 Thank you. Based on our regular economic and monetary analysis and in line with our forward guidance, the governing council decided to keep the key CB interest rates unchanged. As regards the non-standard monetary policy measures, the asset purchases are proceeding smoothly and continue to have a favorable impact on the cost and availability of credit for firms and households. The governing council has been closely monitoring incoming information since our meeting in early September. While Euro Area Domestic Demand remains resilient, concerns over growth prospects in emerging markets and possible repercussions for the economy from developments in financial and commodity markets continue to signal downside risks to the outlook for growth and inflation. Most notably, the strength and persistence of the factors that are currently slowing the return of inflation to levels below but close to 2% in the medium term require thorough analysis. In this context, the degree of monetary policy accommodation will need to be reexamined at our December monetary policy meeting when the new Euro System staff macroeconomic projections will be available. The governing council is willing and able to act by using all the instruments available within its mandate if warranted in order to maintain an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation. In particular, the governing council recalls that the asset purchase program provides sufficient flexibility in terms of adjusting its size, composition and duration. In the meantime, we will continue to fully implement the monthly asset purchase of 60 billion Euro. These purchases are intended to run until the end of September 2016 or beyond if necessary and in any case until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation rates below but close to 2% over the medium term. Let me now explain our assessment of the available information in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Euro area real GDP increased by 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 2015, following a rise of 0.5% in the previous quarter. The outcome for the second quarter reflected positive contributions from both domestic demand and net exports. The most recent survey indicators point to a broadly similar pace of real GDP growth in the third quarter of the year. Overall, we expect the economic recovery to continue albeit dampened in particular by weaker than expected foreign demand. Domestic demand should be further supported by our monetary policy measures and their favorable impact on financial conditions as well as by the progress made with fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Moreover, the decline in oil prices should provide support for households' real disposable income and corporate profitability and therefore private consumption and investment. However, the recovery in domestic demand in the Euro area continues to be hampered by the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the number of sectors and the sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms. The risk to the Euro-area growth outlook remain on the downside, reflecting in particular the heightened uncertainties regarding developments in emerging market economies, which have the potential to further weigh on global growth and foreign demand for Euro area exports. Increased uncertainty has recently manifested itself in financial market developments which may have negative repercussions for Euro-area domestic demand. According to Eurostat, Euro-area HICP inflation was minus 0.1 in September 2015 down from 0.1 percent in August. Compared with the previous month, this mainly reflects a further decline in energy price inflation. On the basis of the information available and current oil futures prices, annual HICP inflation rates will remain very low in the near term. Annual HICP inflation is expected to rise at the turn of the year, also on account of base effects associated with the falling oil prices in late 2014. Inflation rates are foreseen to pick up further during 2016 and 2017, supported by the expected economic recovery, the past through or past declines in the Euro-exchange rate, and the assumption of somewhat higher oil prices in the years ahead as currently reflected in oil futures markets. However, there are risks stemming from the economic outlook and from financial and commodity market developments which could further slow down the gradual increase in inflation rates towards levels closer to 2 percent. These risks are being closely monitored by the Governing Council. Turning to monetary analysis, recent data confirms solid growth in broad money M3, notwithstanding a decline in the annual growth rate of M3 to 4.8 percent in August 2015 from 5.3 percent in July. Annual growth in M3 continues to be mainly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 11.4 percent in August after 12.2 percent in July. Loan dynamics continue to improve. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations increased to 0.4 percent in August, up from 0.3 percent in July, pursuing its gradual recovery since the beginning of 2014. Despite these improvements, developments in loans to enterprises continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors, and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households increased to 1 percent in August 2015, compared with 0.9 percent in July. The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey for the third quarter of 2015 confirms the increase in demand for bank loans supported by the general level of interest rates, financing needs for investment purposes, and housing market prospects. In addition, credit standards eased further on loans to enterprises, notably due to increasing competitive pressures in retail banking, while tightening somewhat on loans to households for house purchases. Overall, the monetary policy measures we have put in place since June 2014 provide clear support for improvements, both in borrowing conditions for firms and households, and in credit flows across the Euro Area. To sum up, across check of the outcome of the economic analysis with signals coming from the monetary analysis indicates the need to firmly implement the governing council's monetary policy decisions and to monitor closely all relevant incoming information as concerns their impact on the medium-term outlook for price stability. Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium-term, and its accommodative monetary standards supports economic activity. However, in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute decisively. Given continued high structural unemployment and low potential output growth in the Euro Area, the ongoing cyclical recovery should be supported by effective structural policies, in particular actions to improve the business environment, including the provision of adequate public infrastructure, are vital to increase productive investment, boost job creation, and raise productivity. The swift and effective implementation of structural reforms in an environment of accommodative monetary policy will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the Euro Area, but will also raise expectations of permanently higher incomes and accelerate the benefits of reforms, thereby making the Euro Area more resilient to global shocks. Physical policies should support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with EU's fiscal rules. Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Act is crucial for confidence in our fiscal framework. At the same time, all countries should strive for a growth-friendly fiscal composition of fiscal policies. We are now at your disposal for questions. Mr. Corani? Microphones are coming. Just one second. If I could ask you to develop this last point that you made. The Governor last week said that monetary policy may be coming up to its limits, and perhaps it was up to fiscal policy to loosen a little bit to provide a bit of accommodation. Could you share your thoughts on this, and perhaps even touch on the Italian budget? And if I could ask the second question that's regarding December, I'm curious, what will be the triggers? What specific measures will you be looking at in December to make your decision whether to adjust the program? Well, on the first issue, I'm really commenting only on monetary policy, and as we said in the last part of the introductory statement, monetary policy shouldn't be the only game in town, but this can be viewed in a variety of ways. One of which is the way in which our colleague actually explored and examined the situation, but there are other ways. Like saying, for example, as we've said several times, the structural reforms are essential. Here, however, in order to reap the monetary policies focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term, and it's a commentary monetary stance supports economic activity. However, in order to reap the full benefits of our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute decisively. So here, we stress the high structural unemployment and the low potential output growth in the euro area as the main situations which we have to address. The ongoing cyclical recovery should be supported by effective structural policies. But there may be other points of view on this. The point is that monetary policy can support and is actually supporting a cyclical economic recovery. We have to address also the structural components of this recovery so that we can actually move from a cyclical recovery to a structural recovery. Let's not forget that even before the financial crisis, unemployment was being traditionally very high in the euro area, and many of the structural weaknesses have been there before. On your second question, as you might have seen in the introductory statement, there was a very rich discussion about all monetary policy instruments that might be used if warranted. No specific choice has obviously been made yet. So there was a thorough assessment of the situation on which I'll elaborate further following your questions. And the conclusion was that we are ready to act if needed. We will examine all incoming information, and we are open to a whole menu of monetary policy instruments. To this extent, the Governing Council has tasked the relevant committees to work on different monetary policy instruments that could potentially be used to examine the pros and cons of different instruments. In other words, if one has to summarize what was the attitude of the stance of the Governing Council discussion today, one would say that it was not a wait and see, but it was a work and assess. Thank you. Claire Jones, please. Mr. Draghi, just following on from your previous answer, would it be possible for you to elaborate a little on the discussion today about the options that you still think are available to beef up the monetary policy response? And you said in the past that rates, particularly the deposit rate, are now at the zero bound. Is that a statement you'd still stand by, or are rate cuts another potential option available to the Council? Well, let me just report to you on the general lines of our discussion today. First of all, we examined the prospects for firming up of our recovery, and we concluded that the recovery is continuing and is projected to continue at the same pace it had in the second quarter of this year. But we have to distinguish two components, the domestic part of this recovery and the external part. The domestic part has shown resilience, mostly driven by consumption, and the drivers of this recovery are the lower oil prices, also our own our monetary policy, and to some extent the fact that many countries have achieved some progress in fiscal consolidation, so the headwinds coming from fiscal policy would be lower than in the past. To see how important is our monetary policy, consider that the real disposable income and consumption have grown at the same pace, which implies the growth rate of savings has been flat. And this is so because interest rates are so low. So we often complain about interest rates being low for savings, but there's also a positive side to that. On the other hand, we have an external demand, which has shown weakness, mainly for the challenges that emerging market economies are now experiencing, and more particularly China. On the inflation rate side, the picture is, in a sense, less sanguine. We see that inflation, headline inflation will stay low for a protracted period of time. Although, as I just said in the introductory statement, we expect to some pick up because due mostly to base effects and possibly projections of higher oil prices. Having said that, the core inflation is basically stable at 0.9%. When we look at the expectations of inflation, which of course is a very relevant variable for our monetary policy decisions, we see that since our last meeting, short-term inflation expectations have declined, but medium to long-term inflation expectations after some decline following our last meeting have now recovered and are basically unchanged since then. We see that this development is both for market-based inflation expectations and survey-based inflation expectations. However, we see some downside risks, as far as this picture is concerned. The downside risks come from a continuing high output gap, from the possible further fall in oil prices, from the fact that the nominal effective exchange rate is appreciated over the last three or four months, if I'm not mistaken, by 8%. And finally, from the fact that we continue to observe a high degree of correlation between headline inflation and medium-term inflation expectations, which means a high degree of correlation between oil prices and inflation expectations. This is a risk because it could lead to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. We are not saying that these risks are materializing, but these are present, and as I observed in the course of the last meeting, these risks have gone up, and we want to be vigilant, as people used to say in the old times. So on the other hand, we see that credit markets are improving, and we can expand on that in the coming questions. So the overall assessment, as I said, is not a wait-and-see, but it's a work-and-assess. So the governing council is there ready to act if the convergence of our inflation path to 2% in the medium term is pushed back. I think I can stop here. Oh, yes, on the interest rate on the deposit facility. I said before that, I think, I don't know where it was last meeting, or the meeting before that, when I was asked whether it was discussed, I said it was not discussed. This time was discussed. Further lowering of the deposit facility rate was indeed discussed, and it's one of the instruments of monetary policy that I refer to when I said all instruments have been discussed. Brian Blackstone. Brian Blackstone with the Wall Street Journal. You talked about the inflation picture being less sanguine. Can you just explain a little bit more to the public why you think you have to fight so hard against low inflation, especially for lower-middle-income people spending less at the gas station, spending less at the grocery store, is helping their purchasing power? You've said before, people buy more stuff when inflation is low. Why spend all this money on government bonds to fight something that a lot of people would say is a good thing for them and for their budgets? My second question is, is there a risk that the ECB will just kind of fall into a trap of QE without end, that you keep doing it, that you keep buying government bonds? We see it from the Federal Reserve's experience, whether or not they start raising interest rates. Is there a danger that the stimulus keeps going on and on and the markets just come to expect it and that you won't be able to get out? Thank you. Well, let me respond first to your second question. The projections of recovery both in output and inflation are based, are conditional on the full implementation of the QE program as been announced in January and the full implementation of all the credit easing measures that have been announced in the course of 2014. So, we have to continue on that. On the other hand, they were also based on a set of technical assumptions concerning exchange rates, oil prices, external demand, growth in output and so on. To the extent that these conditions change and and possibly worsen, we will have to adjust our QE program or in general our monetary policy stance. I think that's the sense of our discussion about downside risks. Now, on the, on why to fight low inflation. I've discussed this many times. I mean low inflation has on one hand, has a supporting power for real disposable income. On the other hand, it increases real value of debt. It's not, as we've seen, low interest rates promote consumption and it's essential for the recovery of growth and economic activity. That's why we are fighting. But to fight low inflation doesn't mean that we want high inflation. We just won't be complying with our mandate, which is drive the inflation back to close, but below 2% in the medium term. I understand the Vice President may want to add something on the first question. Thank you. Yes, I would like to add something because it's the second or third time that you asked that question. And so let me add something. First, let me remind you that some years ago in the U.S. there was a commission added by an economist called Boskin to examine the measurement of inflation. And the conclusion of the Boskin commission was that the way inflation is measured, in particular the type of indexes that are used, the last pair of indexes, tends to exaggerate the measurement of inflation in the case of the U.S. by 1.5 percentage points. So if the target would be zero, very likely we would be targeting a negative inflation rate. So there is a measurement problem with inflation which justifies that the target for inflation should be above zero. Second point is the point that the President just reminded you about debt deflation. And when there is a situation of in-depthness, when inflation is very low, the burden of servicing the debt increases and that is very detrimental to the economy. The third point is that with very low inflation or negative inflation, the real interest rate increases. And when the nominal rate cannot go very below zero, it means that the interest rate in real terms may be why above the equilibrium real interest rates that would equal savings to investments at the level of full employment. So that's another reason why negative inflation rates can be very detrimental. And then there are the deflation risks. Real deflation, not what you implied in your question, because to have negative inflation a few months is not a deflation situation. A deflation situation is a situation of prolonged, meaning more than one year, of negative inflation. And in that case, you have two phenomenon. You have an increase in real wages because there is rigidity in nominal wages to go negative. So you will constrain supply, profits of firms, and you eat growth. And second, there is also then in such a situation a problem of consumers postponing their expenditure. If deflation lasts long enough when we are talking about real deflation, not just a few months of negative inflation. So there is a host of reasons why central banks fight deflation, why they spend money as you implied. And by the way, just reminding you there is not just one way of central banks spending money to fight low inflation. We, as other central banks, purchase securities. The Swiss central bank purchases foreign exchange in order to defend the level of the exchange rate that they want and they have a balance sheet, which is higher than ours in relation to the respective GDP. Thank you. Mr. President, first of all, I would like to ask you a question on what you said on the deposit rate that it could be lowered further. Could you explain a bit more the reasoning behind these discussions, how it could work? And also you had said that the rates were effectively at a lower bound. So how would this measure up? How would you explain this move to the markets? And second question is if you were to expand QE, do you feel there might be risks that you run into scarcity that might be that you might have to extend the pool of purchasable assets? Thank you. Thank you. On the first question, we touched lower bound, but also, and this, my answer is also linked to the previous question, when we are at zero, practically zero nominal rates, the real rates are being driven by the expectation of inflation. So lower expectations of inflation implying, and this is an answer to Brian Blackstone before, that's why we fight low, I mean negative expectation of inflation. Whenever expectation of inflation become more and more negative, we have higher and higher real rates. That's why, that's one of the reasons why we consider other non-standard monetary policy measures, one of which is the rate, the negative rate on the deposit facility. So there we've decided, we've seen that, we've decided a year ago that that would be the lower bound, then we've seen the experience of other countries, and now we are thinking about that. We haven't, I should say, we've not taken any decision on that. It was an open discussion on all the monetary policies. We've discussed many other or some other policy, monetary policy instruments besides this one. On the scarcity, I mean I've been asked this question many times. We haven't seen yet this scarcity. Let me say that also the fact that the ECB now is a constant, the system of central banks is a constant source of demand on the markets. This is helping market makers to show their big prices, and this by itself increases liquidity. Also we are not chasing bonds that we know are less available. That's also another thing. And let's not forget that the ECB is also lending bonds to the market makers and to market participants. It was also increasing liquidity. But as I've said many times, we stand ready to adjust the design of our asset purchase program according to the needs and when and if needed. Thank you. Ms MacDonald? The governing council today met in a member state where the GDP growth is actually 5.2% in the second quarter. Inflation is 1.6% and unemployment is 5.4%. It's an economic situation that is actually very similar to the one that we see in Germany. So you've got the biggest company, a country and one of the smallest countries performing similarly and all the ones in the middle are ranging quite differently and struggling despite the accommodative stance of ECB. Is this something to do with structural change and what insights will you be taking back to Frankfurt after mortar for your future policy deliberations? On this question I'd like to give the floor to Governor Bonicci. But first let me say one thing about the other countries, why we observe this difference. You're absolutely right. One of the most important differences is the degree of implementation of structural reforms in different parts of the Euro area. But there are also other considerations. There are different cyclical positions. There's a different exposure to external shocks. For example, if a large export market were to experience a recession, this would reverberate in a different way according to the different countries and different exports they have to this part of the world. What sort of economic policy different countries have undertaken to adjust to their macroeconomic imbalances previously that they had previous before the crisis? That's also one other consideration. Also what is the sort that's probably one of the most important differences across the Euro area is what is the degree of in-depthness? Both in the public sector and in the private sector of different countries. It's quite clear that high stock of debt hamper growth. So how to get rid of these different ways to decrease the in-depthness also have different implications. I would like to give the floor to Governor Bonici as far as also the specific experience of the Maltese economy is concerned. Well, as the president has said, in fact, structural change has a lot to do with the performance of an economy. And the Maltese economy has gone through quite a significant structural change over the years, which has enabled the economy to be much more resilient and dynamic. So new sectors develop as all sectors fall by the wayside. I think also that the impact of the QE on the asset purchase program, it has on a country that has exports of goods and services of 150 percent of GDP on the exchange rate. The exchange rate is also very important for a small economy. So from tourism to exports of goods, these are positively influenced. And perhaps also one needs to look at the space, the fiscal space the government has. The deficit has been coming down. The public sector debt is just above the EU average. And all these factors give you more space for an economy to be able to expand in some ways similar to Germany, too, which also has a similar scenario. Thank you, Mario Blaszczak, World Business Press. President Dragim, you stressed that the emerging market development is a worry for the governing council in terms of the growth outlook. How would you judge if China slowed down to 4.5, not 6.9 percent, and how big of a threat is that for the inflation outlook, not for the growth outlook, and how big threat for the inflation outlook is the resilient exchange rate of the euro? That's the first question. The second one, the last part of your introductory statement, you mentioned the structural reforms. This is a repetitive point you are making. Structural reforms are very important for countries, and just yesterday the Eurostat pointed out that the level of the government debt in the euro area countries is growing. And that only small countries, only three countries actually fulfill the master criteria. So what would you say, what would be your comment on that? Thank you. Thank you. The first question is quite important. There are two ways to respond. One is to look at different channels of propagation of what happens in China towards the euro area. And then there's a different way. Well, let me first explore this way. First of all, we have, we look at all these channels, namely direct trade channel or indirect trade. Direct trade channel, the conclusion is the exposure of the euro area to Chinese economy is not very significant. After all the exports of the euro area to China are 6 percent of the total. However, there are some countries where such a figure is higher and reaches 10 percent, the case of Germany. Still it's not, I would say it's not exceptional. The second is so-called indirect channels where you have also to account for the changes in oil prices and commodity prices that a higher recession in China would imply. The third channel is the financial channel. And again, we see not a very significant exposure of the euro area towards China. But then there is another channel which is the confidence channel. We think that so far the, what happens, the growth in China hasn't affected confidence in the rest of the world and more specifically the euro area. The latest meetings in Lima, at the latest meetings in Lima, the IMF confirmed the growth projections for this year as far as China is concerned, which are above 6 percent. So this is not, I mean, your perspective is not something that it's on the screens now. Of course, any very large surprise in a very large economy might have the potential to affect confidence worldwide. And then we would have to see in which way and how to cope with that. The second question was about, oh, by the way, the other thing is, the other dimension to this is when we say that it concerns the effect of lower oil prices on our economies in general, we've been saying several times that most of the reasons why oil prices are low have to do with supply conditions and the demand conditions play only a minor role. Now, recent analysis suggests that we should be more cautious about this because to the extent that the investment in oil production had been geared in the past on the basis of the projections of demand, which turned out later to be less than expected, this is also a demand-induced oil price shock and has different consequences on inflation and inflation expectations than it would if it were supply shocks which were supply determined. I think I've answered your questions. Thank you. I also try to ask about the channel, how strong is the channel of the exchange rate for the inflation projections, medium term projections? Regardless of what happens in China. Of course, one of the downsides I mentioned before, one of the downside risks to our inflation projections comes from the exchange rate. As I've said before, the nominal effective exchange rate has been appreciating over the last few months, four or five months to a somewhat significant level. But let me restate, the exchange rate is not a policy target for the ECB, it's never been, it's not now. However, it's significant, as I've just said, for price stability and for growth. Thank you. Mr. Toussaint, Mr. Toussaint. Benoît Toussaint from the Agence France-Presse. Mr. Draghi, you told us today that there is an open discussion in the governing council about the possible next step from the ECB and you told us that no decision has been made so far. Did you already see maybe a form of preference among the governors or maybe specific opposition regarding the option the ECB could use, should it become necessary to bolder its policy, a form of preference or a specific opposition regarding the option the ECB could use? And the second question, could you tell us if there was a discussion today for acting today? You said that a new rates cut was discussed today. I'd be interested to know if you could elaborate a bit more on the argument raised for postponing an action to the next meeting. Thank you. Well, the answer to the first question is no. There was no explicit preference towards one instrument or another instrument. All of them were considered. Let me add one thing that as far as the possible changes in the possible cuts in the rate on the deposit facility, the issue there is how come that we have announced a year ago that that was practically the zero lower bound and now we are thinking of going into further negative territory. Well, let me state quite clearly that the credibility of a central bank is measured by its ability to comply with its mandate and to this extent any instrument could be potentially used. Given the conditions prevailing a year ago, that was a statement. Today things have changed, but this doesn't necessarily imply that we are going to use this instrument. The discussion was wide open. But let me cope with this credibility argument immediately. Second, I would say there were a few, few, few members of the governing council which hinted at the possibility of acting today. But I wouldn't say it was a prevailing theme of our discussion today. Mr. Jacoush? Klaus Rana Jacoush, the German television, Mr. President, may allow me to touch again on the issue of structural reforms. Unfortunately, not all countries take it as seriously to act on its men. I like the country in at the moment. Would you rule so far to say that if structural reforms are not taken more seriously and more strident by the relevant governments, QE won't be able to fulfill its total amount, will not be able to so successful as you would like to be. And if this is so, my second question, does it make any sense then to adjust QE or even to expand it? Thank you. Thank you. No, I never said that QE would not yield its benefits if there were no structural reforms. I would say that structural reforms would transform what is a cyclical recovery caused produced amongst other factors by our monetary policy into a structural recovery later on. It's quite apparent that the monetary policy measures that we've been undertaking over the last year and a half, two years especially, but even before, have significantly improved the financial markets and the credit markets and the money markets. And now it's time when we see these improvements being translated into a recovery which is resilient, especially in its domestic component. So no doubts whatsoever about the effectiveness of our monetary policy regardless of whether the structural reforms have been implemented or not. And we also add that we shouldn't have a too negative picture of why, of how structural reforms have been, because there has been some progress in many, in several of our countries about that. It's not that countries didn't do anything. So more can be done. There's room for improvement, but quite a few reforms have been undertaken in several of our Euro-era countries. Thank you. Mr. Grima? Is there concern in the governing council that the asset purchase program could be insufficient to create the conditions that support growth and avoid the threat of deflation? Well, our judgment today is that the monetary stance that has been designed with all, with the monetary policy measures announced in January, with the credit easy measures announced in the course of 2014, is essential for producing recovery in output and the convergence of inflation towards the objective of being below but close to 2% over the medium term. These objectives are predicated on the full implementation of this monetary policy. That's the current assessment. However, if we were to see that the technical assumptions underlying these projections have worsened, or the downside risks are increasing and further on materializing, we may well change the size, the composition, the design of all our monetary policy instruments as needed. Yes, Mr. Merly? Alessandro Merlio, with only 24 ore. Could you comment on the possible political uncertainty in Spain and Portugal, and if that could derail the process of reform that you've alluded to so many times today? And is it a worry for the ECB, the fact that some of the parties that may be called to form a government, especially in Portugal, reject the euro? Well, the answer is no. I can't comment. But a more gentle way of saying no would be the following. Uncertainty for economics is bad. It's bad for consumption. It's bad for investment. Political uncertainty, however, is part of democracy. Thank you. Ms. Lee? Thank you. I have two questions. The Chinese President Xi Jinping is currently paying a state visit to the United Kingdom. What are the positive effects that this visit will bring to the trade between China and Europe? And what's your expectation on the further development of economic relationships between China and Europe in the future? Thank you. I mean, I just can't comment on this. These are political statements. What are the positive effects that you think that China and Europe in the economic relationships, what are the further developments do you expect? I think China is a very significant partner of the euro area and will remain so, and if anything, will become a stronger and stronger economic partner of the euro area in the future. Mr. Sunaga? Thank you very much, Mr. Draghi. How do you assess the economic impact from the emission scandal of Hong Kong again to the full eurozone economy? Thank you very much. Thank you. My answer is going to be very short. It's very, very early to say. There will be a time when we'll have a full visibility on the economic impact, but it's very, very early to say it now. Mr. Ryan? President Draghi, Peter Ryan from ABC Australia. I wanted to see if the Government and Council had any discussion or views on the migrant crisis and how that's been on the migrant crisis, and what potential impact that would have, depending on the decisions made on potential resettlement in Europe. Thank you. There was a brief discussion on the migrants. It was very brief because it's very, very early to say what the impact could be on the eurozone economy. We are at the time when we can only make inferences really from standard economic thinking. It's clearly a very significant increase in labor supply. However, there's also probably need of significant investments in the labor, in this increase in labor supply, and also how these public investments in knowledge, education, and so on are going to be financed. It's also going to make a big difference. So, I would say it's very early to have, as I said before, on occasion, a different question. It's very early to have full visibility on the economic consequence of this phenomenon, and even more so to have, to know what impact this might have on our monetary policy decisions. The key important thing, however, is that we are, we're going to cope. We should be able to cope successfully with this humanitarian crisis of unprecedented size. Give the final question to Mr. Forel. Yes, President Draghi, earlier we had Governor Bonicci's take on how Malta is doing. I would like to ask for your opinion as president about how Malta is doing financially and economically and the way it's implementing its policies and how Malta is following the advice and the guidelines brought forward by the ECB. I'm sorry to say, but I'll revert again to Governor Bonicci for an answer to this question. But this, I'm saying this not because I want to avoid the answer, but I think because he's the most fully qualified for answering this question. Please. Thank you. Well, Malta is following the asset purchase program. It's right on target. And basically, also when you read the press release that we've issued about structural change and the need to have growth-friendly fiscal policy, I think it's on the right track. There is the type of fiscal policy that is reducing the debt. It's forecasted next year to be 1.1 percent of GDP. And I think that is pretty good. At the same time, the debt burden is going down and the expenditure is going into areas from education to other areas that essentially improve the quality of the labor supply. So, in general, Malta is, I think, performing reasonably well for its own future. It's a good performance. Thank you. So we will now close the press conference and we'll actually take the multi-spirit with us. For all of you traveling to Frankfurt, we'll start with the cultural days, featuring Malta as of November. So we'll take the spirit with us. Thank you very much. Bye-bye.