 Good morning everyone. It's my real pleasure to share this session dedicated to Asia and the Sino-American Revalry. It's a topic we have already partly discussed yesterday during our very substantive discussion. I hope that all of you had a good rest during the night. We have 90 minutes to discuss this topic this morning. With six panelists, I will introduce just after three sets of questions I would like to raise. The very first one is about the nature of this revalry and to try to identify the main fields in which we could observe it. Is it in the military field? What about Taiwan for instance? Is it more in the technological field? What about the chips? A topic we have already addressed yesterday. Just two examples about the way the discussion could take. Second, I think we should explore in this discussion the consequences for the others. Apart from the US and China, there are other very important strategic players in the region, namely Japan, Korea, India of course, and the ASEAN countries. It's important and I think the benefit from this panel is to add the different viewpoints. Last set of questions, it is I would say the regional agreement, regional partnerships which do exist at the time being or which will exist in the future. Obviously in that the military alliance, the AUKUS, is certainly a game changer. We should address as well as we did partly yesterday. So with this three set of questions, we have a lot of things to be discussed. We will do so with six panelists. The first one will be Mr Akita, who is from Japan, who is a commentator for Nikai. He will be on Vizio with us this morning. After that I will turn to Renault Girard, who is a senior reporter and work correspondent for Le Figaro. Renault will speak about China's attitude, China maybe strategic mistake in the region. After that I will turn to Ambassador Li, who is a senior advisor of a team and Chen and a former chief negotiator for the Korean EU FTA. I will turn after that to Mr Narayan, who is the executive chairman of Secure X System and a former national security advisor to the prime minister of India. We will continue our discussion with Marcus Noland, who is the executive vice president and director of studies at the Peterson Institute and Marcus is with us on Vizio. And we will finish the first round of the discussion after the exchanges with Professor Wang Gezi, who participated in a previous session yesterday and with the president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University. So let me start with Mr Akita. Mr Akita, the floor is yours. I have asked all the panelists to speak about six, seven minutes before having exchanges and turning to the audience. Mr Akita, the floor is yours. Hi, thank you very much for having me here today. I'm sorry I couldn't come to the conference venue. Actually when I was invited I get excited and I check all the information about Abu Dhabi from culture, restaurant and food and so on as well as conference agenda. So I hope I can visit Abu Dhabi in the future. So I will finish my classroom in six minutes. So I just want to make a three brief point. First point is about the changing nature of US-China rivalry. Second point is the prospect of that rivalry. And thirdly, lastly, is about what we should do to win this competition. So first point, changing nature of US-China rivalry. Before the pandemic, I think that the rivalry was more or less about competition over the high-tech and maritime security domain, hegemony. But through this pandemic, now we have a very important new element in this rivalry, that is fierce competition over the political system. In short, competition between communist-wide regime political system versus US-democratic system. So now US generally believe that communist-party regime is hard or responsible to this COVID situation in the US or other country. And the US believe that if communist party allows freedom of press or press freedom of expression, maybe Beijing could have avoided this situation and could contain the outbreak of the infection in Wuhan at earlier stage. So US perceive this situation as a program of the political system. On the other hand, China believe that US current situation is largely due to the former Trump administration's way to handle the COVID. Beijing now explained the narrative that communist-party regime system is superior than US-democratic system. So it seems to me that now it is this rivalry is beyond high-tech or maritime security, but also to do with the political system. This is the first point. That's the second point. What is the prospect of this rivalry? I'm afraid to say, but I think that western countries are in less favorable position and Beijing is in a much better position now. Let's look at the economic front. China has signed mega-FTA agreement with 15 Asian countries last year. It is called RCEP. Now China also applied the participation to TPP. We cannot underestimate China's willingness to enter TPP. On the other hand, US does not have any alternative economic strategy. US is not maybe willing to come back to TPP. So this is economic competition. And also on the military front, again, we have to admit that China is in a more favorable position as of today. China's military now deploys about five times more submarine aircraft lines and also warships than US military deploys in the Pacific. And according to the projection of US in the Pekong, this military balance of power will shift toward China's favorable war in coming years. So the second point is that we are not in a favorable position now. These are the China. So that leads to my last short point. What should we do to win this competition? Obviously, we nearly need to have better common in the Pacific strategy to push back. We have in each individual country or EU now have their own strategies, but we have to have common strategy. But this is very, very difficult because disc tolerance to counter China largely differs depending on each Asian country. For example, Japan and Australia can accept highest risk to counter China because we are the treaty ally of the US and we are the under the security umbrella of the US. But on the contrary, Asian country is relatively small and largely rely on China economically cannot afford to recent China. So accommodating all these Asian like minded country and proceed in the Pacific strategy is very, very difficult, but I don't think it's impossible. My conclusion is this. If we were to be, we were the painter, let's say, maybe we should pursue the George Sula point to reason painters approach rather an alternate and approach. That is, on campus, we placed dots on the important spots with the like minded country and accumulate those dots with a whole aim to evolve to be ambiguous in the Pacific strategy. So that's dots includes high tech or supply chain or consequential digital rulemaking. So this is approach rather than a portrait painter approach to draw clear picture, static picture and impose it to everybody. That's it. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Akita for your points on the changing nature of the rivalry between the US and China for the prospects. You argue that China is in a better position, so it would be certainly the good way to start the discussion with Renault may have another vision and also for your proposal at the end. So Renault, I turn to you for seven minutes. The signature of the treaty on Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. So Asia and China. And there is obviously a rivalry between us Americans. The thesis is that in fact, China, the micro does not work. Sorry, I can't hear you. I'm sorry, I can't hear you. Is that what you heard me? No, in fact, I was... If the technician could come. Thank you. Can I take that? Yes, and there, does it work there? Yes, does it work well? No, no. Ah, do you hear me? Well, I'm not going to the microphone. So all my thesis, in fact, is that China committed a serious strategic error. Its strategic error was to get out of the wood too early. In strategy, tile is of the essence. And there, I think it came out too early. What was the strategy after the Moist episode, marked above all by the confrontation with the West, with France in Indochina, with America in Vietnam? With, because of an external factor, the Soviet Union, a reconciliation at the end of Mao Tse-tung's reign. The replacement of Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping, made a strategy of accommodation with not only the Western powers, but also with the Asian powers, such as Japan. We have benefited a lot from Japanese technology for its economic development. And the historical problems with Japan were not mentioned. When in the 5 Kaku Islands, they had been put on the stage of the first historical meeting between the Prime Minister Tanaka and the Chinese Prime Minister Shouan Lai. China has achieved its great economic power with a model that was very simple. We are a peaceful power. We have a good relationship with everyone. There was even a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. You remember Gorbachev's trip to Beijing in 1989. But we are poor, so help us. We are a great country. And you have had all of the West, and even all of Asia, fascinated by the progression of China, fascinated by these sumptuous things that they organized in 2008. And all of the West, all of the powers of the world, helped China to develop. China was doing its best to help a developed country. It used this paradigm to the end. Listen, it's enough now. You are not a developed country. We can no longer consider you as such. And it worked. But it came out politically too early in the wood. When it consolidated its economic power, it became a bit arrogant. And in fact, in strategy, arrogance fits very badly with power. And what happened to China, how did it come out of the wood? It came out of the wood for themes that were not essential to it, that were not really strategic. It was the islands in the East China Sea, a sort of confrontation with Japan. And at the same time, a confrontation with the countries of Southeast Asia, since it wanted to take over, the sea of ​​China Meridional, by installing aerodromes on reefs that were just terraeulises, international places of uninhabited islands that did not belong to anyone. But China has taken over this sea that is bigger than the Mediterranean. And so today, it considers that it is the theory of the line of the nine trains that all this sea of ​​China Meridional, which goes along the coast of Vietnam, goes to Malaysia, goes back to Brunei, then goes back to the Philippines, belongs to it. And it has captured all these stories. It happened quite badly against the Vietnamese at the beginning. And then Mr. Xi Jinping promised, it was during a trip to the United States, that he never, he promised to Mr. Obama that he would never militarize these islands. In the archipelago, which is called Paracels and Spratles, it doesn't matter. And well, he didn't keep his promise, it happens in China, because today, these islands are equipped with missiles and strategic bombardiers. And this adventurism for reasons that are important, perhaps for China, but that are not essential, suddenly creates a very important fear movement in Asia. Xi was rather ready to ask the Americans, who did not necessarily want to stay, to leave their base. We saw that, for example, in the Philippines. And there, the movement was entirely reverse, with all Asian countries who asked for more from America. If you please, stay. And even Vietnam, who invited, we remember, the visit of Hillary Clinton to Vietnam with the Obama administration, who removed the Vietnam from the list of countries that America could not afford to armament today, America can sell quite freely armament to Vietnam, while of course, it can't do it in the face of China. It's the same thing for Europe since 1989. In fact, by getting out of the box too early, by affirming its power, China would have missed the opportunity to sit down and master Asia. Because I think strategically, China doesn't want to conquer the world. China doesn't want that Thomas Gommar or Renaud Girard live like Chinese. Very well, stay in our little French museum, it's going very well. But on the other hand, I think that China wants to be master in Asia. That's very clear. And above all, China, and it had been entrusted to me by a Chinese vice-minister with whom I had dinner in 2009, considers that America has nothing to do, it's not at home in Asia, that America has nothing to do since, I would say, the Gulf of Bengal to the island of Hawaii. And that this area is very far away, it's true that it is far away geographically, very far away from America, and that there is nothing to do with it. But in fact, by getting out of the box too early, by being too assertive, as they say in English, on its power, China has made a strategic mistake. It has alienated it, in fact, it has scared all the countries who had been very willing to cooperate with it, including Japan on the economic level, and it has provoked a fear of all these countries. So there are countries that are less dependent on their trade with China as Japan, which doesn't really depend, I think it's only 4% or 5% of the Japanese PNB that is doing export and import of China. However, there are countries that are much more dependent like Korea, with the problem that China was extremely brutal in the face of Korea, after Korea was equipped with the entire American system. So I think that, and we have had, this is my conclusion, we have had a new example of Chinese arrogance, and I repeat, arrogance goes very badly with power. The more you are powerful, the more you have to be humble in international relations, the more you have to progress, and China has been, obviously, very powerful, it will automatically become the first world economic power, but it has not been able to stay more humble, it has shown itself arrogant. The last form of an incredible arrogance is this case of Covid, which in my opinion is obvious, from an industrial accident to one, of the experiments on the transfer of the coronavirus, of the mouse fever to the human species, and when it refused an international investigation on the origin of the virus, while it was an international pandemic, and that it punished Australia, which had, naturally, a natural request for an investigation, it lost, we saw it with the focus of Australia, Australia was quite close to China, there was a very important trade with China, today it is really a strategic rival of China, so China came out of the wood too early, arrogance in international relations was very bad with the power, thank you. Thank you very much, Rono, and I think it's a very good point of discussion with the presentation made by Mr Akita, so we will continue on that, but before that, Ambassador Lee, the floor is yours. Okay, thank you Thomas, do you hear me? I am very happy to have you here this morning, I would like to first congratulate Thierry and I keep Thierry to their courage and their capacity to make this conference a merveilleuse, malgré de nombreuses contraintes obstacles sanitaire, logistique, bravo, and merci. The expanding tension and conflict between the United States and China is much more serious concern to Korea than any other countries in the world because of history and geographical vicinity. The military alliance with the United States is a backbone of Korea's foreign policy but we need to note that more than 30% of Korea's total export goes to China and Hong Kong and Korea is the largest source of China's import. In addition, maybe more importantly, the US and China are two indispensable partners for Korea to manage the threat from North Korea maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. It is almost impossible for Korea to segregate economic and geopolitical concerns and I think the idea of eventual economic coupling with China is a non-starter for Korea. Having that said, as an ally of the United States, Korea will follow the US strategic trends and it was reconformed at the face-to-face summit meeting of the two countries in May at the White House. However, it would be difficult for Korea to join any initiative explicitly targeting China such as AUKUS. The international political order we want to see is non-exclusive and we value highly the cooperation with all countries of the world because more than 90% of Korea's total GDP is generated from the external trade. Korea wants to remain a good and reliable partner of the United States without confronting and provoking China in the future. In response to the current geopolitical situation, Korean companies like Samsung, LG, SK, and Hyundai Motors are all trying to increase their investment in the United States and are currently examining how to change their current global supply chain. At the sideline of Korea-US summit meeting of May, those four companies announced around US$40 billion investment in the United States. This investment in the United States will allow those Korean companies to be able to produce high-end technology products in a trusted and predictable political and legal environment. Business leaders of Korea are well aware that US-China conflict will continue and it is a constant important factor in considering their business strategy. Now I would like to briefly touch upon TPP and RCEP in the context of US-China lively. I think the US will come back to TPP though not immediately. In case of US return, it will play a very significant role in changing the current global supply chain dominated by China and to establish international trade rules such as digital trade without China and even without the European Union. But the decision of the Biden administration regarding TPP will be most likely made after midterm election of next year because trade is not so popular issue in the domestic politics and does not help to increase supporting votes in the election. In case US returns, however, it will not return to TPP of 2016, but it will propose TPP+, based on the provisions of USMCA and strengthened labor and environment as well as digital trade and climate change provisions. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, RCEP, whose negotiation began in 2011, was signed in November last year among ASEAN 10 plus five countries without India. However, the agreement is not so commercially meaningful in substance because its level of liberalization, both in goods and services, remains almost unchanged from the current ones provided by the already existing bilateral FTAs between the signatories. Even the prospect of its entry into force is not so clear yet. It requires ratification of at least six ASEAN countries and three non-ASEAN countries for the entry into force. As for non-ASEAN countries, China and Japan have already ratified the agreement and Korea plans to do so before the end of the year. For ASEAN, it seems rather complicated. Myanmar may not be able to ratify soon because of a recent political situation. Malaysia is not likely as well because it recently becomes rather negative to the trade liberalization agreement. We have to note that Malaysia and Brunei have not ratified even CPTPP, TPP-11 yet. It would take rather long time for the agreement to enter into force in case U.S. raise concerns or U.S. comes back to TPP. Ironically, the fact that ASEAN is not so commercially meaningful can be a reason why U.S. may not care much about the ASEAN, but the political and symbolic importance may matter more to the United States. Thank you. Thank you very much. I think one of your main points is to remind of his wish for Korea to stay in line with the U.S. without provoking China's balanced position. I turn now to Mr. Narayanan. You have the floor. Narayanan. Excuse me for the pronunciation. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I feel particularly privileged to be present on this occasion because I think of all the continents, perhaps Asia is the one racked with the largest number of rivalries. Before I take up the subject proper, may I echo what Ambassador Lee said about Monziah theory and its remarkable efforts in putting together the 14th edition of Global Governance? It is, I would say, a most magnificent effort, but I'm sure that Monziah theory and its team, SNK, have done a great job. Thank you very much, Ambassador Therry, for what you've done. As is aware from what the previous speaker said, there are many more rivalries in Asia other than the one between the U.S. and China. Some are much longer standing in many ways, but each of them are important for the future of Asia and perhaps to some extent for the future of the world itself. We have seen some of them turn into bitter wars, Vietnam earlier, Afghanistan more recently. But under the surface, I would like to say that each of the rivalries have the potential to turn into major conflicts. And I think the subject is particularly important for every nation of the world, apart from those in Asia, to ponder over and try to arrive at certain basic tenets as to how to overcome the situation. Before moving over to Sino-U.S. rivalry, let me take a view of the issue from an Indian perspective. For India, there are two major conflicts that are of two major rivalries that affect its future. The Sino-Indian rivalry and of course the India-Pakistan tensions and conflicts. We had thought that after many years of intense bickering and conflicts, we had reached a plateau as far as Sino-Indian tensions were concerned. But in the course of the last 18 months, we have seen a flare-up of the Sino-Indian tensions with the Chinese unprovoked aggression in the Galwan Heights in Ladakh. And it's obvious, therefore, that China will never allow any of its neighbors to live in peace. I will revert to that a few minutes later. But there's another 400-pound gorilla in the room, the India-Pakistan conflict. And that, again, has an unending saga of conflict and tensions, resolutions, etc. So the basic issue that India-Asia conference is a series of conflicts. We've heard Ambassador Lee and others talk about other issues. But if I might say so, I would say that from the point of view of world peace, the China-Taiwan conflict and I would say the Sino-Indian conflicts are perhaps the ones with the maximum potential for a worldwide configuration. And I think it's important that this conference deals with some aspects of this. The point I would stress is that there are a few pointers to what exactly China wants other than dominant over Asia as a first step in dominating the rest of the world. And I think we should flag this point. Otherwise, as I said, there was no reason in the spring of 2020 for China to have done what it did in the Galwan Heights. Therefore, I think check-mating China's ambitions or expansionist ambitions is crucial for the future of Asia, if not the world. I would sense that we need to be clear about what exactly Sino-U.S. rivalries want. Is it to checkmate China alone or is it that the U.S. does not wish to have another nation confronting its, what I would say, being the number one power in the world? All that I would like to say is that the fact that China is a common factor in most conflicts in Asia and perhaps in other areas as well reminds me, at least I hope the audience will go along with this, of Francis Fukuyama's warning that the new global strategic threat comes not from Islamic terror, but from China. I think we should heed this. The world must accept this innate wisdom because I think it contains a lot of important ideas. Talk of Sino-American rivalry should factor this aspect into calculation and not see it as a mere rivalry between China and the United States. It encompasses the rest of the world as well. On this point, let me strike a jarring note. It's all very well to talk of the U.S.-China rivalries. But if the United States is keen to checkmate China's expansionist ambitions, is it willing to go the whole way? There have been periods in the past when the United States has talked of checkmating China. We have seen the pivot to Asia toward the end of the century. But as each U.S. administration changes, there's a change in attitudes, there's a change in perspectives, there's a change in objectives. And therefore, we have seen the United States receding many Asian countries which have lined up with the United States being caught off the wrong foot while China keeps going ahead, expanding its ambit of authority and power and moving further and further afield. So when we talk of Sino-U.S. rivalry, and I would like this audience to really say how far will the United States be willing to go? Are we going to see the Biden administration do what Barack Obama said, what my good friend Hillary Clinton said about the pivot to Asia, et cetera? We need an objective. I'm very clear in my mind. I live in Asia. I've dealt with China for the better part of nearly 50 years in my official and semi-official capacities. I understand China. I've studied Chinese communism. But there's one thing, whether it's Chinese communists or Chinese nationalists, China wishes to dominate the world. We may accept that position. We may accept Nostradamus, who thinks that the Yellow Rays will dominate the world. Or we need to start thinking about it. And I think Monzio Thierry and others who have thought of the subject need to look at this point. So I would say that Asia by itself cannot withstand China. India is about the only country in this region which has the capacity to stand up to China. But what China has done by virtue of its so-called strategic imperative, Belt Road Initiative, et cetera, is to confuse the rest of Asia and tell them that we are offering you so much in terms of economic development. And in the process, as we heard yesterday, they've taken over large parts of territory across the world. They have more or less kept many countries of Asia completely sort of in their thrall economically and otherwise. And as we saw in Afghanistan, for instance, many Asian countries require western involvement to even protect the democratic traditions that they've been used to. So I think I'll be running short, but I just want to ask this question because I think it's a little jarring. Is the United States willing to bite the bullet? Will they walk the talk? We don't want another repeat of what happened in 1999, 2000, 2001. The concerns that many people have about China are real. But given the historical events of recent decades, Vietnam may be in the past, but Afghanistan is right there just a few weeks back. So can we expect the United States to do something or not? Or are we going to just talk about it? We'll talk in these fora and whatnot. People are now talking of the Quad. India is a part of the Quad. But Quad is a blue national grouping. It's not really a security. And I've been part of many of these discussions. I don't really think that the Quad is capable of putting its shoulder to the wheels to protect. Then now you've got AUKUS. It's AUKUS going to be. You've seen many other groupings of this kind. But ultimately it's a matter of resolve. It's a matter of resolution. And I'm convinced that somehow the American people are not ready to sort of pay the penalties for what they have to do if they wish to take off. My good friends in British did much more. So just one minute more. And I therefore say that what we require is a display of determination by the United States. Because if the United States is not present in the conflict, Sino-U.S. rivalry will then finally dissipate after everything. And the Chinese will have everything that goes where they want to. How do we implement these plans? We've already seen the brouhaha that has taken place about what has AUKUS done in France, the Step Bank, et cetera. We want a clear, determined effort on the part of the free world to really come forward and say, can we prevent Chinese expansionism, which is the biggest shadow of all. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your presentation and for having reminded us that there is not only the rivalry between the U.S. and China in Asia, plus what you have said about the U.S. and you expect maybe a more cautious U.S. behavior in the future. So it's a good opportunity to turn to Marcus Nolund, who is on Vizio with us this morning. Marcus, the floor is yours. Well, thank you very much. I would like to point my predecessors in thanking Thierry and the WP staff for again putting on a wonderful program. I recently had surgery, which prevents me from traveling. And I hope to be able to rejoin you in person in the future. The situation in the United States is concerning. We have mounted a mediocre pandemic response. The conduct of the Afghanistan withdrawal must be desired. We have a narrowly divided conscience engaged in financial partnership. And we face a basic issue of credibility associated with the likelihood that the Democrats will lose one or both houses of Congress next year, creating paralysis. And in 2024, we face the possible return of Donald Trump and wholesale policy reversal. President Biden has a radically different public persona than former President Trump. And his trajectory on domestic policy is significantly different. However, in foreign policy, there has been more continuity than one might have expected. This in part reflects a tendency within the American political system to devalue efforts to sustain international institutions and cooperation and to prioritize digital policy concerns. While the United States is deeply polarized politically across the political spectrum, American attitudes of China have deployed at both the elite and mass level. That consensus appears to be largely attributable to the perception that the government of China is engaged in increasingly repressive behavior internally, as well as aggressive external behavior. This shift is not uniquely American. A polling done by few researchers indicates that negative appraisals of China are widespread, including in China and Asia. In terms of U.S. policy, for example, with respect to Taiwan, the Biden administration has conducted high-level meetings with Taiwanese officials and has begun talks on a trade investment framework or tea plot agreement. It has kept most of the Trump administration's tariff and export control in place. It is grappling with how it would best address the issue of Chinese industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises. The Biden administration has criticized China over its refusal to cooperate on a rigorous independent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 virus, and it has reaffirmed the Trump administration's characterization of the situation in Xinjiang as genocide, and like the Trump administration, it has enlarged China for its violation of the one-country system in Hong Kong. With the revival of the Quad and the recent al-Qus submarine deal, the U.S. is trying to constitute a military alliance to balance China in the Indo-Pacific region. A problem with this strategy is that China is the leading trade partner for most countries in the region, and the U.S. moves are not being accompanied by a robust economic policy component. The result is that countries are feeling the centripetal pull of the Chinese economy are being put in the difficult position of choosing between political and military interests and their pocketbooks. In Australia's case, it has been the object of hardball Chinese actions in the economic sphere, which have contributed to a significant hardening of the Australian public's attitude towards China. Similar stories of Chinese economic pressure, followed by shifts in public attitudes, can be told for Japan and through South Korea. In this context, China's announcement that it wanted to join the comprehensive and progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP, has wrong-footed the U.S. For domestic political reasons, the Biden administration will have difficulty countering this move. Historically, Republicans in the U.S. have tended to be pro-trade, while Democrats were the more skeptical of globalization. The Trump takeover of the Republican Party has flipped that identification. Now Republicans are more trade skeptical, while a plurality of Democrat-affiliated voters are pro-trade. Biden and the Democratic Party are beholden to the unions, which are traditionally productionist, however. So today in Congress, a coalition of Republicans and the so-called progressive wing of the Democratic Party can block trade initiatives, such as U.S. accession to CPTPP. If the Chinese application to join CPTPP moves forward, and I believe it ultimately will, this could create a crisis moment for the WTO. The trade policy action will have shifted to CPTPP, without the United States or EU involved. One foreign policy area where the Biden administration policy differs markedly from the previous administration is with respect to climate change. And here China and the rest of Asia are central. China and India alone are projected to account for half of the increase in global energy consumption to 2040. In terms of CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants and train, China accounts for 54%, Indonesia 11%, Indonesia 7%. So together these three Asian countries account for 71% of the projected increase from CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants. So any solution to climate change has to include China. The outstanding issue is whether the U.S. and China can cooperate on issues such as climate change while continuing to work together on more problematic issues such as both Korea, where their interests do not entirely align, while disagreeing on other matters including sensitive domestic policy issues such as genocide and Xinjiang. The Biden administration wants to pursue this kind of multifaceted approach, but the evidence is thin as to whether such an approach can be successful. Thank you. Thank you very much, Marcus, for having reminded us the importance of the domestic factors within the U.S. system and also the continuity of its fine policy regarding Asia and China in particular. It's time now to turn to Professor Wang Jizi who participated in the session yesterday. So Professor, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Thomas. I'm happy to join others. Although I'm not able to join you physically, I hope I will be with you in person in the future. You asked quite a few questions, but I cannot be very precise. As some people have said, China is rising strong materially, but in public acceptance of China around the world, the picture is mixed. Modern media reports indicate public opinion polls in Western countries, Japan, South Korea, and India are increasingly favourable to China. Recently, I heard that Mr. Kishida may be elected Prime Minister in Japan soon. It's related to what he and other Japanese see today as China. He was elected, he was educated in America. He is pragmatic, but probably unsympathetic to China's political values. And I would like to know my South Korean colleague how he will assess the upcoming election of South Korea. And the next president of South Korea may have another approach to China. Last week, the leaders of the four nations that make up the informal group in the United States, Japan, India, and Australia are known as court, met for the first time in person at the White House. His unstated goal is to stop China from becoming Asia's undisputed hegemon. There have been other events and developments in recent months, not in the picture of China. But they are hardly reported in China itself and hardly known to the general public in China. China's media is full of child optimism, meaning we are winning, we are winning, and we are winning. We have friends all over the world freezing our achievements. This self-image makes it difficult Beijing to show any consideration toward whoever viewed as hostile to China. I don't see any prospects that Beijing would back down on major foreign policy issues and become less assertive, but at least in rhetoric. Our French participants asked China to be humble, but I don't see the likelihood of being humble for China in the near future. China and the United States have been engaging in a projected strategic competition that may last for decades. However, at this moment, both Beijing and Washington are preoccupied with their respective domestic imperatives. On the Chinese side, we have electric outage in many provinces, especially in the northeast. The debt crisis regarding Evergrande is another example of China's weakness. The most damaging problem is the slowing down of economic growth. There are issues related to the increasing fertility rate and the aging population. It is difficult to achieve the goal of common prosperity when economic growth is slower, private-owned enterprises are depressed and are not doing well, and social safety net has not been remarkably improved. In the US, we see continued political policies fighting back for democracy, for the Republic, for the Congress, for infrastructure construction, for pandemic control, for legal immigration, for gun control, to name just a few. So, I envisage a temporary state in bilateral relations between China and the United States. All this in the months ahead. I don't see bilateral issues emerging, but I don't see this as an achievement. There can be a resumption of consulates in Houston and Chengdu. There could also be an economic dialogue at high levels between the two countries. However, three possible problems are lying ahead for China in the next few months. First, the continued US effort to trace the origins of COVID-19 that worries China. Second, the winter Olympic Games. Western countries are not going to boycott the Games, but their public opinion polls show that these countries are not sympathetic and they may not be wholeheartedly supporting the Games. That could be the embarrassed time. Third, there is the talk about the Democratic summit toward the end of the year. That is, of course, not very favorably received in China. Especially, China is concerned about Taiwan's participation in the summit. Maybe not President Tsai Ing-wen or some top leaders, but even lower level participation will annoy China. We have seen the intensification of China's propaganda war both at home and internationally against the United States. We see reports on racial tensions, gun control issues, bad management, pandemic, human rights violations in the United States, and international failures like in Afghanistan. But the Vienna campaign is directed more at domestic audiences to enhance their confidence in the Communist Party rather than at international audiences for them to have a better understanding or a positive understanding of China. So I see China's international behavior as mostly defensive in nature. I don't buy the theory that China decides to buy to be the hegemon of the world or even of Asia. As I say in my recent articles, I think the Chinese U.S. competition is basically a game between the domestic order maintained by the Communist Party of China and the international order maintained and advocated by the United States. So in the United States, you see America first as a slogan. But in China, my slogan I always hear comes partly first. So I see U.S.-China trade volume increase last year and climate change, the effort of China is serious. I'm more worried about technological decoupling. Thomas mentioned the chips. That is a real issue in U.S.-China relationship. And also there is a possible cyber war. I'm not much worried about the confrontation despite the increased militant uproars among some Chinese netizens and some commentators. We know that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year made a phone call to his Chinese counterpart to prevent a war between the two sides. There will be improved crisis management arrangements I think the Taiwan policy of China is consistent. Xi Jinping made a telegram to his counterpart the chairman of the Kuomintang in Taiwan and he said Taiwan should engage each other for a peaceful solution. Constant will upgrade its military preparedness. There could be air fighters and bombers flying over Taiwan or near Taiwan, things like that. But I don't see a real war between the two sides. When we talk about... Professor Borgesi, I'm afraid I have to interrupt you. I will be back to you just to respect the time constraint. But as Marcus Noland insisted on the domestic factors, I think also what you have said about the Chinese opinion is very useful to fuel our debates. To continue, I would like to ask two questions to the panelists because there is this point of disagreement between Mr Akita and Rono Jira about China. For Mr Akita, China is in a better position and for Rono, in a sense, China is in a worse position. So my first question is for the three other panelists. After Marcus, how do you assess Chinese position? Is it better or is it worse? That's for my first question. The second one is addressed to Mr Akita and Rono Jira in line with the last words by Professor Borgesi about Taiwan because you didn't elaborate in your statement about Taiwan. I would be interested in knowing your respective views on that. So maybe to start with Ambassador Lee about China position, how do you assess it? My opinion, I think there is no change for China. There is a kind of anticipated path because the Biden stressed the importance of enlisting partners and allies in his combat against China even before he took office. So that is the way we anticipated, in a way to enlist partners and allies. Which is interesting to me is the drastic change of United Kingdom's positions. UK was first European countries to support AIDB a month ahead of the expression of support by France, Germany and Italy. But now they joined the camp of the United States in dealing with China. I think that is because of Hong Kong issues. I think China now tries to avoid isolation. One way of this is to apply for CPTPP knowing that it will not be possible for China to join the CPTPP because CPTPP for CPTPP is unanimous consent is required to accept new members. At this moment, it is impossible for TPP 11 countries to give unanimous support to China. However, China has nothing to lose in applying for the CPTPP because if denied, it is the fault of CPTPP, who refused China's effort to join international effort for further liberalization of trade. So I think with the Ligato Accuse, China's effort to out of isolation will continue. Thank you very much. This very first question about your assessment of Chinese position. Is it better or is it more difficult for China right now? I have a rather conflictual position. China is strong, but I think it is also one of its peak moments. I see that it is not the United States or the rest of the world which is going to be a problem for China. I think it is certain inner tensions within the Chinese Communist Party which are not yet apparent. In some ways, I see what Mao's position was in 1958-59. There are many things that Xi is doing, which of course the democratic world sees as difficult, but I think in the Chinese Communist Party, there are many who feel that in the bid to ram through holds a lot of ideas, plans, his own position for the future, his own thoughts for the future. There are tensions. I think it is well worth the democratic world to see that rather than I think the outcomes and the quad and all the other great tensions that are present. I think these are not going to make me. Can we bite in the fault lines within the Chinese Communist Party which are not too apparent? I am sure Mao's details call us that myself. How do we use that? How do we exploit it? That is probably far better than sending five squadrons of the militarily equipped planes and whatnot. I think there is something which I have not seen it, but I live in India. I don't see much of scholarly dissertation on what are the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party tensions. It used to be we used to get much more in the past. It is not apparent. But from what I see there is something which is there and I think it is well worth and maybe this could be the theme for the next major dissertation of the global governance of the year. Thank you. I return to Professor Wang Jizi on this first question. It would be interesting in having your assessment, Professor. This is your first question. I didn't hear you. There was a point of discussion at the beginning of our session between Mr. Akita and Girard. For Mr. Akita, China is in a better position. For Renault Girard, China is in a more difficult position. What are your views on that? Okay. I think China is in a difficult position to expand its influence. Its material power is very strong. Thank you. Now I turn to my second question, which is focused on Taiwan. So, Renault, if you can go first and I will turn to Mr. Akita afterwards. Can we hear you? Yes, it works. I think that in fact, in this great match which is being signed in history, because at one point we thought that the American-Sino-American rivalry was simply due to Trump, we see that in fact, Biden continues totally the policy taken in the face of China. So it is something that is being signed in a great historical movement. I think that with the signing of the Ocus Treaty, I think that in fact, China has lost a first set, it is a tennis match at least in 5 sets, like in Wimbledon, China has lost the first set, but it has not lost the match. I think that the main objective of Xi Jinping, I do not know if he will want to remain in power beyond 2027. I think that if he wants to stay beyond 2027, he will have to change the status of the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, it will not bother him too much because he has already changed the constitution. But I think that his main objective, what he wants to link to China, his passage to power, it is the recovery of Taiwan. I think that even it frees him from the obsession, otherwise these aerial maneuvers, this frequent rape of the Taiwanese aerial space, and not Chinese Chinese fighter planes, would have absolutely no meaning. But I do not think that in this conflict, China wishes to deliver a battle. China, since Sun Tzu, wants to win the wars without delivering a battle. So I do not see at all a battle of the Koray War, a battle of Midway for the control of Taiwan. I see rather a strategy on two axes. The first axis is obviously a fifth column inside Taiwan thanks to the Kuomintang Party, which is weakened in relation to the part of the Hamtzei, but which is still very present. I think it is a real policy of the continental China in favor of the part of the Kuomintang Party in Taiwan. And the second policy is indeed a policy of patience. We are going to wait for the Chinese to let the Americans. We have seen them leave in Indochina. And finally, they left Indochina after being arrived in Indochina until 1955, as the novel tells a very quiet American. They left in 1975. They left everything. We Chinese have seen them leave in Mesopotamia. We have seen them leave in Afghanistan. Finally, we have seen the Americans leave after the invasion of Iraq to Iran. And then we remerciate them because they have just given us on a silver plate Afghanistan with all its meteorites and lithium. And it will allow us Chinese to make our way through Afghanistan. So I think that the Chinese calculation is simply to have a strategic patience and to wait for the Americans, for one reason or another, which can be an internal American policy, that the Americans withdraw and that Taiwanese understand that they have no other choice than to join China and negotiate the maximum autonomy. And that's how I think that China wants, with the construction of an extremely strong navy to intimidate with the pursuit of the cyber war because the Chinese do a permanent cyber war, not only against Australia at the moment, but also obviously to spy on France and the United States. A Chinese cyber war is permanent, but it's a strategy of strong relationship. I don't think we're going towards the hot war, the naval war, as we had known in the first Pacific War. This second Pacific War, which started, is a strong relationship war, an intimidation war with the use of cyber war and which in order to obtain that Taiwanese themselves deliver to China simply by looking at strong relations. What you remind us of is that the fifth Pacific War was played at the Thai break. Mr Akita, what are your views on Taiwan? Okay, yeah, yeah, thank you very much. If I go to Taiwan, let me briefly elaborate why I think China is in a favorable position. If I put China as a person, China has a big muscle, China have more money, and China live in a more favorable geopolitical location. Oh, I think China is in a favorable position. But also, China has a full-on problem inside his family, like an income gap, like a person once said, a shortage of electricity and also a lack of the social welfare system. So I think that in long run, China is a decline. China will be a declining empire and also the instability of the political system will arise. In long run, I think that China will lose favorability, but that's why China tried to do everything they can do now. So that is my point. And on Taiwan, I echoed a French participants' analysis. I don't think that China have enough capability to guarantee itself to win the full-scale war. China can destroy Taipei, or China can land on Taiwan, but it doesn't have sufficient military power to take over Taiwan by resisting all kinds of counter-attack from the US or other allies. So I think there are two likely scenarios. The first scenario is similar to Russia's hybrid war against Crimea 2014. So China may conduct massive cyber-attack or cut undersea cable and to disrupt Taiwan or spread fake news so that they can weaken the Taiwan political entity gradually and then find some chance in long run to annex Taiwan. But another scenario is the 1937 Japan and China scenario. Japan and China didn't have intention to fight total full-scale war, but triggered by the conflict at the Marco Polo bridge near Beijing. Both countries gradually engaged into a full-scale war. So there is a risk that due to the miscalculation, the US and China will face serious conflict without intention. Thank you. Thank you very much. So we are ending this session. I would like to thank, of course, all the panelists for their contribution. I think it was very substantial because we had the chance to have a view from Europe, a view from Japan, a view from Korea, a view from India, and a view from the US and from China. So thank you for all of us, and I would suggest to applaud you and to be back for the next session. Thank you very much.