 My story was throughout when I worked for DFID in China and on the DFID side managed the alerts, rural development program, which have generally been quite successful with the World Bank. And we were asked particularly in China was quite sensitive, why does the UK spend money in development aid in China. So I got the question, like, so how many people have you lifted out of, has the program lifted out of poverty already? And we were just starting the measurement that Martin Revellian had been, was involved in in design and remember his analysis that said, well, basically said, oh, we need about five years before we know anything about that. And after 10 years we know the real impact because he showed very nicely that the positive impact kind of, not that it tampered off, but other regions were kind of catching up. So I said, oh, it's way too early to tell, of course. So the next day I got this question again, how many people has this program lifted out of poverty? And by day three I started to realize that to say, oh, it was way too early to ask, was actually a career limiting move. So we were, but the flip side to that, of course, is and that's my question to the other presentation. There's no way around this, right? We still do need to have this data. And I definitely want to challenge the other presenters to think about the needed accountability behind this measure so that this data actually can work. Even though I was trained as a sociologist and as a social historian, I do believe that this data are absolutely essential. What I want to talk about is something very different in a way and certainly doesn't fit in a session on unpacking numbers because what this effectively does is further packing our arsenal of numbers that may or may not be available. I imagine that after this session many people walk out of here that what we're proposing here is no go. What I think we're proposing here is one very important. When I was listening to Ravi Kambur yesterday, like I said, I was trained as a not in a quantitative style at all and you'll see that through my presentation, but when Ravi, so I believe in case studies, national histories are important, but Ravi Kambur yesterday talked about the Nordic model and his desire and I think it was absolutely right to say, so how did, if we want to learn lessons from a Nordic model, we need to understand how norms of egalitarianism originated in a Nordic context and that's exactly the kind of things that hopefully we're making contribution here, is that there are certain aspects of an overall development process and I think it's very appropriate to talk about this when we talk about inclusive growth that so far have not been measured, so what I'm proposing here is not an alternative to anything. I don't have any comments on Morton's presentation just to fear that he will discover that in many cases his critique apply to these as well, but it's a different aspect of the development process that a part of the development community has emphasised for a long time, but so far hasn't been measured. This project is currently at the Institute of Social Studies that actually came out of the World Bank from a group of social development people that felt, and this is Morton, is a very interesting story about how they felt the need to quantify social development and have come up, they came up with a database and I know the interesting part of the story, I've left ISS now so I can't talk about it, is why the World Bank didn't want to keep it, maybe for, well that had not much to do with social development in general, but the kind of problem that international issues like the World Bank regularly came under when they published any sort of data that would be found out by prime ministers that why is our country suddenly poorer or richer than the other one, the idea that of the executive director of the World Bank looking at the Institute of Social Development, certainly once on accountability in China of course makes it quite obvious why the World Bank wanted this an independent institution, and we thought that it was useful to do. Now in the meantime I've left ISS, there's other people that are working on this, but I thought it would be appropriate for this conference to give you an insight in what this database does, specifically with respect to Africa of course. So these are the topics that I hope to talk about and I hope you remind me of the time Mr. Chair, because my jet lag makes me even less disciplined than I usually are. I won't say a lot about why social development matters, but as I said before there's this very much came out of a tradition of social development specialists that were strongly represented in the World Bank, in many of the other donor agencies as well. And the key to social development, the kind of core to the definition of this measurement instrument is that this is around the behaviour, norms, conventions, that pattern, human interaction. Say the soft aspects of development, but what most people when they start talking about informal institutions will quickly say these are actually very, they may be very soft aspect of development, but they have very big implications for most of the development processes, markets and governance that we're interested in. Up to 20 years ago, 10 years ago, even most of the social development work was entirely qualitative, while in many other areas, of course, the measurement instrument developed quite rapidly and in a way, if you think about how we measured tons of steel about 100 years ago and now it's now acceptable for economists to measure happiness, doesn't make me that happy, but it is now accepted in a way. You can see this in this of social development as the last mile in this sequence. So what this does, the promise of it is that it systemises and compare different aspects of social development and of course I'll talk about the different aspects and relate those to other development outcomes and I'll do that in very simple bivariate graphs for Africa and trends over time, which I will not say much about because the data in Africa is too limited to say anything meaningful about trends. How does this matter for Africa? Any development story brings out issues like this, the importance of conflict, often defined as ethnic conflict, very poorly defined in general. The importance of kinship and the way that impacts the quality of institutions, I think it can go both ways, but it generally portrayed as being negative, as being traditional, the role of informal institutions. The changes in informal institutions during ongoing structural transformation, maybe particular urbanisation. So a question, if you think about Africa, the low income part of Africa, how the soft dimensions of development are important in those contexts. What does it measure? The six aspects of social development, as I said, and I'll mention them in a minute. These are derived from a very wide range of databases, about 20, 25. So of course the quality of this data is entirely dependent on the quality of those databases. They are generally regarded as reputable. Out of those 25 databases we work with, the database works with about 200 different indicators and it aggregates those of using a method that is called matching percentiles. I can't explain how that works. What I can tell you is that it's exactly the same, or pretty much the same as the way world governance indicators are aggregated. And basically what it, I can't explain the technical detail, but basically what it does is that it brings together rankings on the different indices. And if in those different rankings at least two of the same countries appear, it kind of merges those two to create, if you have one ranking of three countries, one ranking of two countries, it merges them in a way that say artificially enhances the coverage of countries. And that's really all I want to say. And like I said, the reference is to people familiar with the world governance indicators are familiar with that. And my co-author, one of the co-authors would need to be here to tell you how this is done in detail. I just want to talk about what it does, which indicators we have. The first one is civic activism. And this is, of course, the popularity of this was enormously enhanced during recent, the Arab Spring, different social uprising. So this, what this measures through the use of those different databases is social norms, organizations, and practices which facilitate citizens' involvement in public policies and decisions. So examples of those questions, people participating in demonstrations, access to information, there's data on density of international organizations, and civics has a civil society rating. And the right column there, you see where those different, and there are many more of that, of course, where those different indicators come from. In the case of Africa, of course, the Afrobarometer, I mentioned the regional barometer, but of course the Afrobarometer is a very important instrument, and very rapidly growing with, I think it's four main rounds now in publication. The Afrobarometer would give you many of those data, but not for the same number of countries. So the kind of data, and this is not to suggest anything. Well, there is a line, so I guess I am suggesting something, and that something is good news, is that if you take the global database, that there is a positive correlation, that I think is good news between GDP levels, this is levels of GDP and civic activism. This has been analyzed quite carefully for the global database, and it actually has, I'm sure with lots of caveats, but it has established that there's actually a causal relation measured by Granger causality from per capita to civic activism, i.e. better countries, better off countries allow citizens to express civic activism more strongly. What you see for Africa is that as a whole, within Africa, there would be something of a similar correlation, but of course the numbers are very small, and that the levels of civic activism compared to the global sample is quite a bit lower. But still, the overall story about that positive, if there's anything that one can suggest that even within Africa, that there is a little bit of that positive correlation, like I said, the kind of thing that we were hoping to see. The second is on clubs and associations, how much time have I used, Mr. So I'll talk about for one minute on each of those. This is kind of the, I guess, the classic social capital, the strength of ties to neighborhood and associational life, the kind of questions that are in there are the use of free time, membership of clubs, time spent socializing, and norms around, or rather than norms where people actively support others. Again, it's from those type of surveys. And here you see a pattern that is a little different, actually. We don't get that kind of good news. The global database, I think there's actually this other analysis that actually even a little bit of a negative correlation there is on the global database. We actually see a decline in the levels of clubs and associations. And this was just the first analysis, and it can actually mean very different, you don't see that in the graph, but certainly no positive correlation. The trends over time show a decline in clubs and associations, which may actually well be because of a shift of associational activities to the internet, which is not very well measured in that. For Africa, that would not be that relevant. But what we do see there, of course, is really nothing, I suppose. It's a very wide distribution, very high levels of associational activity in certain countries. So not like the first one where we could discern some pattern safety and trust, the extent that people feel they can rely on others, questions that are quite common in global databases around experience of theft, people feeling safe, perceptions that people can be trusted. And again, the sources. Here, what we see the global database shows, I guess, what one would expect that richer countries are people feel safer. Safety may contribute to economic growth. Of course, we have no idea which direction it goes. The global analysis has not shown any clear patterns in there. Certainly no causality. And then, of course, in Africa, I think that there is, well, if there was any correlation, it would be very, very weak. But of course, the enormous diversity in terms of levels and trust, which I don't know if that matches. People might wonder why Libya is so high up in terms of the safety. And that was, of course, in a particular period. We wouldn't get the same numbers now. So four to six are all around, these are kind of perhaps social capital type of these. The four to six are all around cohesion and equality. And the first one on that is an intergroup cohesion, the relationship of cooperation and respect between identity groups in society. And we think that if there's been quite some analysis earlier on the role of ethnic conflict and development, we certainly think and hope that this data will allow us to do this much, much better than what I think were very poor indicators used in those data set. The kind of questions are around incidents of riots, levels of ethnic religious tension, and at the micro level, a proportion of people who reject others as neighbors, a variety of database that is built on including a fund for peace and minorities at risk. It is actually quite stunning how much data there is available on those issues. And this is the pattern that we get, again, enormous diversity within Africa with that same diversity does not exist. Well, it's actually there in the global database as well. And as I guess one would expect, very low levels of cohesion in certain countries. And if I'm not mistaken, if I remember well, there is, this would suggest some positive correlation. As one would expect that that cohesion would increase as countries grow richer. But of course, some of the outliers, the growth may well be based on very exclusionary patterns. I know I'm not saying anything new, but what I'm saying here is that there is a potential to actually measure that and start measuring this in a cross-country basis. Inclusion of minorities. These are, it's quite close to the previous ones of course, but this is, there is more about the levels of perceptions and reported discrimination. The uneven ratings on an even economic development between groups and also a little bit on ethnic tensions. Which shows us a pattern which is not very different actually from the intergroup cohesion. Certainly with the same kind of outliers. But there's also very clear cases of countries where, well this does measure something different where the intergroup cohesion scores high and on minority scores low and vice versa. And I mentioned the examples in the paper. The final one is gender equality. And of course that's a whole, this is I think among the six, the least new and then there are many variants of global gender equality measures. So let me skip that there. I'll skip that one as well and come to the conclusion. Now this was not to make a point about interrelationship of the software aspect of development and broader aspects. But really to suggest to you that with this database we can now measure this. And of course it is very clear to most of you in the room who have quantitative skills, the kind of issues that need to be addressed. The Africa data, the coverage is much better than I would have expected actually. Much more database. But certainly if you look at changes over time there's a lot of work to be done. And if these are not clear correlations of course, but if you look at the graphs, you do see the kind of trends that you would expect certainly on the issues of activism. Well the activism if it's true in that sense, not with the causation the other way around, with intergroup cohesion, more inclusive societies. Let's put it this way, what it seems to suggest is that there is no necessary trade-off between wealth creation and aspects of inclusion that didn't go so far for the measurement of clubs and association. And the one on safety and trust also we would perhaps have expected a clearer pattern there. But like I said certainly on some of these, if one can draw any conclusion and so far we don't see that trade-off, i.e. potentially focus on growth and developing more inclusive societies are not alternatives, it can go hand in hand. Sorry I took too much time I'm sure. Nope, just right. Thank you very much.