 Last weekend, a NATO airstrike killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers, and it pushed U.S. relations with Pakistan really to the brink. What does this mean for the ongoing NATO-ISAF, U.S.-ISAF operations in Afghanistan? It doesn't bode too well for obvious reasons. I think everybody is very anxious to get out of Afghanistan. We've got a 2014 deadline. We need Pakistan to help us. There is no solution without Pakistan. Pakistan says there's no solution without Taliban. So the feeling is let's get on with it and deal directly with Taliban. The trouble is now Pakistan is not out of the loop, but it's close to being out of the loop because it's been turning against us with the vengeance for, as you mentioned, these two dozen Pakistani soldiers who were killed. But the latest now is that, according to the authorities in Afghanistan, is that this was done after these Pakistani outposts started firing at us. We then called in helicopters to fire back at them. So there are several versions as to what actually happened. It's going to be some time before we sort it all out. It doesn't bode well for our relations with Pakistan for obvious reasons. Has our relationship with Pakistan become just transactional at this point? For the time being, yes. And I'm afraid Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world today, not just because of this incident, but because of things that go back 20, 30 years. The most important period, it seems to me, was when we finally left after defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, we turned against Pakistan with a vengeance because they were developing secretly nuclear weapons. And for 10 years, there wasn't a single Pakistani officer who was allowed to come to this country as they had done for decades before. So that gap is very important because those who were lieutenants and captains during that period who developed a certain hatred for the United States are now one, two, and three star generals. Let's talk about the so-called Bonn-2 conference. Pakistan has said it intends to boycott the International Conference next week in Bonn about Afghan security and development. How important is Pakistani engagement in this process? I think it's still critical. And I'm sure it'll blow over eventually. We've had major crises, none quite as bad as this one, but major crises before. And eventually it blows over because both nations need each other. You know, I can't tell you how many times I've heard that U.S.-Pakistani, and you just said it, U.S.-Pakistan relations are on all time low. How did we get to this point, considering it's so crucial for us to have good relations? Well, also there's a certain amount of paranoia. It's the only country in the world where I've met PhDs, Army generals who are convinced that 9-11 was done by Mossad on the CIA. You tell them it's... Serious people. Serious people. And you tell them quite simply three people can keep a secret provided to them are dead. Otherwise it's ridiculous to think that an enormous organization like the CIA, the U.S. military, etc., were involved. It's almost ridiculous. Yet you can't imagine how many people take it seriously. And is the relationship beyond repair? Is it something that... And if not, is there any way that it can be salvaged? No relationship is beyond repair, but we have to... It seems to me elevate our sights and bring other major powers into a settlement as quickly as possible. And how would that look? That would have to bring in Iran, neighbor, China, neighbor. A small part of the frontier is a frontier with China and obviously India. Russia, China, India and Iran would have to be brought together for some kind of internationally guaranteed settlement in which everyone would have a stake because there's at least a trillion, if not two trillion dollars worth of minerals that are quite deeply buried in Afghanistan but everybody would like a piece of the action. Is there a problem with the U.S. military and the State Department being on the same page as far as our policy towards Pakistan? I saw in the New York Times the other day, Vali Nasser, a former aide to late Dick Holbrook talking about how the way things are set up now, colonels in the field who are commanding soldiers are effectively making policy. Yeah, I think that's true to a certain extent. We have the same problem in Vietnam. In fact, I have a funny feeling that Afghanistan could end up conceivably the way Vietnam did. How so? Because the last American soldier left Vietnam on March 29th, 1973. Saigon didn't fall until April of 1975. Two years later, South Vietnamese did quite well on their own with U.S. military aid. And then Congress decided, in its infinite wisdom, to cut off military aid. And what happened? The North Vietnamese improvised an offensive to take Saigon. And if you read the memoirs of former high-ranking generals, et cetera, from North Vietnam, they said they were taken totally by surprise by the decision of the U.S. Congress and they had to improvise an offensive to take Saigon, which they thought was still at least two years away. Arno de Borger, always fascinating. Thanks very much for your time. My pleasure.