 Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the World Economic Forum's panel debate on the global debt dilemma. First, I regret to inform you that the governor of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Governor Nabilina, is unable to be here. And also, unfortunately, Professor Justin Lin from Peking University is unable to attend as well. He's a little under the weather. Having said that, that gives us even more time with these three very distinguished, very esteemed, and very interesting panelists. So I'm delighted that these three are here. And thank you very much for coming. To my immediate left is Argentina's newly appointed finance minister, Alfonso Pratke. To his left is Kenneth Rogoff, who, of course, is a professor of Harvard who's written extensively and eloquently about global debt for many, many years. And to his left is Barry Gosin, who is the chief executive officer of one of the largest commercial real estate companies in the world, Newmark, Grubb, Knight, and Frank. Obviously, global debt is an issue that all of us contemplate, think about, wonder about constantly. It's always surprising to me that this is an issue that we wrestle with for centuries and centuries. And we never seem to be able to figure out when it's going to reach out and grab us, like it did in 2008. And it seems to come from unexpected quarters and unexpected sources. It never seems to go away. And it's almost impossible to optimize. Right now, we're talking about SOEs in China. We're talking about student debt. We're talking about emerging market debt. And yet, we still don't know where the real trouble spots are. And so I think that I'd like to start with Professor Rogoff and Ken, because you've written so much about this. And get your take on the situation just from a very macro and historical perspective. Where do we stand right now in terms of global debt leverage in the system? And how do we know if we're at a danger point? I think the most important thing to say is debt is a piece of a larger picture. Debt crises don't happen out of nowhere. Typically, there's a big growth story that's a good one. And at some point, there's too much leverage in the system. And the growth story starts to fade. The leverage seems too much, et cetera. So there are many things going on in the global economy. But I'd say broadly where we are is I can think we've been through what I would describe as a debt supercycle that started in the US, focused on the subprime and reaching out. It morphed to Europe, which was obviously an unusual situation of the dysfunction in the European, the Eurozone of not being a full union. And of course, the emerging markets up to that point had the best recession they had. They really had a great recovery very much on the back of China's growth, raising commodity prices that was sort of a big boost to the whole world. But that growth in China, especially after 2008, was very much fueled by a big run-up in government credit. You can see it where it was moving pretty fast and that it really shoots up. And after five or six years, it's reached a much higher point, six or seven years, reached a much higher point than it would have been otherwise. And OK, does that mean that they're going to have a collapse in debt like we did in China? It's very different. The European leg of the debt crisis was different than the US leg of it. The Chinese will be different again. But I think, of course, it's making them more reluctant to do the same again. They could, but they already see their problems. Non-performing loans officially are 1 and 1 half percent, but people believe that about as much as the GDP numbers. And so they know that. And they think maybe we can handle where we are, but call it 6% non-performing loans, 8%. But if it gets a lot bigger, maybe we couldn't. And if they're reluctant to use credit, of course, that's very important to achieving global growth. And I would just say, I just want to contrast that against a story that my brilliant colleague, Larry Summers, likes to say that we're in secular stagnation, we might be meaning, well, his meaning has morphed a lot and over time. But certainly, if you interpret it to mean that for a very long run, things aren't going to be good. I don't know. I tend to think, eventually, after the cloud of this debt supercycle cools, things will be better. I mean, just one final point in the global recovery. I mean, I think the US is recovering. And we hear the stories about the US is back in recession. The markets are saying that macro data doesn't show that. And I think the president of the European Central Bank just spoke saying he doesn't see Europe in that position at all that they're recovering. The IMF just downgraded its forecast, but not so much for the advanced countries. Where is the problem? It's in emerging markets. I'm very happy about what's going on in Argentina, by the way, but there's China where we don't quite know what's going on. It's slowed down significantly. Lots of issues to be continued. But Russia and the governor of the Central Bank of Russia I think did a wonderful job letting the ruble float because if they hadn't, they would have been in crisis at this point. There is Brazil with huge political problems. These are two countries. Brazil's recession might get worse in 100 years. So 2016 is a rough year for emerging markets. And that's the concentration of problems. You mentioned student loans. I mean, it's an important moral problem and political problem. I don't think this is a systemic problem in the system. We want to be careful to contrast places we use debt where probably we should have a more nuanced instrument and cases where debt blows out the system. Right, securitization, for instance, what that did coupled with real estate. We'll talk a little bit about that in 2008. Well, we talked to Ken's drop mentioned emerging markets. So let's continue in that vein. And he tipped his hat to you, minister. So Argentina, can you give us sort of just a praisey? What was going on so wrong for so many years in Argentina? And what are you looking to address? How are you fixing it? Big question. Thank you, Andy. First, it's a pleasure for me to be here and to be in this panel with honorable people. It took me 12 years to get back to Davos. My last time here was in 2004. Welcome back. I was governor of the central bank back then. And well, just like you mentioned in your question, I believe my country has gone the wrong way pretty much ever since. We had the resources, both fiscal and FX-wise. So basically, this was a story about populism with resources. And it lasted as long as the resources lasted. As simple as that. I could speak all day about the last 12 years in Argentina. I don't think that's really the point. The point is that there's a new government in place that in only a month time, we've removed a significant part of the regulations and of the obstacles that were preventing the economy from actually plowing ahead. This is an economy that has barely shown growth over the last four years. Almost no private sector labor growth. There are many areas of the economy that are basically underutilized. And President Macri's commitment is to fix all that in the shortest period of time with an idea of one of the main targets of his campaign is to bring Argentina as close as possible to the zero poverty line, which in itself is a massive, ambitious target. Right now, despite the boon of resources that Argentina has enjoyed throughout the previous administration, not only because of terms of trade, positive shocks, but also because of a massive tax pressure on the private sector. Still, Argentina is showing poverty rates of around 30%, which is unacceptable. It's immoral. We are one of the best food producers in the world. We can feed more than 400 million people. And yet, there are 10 million people in Argentina that don't make ends meet. So these are the things we'll be working on over the next mandate. And I'm very happy to be part of that adventure going forward. Just a couple of points on that issue. And of course, I'm willing to answer questions about Argentina as well. But I don't want to miss the opportunity to give my two cents on what Ken was talking about. From an Argentine perspective, I mean, we are champions of debt, aren't we? We make the headlines because of that. But the paradox right now is that everyone is talking about the trial of the century and Argentina's holdout stand alone and whatnot. When you put it in context, it's the claim that we are now negotiating at the New York courts is less than two points of GDP. You're talking about the Elliott management litigation, the hedge fund in New York City. It's small change compared to the 60 points worth of GDP that debt has increased in China over the last three or four years. So first message there is let's put things in context. Second message is within our first month in office, we've come to the table, we've sat down with the mediator. We want to put an offer on the table. We wanted to do that actually next week. There were some logistic problems, whatever that means, on the other side. So we will have to wait until the following week. But we're eager to put this thing behind basically in fair terms, of course. I want to drill down into that issue a little bit more, but I do want to get a... Ken, you have a... I just make one to under. Many people think of Argentina as the debt champion, and I'm sorry to say you're not Venezuela, for example, is to fall the farm off. However, you do it with great flair. Wow. May I make a general point on the debt issue? I think just to lay the groundworks of the discussion. What's different this time in emerging markets? A few things. First thing is that it's a lot more corporate and household debt that's gone up rather than public debt, and it's a lot more domestic rather than external debt. So in that regard, it's a completely different animal from the historical emerging market perspective that has been so well documented by Ken along the years. That's a reason why you're not seeing a balance of payment crisis in the emerging market world, despite the fact that commodity prices have collapsed. The benefit and the beauty of floating exchange rate regimes is something most countries are actually enjoying. We've just joined ourselves because Argentina has had for the last 10 years or so more or less a fixed peg with very stringent capital controls, and that is something we've removed. But I think it's a very different animal from what we've seen in the last episodes. My thought here would be, don't look too much into FX reserves and balance of payments. Look more into the domestic banking system in each country. And this is where I wouldn't be too in comfort with what's going on in China. I think as Ken said, we don't have good information about many issues in China. The banking system is the place where we should be looking at. Okay, we'll talk about that a little bit more. Go ahead, Barry. Argentina has a very low proportion of public and household and corporate debt by comparison to the United States, which is close to 280% of GDP. And Argentina might be 60 to 70, not even 70. I mean, the corporate and household debt is less than 20% of GDP. So it's a very under leveraged economy. See, people know a lot about Argentina and the economy. That's why I'm talking about Argentina. But it also brings to the point that the moniker global debt dilemma can't pay to broad brush on global debt because every crisis is different. And whether it's oil-based, it's currency-based, it's bank government, I don't think you can look at it as a global debt dilemma. What's driven the cycles have been different in the U.S. The last cycle actually most, probably five or the last cycles were real estate cycles driven by over leverage. Well, let's talk about real estate and that's your area of expertise. And isn't the real estate business rife with leverage? You guys always borrow tons of money, leave us in the lurch, mess up the economy, right? Don't look at me. I mean, the fact is at the height of the market, there were the CMBS market was a $285 billion a year market. Today it's a $90 billion market. There is no R-MBS market. There is no residential mortgage-backed security market. There are no CLOs, CVOs, that whole market melted down. The underwriting by banks is a heck of a lot better. The coverage ratios are better, interest rates help. In fact, if you look at it, it's a leveraged business, but the banks are much healthier, the amount of capital they have is much better. Is this a case of regulation working? Well, I mean, for the most part, when you're close to a war, you're more frightened of a war. We're still very close to what was a terrible meltdown, like the Great Recession. So some of it is self-inflicted good stuff, but it should be regulated and regulations are important, but self-preservation is also important. And I think that the banks have gotten it. A lot of the banks are even out of the business. A lot of the shadow banking, a lot of the CMBS business is done through SPEs that have their sort of siloed balance sheets that will do a lot of the more riskier loans. The banks are generally, when they do single asset securitizations, they're generally backed by credit. So it's a lot smarter, it's a lot better. I don't, I think if you have a change in the market, it's likely to be an equity bubble, not a systemic. If you always have bubbles, there'll be bubbles from the beginning of time to the end of time, that's not gonna change. And I'm not sure there's a real definition of bubble, of what exactly is a bubble, but there are always corrections. Corrections are also an opportunity. I look at a correction as it could be a great opportunity, a buying opportunity, it's just a correction, but there will be an adjustment and it will be some lost equity. It'll be lost by private equity firms, sovereign wealth funds, some pension funds which will get it over time. And that's just gonna be a big ho hum. Fund nine will not yield the kind of return that they promised the investor, they'll be pissed off for a few months and then they'll give billions of dollars to the private equity firms to buy again and then they'll hopefully make it back in the next cycle. Okay, I wanna ask you about Donald Trump and his use of leverage at some point. Maybe you know a little bit about that. Well, let's start right now. You know, interesting enough, but what people don't realize about Donald Trump and he is a client of the firm, is Donald Trump, well, most politicians look at the polls. They look at the negatives and the positives, but Donald Trump, he looks at ratings. So he's more likely to call a media people to see how his ratings were after a debate than he would call a poll to see what the negatives were, which is a really interesting approach. Donald, if you're gonna buy and build real estate, business, you need leverage to build it. So everybody in 1990, when he almost took down Bankers Trust, you know, when he bought the Plaza, there was an article about the Plaza Hotel and they gave him a $40 million loan on his word. You know, how could you ask me for information about my real estate? I take umbrage to that, but that was, so everybody uses leverage at the moment. If, and a lot of real estate just gets done, if you, if the banks are there and give you the money, you will buy the real estate. So maybe jumping off that point, Ken, how do you know an optimal level of leverage or debt when you see it? No, you don't. I mean, I think all you can do is think of debt levels as like cholesterol levels or, you know, weight guidelines. There are, you know, certain levels that historically, you know, or you're at greater risk. You can have a cholesterol level, you know, well over 200 and your doctor tells you, I don't think you're gonna make it another month and you live for 50 years and you can look great and, you know, you don't. And so I just think it's something, you know, it's a, and by the way, data's not very good even in advanced countries. The debt comes jumping out of the woodwork. We saw that in the financial crisis even in the U.S. I actually, if you don't mind, why to test Barry if real estate's overvalued because he was talking about equity. Well, we just. It's equity. I just hosted a breakfast. We just launched an asset bubble study. We've created an algorithm to look at markets over time, you know, but so anytime you have low interest for a long time, it disguises real asset value. I mean, it has to, liquidity will drive investment. So pricing is high, but that doesn't mean, so we believe that there is, we're close to a peak. The question is, what are the factors that you can predict that delay things from happening? You can't, FERPA in the U.S., for example, was eliminated recently. So that will lengthen the ability to invest. Foreign investors will invest more in the United States because they're not taxed as much. So no one could have predicted that. I mean, you know, fundamentally, I think the real estate market personally, I would say when people ask me that question, I'm not a buyer, I'm not a seller. So the equilibrium, and depends on your horizon of investment over the long term. And there were three lessons that my partner's father had taught me when buying real estate, very he said, don't sign personally, don't cross collateralize, and if you live long enough, it'll be worth a lot of money. It works, okay, we're all gonna get in the business. Minister Pratke, I wanna ask you a little bit more about the situation with Elliott management, just to give people some background. So this is a hedge fund in New York where they bought a bunch of Argentine bonds. And then there was a question of whether they were gonna get paid back or not. And then they have sued the country of Argentina saying they want everything back. That is a very simplistic description. Are you in a position to say that you're paying them back at a certain level, you know, a sense on the dollar? How are you resolving this issue with them? What's the plan? Well, background, some background information for everyone in the room and everyone watching us to take away. What's fair value? That's a difficult question. What's original value and what's face value? Right now, the litigants have won their lawsuit in the court, NML and Elliott, but there are also some me-tos that basically won a lawsuit against Argentina on a Paris-Passo clause. What the Paris-Passo clause means is that all creditors need to be treated equally. And therefore, right now, the situation that we've got is that even if Argentina has restructured, it's 93% of its original debt that was defaulted in 2001. 7% of that debt, the holdouts, are basically, well, with this injunction at the New York courts, are impeding Argentina to be current with that 93% of the bond holders who accepted the deal. The deal that Argentina offered in 2005 and again in 2010 is now worth how much would you say on the original capital? I have no idea, I'm sorry. Make a guess, make a guess. I'm gonna be the moderator. You mean cents on a dollar? Yeah. 78 cents on a dollar. It's above 100, it's around 120. Why wouldn't they take that? Well, they ask for 350. Oh, that's why. You see, we need to be clear about these numbers because otherwise it looks as if Argentina doesn't want to pay what they owe and they should pay the full amount. There are some bonds in the arsenal of bonds that Argentina issued during the 90s. More than 150 bonds were actually defaulted. There are different bonds, of course, but there are bonds that had a very particular accrual interest rate mechanism. And when I say particular, is annual rates of 80% per annum. 80. 80. So while the litigants were seeking for justice, fair enough, in the court, they were sitting on a very juicy, 60, 70, 80% per annum accrual interest rate. Just on the basis of these were floating rate notes that would adjust for Argentina's country risk. Argentina's country risk, of course, we didn't know what it was because there was no market for most of these bonds. But someone was actually writing down a country risk rate somewhere and that was embedded into the contract. So for some cases, when you look at the claim, the claim is worth 10 cents on the dollar for the original capital, 90 cents on the dollar for the interest bill. I mean, we can go over and over again this. My opinion is that we need to discuss whether this is a fair claim or not. And this is all we've said. We've sat to the table, we've said we want to honor the debt. There are 30 cents on this claim that is original capital. We want to go ahead and settle that down. Let's discuss the interest bill because I don't think you're gonna find, not even in the real estate market, you're gonna find a more juicy investment over that period. This claim beats anything over that period of time and therefore that's the discussion we wanna have. Again, Andy, this is just three points worth of our GDP. It's really a massive waste of energy, time, and argumentation, we want to put it behind, but we want to put it in fair terms and we want the world to be aware that it was not true what our previous administration kept saying. It was not true that it was the haircut of the century, 75% haircut, that was not true. It was not true that the claim now is equal to 100, the claim is equal to 350. And I think this will set a precedent for, as Barry was saying, bubbles come and go, defaults will have defaults in the future. And I think it's very important for the judicial system in the US and for the global financial market that we're clear on what's being discussed such that we don't make the same mistakes again going forward. Sounds like you're committed to resolving this. Ken, you wanted to jump in? I just sort of connect points, Barry and the governor were making, I mean, people sometimes they ask me, are we still gonna have this problem? A minister. A minister, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I was at the IMF in the early 2000s when he was governor of the central bank and I apologize for my mistake. And it's a very happy that you're the minister. The people sometimes ask me if in a hundred years are we gonna still have these problems? And okay, part of me says I hope so. Some of my books still sell like that. And you have a job, too. But. This time is different. But I think one of the problems with an over-leveraged system, with a system which depends too much on plain vanilla debt, and I wanna emphasize plain vanilla debt, that's not indexed anything as opposed to equity, is with equity, I think Barry said, goes down, some people lose some money, they wake up, okay, let's figure out what to do. With debt, too often it's the start of a very long and painful conversation and that's a big part of what makes it so costly. If somebody could figure out at the outset what's the right way, okay, you can't panty more, what's right, what's fair, those are very loaded terms, it would be far less of a problem. And I mean, obviously the Argentine experience is this in the extreme, although not the most extreme. Russia took forever to resolve. So Bob Schiller has evangelically advocated having more indexation in debt. Of course, the problem is it's hard to get transparent data, it's hard to start the markets, but I do think at some level that has to be where we wanna be to have a more equity-driven system and less dependence on leverage. So it's both about telling people they can't leverage as much, but giving them another way to borrow money. We're gonna take some questions from the audience in a little bit, but can I want to follow up? You mentioned the IMF and the IMF has said that emerging market debt, recently said, emerging market debt could potentially be the source of the next economic crisis. Are you buying that? And if not, where are the real hotspots, the trouble spots with regard to leverage in the system? No, I'm buying that. I think that's, can you name some names of countries that are particularly trouble-some? You know, well, we'll go, of Venezuela's the champion, and I never wanted that against the champion. So, yeah, I mean, I do think the floating rates is an element which makes it a little harder to understand. And I think, you know, if we go back to the countries which haven't cleanly gone on floating rates, they're experiencing problems. And I think what we'd said to China back in the early 2000s was, you know, why don't you have a more flexible exchange rate? And they would say, why? And so, well, one reason is, you know, if things are good now, they might not be so good someday. And they would sort of say, okay, professor, that's great. We'll call you when that happens. But that's, I think, a big problem in there structurally. I think if the, right now, everybody's worried, you know, their exchange rate would devalue. What would it do? That had a floating exchange rate, you know, it wouldn't have all these loaded questions about why was it going down? What was going on? And so the floating rates, we haven't, as the minister said, you know, that we have in many countries has been a cushion against that. And I think it makes it harder to call. That said, there is a lot of corporate debt. And it didn't seem like a big percent of GDP when my thesis student, Jesse Schrager, was working on it a few years ago. He thought it was alarming. But of course, the exchange rates have gone down so much that the corporate debt, which is, that's in dollars, is now much bigger as a share of income. And, you know, it seems likely some, somebody is going to get into trouble. Very, oh, go ahead. Yeah, I just wanted to make a broader point. I don't know if it's suitable for this discussion or not, but we're talking about debt all the time. I think we should spend some time at central bank debt because to some extent, at least my view, is that this might have been the beginning of the cycle we're going through right now. You know, you look at central bank debt, basically money printing over the last six years or so, and it's gone up like 30 points worth of global GDP. So that's a massive increase in central bank debt. And we keep talking about household, corporate, public. I think we should focus on central bank debt as well because this liquidity that has been sort of instilled into the system has created, in my opinion, quite a few distortions, relative price-wise. And also it's created maybe a dilemma for most central bankers. You had Mario in the previous session here. He was the savior of the markets today because yesterday he was very committed to keep issuing euros and so forth. And I think we should also think about that going forward. Are we on the central bank respirator such that any time the market sneezes, these guys will be called in to put out the fire? And if that's the case, maybe since the last global recession, not a lot of work has been done with the exception, probably, of the US to fix things, but rather to cover them up with massive liquidity and that massive liquidity has gone to the right places in some cases and maybe to the not so right places in some other cases. So I just wanted to put that question over to my colleagues at the panel. But there have been times where, look, the government, the idea of government stepping in and covering debt into a growth economy, that growth can solve a lot of things. We just haven't had the growth to grow around. In the 90s, which was probably seemed to be worse in real estate, and the RTC took over most of the bad loans and the bad banks, and interest rates were lower, the banks had time to recover, and they did this time again, I mean, for the most part. So also with respect to debt, I mean, I think it depends on the country, whether it's household or corporate, the US is a consumer economy, I would suspect that corporate and household debt would have more of an impact in a consumer economy than it would be some other kind of economy. And China, for the most part, it's mostly government debt. So governments can also print money and they can tax. So the question is how women and problems are when the government has the bulk of the debt as a really pivot point on a meltdown. Professor Rogoff, let me shift gears a little bit and ask you about young people, millennials. There's talk about this being a very levered generation. Is that the case? And if so, does that concern you? Are there differences, generational differences out there that we should be aware of? Well, actually, I mentioned that the young people actually are very conservative in a lot of ways, but they've been levered, you're particularly talking about this, coming to the student loans and stuff, where that's sort of, there's a regulatory change, I think they made it too easy to default before, and I think they've made it too hard to default now, and that's certainly going to create a lot of anguish. I think if you looked across Europe and the whole world, I don't think you'd see this as the young people being incredibly over-leveraged. I have to say, I don't know the numbers at my fingertips. And what about crowdsourcing? I mean, is that another potential area that could sort of become problematic? And it's a area where people can borrow and it's sort of unknown, right? Yeah, so the broad point is that the regulators are always trying to fix the system and make it stable, but they're always behind the private sector, which is always innovating, and the innovation's good, because it keeps things going, but the regulators don't always follow things. So I think crowdsourcing's a positive thing, but you could have said that about some of the markets that led to blowing up in 2008 if you'd set it in 1998, but then if you don't keep your eye on them, they can get out of hand. Right. Do we have some questions from the audience at this point? Got one over here. So I think just wait for a microphone and then identify yourself, please. Hi, my name is Eddie Tai. I'm a global shaper with the Ho Chi Minh City Hub. I'm also an investor with 500 startups. Thanks for your time. I want to follow up on this student loan conversation. Obviously on dollar terms versus global debt, it's small in the U.S., it's about $1.2 trillion, but that's two times the Argentinian GDP, so still pretty large. Good facts at your disposal, I'm... That's what Google's for. I know what it's for. I want to push on the possibility that actually the student debt is actually very cumbersome to the U.S. economy. I mean, we're putting tens of millions of young people potentially very entrepreneurial and innovative on chains, which I think could reduce economic growth in the medium and long term. So I wonder how you account for that possibility in terms of policy making, in terms of analysis. You want to take that, Ken? I mean, I don't have a glib answer to that. I've said there's a moral question here. It's like in any debt problem, you want to make it easier to borrow when they needed the money to get through school, but you want to be careful not to put yourself in a situation, have people put themselves in a situation where it's difficult to work it out. So there's, I think, going to be some kind of political resolution of this going forward, but I don't know where it's gonna go. It's a good question. I just, I want to suggest it's more than a moral. I have a comment. So when I went to college, I had a student loan and I had scholarships and grants. And the book that I got when I graduated that the coupons said was this big that I was gonna be paying for the rest of my life and I didn't have a job for a while and it was very hard for me to pay and they defaulted me, but in order to go into business, having a bad credit rating is not a good idea and they reinstated my loan and I paid every cent back because I told them I'm gonna sign it out, I will pay you back. So maybe there are probably some solutions to that. We had another question here, this gentleman. Thank you. Jacob Frankl, JP Morgan. The last question about the student loans and the remarks here about central bank debt and the like suggests that maybe not all debts are the same and yet when we speak about the debt dilemma, they are all eventually going to the same big ocean and maybe they are impacting on each other. And I want to come to the analogy that Ken made about the general guidelines about optimal debt and the cholesterol. We also know with the cholesterol level, first of all of course the guidelines are changing, but we know that there is also good cholesterol and bad cholesterol, which begs the question that came up almost 30 years ago by the Chancellor of the Exchequer speaking about good deficit, bad deficit. Should we have a distinction between good debt and bad debt and how do we go about it or maybe we create a system in which the good debt degenerates itself to become bad debt and we should not draw these distinctions? Well, I mean sort of the obvious answer to that question is gonna take the example of infrastructure. If you're borrowing to build infrastructure that's really going to be useful, it's a no brainer, I mean especially in this situation. And so that's okay, it's the purpose of the debt makes sense, you might have made a mistake, you might have had the best intentions, best project with something changes and it's not a good idea, but I mean you'd still say that was good debt. On the other hand, if you're China and you've gone through this long credit cycle and your debt levels are very high and you're building infrastructure so that you have further over capacity in steel and whatever other commodities, that's probably not a good idea, but obviously you can't just look at the debt. I mean I started by saying that, you have to look at the whole picture of what's going on, it's not something in isolation anymore than one aspect of your health is. In real estate, they talked a lot about the good debt and bad debt and having some separation between good debt and bad debt. In the real estate meltdown, the fact that banks have to reserve cash against marked downs is a pro-cyclical event and it's like burning the furniture to keep the house warm. There's no market, it's illiquid. Somehow when you have a market perception of a decline in value and as a result, when it gets bad you have to reserve more capital in an illiquid market, it makes it harder to lend, it slows down the entire economy. So having bad debt or some facility that where it's sort of out of control that the market is perceiving this condition, there should be, I think it would be great to have an opportunity to set aside certain kinds of debt with a capacity to not have to reserve against it in the hope that there is some adjustment because there's nothing you can do when an illiquid would market gets devalued. All right, final word from the minister. Just to follow up on what's been said already, thanks for your question, Jacob. My, from my experience as former central bank governor, the sense that I have is that debt is never bad until it's really bad. So it's very good that we use these opportunities. You were saying when you're close to the war, this thing, I think global regulation has been too much backward looking into the 2009 crisis and not so much forward looking into the next crisis. And this is something we should take home and try to make sure that these things we can prevent as Ken was saying with the cholesterol example. The problem with the cholesterol example is as my grandfather used to say, you've got to be in very good shape to go to the doctor. But what can you do? Well, why don't we leave that as the final word? Obviously much more to discuss here and we will be for many years to come for better or for worse. So please join me in thanking our panelists, Barry Gosin, Professor Ken Logoff and Minister Kratge from Argentina. Thank you all very, very much.