 Felly yn dangos dros llwyso i ni. Fy analyse i gael sut ynghylch atweithio'r anodol ddau, ac mae ei anhygoel yn cysylltu ar yr anodol o ymddangosion na armengafol o由ch yn Foskotland. Felly yn ddaw'r ddellog, David Martin, me film-m-e-p, ac Alan Smith. Felly yn ddodol ar jargwadau i'r eich cwestiyne, fy nhw'i gwybod ai'n ddodfallwyd wedi'u dd pequ ddod favourite ac fe gain i'r gweithngau. Felly yn ddodol ar gyfer-m-e-p? Alun Cenglidol yn fawr. I was doing the water. It's very brief opening remarks. First of all, in general terms, we naturally here are focusing on the British Government's negotiating position, but we should consider very seriously how we influence the other party's negotiating position as well. I'm sure that you've already thought about it as a committee, but despite his, and the way he was reported in the British press, Michelle Barney is not at all anti-British. He's not at all unsympathetic to the issues that we will be raising with him, and I think he would be a very good person to be in touch with. Collectively, we are trying to build contacts with him and his team. Likewise, Ivor Hofstadt, the Liberal Leader in the Parliament, from a Scottish perspective, has shown a great deal of interest in the unique position that we find ourselves in, if having voted to remain when the rest of the UK is voted to leave. He is very interested in how we can assist the Scottish case. Very briefly, and I'll try to do it as tilly grammatically as possible, I think that there are three things that we need to try to defend as a nation post Brexit. First, we have to find methods for protecting jobs, we have to find a way of protecting retaining rights and we have to look at our security. All of which have been well rehearsed, so again I'll be very brief, but of course in relation to jobs, full access to the single market is, for me, the key issue. I don't believe that we will be able to obtain that if we do not have some movement on free movement. If we stick to the steady British position of no free movement, then I think that we'll find on the other side of the fence no access to the single market or no membership of the single market, and there's a passing point since it slipped out unintentionally. I have no idea when we keep hearing Government ministers talking about access to the single market, what they mean by that phrase, because every country in the world has access to the single market. It's membership of the single market that gives you the privileged position that we have. Again, this committee is well aware of all the options. The Norway option for me is the best option, but I can't understand why we'd want to have no say in setting the rules, still pay the bills and what the advantage of that would be compared to full membership that I don't get. Swiss option has been talked about, but important for Scotland, important for the UK as a whole, it's important to bear in mind that the Swiss do not allow free movement of services, so a UK agreement that doesn't give us access to the service market would not be good news. I do most of my work in the Parliament on the international trade committee. I'm the spokesman for my group on the Canada agreement. It's a good agreement for a third country, it would not be a good agreement for the United Kingdom, and again I've heard in the last two or three weeks a number of British ministers talk about Canada being a suitable option. I won't go through all the options, but it doesn't give you unfettered access to fishing or agriculture. It more or less gives you tariff-free access for manufacturing goods, but even there there are some exceptions. It doesn't involve financial services, and it doesn't give you any role in setting standards if you want to sell into the single market. You have to accept a single market standard, so I don't see why Canada is suddenly becoming this great option for us. It's good for Canada because they have a different relationship with the European Union, but it's not good for the United Kingdom. Finally, on jobs, the WTO option, again because I do my work in the trade committee, I've just come back from Geneva, where the Secretary of State, Liam Fox, spoke, and I was just telling Alan before the meeting, he implied that because the UK was an original member of the WTO and a continuing member of the WTO, there would be no problem for us in terms of moving from membership of the European Union to full WTO status. Well, there's no problem in terms of membership, but immediately after he spoke, the Deputy Director General of the WTO pointed out that our schedules are 40 years out of date, and he said that it would take years to update our schedules. On the one hand, you had the Secretary of State saying no problem, on the other hand, you had the Director General saying that we are in deep conversation about how we're going to handle this, and we expect it to take years. The idea that there's a simple sign-up for the WTO option and everything's fine is clearly not a good option. Just as one product, just to mention in passing, again, I'm sure that you're very aware of this, it would mean a tariff of 10 per cent on our whisky if we took the WTO option instead of having a completely free access to the European market as it does at the moment. On rights—and I'll be much more brief on the other two things to leave them at the time for discussion—I think that there is no way that the current British Government is going to protect our social and labour rights that we have from the European Union. My personal view is that Scotland should be pushing very hard to make sure that those matters become a Scottish responsibility, so we need to make a case for those being devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive, because it's clear that Scottish people want to defend those rights, and it's also clear that if there's no change at the British Government level, they will not be defended. In terms of human rights, I think that there is an argument to say that, even with its existing powers, that the Scottish Executive could sign up for the European Convention and could have its own version of the British Human Rights Act and defend the human rights that we currently have at the European level. I think that that should be a high priority for the Scottish Government. Finally, on security—again, it's debatable, but I personally do not think that there should be a major impediment for Scotland, but it's devolved justice system, remaining part of the European arrest warrant system, and, again, collectively, Alan and I are trying to see Interpol on this issue, and I know that Government ministers have also been speaking to Interpol. I don't see why we couldn't remain the Scottish Police, could not be part of Interpol, even if the rest of the UK decided not to, so we can defend our security in that way as well. There are many other issues. I think that jobs, rights and security are the three key things. Obviously, staying part of the research programme and being part of the Erasmus programme, looking at how we can take advantages of the agricultural and fisheries coming back to Scotland, but also bearing in mind the dangers of that, if we don't have full access to the single market, it could be difficult for some of our agricultural and fisheries products to compete in Europe. I will stop. Thank you very much, Mr Smith. Thank you. I very much endorse everything David is saying. It's one of the things that it is worth stressing to fellow Parliamentarians that post-Brexit five out of six of Scotland's representatives in the European Parliament have sat down and committed ourselves to work together as we often have done in the past as Team Scotland and get a result for the people who we serve. There is a great deal of cross-party joint working going on across the Parliament. We are seeing that across a number of the UK MEPs where we are cooperating to try to get the best deal out of whatever is going to be in Scotland and, indeed, the UK's future. I would also compliment your committee on the work that you have been doing with this inquiry to get a lot of useful information into the public domain. One of the sad side effects of how dreadful the EU referendum campaign was is that a lot of organisations did not prepare for the eventuality of a leave vote in terms of what the implications are for farming, for fishing, for all sorts of other industries. I was at a meeting with the Law Society of Scotland this morning, and it is clear that only now are a series of organisations really going through the gears in terms of what this actually all means. The work that your committee has been doing is really very, very important. I would add a few points in terms of what is going on over the water. Commissioner Barnier and Mr Verhofstadt are very alive to the Scottish question. My advice to Scotland and this committee is that Scotland should not be silent as this process is going forward. The idea that we can wait until we see fully formed what the UK is going to present as the article 50 demand is an opportunity that I think we need to be taking forward as well in terms of what are Scotland's demands out of this, what does Scotland want to keep, what do we want to remain part of, how do we want to do that? There is a good will towards us at present. To paraphrase almost everybody who has been involved in politics since Palmerston, countries do not have allies, they have interests, and it is up to us to define what our interests are and make sure that we are part of the discussion as that goes forward. We have open doors at the moment. It is an open door that I suspect is going to start closing. The idea that article 50 is entirely under the control of the UK, all that the treaty says is that the member state informs the council. Arguably that has been done verbally by Prime Minister Cameron in the summit after the meeting. In the event that the UK is going to find out really rapidly, 27 is a bigger number than one. In the event that the 27 decide that article 50 has in effect been triggered, there is a lot of other stuff going on that the member states of the European Union want to be getting on with. The idea that the UK can string this out beyond what is reasonable. For the moment, I think that we need to still have the time to put together what a realistic article 50 approach is, but that goodwill will not last forever, and I think that there is a timescale there that needs to be respected. In terms of the plurality of interests of the UK as well, very much no surprise supportive of the Scottish Government's and Parliament's efforts to reach out to the plurality of interests within the UK, Gibraltar, Northern Ireland and other places as well. There is a lot of interest in this that has been thrown up into the air, and we need to find some sort of joint approach. I believe that there is a goodwill at UK official level and, indeed, politically, so it will take all the talents on this and I am very happy to continue the discussion with yourselves. Thank you very much. I take it from what you have both said that there is an understanding within EU institutions in the Parliament of Scotland's unique position. Would you agree with that, or is there more work to be done? I think that there is always work to be done and I think that there is a focus that will need to be maintained on that. There is a recognition that we voted to remain. There is a recognition that, if there is an opportunity to find some sort of circumstance that will suit Scotland, then let's explore that. I think that that needs to be issued by issue rather than a wider sort of status. More preoccupying actually is the position of Northern Ireland in that that directly involves another member state, which is going to be part of the 27th, where we are part of the member state that is not going to be part of the 27th. There is an awareness of the situation of Gibraltar as well, but we are fitting within that picture and the fact that Scotland has been as vocal as we have been immediately post Brexit did make us very much part of that picture. That is something that we can use to Scotland's advantage, but we must not go silent within that process. How can this Parliament and this committee most effectively engage with the European Parliament and its committee system to make sure that Scotland's voice is heard? At the moment that's quite difficult to say in some ways in that the Parliament itself, the European Parliament has not yet decided the form that it's I think that eventually we're going to have a Brexit committee, but we haven't got that yet. We're not there yet. The president has appointed a special representative, Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the Liberal Group, to be Mr Brexit for the Parliament. Initially he would be the point of contact at the present time, but I'm hoping that there will be a Brexit committee in the Parliament in the way that we have committees for everything else that goes on that will analyse the article 50 process once it starts. I guess it's because article 50 hasn't been triggered that we don't have such a committee at the present time. One piece of advice I would give, and I know it's treading on eggshells, trying to put this delicately, but if the Scottish interests, defending the Scottish interests as seen as promoting independence, you will find some hostility in the Parliament, all the usual suspects of Spanish, the number of other nationalities will be very nervous about this. If it's seen genuinely about promoting the difference between Scotland and the rest of the UK in terms of desires, in terms of European connection, then I think you'll find a sympathetic audience, but it has to be handled very delicately. I would from my own political perspective very much endorse that. I think if there is a perception, and it would be entirely wrongly, if there is a perception that we're using this as a pretext to a mad dash for independence, there will be a backlash. Whereas if we're dealing with it on a granular level about plucking an example out there, how does Scotland continue to be part of the Europol network? That's a discussion that people will engage with. How do we remain part of Horizon 2020? How do we remain part of Erasmus? How do we remain part of the Hague Convention or whatever else it might be? We can have a granular discussion about technical specifics rather than a broader constitutional discussion. There are umpteen places across the EU that have a different constitutional status vis-à-vis their own member state and vis-à-vis the EU. There are umpteen examples that we can point to for a wider status, but as a starter for 10 for where we are now, it's about identifying the bits of the Hague that we want to remain part of and the bits of the framework that we want to continue to be active in going forward, which allows us to engage subject by subject, committee by committee. I suggest that that's where the discussions actually start rather than going straight into Mr Brexit or Ms Brexit whoever they're all going to be in due course and make it more about what we want to keep this specific programme going. How do we discuss how to do that? I think that that would allow a granular level of discussion, which would be more productive for where we are now. It has been suggested to us that what we need for that to happen is a clear indication from the UK Government that they are comfortable with Scotland doing that. What are the chances, do you think, that the UK Government is going to do that on? No idea. It's very difficult to judge at the moment what their attitude will be, frankly. But if the UK Government did give that indication, it would make life much easier. Even in those devolved areas. What about, obviously, the key thing is membership of the European single market for Scotland? That's what the First Minister has been very clear, that she wishes to retain. Indeed, the evidence that we're taking so far in the committee suggests that the sectors across Scottish society wish to retain that access. Is that something that we could argue for a differentiated relationship? I think that we should argue for whether it's part of the UK or a bespoke Scottish settlement. We should certainly be arguing for maximum access to the single market. I think that there's no question that that's where our economy would benefit most. I think that the difficulty is for us, for Scotland, to have a different level of access to the single market compared to the rest of the UK. It becomes very difficult because goods move so freely across the United Kingdom. How you would identify Scotland as a separate market in that context would be close to impossible, I would suggest, in a similar argument with free movement. There's an indication that the argument to free movement of people with Scotland is different from the position of the rest of the United Kingdom, but it would be very difficult to have free movement in Scotland with a porous border between ourselves and the rest of the United Kingdom. Ross Greer. Thanks very much. Taking on board what you've just said about the difficulty of a differentiated relationship, would the UK Government's negotiating position affect the willingness of the remaining 27 to engage directly with Scotland-specific situations? If the UK Government is heading towards hard-brexit WTO rules default, would that make the remaining 27 more open to looking at a differentiated relationship for Scotland? It's very difficult to say. One of the paradoxes is that the harder the Brexit, the more difficult it is for Scotland to have a differentiated relationship, because if it's real hard Brexit, then, when we're completely out of the single market, it's very difficult for a part of the United Kingdom to be in that single market. I actually make the situation worse, not better, the softer the Brexit, the probably easier it is, in my opinion, to actually have nuances in Scotland's position compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. What we're hearing in relation to Northern Ireland, and just in every aspect of Brexit, there are so many variations at the moment. If I was a unionist, I'd be a Northern Ireland unionist, but one option is to have a porous border between the north and south of Ireland, but to have a hard border between the north of Ireland and the United Kingdom, which would not be if you regard yourself as British living in Northern Ireland. I can imagine not being a very satisfactory settlement, but it seems to be one of the few ways that you could keep the border between the north and south open. One of the things that the EU has managed to do over the years has been that it's been quite a flexible organisation when it has to be, so notwithstanding what's been said thus far, where do you see any flexibility for Scotland's position and any type of negotiating position for Scotland in the coming six months to 12 months, particularly because of the elections that are going to take place in France and then in Germany? There are several questions in there at once, but in terms of Scotland specific, I think that once the heat goes out and the heat might be around for quite a while to come, but once we get into the process, some of the things that Alan and I have already mentioned, the Erasmus programme, part of the horizon 2020, even Europol, keeping European arrest worn, those sort of issues, I think there will be flexibility. I think the big problem is the big issue is the single market, and that's where it's going to be very difficult to get the flexibility. In terms of the UK position, again, this is corridor talk rather than any formal positions, anybody adopting a position. One position I'm told that if a British Government was prepared to compromise on free movement of people might be, and it was floated by one of the Brexit years, actually, when he was shot down by the Prime Minister quite quickly, but it's also been talked about in the corridors in Brussels is the idea that you could have keep free movement in principle, but you would have to have a job offer before you could come to United Kingdom. So free movement of labour would still exist, but you need your job offer before you came in. Some of us would argue in the spirit of the single markets that we currently have it, but it would be a pragmatic way of solving what looks like two hard positions that don't seem to be prepared to come together. It might be one way of bringing them together. Alan? It's one of the known unknowns at the moment. Donald Trump's felt's quote that there's things you know you don't know, and what the UK position is going to be is an opportunity for Scotland in terms of there is, I believe, an open ear, certainly at official level in Whitehall, to try and formulate some sort of UK bid at the article 50 stage, which would actually respect the constitutional issues that have been thrown up for Gibraltar, for Northern Ireland and the external territories even. There's way wider issues than just the whole nations. That is an opportunity for Scotland to be vocal with a list of here's our starting point. Now, politically our starting point is remain means remain, of course, but let's be specific about the programmes that we want to keep, the distinction between what is clearly within devolved competence and things that have other implications. Let's be particularly vocal with the UK about the things that we want to have as part of that discussion. I think that we do that privately where necessary, but as publicly as we need to. This is a democratic process, but my point is well being that there's a concurrent discussion that needs to be had with Brussels and the member state capitals to make sure that Scotland's needs within this process are respected, because then, as the two negotiations coincide, we'll have that hopefully goodwill still in the bank in terms of let's find a solution. We've got Norway just over there, Iceland over there, political Scotland has a clear awareness that there's other ways of skinning this. I think that there are ample constitutional examples that we can point to in terms of particular things. Some of the bigger demands about, well, passporting of financial services, I could think of constitutional ways in which we could have passporting of financial services for Scottish domiciled organisations, where perhaps that might not be the case for south of the border, but then that throws into sharp relief how will the situation be within the UK jurisdiction as it stands. I think that our starting point has to be what do we want to keep. Let's build the consensus in Scotland about why we need to do that, and then I think that there are constitutional exceptions that can be found in discussions with Brussels, but bearing in mind always that the member state is the member state, and there will be one representative in these discussions. We're not without allies. We're having a good discussion with the Irish in particular, Government to Government and then elsewhere. There are people that we can talk to about this stuff outside of just allowing the discussion to be a narrow channel between Edinburgh and London. There's a wider discussion we should be having. On the question regarding the elections, taking place in France and Germany, in terms of their timescales, how do you think that these two events are going to impinge or have an effect upon the situation here in Scotland and also in the UK? They will have a significant impact, and she's also thrown to the pot the fact that the Dutch are having elections as well, and possibly even of the three, they have a bigger, if you like, anti-European, and it's not the right description, but a sceptical audience in Holland will cause them some difficulties as well. Any negotiations that start early next year, if we believe the rumours of February next year, I don't think we'll see a lot of progress till October-November. I certainly don't think we'll see any weakening of the Dutch, French or German position before then. In fact, you might well see a hardening of their position before then, so I think they do make the negotiations complex. There have been some people arguing that we shouldn't even lodge article 50 until October next year, but I gather the view of that as it's politically unacceptable to wait that long, but I suspect the negotiations will not be easy in the first nine months. There's an active danger, I think, that there is an incentive across the 27, because if the UK establishes the precedent that you can leave and somehow get a better deal, then everything starts to unravel really fast, because you don't need to think too hard about other European countries that have that sort of element within their politics. Hungary leaps to mind, but there's plenty others, but every single member state will have an interest in this, and they will be wanting their interests to be looked after in order to approve whatever Brexit eventually turns into. The domestic reality of 27 other places is going to be pivotal to what the UK actually gets in the end. The UK cannot demand terms and get them. Article 50 is just an opening bid that is not remotely the end of the process. My final question in this area is in terms of—you mentioned yourself, Alan, that, in terms of discussions, it's at member state level. In terms of Scotland's contribution to that and the fact that we won't be—we don't have that opportunity—how can you see Scotland actually having that direct level of discussion with some of the European countries and representatives notwithstanding the six or five of the six MEPs on the same page? It's clearly a challenge for Scotland to get that message over. It will be, but this is where the Government has cut something of a dash already. Nicola Sturgeon being over to meet the German Foreign Minister, Funa Hyslop was over in Paris meeting Erlan Dizir just beginning of this week, I believe, very recently. The channels will remain open. The negotiations will be the negotiations, but we can talk to the people who are part of the negotiations. We should also, incidentally, be demanding a formal part of the UK negotiating team, which is a very live discussion between Michael Russell and David Davis. If we are silent within this process, decisions will be made on our behalf in Brussels, in Berlin, in Paris, in Lleubliana and in London. It's up to us to make sure that we are vocal in terms of what we want and we want to place in those discussions on a seat at that table. If that's refused, that's refused, and the constitution is what it is, but we certainly shouldn't allow decisions to be made for us without making the case. I mean, firstly, I endorse what Alan says in terms of the First Minister and other ministers keeping contact in Europe. It's not going to be easy. People are not going to negotiate at the moment, but nevertheless, having the dialogue and keeping the contacts open is vital. The point that I wanted to add is that you're well aware that at the end of this process, the European Parliament will have the right to say yes or no to any Brexit deal. Firstly, that makes a point that's worth speaking to a wider group of MEPs and making sure that MEPs understand your demands. It's not, I'm not predicting it, but it's not beyond the level of possibility that we will say no to a Brexit initially. We've said no to some big deals in the past, so just because the member states are negotiated, don't assume that the Parliament will just rubber stamp it. On that point, the point that I wanted to add is that, as much as I always defend the rights of the European Parliament, I think it's ludicrous that if the European Parliament has the right to say yes or no to such a deal, that the parliaments have been any kingdom, I mean all the parliaments have been any kingdom, don't have that say as well. Just on that point, that European Parliament has the chance to say yes or no. What would happen if the European Parliament did then say no? What kind of type of constitutional crisis would that give a kick-up here in these islands? This is the problem with the whole article 50 process. We have never been, but it's cliche, but we are in uncharted waters. We don't know what would happen. One assumes that we don't have to go back to the negotiating table, but we don't know what that means in terms of the two-year time period. We just don't know in the past. The two most recent examples of parliaments saying no to international agreements was the act agreement, and it simply killed it. The other one was the passenger name recognition agreement with America. That led to the vice president of America coming to the European Parliament pleading with us. The nuances went away and negotiated the agreement and it became an agreement. There are two opposites. One killed it, one led to a few months delay, and with Brexit it would be impossible to make a prediction. It all depends entirely upon the goodwill that starts the negotiations and then continues through the negotiations. If there is goodwill and mutual self-interest, a deal can be struck. We are all grown-ups, but the omens aren't good. The pronouncements that we've had out of various London ministers—that's not the language I should use—contradicted almost immediately by their boss is just not credible. You saw the reaction of the French and German foreign ministers when they offered to explain in English how the Lisbon Treaty actually works to Boris Johnson. We're not looking good here. The extent to which the UK is throwing goodwill away is a problem for us, because we're not looking serious, we're not looking credible, but from a Scottish perspective I think that underlines the need that we need to be vocal and reasonable within where we are. We do have interlocutors within that discussion who will be in the room when, from a UK perspective, we'll be arm's length to someone who's not going to be in the room. The result of the UK referendum has obviously set a question amongst other member states within the European Union, as we've just alluded to. With this political uncertainty in the other member states who have a strong populist right-wing view, do you think that this could cause a domino effect withdrawal from the EU? I don't see it. I think that the evidence, poll-wise, is quite the reverse at the moment. The way the UK had a vote then, won a vote then collapsed into chaos was not a good look. I think that there's a number of other anti-European movements that are watching very carefully. The Front National has a very close relationship with the UKIP group within the European Parliament and they are obviously comparing notes. There are indeed ingredients of the same sort of discussion in various European countries, but that underlines our point that there is an incentive on the part of the 27 Governments and the institutions of the EU to make this tough in order to specifically underline that you can't leave a club and get a better deal. I don't see a domino effect domestically in any particular member state, but the risk of a domino effect actually makes it tougher for us. Ross, was your supplementary on the same? It's on the negotiation process that's part of what Alan Smith had brought up. Alan, you mentioned that Scotland will have to demand a role within the negotiation process itself, not just unilateral informal discussions with other member states, but as part of the team that the UK sends to the Brexit negotiations. That's obviously going to happen in terms of the Scottish Government and the Parliament making representation to the UK Government, but we had the representative of Quebec before this committee last week talking about the CETA process that David Martin will be familiar with. In that situation, there was an expectation on the European side of the table that the Canadian provinces would be represented in the room, not just federal Canada. Obviously, those provinces have considerably more relevant reserved powers than the Scottish Parliament does, but how can we create, if it doesn't already exist, a level of expectation among the other 27 that the UK should bring Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland into the room for the negotiations? We should try and create that expectation, but the two situations that you're talking about are not really matched. It was bizarrely that the European Union insisted that the provinces were involved in the Canadian negotiations because of past experience. One of our key demands in terms of trade negotiations was access to public procurement, which is totally controlled by the provinces or the bulk of it is controlled by the provinces. We recognised that any deal that the federal government in Canada did to give access to public procurement was pointless if we didn't have that guarantee from the provinces. There were a whole number of other issues that are devolved to the provinces that we needed assurances that they would respect. The Canadian constitutional position is that the Canadian government couldn't give away the rights of the provinces. In order to make the deal credible, we insisted that the provinces were involved from the start of the negotiations. Unfortunately, the constitutional position is quite clear that the UK government has the right, like it or not, to negotiate the terms of Brexit. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't try. Don't get me wrong and don't misunderstand the answer. Absolutely. The question is, how do we try to create that set of circumstances where there is a level of expectation? The first flight has to be domestically, but then we also have to look at allies in Europe and get them to—they can't insist—but get them to ask questions about, has this been discussed with your devolved Parliament, your region? Is the Scottish Government on board for this? Is the Northern Ireland has only had a chance to discuss this? There are allies in some of the member states who would be prepared to pose such questions. Again, it's a question of going back to the earlier comment about the First Minister speaking to leaders of other member states and to leading members of the European Parliament and to the Commission getting them engaged in this conversation and making them aware of it. We're also going to bear in mind—it shouldn't be unrealistic either—that, as Alan has indicated and we all know, they have also got their own concerns about this process, and that's for them going to be the number one priority looking after themselves. I agree with all that. Just to add briefly, the reality of CETA is that it's not deliverable unless the provinces sign up, so they had to be involved in a way that, bluntly, we don't. It's primarily a political discussion within the UK about the plurality of interests that we all have, that the unanimity of purpose across Scotland's political parties is, I think, a big strength in terms of that, but also building the coalition with industry groups, farmers, fishermen, whoever it might be, that Scotland has a list of demands that are distinct and legitimate and reasonable that we expect to be represented. The UK constitution is what it is and we're all familiar with that, but we have people that we can deal with outside of that process, but we must not be silent either within the UK context or indeed within the EU, because I think that we do have arms at our disposal. It's an interesting issue that we're unpicking here, because in Canada it was quite clear that the Canadian provinces don't have treaty making powers, they can have agreements, but similarly in the UK there are issues that are very clearly devolved to Scotland that are only deliverable in Scotland. I would have thought that that would have had a bearing on the perception of the Brexit negotiation process. One would hope so, but the problem is that the constitutional position is that the UK is the member state and has not, in any sense, given international competence to Scotland, Northern Ireland or Wales. Therefore, from a European point of view, even if there might be issues in terms of deliverability inside the UK, the British Government signing up for something is all that they need in their sense, because the British Government will be responsible for the delivery. Many of you would be very familiar with this. We're going back to 1997, 1998. Part of the reason why we have the constitutional settlement that we have now is because we learned, if that's the right word, the lessons of Brussels and Belgium were born in mind, where Belgium cannot enforce its federal constituent parts, sometimes to deliver on European policy. In relation to CETA, one of the Belgian parliaments has said that the Government shouldn't ratify CETA and, unless they change their mind, the Belgian Government, even though they have a majority in the Parliament, cannot, because not even the Government alone in Parliament has said that they shouldn't sign up for it. At the moment, Belgium can't sign up for CETA, but we're in a different position like it or not. Emma Harper. My specific example is about how complex our connections are with the EU. Last night, I was at the South Scotland Alliance meeting, along with Rachel Hamilton, and they were very keen for me to follow up about the reclassification of the nuts to areas. If the South Scotland settlement becomes a designated area, then, potentially, the South Scotland could be available with an estimated €970 million. I know that that's an estimation. That's about £840 million. My question is about what is the status or will be the status of the negotiations about the nuts to reclassification for the South of Scotland? Is it on a sugly peg, and if it is, can it be salvaged in light of Brexit? My own attitude at the moment, and I think that five of the six Scottish MEPs have taken the same attitude, is that life goes on. We're part of all those systems at the moment, and therefore we should continue to argue for what we would have argued for in the past. The level of the regional fund qualifying area that you qualify at is contentious for really, since the regional fund started. It's clear that if nuts to would, because of the statistics unemployment per capita income and so on, nuts to would be a better level than nuts three for the South of Scotland. They have a strong case, and we will continue to fight that case. Of course, it could be a poor thing, because we could win the case and then be out of the European Union. It would make no difference, but if you believe that we should continue to do our job, continue to fight for what we think is best in Scotland for as long as we're members, then I think the argument for a nuts to for these, I can't just be for the South of Scotland, but using nuts to as a base area for regional funding makes a lot of sense for Scotland. I've been working with the South of Scotland Alliance going back the best part of a decade, that if Dumfries and Galloway and Scottish Borders were amalgamated into a nuts to region, the numbers would be different, but we must also be aware of the royal politics, that all of our numbers are stopping quite soon unless something pretty dramatic changes. We'll certainly fight the good fight, but there's an extent to which that horse has bolted. Richard Lochhead. Thank you for giving evidence today. I found your contributions quite pessimistic so far in terms of contrasting with the standing ovation that Alan Smith got at the European Parliament and other MEPs, but I find it quite difficult to detect any sign that the MEPs are going to come to Scotland's rescue. In terms of the overall debate, I have not really shown much light on how it would be possible for Scotland to maintain a meaningful relationship with Europe. Erasmus, horizon, Europol are all very important issues for co-operation, but it's not really about the big debate, it's about the big debate, it's about the single market, customs union, the big issues, and you've not really given any indication that it's going to be possible for Scotland to maintain that relationship, so you're basically saying to us that MEPs are not going to have much role in this, and that without the UK Government's green light for the institutions, all the institutions in Europe to speak to us, it's going to be very difficult to make progress. Is that what you're saying to us? I think it is, frankly. Sorry to be pessimistic. I'm trying not to be pessimistic but realistic. Unless the UK Government negotiates a good deal in terms of access to the single market, it is very difficult for Scotland to have a distinctive relationship with the single market. I think that all the issues that you have just mentioned, and we have mentioned it is possible to retain some of the rights, some of the security issues in relation to Europe, but the jobs part, employment, I think is extremely difficult unless we get a better deal from the British Government negotiates a good deal. Just as a slight aside, but again, as we were talking about this earlier, as I mentioned earlier, I've just come back from the WTO, and Liam Fox made great play of Britain being a free trade country now and how getting out of Europe was going to open up freedom in terms of our market, and again better not quote them directly, but since there's three of them I can hide which one it was, but one of the director journals of the WTO then told us in private he doesn't seem to understand that we are the world trade organisation, not the world free trade organisation, which I thought was a nice repost to him. For my part as well, the big picture is freedom of movement in single market access or membership absolutely, but my point about not going silent is let's talk about the things that we can talk about. I think that if you put a motion that Scotland wants to remain part of the Erasmus programme to this Parliament, you'd have pretty much cross-party unanimity that this is something we want to do, so there's an earnest of intent that we can talk about with the institutions about here's one way in which we want to remain part of this, here's one way in which we want to be part of that, and start to get the goodwill in the bank about things that we actually can deliver. Europol, likewise, Justice and Home Affairs co-operation, there are ways in which in any likely scenario Scotland will be able to be engaged in the way that Norway is, or Iceland is, or other countries in Switzerland can be. So while there's so many unknowns within the process about single market stuff, there are things that we can talk about, so let's not go silent and let's be vocal about the direction of travel we want to establish and build some sort of momentum towards that. Meanwhile, concurrent discussions with the UK, et cetera, the MEPs are not going to ride to a rescue no more than any other member status, but the MEPs are useful in reaching the member state capitals. The European Parliament is going to get to sign off whatever Brexit is, whatever the terms eventually are, so there's a lot of lines in the water that we need to maintain, but it is up to Scotland to work out what are our demands, what are our lists of interests that we want to maintain, and then engage ruthlessly member state capital by member state capital as to why that's in their interests also and why they want to help facilitate that. The strongest key that would perhaps unlock this, am I right in saying, is for Theresa May, for as long as Scotland's part of the United Kingdom, to say at some point, preferably sooner rather than later, that she's happy given the democratic vote in Scotland for the institutions to speak directly to Scotland about how that relationship with Europe can be maintained? Will she be as happy or unhappy as she's right? The institutions aren't talking to the UK, junkers, junkers and the rest. Once there is a negotiation under way, we need to co-cani with the institutions, and this is my point about differentiating between Brussels and the member state capitals. We can have the dialogue with the member state capitals about what our interests are, and then they'll be in the room as the 27 are negotiating with the UK. We also need to have the discussions with the UK about making sure that our interests are properly represented, and that will be an inelastic process to a point. But in terms of do we need the goodwill or the acquiescence of the UK, it would be helpful, yes, and there is a degree to which we need to establish as much of a joint operation as we can, but there are limits to that process, and there is a mandate within Scotland from the people of Scotland, and there's a mandate from this Parliament, and there's a mandate that I want to see respected. I think that we need to talk about things that are deliverable within Scottish competence, because they are deliverable within Scottish competence, and we can do things about that. That allows us to establish the earnest of intent that illustrates the wider point that we expect something different out of this process, whatever it's going to be, but that's going to be a multi-level discussion. Waiting for the say-so of the UK Government will only take us so far within that. Can you see any circumstances in which negotiations between the UK and EU institutions would break down? Article 50 is an opening bid, and we've heard much comment about we'll get a lot more clarity once article 50 is triggered. I think that the moment of clarity comes when the member states say no to the article 50 bid, because Charles Grant from the CER has written a very, very helpful paper about the different sets of negotiations. There isn't just one set of negotiations. The ending of the treaties is actually quite a straightforward technical matter. It's what comes next. It's going to be the guts of it. When the article 50 bid is put together, which I hope will reflect all of Scotland's interests and I hope will have some sort of scenario that respects what we want, it's then up to the 27 to decide whether they acquiesce to that or not. It's then up to the European Parliament to decide whether that suits the interests of the wider population of the European Union. It's then up to the Commission to decide whether that respects the treaties. There's a much more varied set of interests ranged against us than just the UK. What do you think the key issue would be, as a free movement of people? There are nitty gritty issues, as Alan has described them, but even the formal, if you like, the administrative part of article 50 could be extremely difficult. The easiest thing might be the day you leave, because that's also going to be in the agreement. However, what happens to Britain's on-going budgetary contribution is because there will be some programmes that run beyond after the period we leave. How much money? Who's going to pay for that? What's going to happen to not our pensions, but even that's not unimportant, but there's millions in terms of pension rights for British employees in the Commission, in the Parliament and so on. Who's going to take pay that bill? There's a whole host of issues like that that have to be settled as part of the leaving process. In Palo, we hope, but some member states even argue that it's subsequent, and I hope that it's not subsequent, but at some point you then have to talk about the future relationship, which will be outlined, I understand, in article 50, but will not necessarily be detailed in article 50 negotiations. That is the key part. If we assume, and I don't think that there's a lot of evidence, one would have hoped, but I don't think that we can be firmly assured that the British Government's lobbying for complete access to the single market, but if the Government is looking for membership of the single market, then free movement of people will be the crux issue, because there are a number of member states who are not going to move, I don't think, on the free movement issue. We don't need them all to move, because we need 21 out of 27 to agree to the Brexit deal. However, the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Slovax, the Slovenians, the Lithuanians, with big populations living in the UK are going to defend their population, so they're not going to give in on free movement. If we believe the British Government, they're not going to give in free movement, so something has to go there. If the British Government does the Leon Fox position, which is settled for WTO, then I think that we've got a very bad deal in terms of the British economy, but getting an agreement from the other member states probably won't be that difficult. You talked about the Parliament vetoing any deal. What do you think would be the circumstances in which the Parliament would veto a deal again? Would it be a compromise too far on free movement? I think that the Parliament, if you get three out of the four, and obviously the fourth one will be the free movement of Labour, but if three out of four of the four freedoms that we talk about are guaranteed to Britain, but one isn't, then you'd have a problem inside the Parliament. The nitty-gritty issues might also be some of the ones that the Parliament takes umbridge at, because Parliament is one arm of the budgetary authority. If it doesn't think that the budgetary settlement is suitable, it could easily reject it on that basis as well. What happens to all the agencies? Will Britain still be part of the agencies or will we give up? I mean, one sort of not critical, but one just sort of off the top of my head, the chemical agency, for example. Every new substance that comes on the market has to be approved by the chemical agency. We are members of that. We pay for that at the moment. What happens after we leave? Do we have our own chemical agency, which will cost a fortune? Or do we not take part in the chemical agency but accept all the European laws? Or do we pay for it and try to influence it? If we are trying to influence it from the outside, even that could be controversial inside the Parliament. You multiply that by, I don't know how many agencies there are now, but you go across the environment agency, the food safety agency, the whole lot of them. All of these things have to be settled in our exit. Anyone could trigger your all-parliamentarian. You know what happened in Parliament. If one thing could get a bit of resonance and take legs and then you find there's a movement against the agreement. Very interesting. Ross Greer, did you have a supplementary on that? Very short. It is a new point, though. If David Martin will forgive me just to go back to what you said about independence. I agree entirely with what you said, having spoken to my own party's colleagues in the Flemish Parliament this weekend, and I understand entirely the domestic situations that other countries are taking on board. Would you agree that, at the moment, it would be irresponsible to take any option off the table? If nothing else, they are all negotiating tools and points of leverage with the UK Government in what could become tense domestic negotiations within the UK? The short answer is yes. If you are pushing me harder from my own personal position, which I have thought about a lot since the 23rd of June, frankly, personally, I think that the emotional case for independence is much stronger, but the Brexit settlement is critical in this. This is probably not the place to go into, but a hard Brexit actually makes the case for independence harder, but bizarrely, and a soft Brexit makes it easier. In terms of negotiating, any negotiator keeps every option on the table, so he should keep every option on the table. I very much echo that. As recently as two and a bit years ago, the people of Scotland were told that we are a family of nations. To safeguard our European status, we need to stick with the UK. Then, less than two years later, we find ourselves in a really very different situation. I absolutely think that independence must be on the table because that gives an urgency to the discussions and a leverage over the UK Government. That is recognised by everybody, not least in Brussels, but it is not our first place to go to. I was in the Sunday Herald just this week about so much is in flux until we can establish what we would become independent from. I think that there are a number of dotted lines into the future where we can only tease so much out as yet. I am talking about status within the European framework, which means a lot more things than just membership, which means a lot more things than just single market membership or access or whatever it is going to be. Our starting point, I think, cross-party has to be what are Scotland's best interests, and then we track back from that in the discussions with the UK Government and in the discussions with the member state capitals. Independence is absolutely on the table because that gives us a leverage, which giving it up would lose. It also is a supplementary. Martin, to elaborate on this comment about the relationship between hard Brexit and soft Brexit independence, because would these issues not be a question of timing of when things happen? I mean, I was thinking quite narrowly, and I accept there are wider arguments for and against independence, but in a narrow issue of jobs, hard Brexit means that the UK is out of the single market, and if the purpose of independence is to keep Scotland in the single market, then we would face—I agree because I have been around the Scottish debate too long, I realise that you are arguing the difficult arguments here—the reality is that if Scotland is inside the European Union and the rest of the UK is outside the European Union, you need a hard border between Scotland and England. And we have roughly a quarter of a million jobs that depend on our trade with the European Union and a million jobs that depend on our trade with England, so a hard border in that situation would not be good news. If you have a soft Brexit, that border would not exist, and then you have a more realistic choice about, in my opinion, between independence and remaining part of the European Union. It is one of the paradoxes, but if the UK goes for the hardest possible situation, it makes it very difficult for Scotland to retain its economic links the way we have them at the present time with the rest of the UK. In my view, that does a lot of damage, which is what I am hinting about, the emotional versus the practical problems of the situation that none of us want to, but we now face. So the logical conclusion of your argument is that question on independence, if that were one option, should be settled before Brexit? No, I do not think that that is my argument. My argument is that until you know the nature of the Brexit, it is very difficult to know whether in economic terms, and I repeat, I know that there is much wider debates about independence. I am trying not to extend the argument in this committee. We can have them elsewhere, but in the economic terms, if the UK ends up with a hard Brexit purely on an economic basis, it becomes more difficult for Scotland to be independent. On a softer Brexit or a middle Brexit, there is an example of Switzerland and Lichtenstein, in that Switzerland and Lichtenstein are both in FTA, but only Lichtenstein is in the EEA and has understood that there is flexibility between those borders. There is not a closed border, for example. Does that illustrate the point that you are making that you could have if it was a softer Brexit? It is easier to have differentiated relationships. Exactly. If you have a soft Brexit, there is no need for a border between Scotland and England, even if one of us is in the EU and one is not. If you have a hard Brexit, my argument and my claim is that you would need a hard border, and that is where the difficulty comes. That is going back to the earlier comment about Northern Ireland. Nobody wants to see a hard border between North and South. If we end up in that position, the only way to avoid that between Northern Ireland and Ireland, even that would be an ad hoc relationship, would be for the Northern Ireland bizarrely to have a hard border with the rest of the United Kingdom, which for a part of a country to have a hard border with another part of the country seems to me to be crazy, but it might be the only way of keeping that island together. As you said yourself earlier, there are certainly Unionists in Northern Ireland who have told me privately and others. I am sure that that would be completely unacceptable for the Unionist community in Northern Ireland. Sure. I can imagine that it would be. I was going to say that they voted for it, but that is not going there. If I could perhaps go back to a point that you made earlier, Mr Martin, when you were talking about the social protection issues, which are in many cases not in devolved areas. We seem to have a consensus that Scotland should be able to negotiate and push in those devolved areas. Social protection employment is not devolved and you suggested that we should now look at transferring those powers to the Scottish Parliament. That was also a point that was raised by Nicola McEwen when she gave evidence to us last week. How quickly do you think that that should happen? As quickly as possible. Again, it is sort of moving beyond the realms of this committee, but my own view is whatever happens post-Brexit, the relationship between Scotland and England has been fractured further than it already was. There is an argument now, if not for independence, at the very least maximum devolution of powers. We need, even beyond the divo max, to post the independence referendum. We need a further movement of powers to Scotland, which is the only way of keeping the relationship workable. I know that many people do not want to keep it workable, but if you want to keep it workable, I think that maximum devolution is now the only option. Scotland clearly has indicated that it has a different set of preferences from the bulk of England, not even the rest of the UK but England. Again, we need to be looking at another constitutional settlement. Among that, Labour and employment laws are a key element. Do you think that you can take your colleagues in the Labour party with you on that? No. I have been desperate to try to walk on eggshells and not be party political here, but I think that you might be surprised that there is a growing movement inside the Labour party that recognises that there is a need for a new relationship, but not everybody agrees with that. At that point, we will end our session. Thank you very much to both our MEPs for giving the evidence, which is an absolutely fascinating session. Unfortunately, we have to close because we cannot be in session when the Parliament is sitting, so we will now close this session. Thank you.