 So, I focused on the pharmaceutical sector for a number of reasons. The first is that it's one of the most R&D intensive and innovative sectors. The second is because it's a sector for which intellectual property is of particular importance just because of its cost structure. And the third is because I think that in general policy decisions that affect the pharmaceutical sector have broader implications for public health. So, at the end of the day, I care about what the answer is from more than an academic perspective. For the paper that I presented today, I was interested in following up on some earlier work that looked at the impact of intellectual property rights on incentives for innovation. So, because I found that incentives for innovation focused specifically on neglected diseases or for developing countries seemed rather limited, I wanted to know are the static effects, as in the consequences of patents that potentially show up as higher prices or reduced access, are we seeing these static effects in developing countries as well? Because ultimately, intellectual property rights are balancing dynamic effects and static effects. So, if we didn't see many benefits for developing countries in terms of dynamic effects, if we also then happen to find that the static effects are extremely negative, then it's clear that that's not the right policy. So, patents in pharmaceuticals, like patents in a lot of other settings, have two potential impacts. The first is that they give the inventor some market power. They give the inventor the ability to try and earn a return on the initial R&D investment by preventing anybody else from profiting from that innovation for a fixed duration. And so, in general, we would think if you provide more patent protection or stronger patent protection, that should lead to stronger incentives to innovate, so more innovation. But of course, finding exactly the point at which that increased innovation continues to generate social benefits is very difficult to fix, ex-ante. The other effect of patents is that because they provide this market power, they potentially allow the innovator to charge higher prices. And so, that's especially contentious in the case of pharmaceuticals because those higher prices mean that some patients are unable to afford treatments that are potentially life-saving or otherwise very important for their health. So, I think the challenge of balancing the dynamic effects and the static effects are starker in the case of pharmaceuticals than in a setting such as, let's say, electronics. Today, I was presenting a paper that tries to assess the impact of trips or the introduction of intellectual property rights on pharmaceuticals in developing countries. Specifically, has it changed the speed of access to new products and has it increased the price or quantity consumed of these new products? So, the reason that that's important is that when the trips agreement was negotiated, there were many concerns that it would result in patents leading to higher prices and reduced access. And so, what I'm trying to do here is assess in practice what have been the consequences. What my co-authors and I were trying to do in this paper was to get at the question by examining at the product level the impact of having a patent or not having a patent by using data across 60 countries and a 12-year time period. So, during that time period, we see the introduction of intellectual property rights or specifically pharmaceutical product patents in a number of countries. And we can compare what happens with drugs that qualified for pharmaceutical product patents versus those that did not, depending on when a country introduced pharmaceutical product patents. And we can compare the same drug across countries where it has different levels of patent protection. What we find is that patents are associated in general with faster launch and higher prices. However, the effect of a patent on price in developing countries following the introduction of trips is not as high as prior to that period. So, in other words, the patent premium post-trips is actually somewhat smaller, which was a surprise to us because we expected, and I think many others expected at the time that the trips agreement was negotiated, that patents would be associated with clearly higher prices and would have very negative effects on access in the short run. We certainly find that patents are associated with higher prices, so it's not that I mean to imply anything other than that. But the patent premium in developing countries is much smaller than in developed countries and it actually seems to be falling a bit over time. Try and investigate or we try and suggest reasons why that might be the case. And this is something I don't think we've nailed down completely. It could be that pharmaceutical firms have started to price discriminate more or to use tiered pricing or differential pricing that has resulted in lower prices in relatively poor countries to a greater extent than was true before. And that might be because of political pressures. It might be because that's actually the profit maximizing thing to do, which is great for all involved. It could also be that pharmaceutical firms have adjusted their prices in response to other policies that were adopted around the same time as patent protection. So, for example, under the trips agreement, countries that are concerned about a public health crisis can issue compulsory licenses. And a pharmaceutical firm that's worried about seeing a compulsory license issued on its product might preemptively lower its price to make the issuance of a compulsory license less attractive. This work is extremely preliminary and so that's one important caveat that it's certainly possible that we haven't taken care of all the things we need to take care of. So there are a number of controls that we would like to include. It's always challenging to get good data on some of these omitted variables, but that's something that we nevertheless need to work on. It's also the case that we're dealing with a very small set of products for which trips' relevant protections are important in developing countries. And so this might change over time as the sample of affected products increases. It might be too early to make any definitive statement. And I think that's actually one of the most important caveats, is we probably haven't had enough time to observe everything. So in particular, countries like India, which only became trips compliant in 2005, that happens to be a setting where a generic competition and the pharmaceutical industry are particularly important. We just don't have that many years to observe. And so I definitely would not forecast that the same results would hold in 10 or 20 years.