 Well, good morning, everybody. It's great to see such a crowd here. And thanks, Frank, for getting everybody in their seats first. That's always great. I'm David Pumphrey. I'm with the Energy National Security Program as well. And it's really great to have this program come together in this way. We've been talking about this for several months as the issues surrounding rare earths had become more and more in the press and being discussed. But really, we kept thinking, well, what are the issues that lie behind this discussion? And what are the things that we're looking at? And it really took us a while to pull together and start looking at the right people to come and start this dialogue and start this discussion. And we were really fortunate that our timing worked out so well with the release from DOE of their study that they've been working on for six months or more, I think. So it's really a great honor to be able to have this program. Our program's been the Energy National Security Program. It's been long focused on the question of the geopolitics of conventional energy and the supply risks that go with that. But as we move into this transformation of the energy sector, the concern becomes what kind of risks are we looking for there? What kind of supply chain risks? What kind of geopolitical risks will we be facing? And so one of the questions that came up around this discussion of rare earth elements was, is this one of those topics that we need to be concerned with? And so we thought it would be useful to look at resource base, the uses, the alternatives, what are the key questions that have to be analyzed? Now for those of us of a certain age, rare earth sort of is identified with something else. So I did a Google this morning to find out whether the rare earth minerals came up or whether the band from the 60s and 70s came up first. And actually, rare earth elements does come up first now. I'm sure if I'd done this six months ago, rare earth the band, for those of you who are younger, I checked it out with Lee Henrichs, our research associate, and she said who? But at any rate, that would have come up first. So this really shows how this has started to penetrate into the dialogue, into the public discussion. We'll have David speak first, because he's going to do a presentation on the report. And for me, it's really great to have David here. I've known him for a number of years. He's a real leader in the effort to make this transformation of our energy sector and get us into a much cleaner energy system. And he's been doing this for a number of years, I would say. Both of this work now as the Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, but before with the work at Brookings and with the Clinton Global Initiative, and then previous to that in the Clinton administration, serving in both the State Department and the National Security Council. We have fuller bios that have been distributed to everybody. But I just wanted to say, David, personally, thank you very much for coming. And it's great to see you here. And why don't you go ahead? Just the usual administrative announcements, please turn off your cell phones so that we don't have disruptions during the time. And we will have time for questions and answers for David right after his presentation, and then we'll switch to another panel. Well, thank you very much, David. It is terrific to be here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of our nation's leading think tanks looking at the issues that I work on. Particularly great to be here with David Pumphrey, an old friend, as he says. We've been working together for many years in different seats. David left the office that I now am at before I arrived. But let me tell you, he leaves a legacy of a lot of respect, a lot of warmth I hear from people in our office, how much they value, and like David Pumphrey. So it's really terrific to be here. And thank you for your invitation. I know that this conference or this event has been in the works for a while. We were delighted you accept your invitation to appear here and use it as an opportunity to talk about this report that's been underway, as David said, in the Department of Energy now for much of the year. And I'm going to, in the next 20 or 30 minutes, describe to you some research that the Department of Energy has done and our findings and some of the conclusions that we draw from them. This has been an extraordinary team effort, and some of the people who have been working hard on this are in the front row right here. They've just done an extraordinary job. And I want to applaud them and the entire team around the Department of Energy for all the hard work that's gone into this. So let me see if the technology works here. It does. So here's what I'm going to do today. I'm going to run through, obviously, background our analysis. We looked at supply and demand. And then we did an analysis. We call it criticality analysis. Talk about a program and policy directions we looked at. And then next steps. Here's a scope of what we did. And for some of you, I think, some of you are probably PhD chemists here and very familiar with what you're looking at. For others, this may be the first time you've looked at the periodic table since high school. The rare, these are the elements that we looked at. And the so-called rare earth elements are the ones that are the second row from the bottom there. And here's a point I want to emphasize. We looked in this study at four clean energy technologies. They're the ones that are pictured here on this slide. Wind turbines, electric vehicles, solar panels, and energy efficient lighting. We did not, in this report, look at the energy sector as a whole. We did not look at the economy as a whole. One of our conclusions is that much more work needs to be done in this area. And we intend to do more research going forward. But our work had a pretty specific focus. That's what we'll be talking about here. Here's our timeline. We announced that we were going to do this in March in the spring. We released a public request for information. We got back 35 responses, extremely helpful responses, from a range of leading companies and experts in this area. We offered the opportunity to companies to provide proprietary data that we would protect on a business confidential basis. Then throughout the summer and the fall, we've been analyzing that data working on drafts. The report that we're releasing today is over 100 pages and is available for downloading from the DOE website this morning. Here are our goals to assess the risks and opportunities associated with the supply of critical materials to inform the public dialogue on this topic and to identify possible program and policy directions that we might pursue. There are three strategic pillars to our work. First is diversifying global supply chains. For any resource, it is important that we have multiple sources of supply. Winston Churchill 100 years ago said with respect to oil, security rests in variety and variety alone, a quote like that. The same is true today with respect to any critical material. It's important that we have multiple sources of supply globally. Within the effort to diversify global supply chains, domestic production is especially important. Obviously, the most secure supply is domestic. That's the first pillar. Second is developing substitutes. It's extremely critical in any application that we have substitutes and so we're not reliant on any particular input. And then third is reducing, we're using and recycling tremendous opportunities here for doing all three of those things. The graphic at the bottom underscores a point which is central to our work and became more central as we conducted our analysis, I think. And it is this, this issue of critical materials and rare earth mining, rare earths. This issue is not just a mining issue. This issue is important across the entire supply chain. I think sometimes it's presented as a mining issue in the media. This is an issue that we need to look at in terms of the supply chain from mining through processing development of components to end use technologies and then back in a loop of recycling and reuse. And we looked at the entire supply chain throughout our study. So here is a chart that shows the use of the materials that we looked at in different clean energy technologies. And just to kind of quickly summarize, and on the vertical there on the left, you've got the different materials we looked at with the rare earths at the top, in addition, indium, gallium, tellurium, cobalt, lithium. And then the specific technologies, you'll see, you know, solar cells, PV films by and large don't use rare earths but they do use indium, gallium, tellurium. Magnets, which are used in both wind turbines and vehicles, draw heavily on neodymium and dysprosium, other rare earths. Batteries, nickel metal hydride batteries and mesh metal, usarium, lanthanum, and lighting and phosphors, phosphors used in lighting, draw pretty heavily on some of the heavy rare earths such as terbium. That's a quick summary and there's much more detail in our report. So let's summarize the analysis that we did on this. First, we looked at supply. And a critical point here, particularly with respect to rare earths that get so much attention, is that rare earth metals are not rare. They are, in fact, found widely across the face of the earth. They are found in the United States. They're found in Canada and in Australia and in a number of other countries. What we have here in this chart I think is a number of mines around the world that have the potential to open in the decade ahead. And the numbers that you see is this expert assessment of the order in which these mines are likely to open. So in Western Australia, you see the one and that's the Mount Weld Mine owned by the Linus Corporation, which is projected to open in the next year or so. I believe it's 10 to 15,000 tons in the first phase and then 10,000 more in the second phase of production. We have then, in number two, is the Mountain Pass Mine in Southern California and the Mali Corp Corporation, which owns the mine, and now it's earlier this week that they have secured all of the permits that they need in order to operate that mine. And they expect to, they say, bring the mine online within two years. And then you'll see other mines around the world. So rare earth metals are not in fact rare. I think the reason that this name came to be is that where rare earth metals are found, they're found in very dilute concentrations in minerals when pulled out of the earth, but they are in fact broadly distributed across the face of the earth. Here's a point that we thought important as we pursued our analysis. We call it co-production complications and there's really two of them here. One of them is that historically, when rare earth elements and some of the other materials we looked at had been mined, they have not been the primary extraction product, precisely because they are found in such dilute concentrations. They were often byproducts. And so for example, in the Bautel mine in China, iron has been the primary production product with rare earth as a byproduct. So that's one point. A different point on co-production is that rare earths in particular are often found co-located with thorium, which is radioactive, difficult to manage. And so there is both expense and significant complications in environmental consequences in separating the rare earth elements from thorium where they're found together. So we looked at supply, we also looked at demand. And just to quickly explain what we did in our demand scenarios here, or demand, we identified four scenarios for each of the technologies we were looking at. We identified a high market penetration scenario for each and a low market penetration scenario for each. So in one scenario we projected the possibility of lots of wind turbines coming out of the market globally and in another fewer wind turbines and the same for each of the other technologies that we looked at. And then we did the same thing with respect to the material intensity in each of those. So for example, we looked at the use of neodymium in wind turbines in current levels and then based upon discussions with industry, we looked at how much that might be brought down and that's a low material intensity scenario. And then we generated four scenarios. So kind of high deployment, high intensity, which would mean lots of this stuff being demanded all the way down to low penetration, low intensity, which would mean less. And some of this may be somewhat difficult to absorb in a PowerPoint. There's a lot more detail in our report. I can explain, both our low technology deployment scenarios and our high technology deployment scenarios were drawn from work, mostly worked on by the IEA for most of our technologies. Here is a chart which is, there will not be a test on this tomorrow, but here's a chart which briefly gives you some data on the high intensity and low intensity content for each of our technologies, gives you a sense of what we did. So at the top for neodymium in wind turbine generators based upon our industry surveys and discussions, we estimate that the average use of neodymium in a generated day is about 186 kilograms per megawatt, but there's a potential there to bring it down to 124. And so that was our high intensity and low intensity. We did the same thing for each of these. So here's a point that also emerges important in our analysis, which is that these critical materials we're looking at are often a small fraction of the total cost of the clean energy technology. And here's an example with a plug-in electric car. The, looking at the cost of the materials that we're looking at here, neodymium, dysprosium, lithium and cobalt in a plug-in electric car. Over the course of this year, we think the input prices within a vehicle varied between about 280, 320 dollars. And this is for a car that was ballpark 30 to $40,000 in cost. So obviously a relatively small percentage of the overall cost of the car, which means potentially the demand for these technologies are gonna be slow to respond to changes in critical materials prices. We don't project that doubling, tripling, quadrupling of the prices for these materials would necessarily have a material impact on the demand for the overall technologies. So we looked at clean energy's share of critical material use. And our top line conclusion is the clean energy's share of total material use is currently quite small, but that it could grow significantly with increased deployment of these technologies in the years ahead. And I've got two examples here. The first is on this page and this is dysprosium, which is a rare earth element that's used in magnetics. Currently only about 16% of it is used in clean energy for clean energy technologies. And we project that by 2025, it could be as much as 62% in high deployment scenarios. And similarly with lithium, today lithium is barely used in clean energy technologies, but particularly with the deployment of electric vehicles in the years ahead, we project that it could be as much as 50% of global lithium use by 2025. So I'm gonna come back to say a few more words about lithium in a couple of minutes. So we did supply, we did demand, and then we pulled them together in charts that look like this. And just to tell you, kind of walk you through a couple of them. This is neodymium oxide. Neodymium is used in magnets. And the green and blue lines, there are demand lines. And what they show, and those are different scenarios, high deployment, high intensity, low deployment, low intensity. And you see that by 2025, we have potential for pretty significantly increasing demand. The red lines are supply lines. And at the bottom, you see our current supply. Then we add on to it the Mount Weld Mine in Australia. We add on to it the Mountain Pass Mine in California. And then the very top line out to 2015 is our additional mines projected to come online by 2015. After 2015, we didn't make any estimates of supply. But we continued the lines there. But what that shows is that with mines projected to come online by 2015, there's a pretty big gap between where the supply will be and where the demand might be in 2025. And so that means something will have to happen. Either additional mines will have to come online. Either additional technologies will have to come forward that provide opportunities for recycling, that reduce the use of this. Prices will need to respond. But there's gonna be some type of market adjustment will be required here. Same with dysprosium. This is also a rare earth metal here. This we identified as probably the most critical. As I'll show in a moment. But here you see even less, we see less supply coming online in the next few years. Dysprosium then in neodymium, just to compare. And then a word about lithium. A couple of years ago, there was a kind of flurry of articles about peak lithium and concerns that maybe the world was running out of lithium. Almost all the companies I've talked to in this space who have looked at this have concluded otherwise. And our analysis bore that out. We do not see lithium supplies being a concern in the years ahead. There's lithium in Chile and Argentina and Australia and the United States. And if you kind of walk through our charts and you'll see that we think the world's in pretty good shape when it comes to lithium supplies. So we pulled this all together. I know this is a lot to absorb. But we pulled this all together in what we call criticality assessments. This is a methodology that is based on one first developed by the National Academy of Sciences. And we did it as follows. We, on the x-axis, looked at supply risk in different ways in which the supply of these materials might be disrupted for clean energy uses and the risk that might happen. And on the vertical y-axis, we looked at the importance of the clean energy economy. And so, and using that type of analysis in the short term, we found dysprosium to be the most critical element. It's both extremely, it's important to various clean energy applications with current technologies and the supply risk is highest. And down, kind of moving from the top right to the bottom left, we found lithium, as I just said, samarium, some others, to be less critical. We looked in the medium term, here's the medium term and here's kind of the shift from short term to medium term, being 10 to 15 years, excuse me, five to 15 years. And still, some of these elements remain pretty critical in the medium term. There are to be sure, and I want to emphasize this, there are opportunities for changing this story. And we're gonna get to this. If we invest in research and technologies, if we respond with new recycling technologies, if we open up new sources of supply, this will change. But we're gonna need to take action in order to address the situation, which gets me to our program of policy directions. So we looked at eight categories of programs and policies. The research and development, information gathering, permitting for domestic production, financial assistance for domestic production and processing, stockpiles recycling, education, and diplomacy. So a broad range of different types of policy responses. A key point, and I want to emphasize this, this is a DOE report that we're doing. It's just the department, we coordinated and talked with colleagues in the interagency community, the federal government, but this is a DOE report. And so some of these areas are very much within DOE's core competence. Others are areas in which DOE has no jurisdiction. For example, DOE does not regulate domestic permitting for mining. Or it doesn't, we don't have, we don't work in that area. But we looked at all these areas, and we talked with colleagues in the interagency process. And we have thoughts on each of them in our report. I want to talk about a few of them here, starting with the area that is most squarely within DOE's core competence, which is research and development. DOE is the nation's leading funder of research on the physical sciences. And it has a long history of work in exactly this area. In fact, the Ames Lab in Ames, Iowa, is the United States historic leader since World War II on rare earth research. And so Ames Lab has been doing work on this area. Our energy efficiency and renewable energy program has been doing work in this area. The Office of Science has been doing work in this area. And our new and very exciting program, RPE, has also been doing work in this area. Until this year, for historically, this work had not been coordinated and was within different stovepipes within DOE. And one of the efforts that we've made is to pull these together. So DOE is doing integrated work in this area. We have, just to say a little bit about the Office of Science is doing work across a number of different topics related to materials research out at the Ames National Lab on magnetic materials, nanoscale processes and a variety of related topics. Our energy efficiency and renewable energy program at the Department of Energy is already doing work on alternatives to permanent magnet motors, more applied work out of the energy efficiency and renewable energy program, looking at the topics up here with magnets and motors. And our RPE program is as well. Could explain this chart for anybody who's interested, but I have a sense that you might want me to move on. But we can come back to it. So the Department of Energy in the past two months, actually in the past month, has done three workshops on this topic, which indicates a serious sense that we attached to it. Two of them have been with international partners, which I think underscores how much of an international issue this is. We did a workshop out of the Lawrence Livermore National Lab in mid-November with Japanese colleagues looking at critical materials. We did one with European partners at MIT on December 3rd and RPE sponsored one here on December 6th. Coming out of these workshops, we have some pretty refined views of the most cutting edge research that can be done in this area and are planning on pulling together an integrated research plan for the department going forward in this area. One of my main conclusions after spending some time looking at this literature is the volume of the data gaps. It's really quite striking in some areas how little is known and how helpful it would be to know more. I'm struck that public entities by and large do not collect price production consumption data and people tend to go to metal pages to find out that type of data in this area. There is little known publicly about the material intensity of different energy technologies. We collected some of that as a result of our request for information, but there's not much out there and it took a fair amount of concentrated staff time for us to develop learning on that topic. And in terms of individual technologies and the potential for substitutes, there's not a lot of known there either. So one of our main conclusions coming out of this is that we need additional attention to data gathering and EIA is exploring opportunities to do that, the Energy Information Agency within the Department of Energy. And we intend to, in the year ahead, have additional requests for information, hold additional workshops in order to gather more information. Another key point here is the importance of education and workforce training. Today, there are thousands of researchers working on this issue in China. There are dozens in the United States. And in order for the world community to move forward as it needs to in this area, we need to develop expertise around the world. And I think in the United States as part of the development of our clean energy technologies in order to promote a clean energy future, we need to develop the human capital here to promote these technologies in the decades ahead. As President Obama has said, improving education and math and science is about producing engineers and researchers and scientists and innovators who are gonna help transform our economy and our lives for the better. And our human capital here is absolutely essential on this issue and on so many others. So just, I wanna place this within kind of the constellation of related government activities on this. As I said, this is just a DOE report. There is lots of other activity going on within the US federal government on this topic. OSTP, the Office of Science and Technology Policy within the Executive Office of the President has coordinated work on this area among federal agencies. USGS has just been an excellent report I commend to everybody on this topic. DOD has a study underway. GAO and Congressional Research Service also have reports underway. Or actually, their reports are released. So to wrap up our conclusions out of this report. First, some materials analyzed are at risk of supply disruptions. We identified in particular five rare earth metals, dysprosium, neodymium, terbium, uropium, and yttrium, along with indium and assess those as the most critical. Second, clean energies share of material use is currently small, but it could grow significantly with increased deployment. Third, critical materials are often a small fraction of the total cost of clean energy technologies, which means among other things that demand for those technologies may not respond quickly when prices increase. Fourth, and I emphasize this again, data are sparse, more information is required, and Department of Energy looks forward to working with many people here and others to make sure that we have quality data on these issues in the years ahead. And then sound policies and strategic investments can reduce risk, especially in the medium and long term. So next steps, we at the Department of Energy are going to develop an integrated research plan building on our three recent workshops. We're going to strengthen our information gathering capacity. We're going to look at additional technologies. We're going to continue to work closely with international partners, with interagency colleagues, Congress, and public stakeholders. And we intend to update the strategy and continue working on this update it by 2011. So with that, thank you very much for listening. I'm delighted to take questions. And two things. First, please go and download our report, take a look. And if you have any comments, both you in the audience, anyone listening, and anyone else, please let us know. We intend this to be part of a conversation. We do not intend this to be the last word on this topic by any means. And please send your comments to materialstrategy.energy.gov. We'll be collecting them. And then I'll sit down and take questions and I just want to highlight that our team here, it's got a lot of technical expertise and I may throw some questions to them if anybody has stumpers for me. So thank you. Thank you, David. First, a couple of ground rules, many of you are familiar with in terms of our questions and answers, if you can identify yourself when you ask your question. And then please, if you can ask a question, if you have a comment to make, if you can follow it up with whatever question makes sense at the end. But it's always good to not have, turn this into a discussion session in that regard. One of the questions that came to my mind, David, if I can start is there's a lot of discussion about getting the industry restarted here in the US. And I know you focused mostly on the science and technology aspects, but did you get a sense of what will be the key issues in that pathway to get an industry restarted in the US? This is an industry that's got a pretty big environmental footprint, which may be a consideration. It also is gonna require financing at a time when financing is still difficult to come by. So I don't know if you got a sense of what the issues will be faced by the industry here. I think you just identified some of the key ones. I think the human capital issue that I highlighted in my presentation is really important here. We're going to need the trained professionals in order to do this. Financing will also be important. I understand with increased prices in the past year that financing opportunities look better, I hear. But not surprisingly, but obviously financing is gonna be important. And I think just an understanding of the importance of this issue and the opportunities ahead. This is an issue that is, it's got challenges, but it has huge opportunities. This is a space where lots of people can do lots of good things and prosper as a result of it. So I think it's the sustained attention that's gonna make a difference too. Good, so I'll throw it open for questions. Please, we can start here in the middle. Hands up first here on the, right on the left there. If you can wait for the microphones as well. Phil Cushman, U.S. Marines. I've been following the rare earth issue for about a year now in my spare time. And one thing I've not seen in debate is very much that talks about the bureaucratic obstacles in order to implement all the measures that are proposed. And I was wondering if you could comment on some of the challenges you anticipate and how we can overcome them. Thank you. That's interesting, I'm interested to hear what you more mean by that, Phil. But no, I think speaking personally in terms of my participation within the U.S. federal government, we've had tremendous kind of working relationships with other agencies around the government. Good discussions as I see folks here from other agencies who are real experts in this area. And so I think there's been tremendous work together among federal agencies on this topic. And I think within DOE, one of the things we hope to do with this report is really figure out within the areas that we work on how to overcome any obstacles and move forward. I guess the one obstacle that was clear to us as we started this project within the Department of Energy was that historically, although there had been work in the Department of Energy on this topic, it had been stovepiped. It had been within different parts of the department who didn't always talk to each other. And so now we're bringing that together to make sure that we have the most efficient productive work in this area. I can actually second that last comment in all the years I spent within the office that you're in. I don't think we ever came across something that was quite as technical and as deep as this one on that topic. So I commend you for your ability to go through this PowerPoint so smoothly. It's great. Okay, another question right there in the middle. Second row and then we'll go right here in the front. Thank you. This is Amos Goodman from the Cohen Group. As you noted earlier on, clean energy is not the only use of rare earth. It's not even the majority use of rare earth. And the other applications are also very critical. Things like industrial catalytics, aerospace alloys for defense and national security applications, things like that. As part of your report, did you look at the demand profile for these other applications and how they may be impacting as second order effects the criticality of these materials? We didn't only in the following way. We looked at the current use of these materials and then we projected their increase in the years ahead at the same rate of the growth of GDP. So in our analysis, we did not do individual kind of granularized look at these applications. We just didn't have the resources to do it. And we certainly welcome others with data in that area. If you've got them, we'd love to see it. Question here in the front and then one to the side there. Why don't we take both questions now so that we sort of give David a chance to think through his answers. Jim Hedrick with Hedrick Consultants and retired from the USGS. The question I had was the funding. You mentioned that they needed to get a lot of training for professionals to do processing and everything related to getting the rare earth up and running in the US. And I know that a certain school in Iowa had dropped its support for the rare earth research center there. When you're looking at funding, have you looked at which schools were gonna, where that funding will go to start these programs and looking towards schools that will support this? Let me get the question over on this side too. Don Juckett in the following order, the Standing Committee on Earth Resources at the National Academy of Sciences and the Energy Minerals Division of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists. You touched lightly on an item which is outside of the Elise domain, and I appreciate that, relating to foreign policy issues associated with rare earth minerals. My question to you is, are you at liberty to opine and elaborate somewhat more broadly on those issues? Too easy questions. It's great. It's always fun to be here. No, like in Jim's question on schools and funding, we didn't look in the report of individual universities and their funding pattern and such a thing, but we did conclude broadly that there's a lot of opportunity here and a lot of need. And it's certainly my hope in the years ahead that more resources go into this. I think there's tremendous opportunities for students in the sciences and in technical fields in this area. And certainly hope that they'll follow that path. On foreign policy questions, obviously those have gotten a lot of attention. Two pieces of this first, we held workshops with the number of other countries, as I noted, and I think as I travel the world, I hear about this issue. It was in Japan recently and it was certainly a priority topic of conversation. In Japan, there's been a lot of attention to the Chinese actions in this area. The Chinese have said that they intend to be a reliable supplier of this and so it's a topic of conversation as well. Jim, do you have time for a few more questions? I do. Okay, so just a few more questions and we gotta get back to the rest of the program. So we have one there and then one in the middle and the back. Thank you, Sean Tandon. I'm a journalist with the AFP news agency. Just following up on that is trying to be a reliable supplier. Will it be in the near future? Why don't we get the other question too, so you can. Hi, Karen Wilson with Boeing and a question on the supply. Is there any, I've heard different stories about how long it will take to create additional supply and will there be additional supply in time to meet the surging demand and is there any government action that's gonna be taken to help jumpstart or get involved in that creation of additional supply? So on the first question, China has said that it intends to be a reliable supplier and we welcome that on the second question. That's what our report is focusing on and I would urge you to go download and read in detail. We have a lot of very specific information kind of element by element on exactly the supply demand situation for each of these elements. And there is a lot that can be done to enhance supply, both by the way from mining but also from post consumer use from recycling. There's a major company at an announcement within the past week about new ways of recycling some of these metals. So there's lots of opportunities there. So this is an area that requires a lot of work both from the government and private companies and research institutions in the years ahead. I do need to go, but I really, I want to applaud the work of our great team here and I want to particularly single out Diana Bauer from the PI who led our team did really great work on this and if Diana would stand up and then along with the rest of the team, Paul Tolene, David Diamond, Brent Warner and Jennifer Lee really appreciate all their hard work on this topic. I just want to say thank you very much for coming over. It's really great to have you here and this is really important work and hope to see it continuing in the future and maybe we can get you back in a year and you can do the update. So again, join me in thanking David for his presentation. Thank you, thank you, thank you. Join me in thanking David for his presentation.