 I'd like to turn now and go back to the United States, Jean-Claude Rufa, who's in fact embedded in the United States and a long time observer of American foreign policy and domestic policy. Jean-Claude? Yes. Good afternoon. Good morning for me and delighted to be able to speak to you today and to listen to some of the panelists who expressed themselves before me. I'm sorry I couldn't be in Abu Dhabi but I'm glad at least I can spend some time with you. Let me stop by talking about the midterm election. You've heard my democratic friends on the panel talking about the fact that it was really not what you were expecting, that effectively surge or wave or tsunami of the public and what affected. The reality is that, since I'm not exactly the way it's been described, we should look at states like Florida where Governor Cassantis was re-elected with a margin of 20% when he was barely elected the last election. When you look at Texas, when you look at Georgia, effectively as one of the panelists said, you said, this is not a defeat for the Republican, it's a defeat for Trump. And that's quite obvious. Even in my state of New York, the Republicans made significant progress and we were discussing that briefly a couple of days ago. So the midterm election, yes, we have a slight majority of Republicans in the House, we have a slight majority of Democrats in the Senate. Now, what's the impact on foreign policy? I'm not going to make predictions. I'm simply going to state two things which to me are the result of the election. Number one, and that's two, particularly the Russia-Ukraine configuration, the United States has largely benefited from this conflict. Through the United States and the foreign policy of the Biden administration have been to support the Zelensky administration from the very beginning with massive financial and military aid, but the U.S. has largely benefited from it for a variety of reasons. Number one, and thanks largely to the last administration, the U.S. are practically energy independent and they are exporting LNP to Europe, as you know, and they are benefiting from that. So this is one aspect. The net effect of that is also to attract investors to the United States. Some European companies have already shifted several operations from Europe to the U.S. to benefit from the subsidies and benefit from the tax incentives that the Biden administration is granting to those that are operating in the United States. And this is part of the so-called inflation reduction, which I agree with the other side. It's not really a reduction of inflation, but it's purely another form of protection. And that's benefiting not just the U.S. It's also benefiting our partners in North America, like Canada and Mexico. So this is another aspect of this benefit to the U.S. The fact that the contribution to defense that was a request of the previous administration, whether it's the Obama administration, the Trump administration, and the Biden administration has now taken effect in Europe, where several countries announced that they will increase their defense spending, starting with Germany. I mean, but the benefit also for the U.S. is that they are not spending by buying or European equipment from France or forming your invention or lines. They're buying F-35 from the U.S. So that's another benefit from the U.S. NATO, which was questioned by the previous administrations, also is now threatened by the inclusion of Sweden and Finland, which would have been unthinkable if we hadn't had the conflagration with Ukraine. So we are in a situation where effectively the U.S. has greatly benefited from. This is in a way a part of, but this is the reality. Second aspect, second point that I would like to discuss a little bit, is the fact that there might be changes in the foreign policy, simply because there is a change of control in the House of Representatives. As you know, the House of Representatives has the power of the purse, what we call the power of the purse. They control finance. So if they want to pass legislation, if the administration wants to get more money, he has to get it from Congress. And Congress starts with the House of Representatives without a majority in the House of Representatives. Money won't be spent. Money won't be at the right. So I have to remind you that there is a tradition in the United States of Isolationism. It started many years ago and it's still alive. One has one on the left and one on the right. It's not just one side. You have the traditional part of the Republican or the libertarian leaning part of the Republican Party represented by somebody like Senator Rand Paul, who's, for example, has been all along, opposed to intervention in Afghanistan, but also intervention to a large extent in Ukraine. And he was one of the few in the Senate who opposed the 40 billion that was proposed in May this year. And his argument was that we shouldn't spend money that we don't have and that we should spend this money if we can get it on domestic issues instead of spending it far away from home without any direct benefit for the security of the United States and its inhabitants. And his argument was that we spend money that we don't have and we borrow it from China. One word on this because there is a lot of misconception about the impact of the Chinese involvement in the United States. As you know, the United States has 31 billion of debt. And 6 or 7 billion is really held by government agencies, the trust, the Social Security, the Federal Reserve System. The rest 24 billion, more or less, 3 billion, sorry, is held by the public and the part of it is held by foreign. And there's the percentage of foreign debt, the public debt of the United States held by foreigners is much less, for example, than in France. In France it's well over 50% owned by foreigners. In the United States it's barely 30%. And the Chinese represent less than 1 billion now. Contrary to what many people think, the Chinese are one of the largest foreign holders of the United States debt. This is the Japanese now with 1.3 trillion. So we are not that dependent from China. And this is something that has to be taken into account when we discuss the overall relationship. I'm not going to spend time talking about China. I know people talk about it and some of the families do. So also on the foreign policy, you remember when Biden was elected, he said that I will have a 0.40c for the middle class. I never really understood what he meant by that, but some of you may have a better explanation. Effectively, there's not been so far very many changes. Of course, there's been more emphasis on human rights. There was the first meeting with the Chinese in Alaska, which was a disaster. There was the pullback from Afghanistan. Personally, I support the pullback from Afghanistan. I simply consider it was done in a dreadful way. And there are many people who feel that it could have been handled in a much better way. That has an impact because the confidence of some of the allies in the United States has been severely weakened by the way the Biden administration managed to pull back from Afghanistan. And that has certainly an impact on the position of China in Taiwan. So the Biden administration may say they will support Taiwan and they will defend Taiwan, but there's still a question of how is that going to be implemented if God forbid a sign-out fight in late Taiwan? I'm not going to spend more time. I think I've probably even used most of it. I just wanted to give you this sort of balance view that the US has benefited perfectly from the Ukraine-Russian war and at the same time we are entering a period of three years. That's going to be a little bit more challenging and where we might see the impact of this divided government that ultimately is the characteristic of the US. Thank you very much Jean-Claude. And those are interesting comments, especially about the debt I had no idea.