 You have the floor. Thank you. Thank you very much. And first to Terri Montbrouillard, congratulations on this new edition of the World Policy Conference and thanks for including me and having the chance to appear on this panel with my friend Jean-Claude Trichet and his other illustrious colleagues. Let me make a few comments on the outlook. It's quite appropriate that the timing of our conference today comes with just weeks after the G20 Leaders Summit meeting in New Delhi and the IMF World Bank annual meetings in Marrakesh and as we heard from the minister and we know in just a few weeks the COP28 will be meeting here in Dubai to discuss progress or hopefully to make progress on climate change issues. I'll take as my starting point for the outlook, the world economic outlook of the fund, no offense Gabrielle, they're very similar. The IMF noted that global GDP grew 3.5% last year, 3% this year. Their forecast for next year is 2.9%. And that's compared to the, in the space between 2000 and 2019, that's including the global financial crisis, world GDP growth had averaged 3.8%. And the IMF's forward-looking forecast is for the next five years of growth of 3.1%. In other words, by historical standards, this is a very mediocre outlook at best. They also characterize the outlook as rather uneven and quite uncertain. And notably, they don't expect inflation to return to its pre-COVID performance until at least 2025, not a very pleasing result or forecast. So what are the key issues? To me, one of them is exactly the outlook for inflation. Right now, central banks are advertising that their rate policy is likely to be higher for longer. Of course, that depends on their expectation that inflation is going to be relatively sticky. It certainly seems reasonable at this point, but we also shouldn't forget that it wasn't that long ago that central banks were advertising their policy as lower for longer. It really is going to depend on the outlook for inflation. And here it's possible that there will be not differentiation in target as Jean-Claude underscored, but differentiation in outcomes. And if so, this will have a substantial impact both on global markets but also on the status of financial risks. Right now, a substantial perception of financial risks is related to the substantial rise in long-term interest rates, especially in the U.S. And the combination of losses that that implies for current holders of these securities and interplay with likelihood of continued high policy rates. So simply to say, I'll leave it with saying, if inflation outlook is more favorable than the consensus, just as it was turned out to be more difficult than had been the previous consensus before the COVID-related inflation hit, these worries could diminish. But it remains quite uncertain. A second key issue, of course, is one of the sources for both the differentiation in economic outcomes, but also the pressure on long-term capital markets has been the substantial runup in debt, especially in the fiscal sector, especially among other places in the U.S. in these assumed pressure on budgets going forward that also are an important element of the perception of likely financial and economic risks. Once again, this remains controversial in many countries in Europe, but especially in the U.S. The outlook for the election in the coming year, and I know we'll be having a session on these things later in the conference, could have an impact on the outlook for public deficits and the growth of debt. There is an obvious linkage that is often overlooked. One of the reasons why the runup in public debt that occurred in the wake of the global financial crisis was not anywhere near as destabilizing as many thought, was because of the continuation of very low interest rates, including long-term interest rates, which meant for many years following the crisis, despite the increase in the stock of debt, the percentage of government revenues that were dedicated to debt service was declining, not rising. It's only in the last few years that that trend has been reversed, hence the centrality of the future performance of inflation and the outlook for fiscal policy. Another key issue, of course, and one that's been discussed already, is that for trade. For sure, we've seen the following. For essentially for the 60 years following the formation of the Bretton Woods system, global trade grew faster than global GDP, almost without exception. In other words, just as the architects of the postwar system had anticipated, that the restoration of a global trading system was going to be a key element driving global development. Since the global financial crisis, let's call it the end, for the past 10 years, eight of the past 10 years, global trade has grown more slowly than global GDP, and that remains the case this year. And the outlook going forward certainly remains problematic. There are various forces that are at work here. One is for sure the use of sanctions and protectionist measures that Gabrielle's slide showed us. These are, and the threat of additional use of protectionist measures is an ongoing threat. At the same time, however, in response to COVID, the experience of COVID, there's been a much greater attention paid to the resilience of supply chains. So some of what we see in the changing direction or the changing nature of supply chains in various markets is certainly trade diversion, as Asean was telling us. But some of it is, let's call it, more organic attention to the issue of resilience and reliability of trade in supply chains in more extreme circumstances. Time will tell, but the recent G20 Leaders Summit pledged to restore the functioning of the WTO and to work towards a more open trading system. However, when you read the content of their undertakings, it is far from certain where this is going to happen. Why this is particularly important is because of the growth in trade and services that is, of course, complicating because it is not well dealt with in trade legislation. And secondly, the prospect of new technology that could once again bring forth an improvement in productivity growth similar to what we saw in the 1990s. So this, the development of technology and the evolution of the trading system is going to be, is going to be very important. And in that context, I should have mentioned already the increased use of subsidies and other forms of industrial policy and its risk of complicating the trading system. So was there something new that has come out of this round of meetings of global leaders? And I would say yes, and that is a greater, much greater focus on the provision of what are called global public goods. Matters to deal with climate change, environment, health, food security, etc. What has happened so far is a much greater attention at the level of intentions to deal with these issues that would imply potentially non-trivial changes in public policy and in the provision of these goods at a global level. But what is also clear at this time is the lack of clarity about how this will be accomplished. So it's a potentially substantial new public policy initiative at a global level that so far, if we look at the latest round of meetings, is more intentioned so far than real action. But it's something to watch closely. I'll stop there. Thank you very much indeed, John. I take your point on the longer, higher, for longer coming from the central banks. My interpretation is that they have to fight permanently against market participants that are calling for industries decreasing as rapidly as possible. So it's a way to counter spontaneous, I would say move, that we understand pretty well because they are talking their books and it's normal that the market would give that signal. And I take from all what you said, and it's also valid for the other speakers, this idea that de-risking is okay, decoupling would be totally catastrophic, which is more or less a message coming from Europe also in the difficult circumstances in the geostrategic tensions that we are experiencing.