 3rd Book, Chapter 1 of the Social Contracts This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 3rd Book, Chapter 1. 3rd Book Before speaking of the different forms of government, let us try to fix the precise meaning of that word, which has not yet been very clearly explained. Chapter 1. Government in general. I warn the reader that this chapter must be read carefully, and that I do not know the art of making myself intelligible to those that will not be attentive. Every free action has two causes concurring to produce it. The one moral, that is to say the will which determines the act. The other physical, that is to say the power which executes it. When I walk toward an object, I must first will to go to it. In the second place, my feet must carry me to it. Should a paralytic wish to run, or an active man not wish to do so, both will remain where they are. The body politic has the same motive powers. In it likewise, force and will are distinguished, the letter under the name of legislative power, the former under the name of executive power. Nothing is, or ought to be, done in it without their cooperation. We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. On the other hand, it is easy to see from the principles already established that the executive power cannot belong to the people generally as legislative or sovereign, because that power is exerted only in particular acts, which are not within the province of the law, nor consequently within that of the sovereign, all the acts of which must be laws. The public force then requires a suitable agent to concentrate it and put it in action according to the directions of the general will, to serve as a means of communication between the state and the sovereign, to effect in some manner in the public person what the union of soul and body effects in a man. This is, in the state, the function of the government, improperly confounded with the sovereign of which it is only the minister. What then is the government? An intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and with the maintenance of liberty both civil and political. The members of this body are called magistrates, or kings, that is, governors. And the body as a whole bears the name of prince. Those therefore who maintain that the act by which a people submits to its chiefs is not a contract are quite right. It is absolutely nothing but a commission, an employment in which as simple officers of the sovereign they exercise in its name the power of which it has made them depositaries and which it can limit, modify and resume when it pleases. The alienation of such a right, being incompatible with the nature of the social body, is contrary to the object of the association. Consequently I give the name government, or supreme administration, to the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and that of prince, or magistrate, to the man or body charged with that administration. It is in the government that I have found the intermediate powers, the relations of which constitute the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the sovereign to the state. This last relation can be represented by that of the extremes of a continued proportion, of which the mean proportional is the government. The government receives from the sovereign the commands which it gives to the people, and in order that the state may be in stable equilibrium it is necessary, everything being balanced, that there should be equality between the product, or the power of the government taken by itself, and the product or the power of the citizens, who are sovereign in the one aspect, and subjects in the other. Further we could not alter any of the three terms without at once destroying the proportion. If the sovereign wishes to govern, or if the magistrate wishes to legislate, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder succeeds order, force and will no longer act in concert, and the state being dissolved falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is but one mean proportional between each relation, there is only one good government possible in a state. But as a thousand events may change the relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but for the same people at different times. To try and give an idea of the different relations that may exist between these two extremes I will take for an example the number of the people as a relation most easy to express. Let us suppose that the state is composed of ten thousand citizens. The sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body, but every private person in his capacity of subject is considered as an individual. Therefore the sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand is to one, that is each member of the state has as his share only one ten thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is entirely subjected to it. If the nation consists of a hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects does not change and each alike is subjected to the whole authority of the laws while his vote reduced to one hundred thousandth has ten times less influence in their enactment. The subject then, always remaining a unit, the proportional power of the sovereign increases in the ratio of the number of the citizens. Whence it follows that the more the state is enlarged, the more does liberty diminish? When I say that the proportional power increases, I mean that it is farther removed from equality. Therefore, the greater the ratio is in the geometrical sense, the less is the ratio and the common acceptation. In the former, the ratio, considered according to quantity, is measured by the exponent, and in the other, considered according to identity, it is estimated by the similarity. Now the less the particular wills correspond with the general will, that is, customs with laws, the more should the repressive power be increased. The government then, in order to be effective, should be relatively stronger in proportion as the people are more numerous. On the other hand, as the aggrandizement of the state gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and more opportunities to abuse their power, the more force should the government have to restrain the people, and the more should the sovereign have in its turn to restrain the government. I do not speak here of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the state. It follows from this double ratio that the continued proportion between the sovereign, the prince and the people is not an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follows further that one of the extremes, that is to say the people, as subject, being fixed and represented by unity, whenever the double ratio increases or diminishes, the single ratio increases or diminishes in like manner. And consequently the middle term is changed. This shows that there is no unique and absolute constitution of government, but that there may be as many governments different in nature as there are states different in size. If for the sake of turning this system to ridicule, it should be said that in order to find this mean proportional and form the body of the government, it is according to me only necessary to take the square root of the number of the people. I should answer that I take that number here only as an example, that the ratios of which I speak are not measured only by the number of men, but in general by the quantity of action, which results from the combination of multitudes of causes. That moreover, if for the purpose of expressing myself in fewer words, I borrow for a moment geometrical terms, I am nevertheless aware that geometrical precision has no place in moral quantities. The government is on a small scale what the body politic, which includes it, is on a large scale. It is a moral person, endowed with certain faculties, active like the sovereign, passive like the state, and it can be resolved into other similar relations, from which arises as a consequence a new proportion, and yet another within this, according to the order of the magistracies, until we come to an indivisible middle term, that is to a single chief or supreme magistrate who may be represented in the middle of this progression as unity between the series of fractions and that of the whole numbers. Without embarrassing ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us be content to consider the government as a new body in the state, distinct from the people and from the sovereign, and intermediate between the two. There is this essential difference between those two bodies that the state exists by itself, while the government exists only through the sovereign. Thus the dominant will of the princes, or wrought to be, only the general will or the law. Its force is only the public force concentrated in itself. So soon as it wishes to perform of itself some absolute and independent act, the connection of the whole begins to be relaxed. If, lastly, the prince should chance to have a particular will more reactive than that of the sovereign, and if to enforce obedience to this particular will, it should employ the public force which is in its hands in such a manner that there would be, so to speak, two sovereigns, the one de jure and the other de facto, the social union would immediately disappear, and the body politic would be dissolved. Further, in order that the body of the government may have an existence, a real life to distinguish it from the body of the state, in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfill the object for which it is instituted, a particular personality is necessary to it, a feeling common to its members, a force, a will of its own tending to its preservation. This individual existence supposes assemblies, councils, a power of deliberating and resolving, rights, titles and privileges, which belong to the prince exclusively, and which render the position of the magistrate more honourable in proportion as it is more adious. The difficulty lies in the method of disposing within the whole this subordinate whole, in such a way that it may not weaken the general constitution in strengthening its own, that its particular force intended for its own preservation may always be kept distinct from the public force designed for the preservation of the state, and in a word that it may always be ready to sacrifice the government to the people and not the people to the government. Moreover, although the artificial body of the government is the work of another artificial body and has in some respects only a derivative and subordinate existence, that does not prevent it from acting with more or less vigor or celerity, from enjoying, so to speak, more or less robust health. Lastly, without directly departing from the object for which it was instituted, it may deviate from it more or less according to the manner in which it is constituted. From all these differences arise the different relations which the government must have with the body of the state, so as to accord with the accidental and particular relations by which the state itself is modified. For often the government that is best in itself will become the most vicious, unless its relations are changed, so as to meet the defects of the body politic to which it belongs. End of chapter 1. Third book, chapter 2 of the social contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Third book, chapter 2. The principle which constitutes the different forms of government. To explain the general cause of these differences, I must here distinguish the prince from the government, as I before distinguished the state from the sovereign. The body of the magistracy may be composed of a greater or less number of members. We said that the ratio of the sovereign to the subjects was so much greater as the people were more numerous, and by an evident analogy we can say the same of the government with regard to the magistrates. Now the total force of the government being always that of the state does not vary. Whence it follows that the more it employs this force on its own members, the less remains for operating upon the whole people. Consequently, the more numerous the magistrates are, the weaker is the government. As this maxim is fundamental, let us endeavor to explain it more clearly. We can distinguish in the person of the magistrate three wills essentially different. First, the will peculiar to the individual, which tends only to his personal advantage. Secondly, the common will of the magistrates, which has reference solely to the advantage of the prince, and which may be called the corporate will, being general in relation to the government, and particular in relation to the state of which the government forms part. In the third place, the will of the people, or the sovereign will, which is general both in relation to the state considered as the whole, and in relation to the government considered as part of the whole. In a perfect system of legislation, the particular or individual will should be inoperative. The corporate will proper to the government quite subordinate, and consequently the general or sovereign will always dominant, and the sole rule of all the rest. On the other hand, according to the natural order, these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated. Thus the general will is always the weakest. The corporate will has the second rank, and the particular will the first of all, so that in the government each member is firstly himself, next a magistrate, and then a citizen, a gradation directly opposed to that which the social order requires. But suppose that the whole government is in the hands of a single man, then the particular will and the corporate will are perfectly united, and consequently the letter is in the highest possible degree of intensity. Now, as it is on the degree of will that the exertion of force depends, and as the absolute power of the government does not vary, it follows that the most active government is that of a single person. On the other hand, let us unite the government with the legislative authority, let us make the sovereign the prince, and all the citizens magistrates. Then the corporate will, confounded with the general will, will have no more activity than the latter, and will leave the particular will in all its force. Thus the government, always with the same absolute force, will be at its minimum of relative force or activity. These relations are incontestable, and other considerations serve still further to confirm them. We see, for example, that each magistrate is more active in his body than each citizen is in his, and that consequently the particular will has much more influence in the acts of government than in those of the sovereign. For every magistrate is almost always charged with some function of government, whereas each citizen, taken by himself, has no function of sovereignty. Besides, the more a state extends, the more is its real force increased, although it does not increase in proportion to its extent. But while the state remains the same, it is useless to multiply magistrates. For the government acquires no greater real force, inasmuch as this force is that of the state, the quantity of which is always uniform. Thus the relative force or activity of the government diminishes without its absolute or real force being able to increase. It is certain, moreover, that the dispatch of business is retarded in proportion as more people are charged with it, that in laying too much stress on prudence, we leave too little to fortune, that opportunities are allowed to pass by, and that owing to excessive deliberation, the fruits of deliberation are often lost. I have just shown that the government is weakened in proportion to the multiplication of magistrates, and I have before demonstrated that the more numerous the people are, the more wrought the repressive force to be increased. Whence it follows that the ratio between the magistrates and the government ought to be inversely as the ratio between the subjects and the sovereign? That is, the more the state is enlarged, the more should the government contract, so that the number of chiefs should diminish in proportion as the number of the people is increased. But I speak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of its rectitude. For, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy is, the more does the corporate will approach the general will. Whereas, under a single magistrate, this same corporate will is, as I have said, only a particular will. Thus, what is lost on one side can be gained on the other, and the art of the legislator consists of knowing how to fix the point where the force and will of the government, always in reciprocal proportion, are combined in the ratio most advantageous to the state. Chapter II Book III, Chapter III of The Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rosso. Book III, Chapter III. Classification of Governments We have seen in the previous chapter why the different kinds or forms of government are distinguished by the number of members that compose them. It remains to be seen in the present chapter how this division is made. The sovereign may, in the first place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people, but to the greater part of the people, in such a way that there may be more citizens who are magistrates than simple individual citizens. We call this form of government democracy, or it may confine the government to a small number so that there may be more ordinary citizens than magistrates, and this form bears the name of aristocracy. Lastly, it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all the rest derive their power. This third form is the most common and is called monarchy, or royal government. We should remark that all these forms, or at least the first two, admit of degrees, and may indeed have a considerable range, for democracy may embrace the whole people or be limited to a half. Aristocracy in its turn may restrict itself from a half of the people to the smallest number indeterminately. Royalty even is susceptible of some division. Fata, by its constitution, always had two kings, and in the Roman Empire there were as many as eight emperors at once without it being possible to say that the empire was divided. Thus there is a point at which each form of government blends with the next, and we see that, under three denominations only, the government is really susceptible of as many different forms as a state has citizens. There is more, this same government being in certain respects capable of sub-division into other parts, one administered in one way, another in another. There may result from combinations of these three forms a multitude of mixed forms, each of which can be multiplied by all the simple forms. In all ages there has been much discussion about the best form of government, without consideration of the fact that each of them is the best in certain cases, and the worst in others. If in the different states the number of the supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to that of the citizens, it follows that, in general, democratic government is suitable to small states, aristocracy to those of moderate size, and monarchy to large ones. This rule follows immediately from the principle. But how is it possible to estimate the multitude of circumstances which may furnish exceptions? End of chapter 3, book 3. Book 3, chapter 4 of the social contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon. The social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Book 4. Democracy. He that makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be executed and interpreted. It would seem, then, that there could be no better constitution than one in which the executive power is united with the legislative. But it is that very circumstance which makes a democratic government inadequate in certain respects, because things which ought to be distinguished are not, and because the prince and the sovereign, being the same person, only form as it were, a government without government. It is not expedient that he who makes the laws should execute them, nor that the body of the people should divert its attention from general considerations in order to bestow it on particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the infallible result of the pursuit of private interests. For when the status changed in its substance, all reform becomes impossible. A people which would never abuse the government would likewise never abuse its independence. A people which always governed well would not need to be governed. In the term in its strict sense, there never has existed, and never will exist, any true democracy. It is contrary to the natural order that the majority should govern, and that the minority should be governed. It is impossible to imagine that the people should remain in perpetual assembly to attend to public affairs, and that it is easily apparent that commissions could not be established for that purpose without the form of administration being changed. In fact, I think I can lay down as a principle that when the functions of government are shared among several magistracies, the least numerous acquire, sooner or later, the greatest authority, if only on account of the facility in transacting business, which naturally leads them on to that. Moreover, how many things difficult to combine does not this government presuppose? First, a very small state in which the people may be readily assembled, and in which every citizen can easily know all the rest. Secondly, great simplicity of manners, which prevents a multiplicity of affairs and thorny discussions. Next, considerable equality in rank and fortune, without which equality and rights and authority could not long subsist. Lastly, little or no luxury. For luxury is either the effect of wealth or renders it necessary. It corrupts both the rich and the poor. The former by possession, the latter by covetousness. It betrays the country to effeminacy and vanity. It deprives the state of all its citizens in order to subject them one to another, and all to opinion. That is why a famous author has assigned virtue as the principle of a republic, for all these conditions could not subsist without virtue. But through not making the necessary distinctions, this brilliant genius has often lacked precision and sometimes clearness, and has not seen that the sovereign authority being everywhere the same, the same principle ought to have a place in every well-constituted state, in a greater or less degree it is true according to the form of government. Let us add that there is no government so subject to civil wars and internal agitation as a democratic or popular, because there is none which tends so strongly and so constantly to change its form, none which demands more vigilance and courage to be maintained in its own form. It is especially in this constitution that the citizen should arm himself with strength and steadfastness, and say every day of his life from the bottom of his heart what a virtuous palatine said in the diet of Poland, malo percolosum libertatum come quietum servitium. If there were a nation of gods, it would be governed democratically. So perfect a government is unsuited to men. End of Chapter 4, Book 3. Book 3, Chapter 5 of The Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. We have here two moral persons quite distinct, that is, the government and the sovereign, and consequently two general wills, the one having reference to all the citizens, the other only to the members of the administration. Thus, although the government can regulate its internal policy as it pleases, it can never speak to the people except in the name of the sovereign, that is, in the name of the people themselves. This must never be forgotten. The earliest societies were aristocratically governed. The heads of families deliberated among themselves about public affairs. The young men yielded readily to the authority of experience. Hence the names priests, elders, senate, geronses. The savages of North America are still governed in this way at the present time and are very well governed. But in proportion as the inequality due to institutions prevailed over natural inequality, wealth or power was preferred to age and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the power transmitted with the father's property to the children, rendering the family's petition, made the government hereditary, and there were senators only twenty years old. There are then three kinds of aristocracy, natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only suitable for simple nations. The third is the worst of all governments. The second is the best. It is aristocracy properly so-called. Besides the advantage of the distinction between the two powers, aristocracy has that of the choice of its members. For in a popular government all the citizens are borne magistrates, but this one limits them to a small number and they become magistrates by election only, a method by which property, intelligence, experience and all other grounds of preference and public esteem are so many fresh guarantees that men will be wisely governed. Further, assemblies are more easily converged. Affairs are better discussed and are dispatched with greater order and diligence, while the credit of the state is better maintained abroad by venerable senators than by an unknown or despised multitude. In a word it is the best and most natural order of things that the wisest should govern in the multitude when we are sure that they will govern it for its advantage and not for their own. We should not uselessly multiply means, nor do with twenty thousand men what a hundred chosen men can do still better, but we must observe that the corporate interest begins here to direct the public force in a less degree according to the rule of the general will, and that another inevitable propensity deprives the laws of a part of the executive power. With regard to special experiences, a state must not be so small, nor are people so simple and upright that the execution of the laws should follow immediately upon the public will as in a good democracy. Nor again must a nation be so large that the chief men who are dispersed in order to govern it can set up a sovereigns each in its own province and begin by making themselves independent so as at last to become masters. But if aristocracy requires a few virtues less than popular government it requires also others that are peculiarly its own such as moderation among the rich and contentment among the poor, for a rigorous equality would seem to be out of place in it and was not even observed in Sparta. Besides if this form of government comports with a certain inequality of fortune it is expedient in general that the administration of public affairs should be entrusted to those that are best able to devote their whole time to it but not as Aristotle maintains that the rich should always be preferred. On the contrary it is important that an opposite choice should sometimes teach the people that there are immense personal merits, reasons for preference, more important than wealth. End of chapter 5, book 3, book 3, chapter 6 of the social contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Anna Simon. The social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Third book, chapter 6, monarchy. We have hitherto considered the prince as a moral and collective person united by the force of the laws and as a depository of the executive power in the state. We have now to consider this power concentrated in the hands of a natural person, of a real man who alone has a right to dispose of it according to the laws. He is what is called a monarch or a king. Quite the reverse of the other forms of administration in which a collective being represents an individual, in this one an individual represents a collective being, so that the moral unity that constitutes it is at the same time a physical unity in which all the powers that the law combines in the other with so much effort are combined naturally. Thus the will of the people, the will of the prince, the public force of the state and the particular force of the government all obey the same mode of power, all the springs of the machine are in the same hand. Everything works for the same end. There are no opposite movements that counteract one another, and no kind of constitution can be imagined in which a more considerable action is produced with less effort. Archimedes, quietly seated on the shore and launching without difficulty a large vessel, represents to me a skillful monarch governing from his cabinet his vast states, and while he appears motionless setting everything in motion. But if there is no government which has more vigor there is none in which the particular will has more sway and more easily governs others. Everything works for the same end it is true, but this end is not the public welfare and the very power of the administration turns continually to the prejudice of the state. Princes wish to be absolute, and from afar men cry to them and the best way to become so is to make themselves beloved by their people. This maxim is very fine and also very true in certain respects. Unfortunately it will always be ridiculed in courts. Power which springs from the affections of the people is doubtless the greatest but it is precarious and conditional. Princes will never be satisfied with it. The best kings wish to have the power of being wicked if they please without seizing to be masters. A political preacher will tell them in vain that the strength of the people being their own it is their greatest interest that the people should be flourishing, numerous and formidable. They know very well that that is not true. Their personal interest is in the first place that the people should be weak and miserable and should never be able to resist them. Even all the subjects always perfectly submissive. I admit that it would then be the prince's interest that the people should be powerful in order that this power being his own might render him formidable to his neighbours. But as this interest is only secondary and subordinate and as the two suppositions are incompatible it is natural that princes should always give preference to the maxim which is most immediately useful to them. It is this that Samuel strongly represented to the Hebrews. It is this that Machiavelli clearly demonstrated. While pretending to give lessons to kings he gave great ones to peoples. The prince of Machiavelli is the book of Republicans. We are found by general considerations that monarchy is suited only to large states and we shall find this again by examining monarchy itself. The more numerous the public administrative body is the more the ratio of the prince of the subjects diminish and approach equality so that this ratio is unity or equality even in a democracy. This same ratio increases in proportion as the government contracts and is at its maximum when the government is in the hands of a single person. Then the distance between the prince and the people is too great and the state lacks cohesion. In order to unify it then intermediate orders, princes, grandees and nobles are required to fill them. Now nothing at all of this kind is proper for a small state which would be ruined by all these orders. But if it is difficult for a great state to be well governed it is much more so for it to be well governed by a single man and everyone knows what happens when the king appoints deputies. One essential and inevitable defect which will always render a monarchical government inferior to a republican one is that in the letter the public voice hardly ever raises to the highest posts any but enlightened and capable men who fill them honorably. Whereas those who succeed in monarchies are most frequently only petty mischief makers, petty naves, petty intrigers whose petty talents which enable them to attain high posts in courts only serve to show the public their inaptitude as soon as they have attained them. The people are much less mistaken about their choice than the princes and the man of real merit is almost as rare in a royal ministry as a fool at the head of a republican government. Therefore, when by some fortunate chance one of these born rulers takes the helm of affairs in a monarchy almost wrecked by such a fine set of ministers, it is quite astonishing what resources he finds and his accession to power forms an epoch in a country. In order that a monarchical state might be well governed it would be necessary that its greatness or extent should be proportioned to the abilities of him that governs. It is easier to conquer than to rule. With a sufficient lever the world may be moved by a finger, but as supported the shoulders of Hercules are required. Whatever small the state may be the prince is almost always too small for it. When on the contrary it happens that the state is too small for its chief, which is very rare, it is still badly governed because the chief always pursuing his own great designs forgets the interests of the people and renders them no less unhappy by the abuse of his transcendent abilities than an inferior chief by his lack of talent. It would be necessary, so to speak, that a kingdom should be enlarged or contracted in every reign according to the capacity of the prince, whereas the talents of a senate having more definite limits the state may have permanent boundaries and the administration prosper equally well. The most obvious inconvenience of the government of a single person is the lack of that uninterrupted succession which forms in the two others a continuous connection. One king being dead, another is necessary. These leave dangerous intervals, they are stormy and unless the citizens are of a disinterestedness, an integrity which this government hardly admits of, intrigue and corruption intermingle with it. It would be hard for a man to whom the state has been sold not to sell it in his turn and indemnify himself out of the helpless for the money which the powerful have extorted from him. Sooner or later everything becomes venal under such an administration, and the peace which is then enjoyed under a king is worse than a disorder of an interregnum. What has been done to prevent these evils? Crowns have been made hereditary in certain families, and an order of succession has been established which prevents any dispute on the demise of kings, that is to say, the inconvenience of regencies being substituted for that of elections, an appearance of tranquility has been preferred to a wise administration, and men have preferred to risk having as their chiefs, children, monsters and imbeciles rather than have a dispute about the choice of good kings. They have not considered that in thus exposing themselves to the risk of this alternative they put almost all the chances against themselves. That was a very sensible answer of Dionysius the Younger, to whom his father, in reproaching him with a dishonorable action, said, Have I set you the example in this? Ah! replied the son, your father was not a king. All things conspire to deprive of justice and reason a man brought up to govern others. Much trouble is taken, so it is said, to teach young princes the art of reigning. This education does not appear to profit them. It would be better to begin by teaching them the art of obeying. The greatest kings that history has celebrated were not trained to rule. That is a science which men are never less masters of than after excessive study of it, and it is better acquired by obeying than by ruling. Nam utulissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarmqu reerum delectus, co-guitare ket aut nuluriris sub alio principi aut voluriris. A result of this want of cohesion is the instability of royal government, which, being regulated sometimes on one plan, sometimes on another, according to the character of the reigning prince or that of the persons who reigned for him, cannot long pursue a fixed aim for a consistent cause of conduct, a variableness which always makes the state fluctuate between maxim and maxim, project and project, and which does not exist in other governments where the prince is always the same. So we see that in general, if there is more cunning in a court, there is more wisdom in a senate, and that republics pursue their ends by more steadfast and regular methods, whereas every revolution in a royal ministry produces one in the state, the maxim common to all ministers and to almost all kings being to reverse in every respect the acts of their predecessors. And this same want of cohesion is obtained the solution of a sophism very familiar to royal politicians. This is not only to compare civil government with domestic government and the prince with the father of a family, an error already refuted, but further to ascribe freely to this magistrate all the virtues which he might have occasion for and always to suppose that the prince is what he ought to be, on which supposition royal government is manifestly preferable to every other, because it is incontestably the strongest and because it only lacks a corporate will more conformable to the general will to be also the best. But if, according to Plato, a king by nature is so rare a personage, how many times will nature and fortune conspire to crown him? And if the royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what should be expected from a succession of men trained to rule? It is, then, a voluntary self-deception to confuse royal government with that of a good king. To see what this government is in itself we must consider it under incapable or wicked princes, for such will come to the throne, or the throne will make them such. These difficulties have not escaped our authors, but they have not been embarrassed by them. The remedy they say is to obey without murmuring. God gives bad kings in his wrath, and we must endure them as chastisements of heaven. Such talk is doubtless edifying, but I am inclined to think it would be more appropriate in a pulpit than in a book on politics. What should we say of a physician who promises miracles and whose whole art consists in exhorting the sick man to be patient? We know well that when we have a bad government it must be endured. The question is to find a good one. End of Book 3, Chapter 6. Book 3, Chapter 7 of the Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau. Book 3, Chapter 7. Mixed Governments. Properly speaking, there is no simple government. A single chief must have subordinate magistrates. A popular government must have a head. Thus, in the partition of the executive power, there is always a gradation from the greater number to the less, with this difference that sometimes the majority depends on the minority and sometimes the minority on the majority. Sometimes there is an equal division, either when the constituent parts are in mutual dependence, as in the government of England, or when the authority of each part is independent, but imperfect, as in Poland. This latter form is bad, because there is no unity in the government and the state lacks cohesion. Is a simpler mixed government the better? A question much debated among publicists and one to which the same answer must be made that I have before made about every form of government. The simple government is the better in itself, for the reason that it is simple, but when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent on the legislative, that is, when there is a greater proportion between the prince and the sovereign than between the people and the prince, this want of proportion must be remedied by dividing the government, for then all its parts have no less authority over the subjects, and their division renders them altogether less strong against the sovereign. The same inconvenience is also provided against by the establishment of intermediate magistrates, who, leaving the government in its entirety, only serve to balance the two powers in maintaining their respective rights. Then the government is not mixed, but temperate. The opposite inconvenience can be remedied by similar means, and when the government is too lax, tribunals may be erected to concentrate it, that is, customary in all democracies. In the first case, the government is divided in order to weaken it, and in the second, in order to strengthen it, for the maximum of strength and also of weakness is found in simple governments while the mixed forms give a medium strength. End of Chapter 7. Recording by Shana Sir, President of California. Book 3, Chapter 8 of the Social Contract. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Book 3, Chapter 8. That every form of government is not fit for every country. Liberty, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples. The more we consider this principle established by Montesquieu, the more do we perceive its truth. The more it is contested, the greater opportunity is given to establish it by new proofs. In all the governments of the world, the public person consumes, but produces nothing. Whence then comes the substance it consumes, from the labor of its members? It is the superfluity of individuals that supplies the necessaries of the public. Hence it follows that the civil state can subsist only so long as men's labor produces more than they need. Now this success is not the same in all countries of the world. In several it is considerable, in others moderate, in others nothing, in others a minus quantity. This proportion depends on the fertility due to climate, on the kind of flavor which the soul requires, on the nature of its products, on the physical strength of its inhabitants, on the greater or less consumption that is necessary to them, and on several other like proportions of which it is composed. On the other hand, all governments are not of the same nature. There are some more or less wasteful, and the differences are based on this other principle that the further the public contributions are removed from their source the more burdensome they are. We must not measure this burden by the amount of the imposts, but by the distance they have to traverse in order to return to the hands from which they have come. When this circulation is prompt and well established, it matters not whether little or much is paid, the people are always rich, and the finances are always prosperous. On the other hand, however little the people may contribute, if this little does not revert to them, they are soon exhausted by constantly giving. The state is never rich and the people are always in beggary. It follows from this that the more the distance between the people and the government is increased, the more burdensome do the tributes become. Therefore, in the democracy, the people are least encumbered. In an aristocracy, they are more so, and in a monarchy, they bear the greatest weight. Monarchy then is suited only to wealthy nations. Aristocracy to states moderate both in wealth and size. Democracy to small and poor states. Indeed, the more we reflect on it, the more do we find in this the difference between free and monarchical states. In the first, everything is used for the common advantage. In the others, public and private resources are reciprocal, and the former are increased by the diminution of the latter. Lastly, instead of governing subjects in order to make them happy, the Sputisim renders them miserable in order to govern them. There are then, in every climate, natural causes by which we can assign the form of government which is adapted to the nature of the climate and even say what kind of inhabitants the country should have. Unfruitful and barren places where the produce does not repay the labor ought to remain uncultivated and deserted, or should only be peopled by savages. Places where men's soil yields only bear necessaries ought to be inhabited by barbarous nations. In them, any polity would be an impossibility. Places where the excess of the produce over the labor is moderate are suitable for free nations. Those in which abundant and fertile soil yields much produce for little labor are willing to be governed monarchically in order that the superfluity of the subjects may be consumed by the luxuries of the prince. For it is better that this excess should be absorbed by the government than squandered by private persons. There are exceptions, I know, but these exceptions themselves confirm the rule in that, sooner or later, they produce revolutions which restore things to their natural order. We should always distinguish general laws from the particular causes which may modify their effects. If the whole South should be covered with republics and the whole North with despotic states, it would not be less true that, through the influence of climate, despotism is suitable to warm countries, barbarism to cold countries, and a good polity to intermediate regions. I see, however, that while the principle is admitted, its application may be disputed. It will be said that some cold countries are very fertile and some southern ones very unfruitful, but this is a difficulty only for those who do not examine the matter in all its relations. It is necessary, as I have already said, to reckon those connected with labour, resources, consumption, etc. Let us suppose that the produce of two districts equaling area is in the ratio of 5 to 10. If the inhabitants of the former consume four and those of the latter nine parts, the surplus produce of the first will be one fifth and that of the second, one tenth. The ratio between these two surpluses being then inversely as that of the produce of each, the district which yields only five will give a surplus double that of the district which produces ten. But it is not a question of double produce and I do not think that anyone there, in general, plays the fertility of cold countries even on an equality with that of warm countries. Let us, however, assume this equality. Let us, if you will, put England in the scales with Sicily and Poland with Egypt. More to the south we shall have Africa in India. More to the north we shall have nothing. For this equality in produce, what the difference in the cultivation? In Sicily, it is only necessary to scratch the soil. In England, what care is needed to till it. But where more exertion is required to yield the same produce, plus must necessarily be very small. Consider, besides this, that the same number of men consume much less in warm countries. The climate demands that people should be temperate in order to be healthy. Europeans who want to live as at home all die of dysentery and dyspepsia. We are, says Chardin, carnivorous beasts, wolves in comparison with Asiatics. Some attribute the temperance of the Persians to the fact that their country is scantily cultivated. I believe, on the contrary, that their country is not very abundant in provisions because the inhabitants need very little. If their frugality, he continues, resulted from the poverty of the country, it would be only the poor who would eat little, whereas it is the people generally and more or less would be consumed in each province according to the fertility of the country, whereas the same obstemusness comes throughout the kingdom. They pride themselves greatly on their mode of living, saying that it is only necessary to look at their complexions to see how much superior they are to those of Christians. Indeed, the complexions of the Persians are smooth. They have beautiful skins, delicate and clear. While the complexions of their subjects, the Armenians, who live in European fashion, are rough and blotched, and their bodies are coarse and heavy. The nearer we approach the equator, the less do the people live upon. They eat scarcely any meat, rice, maize, couscous, millet, cassava, are their ordinary foods. There are in India millions of men whose diet does not cost a half penny a day. We see even in Europe palpable differences in appetite between northern and southern nations, as pioneered will live for eight days on a German's dinner. In countries where men are most voracious, luxury is directed to matters of consumption. In England, it is displayed in a table loaded with meats. In Italy, you are regaled with sugar and flowers. Again, luxury and dress present similar differences. In climates where the changes of the seasons are sudden and violent, garments are better and simpler. In those where people dress only for ornament, splendor is more sought after than utility, for clothes themselves are a luxury. At Naples, you will see men every day walking to Pusillipo with cold embroidered coats and no stockings. It is the same with regard to buildings. Everything is sacrificed to magnificence when there is nothing to fear from injury by the atmosphere. In Paris and in London, people must be warmly and comfortably housed. In Madrid, they have superb drawing rooms, but no windows that shut while they sleep in mere closets. The foods are much more substantial and nutritious in warm countries. This is a third difference which cannot fail to influence the second. Why do people eat so many vegetables in Italy? Because they are good, nourishing and of excellent flavor. In France, where they are grown only on water, they are not nourishing and count almost for nothing on the table. They do not, however, occupy less ground and they cost at least as much labor to cultivate. It is found by experience that the widths of Barbary, inferior in other respects to those of France, yield much more flour and that those of France, in their turn, yield more than the widths of the North. Whence we may infer that a similar gradation is observable generally in the same direction from the equator to the pole? Now, is it not a manifest disadvantage to have in an equal quantity of produce a smaller quantity of nutriment? To all these different considerations, I may add one which springs from and strengthens them. It is that warm countries have less need of inhabitants than cold countries, but would be able to maintain a greater number. Hence, a double surplus is produced, always to the advantage of despotism. The greater the surface occupied by the same number of inhabitants, the more difficult the rebellions become because measures cannot be concerted promptly and secretly, and because it is always easy for the government to discover the plans and cut-off communications. But the more closely packed a numerous population is, the less power has a government to usurp the sovereignty. The chiefs deliberate as securely in their cabinets as the prince in his council and the multitude assemble in the squares as quickly as the troops in their quarters. The advantage then of a tyrannical government lies in this that it acts at great distances. By help of the points of support which it procures, its power increases with the distance like that of levers. That of the people on the other hand acts only when concentrated. It evaporates and disappears as it extends like the effect of powders scattered on the ground which takes fire only grain by grain. The least populous countries are thus the best adapted for tyranny while beasts reign only in deserts. End of chapter 8 Recording by Shana Sear, Fresno, California. Book 3, Chapter 9 of the Social Contract This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Book 3, Chapter 9 The Marks of a Good Government When then, it is asked absolutely which is the best government. An insoluble and likewise indeterminate question is propounded or, if you will, it has as many correct solutions as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative positions of the nations. But if it were asked by what sign it can be known whether a given people is well or ill-governed, that would be a different matter and a question of fact might be determined. It is, however, not settled because everyone wishes to decide in his own way. Subjects extoll the public tranquility, citizens the liberty of individuals. The former prefers security of possessions, the latter that of persons. The former are of opinion that the best government is the most severe, the latter maintain that it is the mildest. The one party wish that crimes should be punished and the other that they should be prevented. The one party think it well to be feared by their neighbors. The other party prefer to be unacquainted with them. The one party are satisfied when money circulates. The other party demand that the people should have bread. Even though there should be agreement on this and other similar points there are no quantities lack a precise mode of measurement. Even if people were in accord about the sign how could they be so about evaluation of it. For my part, I am always astonished that people fail to recognize a sign so simple or that they should have the insincerity not to agree about it. What is the object of political association? It is the preservation and prosperity of its members. And what is the surest sign of its use? It is their number and population. Do not then go and seek elsewhere for this sign so much discussed. All other things being equal the government under which without external aids without naturalizations and without colonies the citizens increase and multiply most is infallibly the best. That under which a people diminishes and decays is the worst. Statisticians it is now your business measure, compare. End of Chapter 9 Recording by Shana Sear, Fresno, California Book 3, Chapter 10 of the Social Contract This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau Book 3, Chapter 10 The abuse of the government and its tendency to degenerate. As the particular will acts incessantly against the general will so the government makes a continual effort against the sovereignty. The more this effort is increased the more is the Constitution altered. And as there is here no other corporate still which by resisting that of the prince may produce equilibrium with it. It must happen sooner or later that the prince at length oppresses the sovereign and violates the social treaty. Therein is the inherent and inevitable vice which from the birth of the body politic tends without intermission to destroy it. Just as old age and death at length destroy the human body. There are two general ways by which a government degenerates vis when it contracts or when the state is dissolved. The government contracts when it passes from the majority to the minority that is from democracy to aristocracy and from aristocracy to royalty. That is its natural tendency. If it retrograted from the minority to the majority it might be said to relax but this inverse progress is impossible. In reality the government never changes its form except when its exhausted energy leaves it too weak to preserve itself and if it becomes still more relaxed as it extends its force will be annihilated and it will no longer subsist. We must therefore concentrate the energy as it dwindles otherwise the state which it sustains will fall into ruin. The dissolution of the state may fall into ways. Firstly, when the prince no longer administers the state in accordance with the laws and affects a usurpation of the sovereign power then a remarkable change takes place the state and not the government contracts. I mean that the state dissolves and that another is formed within it which is composed only of the members of the government and which is to the rest of the people nothing more than their master and their tyrant Thus the government usurps the sovereignty the social compact is broken and all the ordinary citizens rightfully regaining their natural liberty are forced but not morally bound to obey. The same thing occurs also when the members of the government usurped separately the power which they ought to exercise only collectively which is no less a violation of the laws and occasions still greater disorder. Then there are so to speak as many princes as magistrates and the state not less divided than the government perishes or changes its form. When the state is broken up the abuse of the government whatever it may be takes the common name of anarchy to distinguish democracy degenerates into oculocracy aristocracy into oligarchy I should add that royalty degenerates into tyranny but this last word is equivocal and requires explanation. In the vulgar sense a tyrant is a king who governs with violence and without regard to justice and the laws. In the strict sense a tyrant is a private person who arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it. It is in this sense that the Greeks understood the word tyrant. They bestowed it indifferently on good and bad princes whose laws were legitimate. Thus tyrant and usurper are two words perfectly synonymous. To give different names to different things I call the usurper of royal authority a tyrant and the usurper of sovereign power a despot. The tyrant is he who contrite to the laws takes upon himself to govern according to the laws. The despot is he who sets himself above the laws themselves. A tyrant cannot be a despot but the despot is always a tyrant. End of Chapter 10 Recording by Shana Serres, Fresno, California Book 3, Chapter 11 of the Social Contract This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau Book 3, Chapter 11 The Dissolution of the Body Politics Such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted governments. If Sparta and Rome have perished, what state can hope to endure forever? If we wish to form a durable constitution, let us then not dream of making it eternal. In order to succeed we must not attempt the impossible nor flatter ourselves that we are giving to the work of men a stability which human things do not admit of. The Body Politics as well as the human body begins to die from its birth and bears in itself the causes of its own destruction. But both may have a constitution more or less robust and fitted to preserve them a longer or shorter time. The constitution of man is the work it does not rest with men to prolong their lives. It does rest with them to prolong that of the state as far as possible by giving it the best constitution practicable. The best constituted will come to an end but not so soon as another unless some unforeseen accident brings about its premature destruction. The principle of political life is in the sovereign authority. The legislative power is the heart of the state. The executive power is the brain giving movement to all the parts. The brain may be paralyzed and yet the individual may live. A man remains an imbecile in lives but so soon as the heart ceases its functions the animal dies. It is not by laws that the state subsists but by the legislative power. The law of yesterday is not binding today but tacit consent is presumed from silence and the sovereign is supposed to confirm continually the laws which it does not do so. Whatever it has once declared that it wills it wills always unless the declaration is revoked. Why then do people show so much respect for ancient laws? It is on account of their antiquity. We must believe that it is only the excellence of the ancient laws which has enabled them to be so long preserved unless the sovereign has recognized them as constantly salutary it would have revoked them a thousand times. That is why far from being weakened the laws are ever acquiring fresh vigor in every well-constituted state. The prejudice in favor of antiquity renders them more venerable every day while wherever laws are weakened as they grow old this fact proves that there is no longer any legislative power and that the state no longer lives. The Sovereign Having no other force than the legislative power acts only through the laws and the laws being nothing but authentic acts of the general will the sovereign can act only when the people are assembled the people assembled it will be said what a chimera it is a chimera today but it was not so two thousand years ago have men changed their nature the limits of the possible in moral things are less narrow than we think it is our weaknesses our vices our prejudices that contract them sordid souls do not believe in great men vile slaves smile with a mocking air at the word liberty from what has been done let us consider what can be done I shall not speak of the ancient republics of Greece but the roman republic was it seems to me a great state and the city of Rome a great city the last census in Rome showed that there were four hundred thousand citizens bearing arms and the last enumeration of the empire showed more than four million citizens without reckoning subjects women children and slaves what a difficulty we might suppose there would be in assembling frequently the enormous population of the capital and its environs yet few weeks passed without the roman people being assembled even several times not only did they exercise the rights of sovereignty but a part of the functions of government they discussed certain affairs and judged certain causes and in the public assembly the whole people were almost as often magistrates as citizens by going back to the early times of nations we should find that the majority of the ancient governments even monarchical ones like those of the Macedonians and the Franks had similar councils be that as it may this single incontestable fact solves all difficulties inference from the actual to the possible appears to me sound end of book 3 chapter 12 third book chapter 13 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book 13th chapter how the sovereign authority is maintained continued it is not sufficient that the assembled people should have once fixed the constitution of the state by giving their sanction to a body of laws it is not sufficient that they should have established a perpetual government or that they should have once for all provided for the election of magistrates besides the extraordinary assemblies which unforeseen events may require it is necessary that there should be fixed and periodical ones which nothing can abolish or prorogue so that, on the appointed day the people are rightfully convoked by the law without needing for that purpose any formal summons but accepting these assemblies which are lawful by their date alone every assembly of the people that has not been convoked by the magistrates appointed for that duty and according to the prescribed forms ought to be regarded as unlawful and all that is done in it as invalid because even the order to assemble ought to emanate from the law as for the more or less frequent meetings of the lawful assemblies they depend on so many considerations that no precise rules can be given about them only it may be said generally that the more force a government has the more frequently should the sovereign display itself this, I shall be told, may be good for a single city but what is to be done when the state comprises many cities will the sovereign authority be divided or must it be concentrated in a single city and render subject all the rest I answer that neither alternative is necessary in the first place the sovereign authority is simple and undivided and we cannot divide it without destroying it in the second place a city, no more than a nation can be lawfully subject to another because the essence of the body politic consists in the union of obedience and liberty and these words subject and sovereign are correlatives the notion underlying them being expressed in the one word, citizen I answer further that it is always an evil to combine several towns into a single state and in desiring to effect such a union we must not flatter ourselves that we should avoid the natural consequences of it the abuses of great states cannot be brought as an objection against a man who only desires small ones but how can small states be endowed with sufficient force to resist great ones just as in the same way when the Greek towns of old resisted the great king and as more recently Holland and Switzerland have resisted the House of Austria if, however the state cannot be reduced to proper limits one resource still remains it is not to allow any capital but to make the government sit alternately in each town and also to assemble in them by turns the estates of the country people the territory uniformly extend the same rights everywhere spread everywhere abundance in life in this way the state will become at once the strongest and the best governed that may be possible remember that the walls of the towns are formed solely of the remains of houses in the country for every palace that I see rising in the capital I seem to see a whole rural district laid in ruins end of book 3 chapter 13 third book chapter 14 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book 14th chapter how the sovereign authority is maintained continued so soon as the people are lawfully assembled as a sovereign body the whole jurisdiction of the government ceases the executive power is suspended and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate because where the represented are there is no longer any representative most of the tumults that arose in Rome in the Cotnitia proceeded from ignorance or neglect of this rule the consuls were then only presidents of the people and the tribunes simply orders the senate had no power at all these intervals of suspension in which the prince recognizes or ought to recognize the presence of a superior have always been dreaded by that power and these assemblies of the people which are the shield of the body politic in the curb of the government have in all ages been the terror of the chief men hence such men are never wanting in solitude, objections, obstacles and promises in the endeavor to make the citizens disgusted with the assemblies when the latter are apparitious cowardly, pusillanimous and more desirous of repose than of freedom they do not long hold out against the repeated efforts of the government and thus as the resisting force constantly increases the sovereign authority at last disappears and most of the states decay and perish before their time but between the sovereign authority and the arbitrary government there is sometimes introduced an intermediate power of which I must speak End of Book 3 Chapter 14 Third Book Chapter 15 of the Social Contract This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau Third Book 15th Chapter Deputies or Representatives So soon as the service of the state ceases to be the principal business of the citizens and they prefer to render aid with their purses rather than their persons the state is already on the brink of ruin Is it necessary to march to battle? They pay troops and remain at home Is it necessary to go to the council? They elect deputies and remain at home As a result of indolence and wealth they at length have soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it It is the bustle of commerce and of the arts It is the greedy pursuit of gain It is a feminancy and love of comforts that commute personal services for money Men sacrifice a portion of their profit in order to increase it at their ease Give money and soon you will have chains That word finance is a slave's word It is unknown among citizens In a country that is really free the citizens do everything with their hands and nothing with money Far from paying for exemption from their duties they would pay to perform them themselves I am far removed from ordinary ideas I believe that Statute Labor Le Corfe is less repugnant to liberty than taxation is The better constituted a state is the more do public affairs outweigh private ones in the minds of the citizens There is indeed a much smaller number of private affairs because the amount of the general prosperity furnishes a more considerable portion to that of each individual and less remains to be sought by individual exertions In a well conducted city-state everyone hastens to the assemblies While under a bad government no one cares to move a step in order to attend them because no one takes an interest in the proceedings since it is foreseen that the general will will not prevail and so at last private concerns become all absorbing Good laws pave the way for better ones Bad laws lead to worse ones As soon as anyone says of the affairs of the state of what importance are they to me we must consider that the state is lost The decline of patriotism the active pursuit of private interests the vast size of states conquests and the abuses of government have suggested the plan of deputies or representatives of the people in the assemblies of the nation It is this which in certain countries they dare to call the third a state Thus the private interest of two orders is put in the first and second rank the public interest only in the third Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated It consists essentially in the general will and the will cannot be represented It is the same or it is different There is no medium The deputies of the people then are not and cannot be its representatives They are only commissioners and can conclude nothing definitively Every law which the people in person have not ratified is invalid It is not a law The English nation thinks that it is free but is greatly mistaken for it is so only during the election As soon as they are elected it is enslaved and counts for nothing The use which it makes of the brief moments of freedom renders the loss of liberty well deserved The idea of representatives is modern It comes to us from feudal government That absurd and iniquitous government under which mankind is degraded in the name of man dishonored In the republics and even in the monarchies of antiquity the people never had representatives who know the word It is very singular that in Rome where the tribunes were so sacred it was not even imagined that they could usurp the functions of the people and in the midst of so great a multitude they never attempted to pass of their own accord a single plebiscitem We may judge however of the embarrassment which the crowd sometimes caused from what occurred in the time of the grouchy when a part of the citizens gave their votes on the housetops But where right and liberty were all, inconveniences are nothing In that wise nation everything was estimated at a true value It allowed the lictors to do what the tribunes had not dared to do and was not afraid that the lictors would want to represent it To explain however in what manner the tribunes sometimes represented it it is sufficient to understand how the government represents the sovereign The law being nothing but the declaration of the general will it is clear that in their legislative capacity the people cannot be represented but they can and should be represented in the executive power which is only force applied to law This shows that very few nations would upon careful examination be found to have laws Be that as it may it is certain that the tribunes having no share in the executive power could never represent the rowan people by right of their office but only by encroaching on the rights of the senate Among the Greeks whatever the people had to do they did themselves They were constantly assembled in the public place They lived in a mild climate and they were not avaricious Slaves performed the manual labor The people's great business was liberty Not having the same advantages how are you to preserve the same rights? Your more rigorous climates give you more wants For six months in a year the public place is untenable and your horse voices cannot be heard in the open air You care more for gain than for liberty and you fear slavery far less than you do misery Footnote To adopt in cold countries the effeminacy and luxuriousness of orientals is to be willing to assume their chains and to submit to them even more necessarily than they do And footnote What? Is liberty maintained only with the help of slavery? Perhaps extremes meet Everything which is not according to nature and conveniences and civil society more than all the rest There are circumstances so unfortunate that people can preserve their freedom only at the expense of that of others and the citizen cannot be completely free except when the slave is enslaved to the utmost Such was the position of Sparta As for you modern nations you have no slaves but you are slaves you pay for their freedom with your own In vain do you boast of this preference and think how are this than of humanity I do not mean by all this that slaves are necessary and that the right of slavery is lawful since I have proved the contrary I only mention the reasons why modern nations who believe themselves free have representatives and why ancient nations had none Be that as it may as soon as a nation appoints representatives it is no longer free it no longer exists After very careful consideration it is possible hence forward for the sovereign to preserve among us the exercise of its rights unless the state is very small But if it is very small will it not be subjugated? No, I shall show hereafter how the external power of a great nation can be combined with the convenient polity and good order of small state End of Book 3 Chapter 15 Third Book Chapter 16 of the Social Contract This is a Libra Box recording All Libra Box recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibraVox.org The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau Third Book 16th Chapter That the institution of the government is not a contract The legislative power being once well established The question is to establish also the executive power For this latter which operates only by particular acts not being of the essence of the other is naturally separated from it If it were possible that the sovereign considered as such should have the executive power law in fact would be so confounded that it could no longer be known what is law and what is not and the body politic thus perverted would soon become a prey to the violence against which it was instituted The citizens being all equal by the social contract all can prescribe what all ought to do while no one has a right to demand that another should do what he will not do himself Now it is properly this right indispensable to make the body politic live and move which the sovereign gives to the prince in establishing the government Several have pretended that the instrument in this establishment is a contract between the people and the chiefs whom they set over themselves a contract by which it is stipulated between the two parties on what conditions the one binds itself to rule the other to obey it will be agreed I am sure that this is a strange method of contracting but let us see whether such a position is tenable first the supreme authority can no more be modified than alienated to limit it is to destroy it it is absurd and contradictory that the sovereign should acknowledge a superior to bind itself to obey a master is to regain full liberty further it is evident that this contract of the people with such or such persons is a particular act whence it follows that the contract cannot be a law nor an act of sovereignty and that consequently it is unlawful moreover we see that the contracting parties themselves would be under the law of nature alone and without any security for the performance of their reciprocal engagements which is in every way repugnant to the civil state he who possesses the power being always capable of executing it we might as well give the name contract to the act of a man who should say to another I give you all my property on condition that you restore me what you please there is but one contract in the state that of association and this of itself excludes any other no public contract can be conceived which would not be a violation of the first end of book 3 chapter 16 third book chapter 17 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau third book 17th chapter the institution of the government under what general notion then must be included the act by which the government is instituted I shall observe first that this act is complex or composed of two others vis the establishment of the law and the execution of the law by the first the sovereign determines that there shall be a governing body established in such or such a form and it is clear that this act is a law by the second the people nominate the chiefs who will be entrusted with the government when established now this nomination being a particular act is not a second law but only a consequence of the first and a function of the government the difficulty is to understand how there can be an act of government before the government exists and how the people who are only sovereign or subjects can in certain circumstances become the prince or the magistrates here however is disclosed one of those astonishing properties of the body politic by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory for this is affected by a sudden conversion of sovereignty into democracy in such a manner that without any perceptible change in the new relation of all to all the citizens having become magistrates pass from general acts to particular acts and from the law to the execution of it this change of relation is not a subtlety of speculation without example and practice it occurs every day in the parliament of England in which the lower house on certain occasions resolves itself into grand committee in order to discuss business better and thus becomes a simple commission instead of the sovereign court in this moment before in this way it afterwards reports to itself as the House of Commons what it has just decided in grand committee such as the advantage peculiar to a democratic government that it can be established in fact by a simple act of the general will and after this the provisional government remains in power should that be the form adopted or establishes in the name of the sovereign the government prescribed by the law and thus everything is according to rule it is impossible to institute the government in any other way that is legitimate without renouncing the principles here to force established end of book 3 chapter 17 third book chapter 18 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Grousse third book 18th chapter means of preventing usurpations of the government from these explanations it follows in confirmation of chapter 16 that the act which institutes the government is not a contract but a law that the depositaries of the executive power are not the masters of the people but its officers that the people can appoint them and dismiss them at pleasure that for them it is not a question but of obeying and that in undertaking the functions which the state imposes on them they simply fulfill their duty as citizens without having in any way of right to discuss the conditions when therefore it happens that the people institute a hereditary government whether monarchical in family or aristocratic in one order of citizens it is not an engagement that they make but a provisional form which they give to the administration and regulate it differently it is true that such changes are always dangerous and that the established government must never be touched except when it becomes incompatible with the public good but this circumspection is a maxim of policy not a rule of right and the state is no more bound to leave the civil authority to its chief men than the military authority to its generals moreover it is true that in such a case all the formalities requisite which a regular and lawful act from a seditious tumult and the will of a whole people from the clamors of affection cannot be too carefully observed it is especially in this case that only such concession should be made as cannot in strict justice be refused and from this obligation also the prince derives a great advantage in preserving its power in spite of the people without there being able to say that it has usurped the power of its rights it may very easily extend them and under pretext of maintaining the public peace obstruct the assemblies designed to reestablish good order so that it takes advantage of a silence which it prevents from being broken or of irregularities which it causes to be committed so as to assume in its favor the approbation of those whom fear renders silent and punish those that dare to speak it is in this way that the December's having at first been elected for one year and then kept in office for another year attempted to retain their power in perpetuity by no longer permitting the committee to assemble and it is by this easy method that all governments in the world when once invested with the public force usurp sooner or later the sovereign authority the periodical assemblies of which I have spoken before are fitted to prevent or postpone this evil especially when they need no formal convocation for then the prince cannot interfere with them without openly proclaiming itself a violator of the laws and an enemy of the state these assemblies which have as their object the maintenance of the social treaty ought always to be opened with two propositions which no one should be able to suppress and which should pass separately by vote the first whether it pleases the sovereign to maintain the present form of government whether it pleases the people to leave the administration to those at present entrusted with it I presuppose here what I believe that I have proved that there is in the state no fundamental law which cannot be revoked not even the social compact for if all the citizens assembled in order to break this compact by a solemn agreement no one can doubt that it would be quite legitimately broken Grosius even thinks that each man can renounce the state that he is a member and regain his natural freedom in his property by quitting the country now it would be absurd if all the citizens combined should be unable to do what each of them can do separately it must be clearly understood that no one should leave in order to evade his duty and relieve himself from serving his country at a moment when it needs him flight in that case would be criminal and punishable it would no longer be retirement but desertion fourth book chapter one of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau fourth book first chapter that the general will is indestructible so long as a number of men in combination are considered as a single body they have but one will which relates to the common preservation and to the general well-being in such a case all the forces of the state are vigorous and simple and its principles are clear and luminous it has no confused and conflicting interests the common good is everywhere plainly manifest and only good sense is required to perceive it peace, union, and equality are foes to political subtleties upright and simple-minded men are hard to deceive because of their simplicity allurements and refined pretext do not impose upon them they are not even cunning enough to be dupes when in the happiest nation in the world we see troops of peasants regulating the affairs of the state under an oak and always acting wisely can we refrain from despising the refinements of other nations who make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery a state thus governed needs very few laws and in so far as it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones this necessity is universally recognized the first man to propose them only gives expression to what all have previously felt and neither factions nor eloquence will be needed to pass into law what everyone has already resolved to do so soon as he is sure that the rest will act as he does what deceives reasoners is that seeing only states that are ill constituted from the beginning they are impressed with the impossibility of maintaining such a policy in those states they laugh to think of all the follies to which a cunning nave and insinuating speaker can persuade the people of Paris or London they know not that Cromwell would have been put in irons by the people of Bern and the Duke of Beaufort imprisoned by the Genovese but when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the state weakened the private interests begin to make themselves felt and small associations to exercise an influence on the state the common interest is injuriously affected and finds adversaries unanimity no longer reigns in the voting the general will is no longer the will of all opposition and disputes arise and the best council does not pass uncontested lastly when the state on the verge of ruin no longer subsists except in a vain and illusory form when the social bond is broken in all hearts when the basest interest shelters itself impudently under the sacred name of the public welfare the general will becomes dumb all under the guidance of secret motives no more express their opinions as citizens than if the state had never existed and under the name of laws they deceitfully pass unjust decrees which have only private interest as their end does it follow from this that the general will is destroyed or corrupted? no it is always constant unalterable and pure but it is subordinated to others which get the better of it each detaching his own interest from the common interest sees clearly that he cannot completely separate it but his share in the injury done to the state appears to him as nothing in comparison with the exclusive advantage which he aims at appropriating to himself this particular advantage being accepted he desires the general welfare for his own interest quite as strongly as any other even in selling his vote for money he does not extinguish in himself the general will but eludes it the fault that he commits is to change the state of the question and to answer something different from what he was asked so that instead of saying by a vote it is beneficial to the state he says it is beneficial to a certain man or a certain party or such emotion should pass thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the general will as to ensure that it shall always be consulted and always respond I might in this place make many reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of sovereignty a right which nothing can take away from the citizens and on that of speaking proposing dividing and discussing which the government is always very important to its members only but this important matter would require a separate treatise and I cannot say everything in this one end of book 4 chapter 1 fourth book chapter 2 of the social contract this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org the social contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau second chapter voting we see from the previous chapter that the manner in which public affairs are managed may give a sufficiently trustworthy indication of the character and health of the body politic the more that harmony reigns in the assemblies that is the more that voting approaches unanimity the more also is the general will predominant but long discussions, dissensions and uproar proclaim the ascendancy of the interests and the decline of the state this is not so clearly apparent when two or more orders enter into its constitution as in Rome the patricians and plebeians whose quarrels often disturb the comatee even in the palmiest days of the republic but this exception is more apparent than real for at that time by a vice inherent in the body politic there were so to speak two states in one what is not true of the two together is true of each separately and indeed even in the most stormy times the plebiscite of the people when the senate did not interfere with them always passed peaceably and by a large majority of votes the citizens having but one interest the people had but one will at the other extremity of the circle unanimity returns that is when the citizens fallen into slavery have no longer either liberty or will then fear and flattery change votes and acclamations men no longer deliberate but adore or curse such was the disgraceful motive speaking in the senate under the emperors sometimes it was done with ridiculous precautions tacitus observes that under author the senators in overwhelming vitelius with excretions affected to make at the same time a frightful noise in order that if he happened to become master he might not be able to do that from these different considerations are deduced the principles by which we should regulate the method of counting votes and of comparing opinions according as the general will is more or less easy to ascertain and the state more or less degenerate there is but one law which by its nature requires unanimous consent that is the social compact for civil association is the most voluntary act in the world or in free and master himself no one can under any pretext whatever enslave him without his ascent to decide that the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man if then at the time of the social compact there are opponents of it their opposition does not invalidate the contract but only prevents them from being included in it they are foreigners among citizens when the state is established consent lies in residence, to dwell in the territory is to submit to the sovereignty. This must always be understood to relate to a free state, for otherwise family, property, want of an asylum, necessity or violence, may detain an inhabitant in a country against his will, and then his residence alone no longer supposes his consent to the contract or to the violation of it. During this original contract the vote of the majority always binds all the rest, this being a result of the contract itself. But it will be asked how a man can be free and yet forced to conform to wills which are not his own. How are opponents free and yet subject to laws they have not consented to? I reply that the question is wrongly put. The citizen consents to all the laws, even to those which are past in spite of him, and even to those which punish him when he dares to violate any of them. The unvarying will of all the members of the state is the general will. It is through that that they are citizens and free. When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what is asked of them is not exactly whether they approve the proposition or reject it, but whether it is conformable or not to the general will, which is their own. Each one in giving his vote expresses his opinion thereupon, and from the counting of the votes is obtained the declaration of the general will. When therefore the opinion opposed to my own prevails, that simply shows that I was mistaken, and that what I considered to be the general will was not so. Had my private opinion prevailed, I should have done something other than I wished, and in that case I should not have been free. This supposes it is true that all the marks of the general will are still in the majority. When they cease to be so, whatever side we take, there is no longer any liberty. In showing before how particular wills were substituted for general wills in public resolutions, I have sufficiently indicated the means practicable for preventing this abuse. I will speak of it again hereafter. With regard to the proportional number of votes for declaring this will, I have also laid down the principles according to which it may be determined. The difference of a single vote destroys unanimity, but between unanimity and equality there are many unequal divisions, at each of which this number can be fixed according to the condition and requirements of the body politic. Two general principles may serve to regulate these proportions. The one, that the more important and weighty the resolutions, the nearer should the opinion which prevails approach unanimity. The other, that the greater the dispatch requisite in the matter under discussion, the more should we restrict the prescribed difference in the division of opinions. In resolutions which must be come to immediately, the majority of a single vote should suffice. The first of these principles appears more suitable to laws, the second to affairs. Be that as it may, it is by their combination that are established the best proportions which can be assigned for the decision of a majority. CHAPTER III. With regard to the elections of the Prince and the Magistrates, which are, as I have said, the most complex acts, there are two modes of procedure, viz, choice, and lot. Both have been employed in different republics, and a very complicated mixture of the two is seen even now in the election of the Doge of Venice. Election by lot, says Montesquieu, is of the nature of democracy. I agree, but how is it so? The lot, he continues, is a mode of election which mortifies no one. It leaves every citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country. But these are not the reasons. If we are mindful that the election of the chiefs is a function of government and not of sovereignty, we shall see why the method of election by lot is more in the nature of democracy, in which the administration is by so much the better as its acts are less multiplied. In every true democracy, the magistracy is not a boon but an onerous charge, which cannot fairly be imposed on one individual rather than on another. The law alone can impose this burden on the person on whom the lot falls. For then, the conditions being equal for all, and the choice not being dependent on any human will, there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law. In an aristocracy the prince chooses the prince. The government is maintained by itself and voting is rightly established. The instance of the election of the Doge of Venice, far from destroying this distinction, confirms it. This composite form is suitable in a mixed government, for it is an error to take the government of Venice as a true aristocracy. If the people have no share in the government, the nobles themselves are numerous. A multitude of poor Barnavotes never come near any magistracy and have for their nobility only the empty title of Excellency and the right to attend the great council. This great council, being as numerous as our general council at Geneva, its illustrious members have no more privileges than our simple citizens, Citoyen. It is certain that, setting aside the extreme disparity of the two republics, the Burgesses, la bourgeoisie of Geneva exactly correspond to the Venetian order of patricians. Our natives, natifs, and residents, habitants, represent the citizens and people of Venice. Our peasants, peisants, represent the subject of the mainland. In short, in whatever way we consider this republic apart from its size, its government is no more aristocratic than ours. The whole difference is that, having no chief for life, we have not the same need for election by lot. Elections by lot would have few drawbacks in a true democracy, in which, all being equal, as well in character and ability as in sentiments and fortune, the choice would become almost indifferent. But I have already said that there is no true democracy. When choice and lot are combined, the first should be employed to fill the posts that require peculiar talents, such as military appointments. The other is suitable for those in which good sense, justice, and integrity are sufficient, such as judicial offices. Because in a well-constituted state, these qualities are common to all the citizens. Neither lot nor voting has any place in a monarchical government. The monarch being by right, sole prince and sole magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him alone. When the Abbe de Saint-Pierre proposed to multiply the councils of the King of France and to elect the members of them by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government. It would remain for me to speak of the method for recording and collecting votes in the assembly of the people, but perhaps the history of the Roman policy in that respect will explain more clearly all the principles which I might be able to establish. It is not unworthy of a judicious reader to see in some detail how public and private affairs were dealt with in a