 Thank you very much, Michael, and really interesting that, you know, financial markets should be perhaps paying less attention at dissecting every line and every word of the Fed policy announcements, but also looking more at, you know, the economic news that come out in the days preceding the decision and what they imply for the Fed decision given the reaction function. So, we, I invite all attendees to put forward, you know, questions and some of them are already coming up in the chat and to also the Q and A, so let me start with one that I have here in front of me. So, most of the results shown in your papers seems to have been obtained by using a rather long sample of basically 30 year of data. Is there important time variation in the results, for example, in terms of monetary policy predictability? And do you see a difference between like pre and post great financial crisis, pre and post great recession, pre and post pandemic? And if you see those variations all the time, why is this so in your opinion? Well, we don't see any systematic evidence for variation over time about this. This is also very difficult to detect that because of, you know, these announcement only coming once every six weeks roughly. And so we may just not see it because of a lack of power. That's absolutely a crucial question. Is this still there? Is it driven by a particular period? We looked at this over a variety of different samples, including excluding the crisis, starting the sample later or ending it earlier. And we found very consistent results overall. But that doesn't rule out that the importance of these channels is evolving over time. Thank you. So you don't find that like difference in the, also the aggressive, the aggressiveness of the response of the central bank, depending on the sample period. Yeah. Well, I mean, that's another issue. No, the central bank has actually absolutely become more responsive over time. That is, in our view, the most plausible explanation for why markets have underestimated the responsiveness they're kind of learning about the policy rule, and they're just, they're just never catching up. You know, the Fed has certainly been more activist, I might say, under Bernanke than under Greenspan and has become more so with subsequent chairs. And there's plenty of evidence both in policymakers' remarks, but also in the data that the reaction to, you know, activity gaps in particular has become stronger over time. That's, we think, a good explanation of our findings. Thank you. So picking up on the questions, there's one around, you know, equity prices. And it says, it still seems that equity prices often move in the same direction as rates, yeah. In short term, short event windows around policy announcements, yeah. So why do equity markets not pricing the macro surprises you use as your key control variable? And I must say, for me, it's also a puzzle that, you know, financial markets are supposed to integrate all this information, apparently don't do so before the policy announcements. They incorporate a lot of information, but they're just unsure about how exactly how much interest rates are going to respond. So stock markets go up in response to the news. You know, money market futures go up in response to good news, but there's just still a systematic hawker surprise, and in particular, double surprises on the downturn. You know, that's just pretty clear. But this is about the stock market, the question here. So I think maybe the question is referring to some of the evidence and Yardzinski and karate's AJ macro paper that they find. I can't really, I kind of lost track of the chat and the QA Q&A all these questions, but you asked like, why is sometimes the stock market going in the same direction as the bond market around the announcement isn't that puzzling. Oftentimes, right. And so I think there's very few announcements where they is a significant positive movement in both markets. Most of these where there's some puzzling co movement, they're, they're very, either one of the responses is very small. And among the big movers, like there's also somewhere just measurement errors. Measurement error plays a role like this is one big March 2001 announcement where there was a supposed information effect. But really, if you measure the monetary policy surprise, more comprehensively realize why the market, you know, you see more clearly that the market, you know, actually took on the monetary policy. Surprise and that it makes sense for the stock market to go down on that day. So I don't think overall the stock market evidence and the occasional co movement in the, you know, with the wrong sign is particularly puzzling. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'll take, you know, perhaps two last questions. So one is, and monetary policy surprises reveal changes in the judgment of policymakers to new information. Not the information is not the information that drives the expectations, but the new interpretation by policymakers of this information. So basically, you know, basically the way the central bank reacts to new information. And so the question is, I think you addressed it, but maybe you can clarify that. I mean, how do you capture this in your analysis? Yeah. Well, I mean, I'm not so sure what I'm not sure I understand the question. I could just say that the monetary policy surprise can capture a policy shock. Or it can capture the difference between the judgment of policymakers and the market. And it could also capture information effects. But if they are not there, right? So the standard assumption is that, you know, everyone knows the policy rule and we kind of understand what the Fed is doing. So then monetary policy surprises would always be a really good proxy for or an instrument for monetary policy shocks. But if there is a wedge between how markets perceive the Fed will react to new data and how the Fed actually reacts to new data, then this wedge can also cause a monetary policy surprise. That's kind of the essence of the channel that we're talking about. That was the question and also how you separate these two effects in your paper. So closing with one final question. So could we understand your Fed response to news channel just as part of the traditional peer monetary policy shock? Yeah. And thus separating these two as any practical advantage, knowing that we can just control for news in lower frequency regressions. Right. Yeah. So the, the practical advantage is that we, well, so the implications I think are clear for both for monetary policy and for empirical work. It's, it's for both. It's, it's important to know what whether there are any information effects. Okay. So now, does it matter whether we have a Fed response to new channel or traditional monetary policy shock? Yeah, I do think it matters. It's important to understand whether the Fed is causing financial market reactions due to proper new information and a shock, or because it just disagrees with the market. Because it has very different implications for monetary policy communication. And so I think beyond the implications I spelled out here, this, this is of first order importance. Thank you. Great question.