 So, yeah, I'm going to take�to Africa. And I'm going to do a�well, part of climate change and these issues is making us grapple with big decisions and big movements. You know, Yannick talked about the financial system and then, you know, here in Vietnam, the way we regulate. And now we're trying to think about, okay, how do we cope with energy in Africa? And this is stuff that we've been doing with the Treasury. So I'm going to talk just a little bit about mitigation pathways and focus a little bit on�eventually we're going to focus on South Africa and regional options to electricity generation and then look at some modeling that we've done, which I'm actually quite proud of. I think it's working quite nicely. So this is what I'm going to try to do in the next 20 minutes. But basically, you know, part of the issue is why would we be so worried about this? And there's, you know, the IPCC has come out with their fifth assessment report. And if you go and you look at, you know, what's necessary to be done in terms of global greenhouse emissions reductions by 2050, in order to just have a 50 percent chance of keeping temperatures within two degrees, you need to reduce total global emissions by about 25 to 55 percent by 2050 and then reduce them rapidly thereafter. The emissions of the countries of the OECD in 1990 are only slightly more than 25 percent of the total. So even if total OECD emissions go to zero, then that means the rest of the developing world has to at least hold emissions at current levels in order to make the very low end of the range. I think Yannick would tell me that this is not enough. So that's where we're sitting. And so then if we go and we just look at, this is all the emissions per capita, where's the, did the pointer go away? There it is. And we just take South Africa here and, you know, South Africa is emitting more per capita, obviously U.S. is right up there, but then China and then India. And, you know, there's not much. If there is a global emissions regime, you know, South Africa being accepted out of it is unlikely. And so this is part of the impetus for a lot of thinking. And South Africa has actually done really a lot of thinking relative to a lot of countries about emissions paths and energy and so forth. And it started with looking at their energy sector and doing some planning with some basic models. And this is South Africa. It's blessed with abundant and cheap coal resources, which is largely what they've used. So most of the power has come from coal. And, you know, they've looked at options. And this is done back in 2010, 2011. So a business as usual billed out to about 2030, about $108 billion. And the low emissions plan was costed out at about $171 billion. So it's significantly more. Cheaper solar might make that cheaper at this point. But, nevertheless, there are tradeoffs here. And I think we'll get to the conclusion. There's a series of issues with this that we wanted to look at. And the one is, first of all, electricity is only about half. So there are opportunities to reduce in other sectors of the economy. One of the problems with these sort of energy sector models, they just project fixed energy. Demand doesn't change with price. And actually, demand, it changes in a very complicated way with price. So if you're carbon taxing a little bit, your demand will go down. If you're carbon taxing enough, electricity demand goes back up again because it's the cheapest source for clean fuel. And South Africa has maintained electricity import restrictions, which is a bit of an apartheid relic or energy security policy, keeping regional sources out. And there are some large regional sources that people are thinking about. And this is something that is being considered, large hydropower options. So on the Zambezi River Valley, there's electricity potential. There's a fair amount in the Nile in Africa. And then here on the Congo is a tremendous amount of electricity generation potential. And it's located just southwest of Kinshasa, fairly near the mouth of the Congo River. And this is, it's called, excuse me, Grandinga. It's very big. So the world's largest dam at the moment in terms of hydropower production is the Three Gorges Dam. Grandinga is about twice the size of Three Gorges in terms of power output. So it would supply more power than the current demand in South Africa. It's actually got a relatively small reservoir. It's largely a run of the river. Damn, there isn't the geology to have the reservoir. But there is the force and the flow. And it's about an 80 billion dollar cost roughly divided between dam costs and transmission costs. And, you know, this isn't an additional cost, right? I mean, South Africa is going to spend around 100 billion on energy. And it's just a matter of where these things are allocated and what are the right things to do. But it is not, South Africa is not large enough to absorb Grandinga by itself, but it would be the largest potential player. And I just included some photos just to sort of give a notion of the size. And this is the Kahorabasa Dam. It blocks the entire Zambezi River. It's in northern Mozambique. And that's about 2.1 megawatts. And if we go here to, yeah, we can see this, okay, this is Inga 2 and this is Inga 1 on the Congo at the site roughly where the Grandinga would be. And these two are only slightly smaller than combined with this one being much larger than the Kahorabasa Dam. And this is courtesy of Google Earth. We go over here. This is the river. That's Inga 2 and that's Inga 1. There's an awful lot of river left over. So it's a very large site. And it brings up the possibility, you know, thinking through time as we look out of a pan-African grid rooted in hydropower with production here, here, and of course feeding to various locations. This is potentially beneficial for renewables because as we spread across more space for wind and for sun, the more dispersed your sources, the more likely it is it's going to be sunny or windy somewhere. And the more likely it is that you're going to have, you know, a relatively steady source of power coming in. So the geographical diversification is potentially important. So we're just beginning to look at this. And we're trying to, we've developed some work which I'll spend the rest of my time looking at trying to do some modeling of whether, just from the South African perspective, this is interesting or not. And what we've done is we've taken a model of the South African economy, the whole thing. And these are really useful in terms of looking at interactions and big investments. And we also get prices. We get demand out of it. So we know what power demand is. We can do reasonably well there. These models are actually model energy production technologies just terribly. You know, for example, in these models we almost always say, well, we'll let you invest in T comes available in T plus one. But a nuclear plant will take, you know, seven, eight years to build, right? So you don't, you invest in T and T plus one and T plus two. And by the time you get to T plus eight, that's when you get your power. And we don't capture that. Other factors are in there in terms of peak. We're working on annual cycles. Electricity demand is very, you know, meeting peaks and so forth. So we merge that up with an energy model that's been specifically designed for looking at the energy sector. So essentially, a lot of the demand side is coming from the general equilibrium model and the supply side is coming from these times energy choice model. And basically then we go and we kind of replicate the planning process in South Africa. So we run our general equilibrium model out for 30 years. That gives us prices and demand and so forth. And then we say, OK, given that, what would be the optimal energy mix? And then we fix it for a period of time. Then we do it again and we iterate forward through time as if we were making a forecast, making a build plan, committing the build plan, going forward two, three, four years, making a new forecast, making a new build plan and committing our way forward. So it's just replicating a standard planning process. We find that this converges quite nicely. This is electricity demand in 2030. We just run two scenarios, a baseline scenario and a carbon tax scenario. And we converge more quickly if we do more iterations basically if we plan in a more refined way. So we run three policy scenarios. One, we just sort of track the business as usual scenario, which is the standard scenario that people look at. We do a carbon tax scenario, which is US $30 per ton. It's just kind of phased in in $3 increments over 10 years. And we actually generates a fair amount of revenue. So what you do with your carbon tax revenue is important. We reduce essentially other indirect taxes, value-added taxes. And the second one, we lift import restrictions. So we sort of say, OK, there's this regional activity that's going on. What happens? And the third, we combine the tax with the imports. And this is just kind of illustrating what can be done. And so we pick up, we get information on total electricity demand. And when we going out to $30 a ton, we bring demand down, we bring price up. If we do the regional option, then the demand and the price are staying relatively constant, slightly low. The electricity supply mix, actually in this case $30, is not enough to move it. And also, you can see this, the black is coal. And you have a lot of persistence in the system. Once you've built a coal plant, it's expensive to shut it down arbitrarily. So by 2025, regardless of what we do, we don't get very much shift in the way production goes. By 2035, things start to happen a little more, especially under the tax with import scenario. We get a lot more imports. We get emissions reductions of around the most, about 25% in the tax with imports scenario, with just a carbon tax, only about 15%. And that's relative to baseline path. We would need to do this principally coming out of the electricity sector. What we're doing this with Fundi actually at the Treasury, and they're principally interested in the economic outcomes, what happens under various scenarios. And we get, for GDP, which is an important variable, we get that the carbon tax alone brings you to about a percentage point lower in terms of GDP. That's not a percentage point. I mean, it's not on the growth rate. So if your GDP were 100 in 2035, under the carbon tax, it would be 99. So the impact on the growth rate is quite small. If we do the import policy, basically what is coming out is the big hydro is roughly competitive with South African coal. And if we combine, we actually get a slight boost. And that's kind of technical, but basically what we end up with in a tax with import scenario is very, very inexpensive emissions reductions. So we have under these assumptions, essentially, about $20 billion in net present value of emissions reductions at the relatively low carbon price that we put in, going up to $30 a ton. And only for South Africa, but almost for free if it works out this way. It is, there's still issues, right? Employment is lower, and this has to do with keeping the electricity price, keeps up the capital intensive sectors, and the way the revenue is recycled. The incidence is not the way we would like it to be as currently constructed. So the carbon tax incidence as constructed benefits wealthier households more than lower income households. So there's still work to be done in terms of setting aside policies. But we wouldn't say that we know what's going on with all of this yet, but we do think we have a potentially very inexpensive approach for decarbonizing and for generating a series of potential positive spillovers. So something of a pan-African grid anchored in hydropower, favorable to renewable energy because of these portfolio kinds of effects. And the regional interdependence is both a good thing and a bad thing. If this helps to foster cooperation within the region, then this would be a good thing. But it's certainly, and I think this is standard, it's much less straightforward than business as usual. I mean, if there weren't environmental considerations, and Fundi asked me what to do in terms of power production, then the easiest thing to do is clearly dig up the colon and burn it, that we know how to do that. And it doesn't require worrying about all of this other stuff with, of course, a series of political risks. This is not easy coming across places that are not... DRC is not known for stability, coordination issues, and also with much of these renewables who get power, but not necessarily power when we need it. And this is very similar about the financing and how we deal with the financing is, of course, an open question and very similar to all of the technologies that Yannick mentioned. This is a mainly upfront cost with then long-run kinds of benefits. And I don't know if we have these kinds of institutions yet to fully deal with this. So that's what I wanted to talk about this morning. So thanks very much.