 Well, good evening. It's a pleasure to be here the day after the elections. One thing during the elections was, of course, that it was about generations, right? There is a conflict between generations, between old and younger, in terms of the pension system. And I see here generations of different generations, all alumni of Tillich University, is there who graduated? Who was studying any of you studying in the 1960s here? 1960s? So you were involved in the Karl Marx University? Yes? That was my first year. That was your first year? And not your last year, right? And you know Jacques Seiber and the gang? Yeah, OK, what's your name? Oh, OK, sure. And of course, Piet Verheijer, former president of Tillich University in the Netherlands, right? You studied in the 1960s here? 1950s even. Anybody else from the 50s, 60s? 70s? Yeah, more. Lex, dean of the School of Economics and Management. And in the 1980s, when I was studying here? Yeah? When did you graduate? 87. 87, wow, it was 88. You see, Marcel, you are not, are you alumni? So, 90s even. So young. So young. I suppose that all of you have been awake last night until 2 o'clock following the elections. Yeah, you have to, you have been, yeah? No, what time did you go to bed? Oh, OK, but then the results were already known, right? So it was, of course, there was a shock, 9 o'clock last night, so when we had the exit polls, it was extremely precise. That was interesting, by the way. They got it right, more or less. Only the VVD got, I think, two seats more, right? 33 instead of 31. Sorry? Which one? Oh, yeah, they had, yeah, right. Is that your party, the Christianity? Since you know so well that, oh, you just listened to the radio, OK, I think. And of course, they got us right, I think, with the Labour Party, the Partij van Aarbeid, with the loss of, the spectacular loss of, what is it, 29 seats. It's amazing. So we are living in historical times, and the interesting thing is that this is not an election only about the Netherlands. So this is very important. We have all seen the television images that the whole world is watching us. This is, of course, also about the rise of populism, right-wing populism, after Trump and Brexit. What is very interesting is, for instance, the Financial Times, is one of the leading newspapers who have been following closely. And last Friday, in the evening, they sent out an email to the worldwide audience, and it said, all eyes are on the Netherlands. Because the idea was, of course, that if this type of populist storm would go ahead, and for instance, the Freedom Party of Wilders would become the largest party in the Netherlands. Then, of course, that may not be such a problem for the Netherlands, because almost all parties have said they don't want to form a government with Gerd Wilders, even Mark Rutte. But the problem is, of course, that this could be interpreted by populists in other European countries, notably in France and Italy, as a way of, you see, things are going well, we are moving into, the Netherlands is following, so it could be used and abused by leading politicians all over Europe. And the point is, why is this so important, because perhaps now we think, now everyone is relieved, Wilders will not be part of the Dutch government, Wilders is not the largest party, so Rutte did it quite well in terms of campaigning and becoming the largest, with the large majority becoming the largest party in the Netherlands again. And now there may be a sense of complacency that we think, now the Netherlands has stopped the populist tide, right? And it's very interesting that I was just checking on my iPhone that the Flansial Times this evening has an article, an opinion article, about the Netherlands, about the Dutch elections and published one hour ago and saying, well, it's a good signal that the Netherlands at least stopped for the moment, the populist tide, that there's no reason for complacency. But because what has been very interesting in this campaign, this election campaign, is that we've been talking about many things, right? About immigration, integration, pensions, labor market, taxes, health care, elderly care. But there's one topic we have not been discussing, the elephant in the room. And what has been the elephant in the room? Sorry? Well, climate, well, some parties have been discussing it, right, Groen-Links and some other parties. But there's, sorry? Is that right? Well, some parties perhaps further reduction of the interest rate deductibility, of the mortgage payments, the loan-to-value ratio. But there's one elephant and everyone in The Hague knows it and has decided not to talk about it, the European Union, Europe. Everyone in The Hague, and I know some people from some journalists, some leading figures you see on television, they are scared to death what's going to happen with Europe, say France, for instance, notably, that they have decided not to talk about it. Sorry? I said we should leave. We should leave. It's a mess in Brussels. You're graduated until the university? Yeah. But what school was this? Are you an economist or a law person? Sorry? Are you an economist or a law? Okay, very good. But the point is, everyone knows about it and nobody is actually willing to discuss it. Of course, there's been talk about Europe. Talk about Europe in the sense of we need to cooperate more in terms of energy, for instance, defense, et cetera. So that has been part of the campaign. But the point is that we are at historical crossroads. The situation in France is very explosive. We think we have our problems in the Netherlands and of course the Netherlands has its own challenges but when you compare the situation in the Netherlands, for instance, with France or perhaps even in the United Kingdom in terms of low income families, then it's a huge, huge world of difference. So the Financial Times had learned about that the poorest city in the Netherlands or the poorest village is Oudepekela in Groningen. So they sent one of their Dutch speaking Simon Cooper who's married to a Dutch lady to Oudepekela and he wrote a beautiful piece in the Financial Times, two weeks ago, FT Weekend, three pages, talking to all the people. And one of his remarks was if this is, this is supposedly the poorest city, the village in the Netherlands. Well, if you compare this with the poorest city village in United Kingdom or France, it's a completely different world. So in terms of what we call the poorest, that this is not to say that we have to deny that we have challenges, it's some low income families. But the situation in France, if you hear about what somebody who is on our way on a state pension in France, so-called socialist country, people get something like 300, 400 euros per month. Much lower than the Netherlands. At the same time, the prices in the supermarkets are much higher in France. So what people, the purchasing power of the people is much lower. So the situation in terms of economic situation, income, but also economic growth and unemployment in France and Italy is, of course, much worse than in a country like the Netherlands. Also the economic perspectives, all types of reforms we have been implementing during the past decades in the Netherlands, France and Italy, it's very difficult. And what we see, what we are, then what you have in France, this, we are talking about immigration, we are talking about Muslim immigration, but of course they have been dealing with this since the 1960s, where you have millions of immigrants from North African countries, former colonies, living in the Balneurs in France. Then you have the terrorist attacks. So the cocktail in France is potentially very poisonous. And so everyone is very much concerned about what's going to happen in France. And if, for instance, of course we do not hope this, but if there would be one or more terrorist attacks in Paris before the elections, then the probability that Marine Le Pen becomes president of France goes to, it becomes extremely likely. And it's very worrying, because so we, in the Netherlands also, so the Dutch political class, all notably also the prime minister, Luther. I don't have anything with Europe, I don't have a vision on Europe, but also the VVD, of course, is a party of the entrepreneurs, right? And if the situation, so what we will have to be facing in France is that you will have, everyone agrees that Marine Le Pen will certainly win the first round of the presidential elections on April the 23rd. And then on May 7th we have the second round. And I have you Le Pen versus another candidate. And the idea had been that this other candidate should be somebody who's also conservative, just like Rutte can take votes from Wilders because he's also, and Buma as well, from the Christian Democrats because he's also conservative. Well, of course that was François Mignon, François Mignon, and he was supposed to be the guy with the clean hands. And his hands may be clean, but there were some problems with his wife. So he is no, and he's prosecuted, so he is not likely to become the candidate. And then we have, of course, Macron, Emmanuel Macron, the very, I think, to Dutch stand, social liberal, very powerful candidate pro-European. But the problem is, well, there are a couple of problems. He may be not conservative enough in order to chase away the votes, to chase the votes of people voting for Le Pen, but it may also be, yeah, so he may be too liberal. And the difference now with the Netherlands, what happened yesterday, the Netherlands and France, is that in our system of proportional representation, we have a different shock absorber. So you have people who are frustrated, people are frustrated for whatever reasons about immigrants, integration, low incomes, and they can go to builders, but some of them have also might be going to Buma, some of them go to Forum for Democracy, so they get spread out. So the frustration is diversified and not going to one single party. Well, in France, it will be the zero one choice. So you are frustrated, and then the question is, well, if you want to have your voice released in terms of frustration, the only voice you can make is, of course, Le Pen. Or you go to Macron, but then you may not feel so happy because you think, well, he's too liberal, he's too pro-European. So what the French of Times also is arguing, hey, there's no reason for complacency. It's a good thing that was happening in the Netherlands that Wilders didn't become the largest party, but at the same time, the situation in France is extremely complex and very worrisome. And as a financial economist, a monetary economist, you all feel if the situation would be that Le Pen would become the president of France on Sunday, May the 7th, what is going to happen on financial markets on Monday. Some people in France, you know, that she won't have, she will not have the majority in parliament. And if she wants to organize a referendum on the euro, she will have to ask parliament. But this is not how investors on financial markets are operating. If she becomes president of France, what you will see is that investors the next Monday will massively start selling off French government bonds and perhaps other investments. They are running away. And then you may get so both prices go down, interest rates go up, you get the type of situation, very similar to perhaps Spain and Italy in 2012. And then we had Mario Draghi, who spoke his magical words, whatever it takes to preserve the euro as a single currency. And that's how he rescued the euro. But there's a problem here. How can he help Marine Le Pen, who has an agenda of leaving the eurozone? So Mario Draghi can help to keep France and the euro, but Marine Le Pen, she doesn't want to stay in the euro. And then of course, there's a fundamental problem. And if the euro would fall, then of course we will be hitting, certainly in the short term, the major new financial economic crisis. Then all the programs we have been discussing, our Fakisingsprogrammas, the electoral programs, right? We spent two million here, three billion there. They all can be put aside. This is the elephant. Because what will happen if the euro falls apart? You will get the type of financial and economic and political crisis in Europe. And we will be, perhaps the Netherlands will be with Germany moving towards a new currency, a euro, a Northern European euro. But the point is, of course, that one will become extremely strong. You will have an appreciation, a revaluation, perhaps of at least 50%. By the way, it's very interesting, ladies and gentlemen. It's a very, always in the discussion, it says the eurozone is a transfer union. We are putting money to Greece, right? We have to pay for Greece. We have low interest rates. That means that on our savings, we get the low interest rates. The pension funds have a lower coverage ratio. But what is never mentioned is that there also is a big advantage. Because if we had had, if we had still had the Gilder, or in Germany, the Deutschmark since the early 2000s, then of course, due to all the problems in Southern Europe that they are usually not competitive, they would have devalued, and we would have been revaluing, perhaps for at least 50%. So the trade surplus that the Netherlands has in Germany would have been much smaller if we would still have had the Gilder as our national currency. So that's a big advantage as well. We are basically exporting against an exchange rate, which is far too weak. Nobody, also in the Dutch political system, is talking about it. Who's talking about it? Who has been mentioning this phone point? Trump. It's interesting, of course, he's not right when he says Germany is manipulating monetary policy of the European Central Bank to weaken the euro, right? Because Germany is very much against this monetary policy of the ECB. But of course, Trump has been pointing it out and he's right in that respect. So if the euro falls, we will have a new exchange rate, which will make our tomatoes and all the exports to France and Southern Europe much more expensive, so exports will go down. But you know also what is the situation when all our credit lines, our investments in Southern Europe, of course, will lose value because of the crisis in those countries, because we have these investments in the currency which is becoming weaker. So we will be facing major losses. Nobody has been talking about it in the campaign because in the Hague they said, well, we shouldn't mention this to the voter because the voter may get scared. But the problem, and my problem is of course, this is about confidence in the political system and the process. If this were to happen, of course, I don't hope that it happens, then of course, and all these, the politicians will have to say, well, the Netherlands is back in crisis and recession, et cetera. Voters will not understand it, right? Because it was not mentioned during the campaign. So hopefully what we will have, we are in a way, my point is that we have been taking irresponsible risks with the stability of the euro system. Hopefully we will go through it this year with France and Italy. But it also means that the new Dutch government will have to be much more active in investing in Europe. So we have to change the political dynamics in Europe. The problem is that with France and Italy, the two leading countries here, is not, of course, the politicians in those countries, of course they know that they have to reform the labor market. They have to change their economies to get rid of the rigidities. But they cannot convince their electorates, their people voting for them. Look at France, each time they want to change something, they're strikes. So, and the political dynamics in Europe, of course, very poor. Because the perception in France and Italy is that, in a way, that they get a dictate, that there's a type of dictatorship from Brussels, where the European Commission is located, from Frankfurt, where we have the European Central Bank, and Berlin, where the German government is located. And the feeling in those countries is, of course, that, well, there's a type of, there's some dictates, so what would they have to do is reduce the budget deficit, reduce the government debt ratio, implement economic reforms, notably of the labor market, and for the rest, keep their mouth shut. And the problem is that the politicians in those countries, who also agrees, have serious difficulty in selling this message to the politicians. Now, what needs to be changed is, already some two years ago with Wim Bohnstra, chief economist at Rabelbank, and I presented internationally a plan, that we want to link this agenda of reforms towards a new European investment agenda. And we want to change the political dynamics. So, we want to go to these countries, we want to create a new European investment fund, which will invest in infrastructure, say, bridges, roads, but also the knowledge-based economy, high-speed internet, solar energy, wind energy, for instance, in southern Spain, and that we make a type of grand deal, with that we basically say, listen, we do understand it's very difficult, that we know it's difficult for you to implement these difficult reforms on the labor market, but you have to do this because, not because Germany is telling you to do it, no, because the whole world is changing. Globalization, China, we all have to change. Even France, one-cent. But if you are, what we are going to do, we are going to link this agenda of economic reforms to an investment agenda. So, we make concrete time planning for the next five years, concrete steps of laws being passed in parliament, and each year we monitor this, and when the country is complying with this, then we release another, say, 10, 20, 30, 40 billion euros for making investments in these countries. So then the political dynamics may be changing, maybe change in the sense that the politicians can say, well, we have to take difficult measures, requested by Europe, but there's also a form of European solidarity through a European investment agenda. It may be our best chance of trying to change the political dynamics, because if we are not doing this, then the probability that the euro in one way or another will be falling apart is too large. And this is not only a discussion in, say, the academic community, but even in the euro system, the central banks, if you talk to some people at the central banks here in Europe, they also have serious doubt whether they can keep the system together, whether they can really make sure that the euro will stay. And that's a risk which is for countries like the Netherlands as a small open economy would be a big, big economic shock. Yes. Okay. Yes, but you hear what I was trying to say, at least, was I want to change the political dynamics, yeah? No, no, but so I'm starting from the point of view and I'm talking about the euro, less about the EU. I'm trying to, I'm saying the political situation, if you don't change the politics, this is not going to fly. I think in that sense we may be moving into the same direction. You have to change the political dynamics. And we are not doing this. We are just saying to countries, hey, we have certain standards, norms, you have to cut your budget deficit, you have to implement reforms on the labor market, and that is from the economic, indeed from the economic perspective, and we see that it's very difficult for those countries to implement these reforms. And then of course we say, yeah, you promised to do it, you didn't do it, so you have a loss of trust, et cetera. So I think you should start it from the politics, from the political side. Yeah, but okay, but the point is before you, because my feeling is if you can change the political dynamics also towards the national level, the level of the nation state, say France or Italy, that may be our best bet. Before we are changing the rules of the game that we can have direct elections for the European parliament, we may have to change the Lisbon Treaty, then we need to have unanimity, 27, 28 member states. Perhaps we need referenda in some countries. Before we have implemented this, it may already be too late. We deal with all the cultural differences in terms of Europe, and then there is a difference, because certainly culture is the norm in part of Europe. Yes. And historically the evaluation of currency have always been the wrong way. I believe that Europe, the rest is probably automatically. Yes, yeah. And I don't quite see how they are going to do that, but I think they really do. And that's the question we shouldn't do better than try and save in the end. Because I believe the damage will really be greater than... Yeah, that's a very good question. Of course, we have different dimension this. How the European Union started, the European Economic Community, by the way, next week on Saturday, it's exactly 60 years ago, March 25th, 1957, a treaty of Rome was signed, creating the free market, the free flow of goods, persons, services, and capital. Still very relevant, also, the freedom of work is to move in the Brexit referendum. The idea of the free market, internal market, is in a way uncontested. Of course, what has created most of the tension now is the euro, that you have a single currency where you then have, you don't have the adjustment mechanism, because the fact that we have these problems in countries like France and Italy and Spain and Greece, that prices and wages go up too much and that they lose competitiveness, and then in the past, under the European monetary system, they had devaluations, and that was a type of adjustment mechanism that you were referring to. And that's lost because within the euro, you cannot devalue against, the Greeks cannot devalue the euro against the German euro or something like that. So that's a big problem, but I would argue two things. First of all, I think that to some extent, countries like Italy and others have to change because the whole world is changing. They need to modernize. Of course, Italians or Greeks, Italians don't have to become like Germans, right? But they need to reinvent themselves, a modern version of Italians. You say, well, this has been tried so long, but what I'm suggesting, changing the political dynamics, is a different, we think this is a more balanced approach. So it's a combination of, say, positive and negative things. Now we say you must do this, you must cut your budget deficit, but they perceive it as a lack of solidarity from, say, the northern European countries. Of course, then you can say with your point, well, you know, cultural differences are too big, right? And of course, we can argue, perhaps the euro chute don't have started with the group of countries, including Italy and Greece. And of course, what we like to do, we can have, we will be talking about this for decades, that the euro chute has started too early, certainly with a group of number of countries, which were too different. It's not an optimal currency area, it's all true. But then the question to you is, what is then, if you don't believe in it, that anything can be done, then of course we can say, well, let's break it up and let's do it now. But then, certainly on a shortened basis, we'll be entering a big new crisis. And what is that going to do for political populism in countries also in southern Europe? So we can always blow it up. If you say, well, I don't want to try any, I think we think that changing political dynamics. And of course, you see that investments, talking about European investments, is becoming now an important, more important part of the discussion. But we will all say, well, let's break it up. But for me, it's still a step too quick, too fast, for breaking up to Europe at this moment. It may still happen, right? Because the problems, as you point out rightly, of course, are substantial. But I think it's too early because the damage, not only in the financial economic sense, but also in terms of the political dimension in Europe, will be severe. People like Gerd Wilders say, you know, we leave the Europe and then we still have the EU, we have the free market. We can still trade, we can still export our flowers and tomatoes to a country like Italy. But of course, that most likely is not true. What's going to happen? If, of course, we have a transfer union. Why are interest rates on Italian government debt or French government debt so low? Because there's an implicit guarantee, right? That in one way or another, the bondholders will get their money back because the European Central Bank will buy it up. But in a way, the taxpayers from the Northern European countries are providing implicit guarantees. The moment we break it up to Europe, then of course we cut through these guarantees. You get a big crisis in Southern European countries. And what will the politicians do in those countries? They will say, do you know why it's such a mess? Do you know why it's such a mess now? Why we are facing this severe crisis? It's because these guys, these politicians in Germany and Netherlands and Austria and Finland, they have been cutting the guarantees. Well, I don't think we should have any illusions that our trucks with tomatoes and flowers and other goods will reach Italy because they won't be allowed anymore. And otherwise, they, people, yeah. Maybe it is. Yeah. Well, I'm trying to, no, I'm just saying, I'm not, I think, I'm not there yet. That's what I'm saying, because I'm just trying to point out this is from a financial economic point of view, but from a political point of view, also for the European project, which has been built after Second World War, is such a huge blow that the question is whether we should be willing to take this risk. And in any case, it will mean that all the, the optimistic scenarios on which the electoral programs in the Netherlands have been based, well, they are becoming of very little value. Yeah. Yeah. I don't think it could go better on it. Yeah, yeah. But if you accept it, it's not about economics. But I think, yeah. It's not about economics. Yeah, no, but, yeah, but, yeah. No, but I'm talking about political dynamics, right? In my proposal of, yeah, changing that. Of course, you can go to federalism, but that it may be also a step too difficult. Each time people like Giegel Hofstadt are mentioning this, I think they are not doing a type of positive job because then people say, you know, look at it. That's the only thing they want in Brussels to, to go to create a federal state. But it's true in the United States. Why is it working? It's because there you have, of course, Washington D.C., which is leveraging federal income taxes, right? And if there is a crisis in California, then people are losing their jobs. Unemployment benefits, transfers, are moving transfer payments from Washington D.C. to the state of California. So they have something of a, of course, why is it possible to do it in the United States? Because it's one single country. Well, the Eurozone, we have 19 national currencies. Now, we have one single currency, but we have 19 independent countries. And each time when there's a problem, say, in Greece, and Greece is needing money, needing a rescue package, then we, of course, then we start quarreling. We say, yeah, who's going to pay for it? And how much is it? In the U.S., it's more, because of the federal state, it's an automatic transfer mechanism. But I think, are you now, politically speaking, for this federalist model, is also making life extremely difficult in the current political landscape in many European countries? Yeah? Yes? It's really complicated, it's too much. And then, later, right-handedly, it's hard to understand. No, but it's a different adjustment mechanism. So in those days of the European Monetary System, when wage and prices went up too much, then you got to a devaluation. And in that sense, the real value of the wage is everything, products become cheaper, and real wages are going down. Now that's not possible anymore, because you have, you cannot devalue. Now you have to do it through the internal devaluation, which is, socially speaking, a different adjustment mechanism, because you really have to cut wages. Somebody earning 2,000 euros per month suddenly gets 1,400 euros per month. And that is what's happening now in Greece, right? And that's a painful process. So the currency changes the possible adjustment mechanisms and is limiting them. And now they have to do something, what we have been doing in Germany, in the Netherlands, well, if you're not competitive, then you have to become increased productivity, you have to work harder, you have to cut the wages. It's a type of mentality, which is perhaps a bit difficult, or very strange to countries like Italy, or France, or Spain, or Greece. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Nope. But you know, interesting, because we were talking about, you say, well, talking about economics, you should talk about politics. But the whole, the euro, the single currency, started, of course, as a political project. So it started in politics, because it was about Germany reunification, and then France said, well, we don't want to have a powerful, re-emerging Germany. So what is the way to achieve this is by asking Germany to sacrifice its own currency, the Deutsche Mark, because then you become interdependent. So the euro was created from François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl as a political, say, as a political thing. And then you can say, ask, well, you need some coordination of economic policies. And then, of course, we can ask the question, the politicians in those days of the Maastricht Treaty at the summit, December 91, were they so stupid that they hadn't thought about it? That you need, if you have a single currency, that you need a type of economic coordination and certain instruments? Yes, they have thought about it. And the Netherlands, having the rotating presidency of the European Union at that moment, Lubbers, was an Hans van der Broekers minister of foreign affairs, they were working together with the European Commission, chaired by Jacques Delors. And what happened in September 91, three days, three months before the Maastricht Summit, on a Monday night, they had a plan on table, which was exactly discussing some of these issues that we are discussing now. But what happened was that the whole plan was basically put away from the table. There were a couple of countries which didn't like it, notably France, because it meant that in terms of economic policymaking, France would also have to sacrifice some national sovereignty. And of course, yeah, if you have a single currency, you have to sacrifice national currency, sovereignty, but the French didn't want that. So it was, the whole plan was killed. And this evening, you can look it up afterwards, this Monday evening, that the whole plan was killed, was Black Monday, Zwartemalbach. If you Google it, you will see the text and the pictures. So there was this plan on the table, but then it was killed. And then the fundamental question was at that moment, can we still proceed with a single currency, a euro, without the appropriate structure like we have in the United States? Or should we stop it? But Helmut Kohl said basically, yeah, yeah, the French want this because, and we want our German reunification with Eastern Germany, so the euro must proceed. So Lubbers asked to Kohl, should we still go ahead? And basically, Kohl said, yeah, it may not be united, the structure may not be well ordered and structured, but still we have to go ahead. But the optimism of Helmut Kohl was that he would, that endured in say the decade after Maastricht, that he would be able to reach an understanding, the deal also on more the political integration, a type of federal model. He was optimistic that he could manage it. And the interesting story here is that at that moment, there was a differential times, I had a journalist, David Marsh, who was the Europe editor of the Financial Times. He was in Maastricht. And he's now running a forum, OMFIV, a forum for monetary and financial institutions in London. And he once mentioned, David Marsh, that he talked to Kohl about it. And they had to bet. Kohl said, I will be able to arrange this during the next political integration, political deal during the next six, seven years. And the journalist from the Financial Times, he said, this is impossible. You will not be able to do it. And they made the bet on a serious nice bottle of red wine. And guess what happened? Kohl has a good memory. So six, seven years, of course it hadn't happened because at least the French don't want to have it, right? Getting rid of national sovereignty. And then Kohl came to David Marsh with a bottle of red wine. I'm not sure French, but I will double check, I will double check on that. And that, of course, is a story. So we are talking about economics and politics, but it started as a political process. And then, and why, of course, of course, France had to be part of it. But French, France knew very well, Fonsa Mitterrand knew very well that he was the type of one of the weakest members in the single currency. So if you are the weakest country in a single currency, that's not a very nice position. So what do you do? Then you make sure that another country, which is weaker than yourself, becomes part of the currency of the euro because then you are in the middle. Well, what was this country which became member of the euro based on that? Italy. Then Italy had a problem because Italy said, well, I don't want to be the weakest member in the single currency. So who can we put next? And that became Greece. And Greece is, of course, the founder of democracy in Europe. So Greece was picking up the pieces for Italy and Italy was picking up the pieces for France. And that's how the selection of euros on countries. It's all politics. It has nothing to do with economics in that sense. And now, of course, in order to get it right, we are having highlighted, we have been emphasizing economic things like cutting the budget deficit, reforms of the labor market. But I want to bring it back to some extent to the political dynamics. So, sorry, the French one or it was all politics. You were at the Ministry of Finance at that moment, right? You're in the Netherlands, right? Yeah, yeah. So it was, the politics was overwhelming that we in the academic field, in the international field, people like Barry Eigengreen from UC Berkeley who's still active, warning against it. But even our country, people like Ayo Klamach, who had this group of academics arguing, I think, economic grounds, but he had an impossible position. And a couple of years ago, the Trust Television Programme Radar had a reconstruction about a euro. And they were able to find an interview in Buitenhof with the very young Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm. Really looking very young, very young. And then they ask him, what do you think about this leaflet, this booklet, that these academics like Ayo Klamach have been producing, warning against a single currency on economic grounds? And Gerrit Zalm, do you know what he said? It's worthwhile looking it back. He said, you know, you know these academics, these economics professors, where I prefer to listen to the real people, to it's folic, right? Gerrit Zalm. So indeed, you're right, but it was also killed by the politicians. So, and Ayo Klamach happened to know well here in the Netherlands, even though he said also in public that later on his career, his career was affected negatively because he had been put aside by people like, by Gerrit Zalm. So it was a very difficult situation. Politics was dominating. No one was listening. Nobody was listening to the economics profession and we all know it's very important to listen to the economics profession, right? So that, so I think that may conclude our session. Thank you very much for your attention.