater the ratio of the pleasure or pain he feels on their account is to that of the pleasure or pain which according to what appears to him they feel for themselves 15 sympathetic bias regards the description of the parties who are the objects of a man's sympathy and of the acts or other circumstances of or belonging to those persons by which the sympathy is excited these parties may be 1. certain individuals 2. any subordinate class of individuals 3. the whole nation 4. human kind in general 5. the whole sensitive creation according as these objects of sympathy are more numerous the affection by which the man is biased may be said to be the more enlarged 16 15 antipathetic sensibility and antipathetic biases are just the reverse of sympathetic sensibility and sympathetic biases by antipathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a man has to derive pain from the happiness and pleasure from the unhappiness of other sensitive beings 18 the circumstance of insanity of mind corresponds to that of bodily imperfection it admits however of much less variety in as much as the soul is for all we can perceive one indivisible thing not distinguishable locked body into parts what lesser degrees of imperfection the mind may be susceptible of seem to be compriseable under the already mentioned heads of ignorance weakness of mind loneliness or under such others as are reductable to them those which are here in view are those extraordinary species and degrees of mental imperfection which wherever they take place are as conspicuous and as unquestionable as lameness or blindness in the body operating partly it should seem by inducing an extraordinary degree above mentioned partly by giving an extraordinary and preposterous bent to the inclinations 19 under the head of a man's habitual occupations are to be understood on this occasion as well those which he pursues for the sake of profit as those which he pursues for the sake of present pleasure the consideration of the prophet itself belongs to the head of an extraordinary circumstances it is evident that if by any means a punishment or any other exciting cause has the effect of putting it out of his power to continue in the pursuit of any such occupation it must on that account be much the more distressing a man's habitual occupations though intimately connected in point of causality with the bent of his inclinations are not to be looked upon as precisely the same circumstance an amusement or channel of profit may be the object of a man's inclinations which has never been the subject of his habitual occupations for it may be that though he wished to but take himself to it he never did it's not being in his power a circumstance which may make a good deal of difference in the effect of any incident by which he happens to be debarred from it 20 under the head of pecuniary circumstances I mean to bring to view the proportion which a man's means bear to his wants the sum total of his means of every kind to the sum total of his wants of every kind a man's means depends upon three circumstances 1. his property 2. the profit of his labours 3. his connections in the way of support his wants seem to depend upon four circumstances 1. his habits of expense 2. his connections in the way of burden 3. any present casual demand he may have 4. the strength of his expectation by a man's property is to be understood whatever he has in store independent of his labour by the profit of his labour is to be understood the growing profit as to labour it may be either of the body principally or of the mind principally or of both indifferently nor does it matter in what manner nor on what subject it be applied so it produce a profit by a man's connections in the way of support are to be understood of whatever kind which he is in a way of receiving from any persons who on whatever account and in whatever proportion he has reason to expect should contribute gratis to his maintenance such as his parents patrons and relations it seems manifest that a man can have no other means than these what he uses he must have either of his own or from other people if from other people either gratis or for a price as to habits of expense it is well known that a man's desires are governed in a great degree by his habits many are the cases in which desire and consequently the pain of privation connected with it footnote chapter 5 pleasures and pains and footnote would not even subsist at all but for previous enjoyment by a man's connections in the way of burden are to be understood whatever expense he has reason to look upon himself as bound to be at in the support of those who by law or the customs of the world are warranted in looking up to him for assistance such as children for relations superannuated servants or any other dependence whatsoever as to present casual demand it is manifest that there are occasions on which a given sum will be worth infinitely more to a man than the same sum would at another time where for example in a case of extremity a man stands in need of extraordinary medical assistance or wants money to carry on a lawsuit on which he's all depends or has got a livelihood waiting for him in a distant country and wants money for the charges of conveyance in such cases any piece of good or ill fortune in the pecuniary way might have a very different effect for what it would have at another time with regard to strength of expectation when one man expects to gain or to keep anything which another does not it is plain the circumstance of not having it will affect the former very differently from the latter who indeed commonly will not be affected by it at all 21 under the head of a man's connections in the way of sympathy I would bring to view the number and description of the persons in whose welfare he takes such a concern as the idea of their happiness should be productive of pleasure and that of their unhappiness of pain to him for instance a man's wife, his children, his parents his near relations and intimate friends this class of persons it is obvious well for the most part include the two classes by which his pecuniary circumstances are affected those to wit from whose means he may expect support and those whose wants operate on him as a burden but it is obvious that besides these it may very well include others with whom he has no such pecuniary connection and even with regard to this it is evident that the pecuniary dependence and the union of affections are circumstances perfectly distinguishable accordingly the connections here in question independently of any influence they may have on a man's pecuniary circumstances have an influence on the effect of any exciting causes whatsoever the tendency of them is to increase a man's general sensibility to increase on the one hand the pleasure produced by all pleasurable causes on the other the pain produced by all afflictive ones when any pleasurable incident happens to a man he naturally in the first moment thinks of the pleasure it will afford immediately to himself presently afterwards however except in a few cases which is not worthwhile here to insist on he begins to think of the pleasure which his friends will feel upon their coming to know of it and this secondary pleasure is commonly no mean addition to the primary one first comes the self-regarding pleasure then comes the idea of the pleasure of sympathy which you suppose that pleasure of yours will give birth in the bosom of your friend and this idea excites again in yours a new pleasure of sympathy grounded upon his the first pleasure issuing from your own bosom as it were from a radiant point illuminates the bosom of your friend reverberated from thence it is reflected with augmented warmth to the point from whence it first proceeded and so it is with pains footnote this is one reason why legislators in general like better to have married people to deal with then single have children than such as are childless it is manifest that the stronger and more numerous a man's connection in the way of sympathy are the stronger is the hold which the law has upon him a wife and children are so many pledges a man gives to the world for his good behavior and footnote nor does this effect depend wholly upon affection among near relations although there should be no kindness the pleasures and pains of the moral sanction are quickly propagated by a peculiar kind of sympathy no article either of honor or disgrace can well fall upon a man without extending to a certain distance within the circle of his family what reflects honor upon the father reflects honor upon the son what reflects disgrace disgrace the cause of this singular and seemingly unreasonable circumstance that is its analogy to the rest of the phenomena of the human mind belongs not to the present purpose it is sufficient if the effect be beyond dispute 22 of a man's connections in the way of antipathy there needs not anything very particular to be observed happily there is no primeval and constant source of antipathy in a human nature as there is of sympathy there are no permanent sets of persons who are naturally and of course the objects of antipathy to a man as there are who are the objects of secondary affection sources however but too many of antipathy are apt to spring up upon various occasions during the course of a man's life and whenever they do this circumstance may have a very considerable influence on the effects of various exciting causes as on the one hand a punishment for instance which tends to separate a man from those with whom he is connected in the way of sympathy so on the other hand one which tends to force him against all those with whom he is connected in the way of antipathy will on that account be so much the more distressing it is to be observed that sympathy itself multiplies the sources of antipathy sympathy for your friend gives birth to antipathy on your part against all those who are objects of antipathy as well as to sympathy for those who are objects of sympathy to him in the same manner antipathy multiplies the sources of sympathy though commonly perhaps with rather a less degree of efficacy antipathy against your enemy is apt to give birth to sympathy on your part towards those who are objects of antipathy as well as to antipathy against those who are objects of sympathy to him End of Part A of Chapter 6