 So, I turn now to Marcus. We are up to you, Marcus. What would you say? Well, I think we've reached the point in the morning where everything has been said, but I haven't said it. When I received the invitation to participate in this panel, I eagerly accepted because it's a great honor. I looked at the composition of the panel. I saw that we had so much talent on macroeconomic and financial matters and I thought I would focus on effectively microeconomic issues as kind of a compliment. I think we are in the midst of a transformation of international trade and investment relations driven by the revival of industrial policy in the major economic centers. Compared with the previous international trade regime, this system will be more complex and considerably less transparent. It will be vulnerable to political capture by special interest groups. It will possibly be accompanied by overall reductions in economic efficiency and will give rise to international tensions. So, how did we get here? There are two principal drivers. The first which I hope, if not all, most of us could agree on is global warming and the need to adopt policies to internalize externalities that the market will not do on its own. The second is more controversial and that's the geopolitical justification. I think the best intellectual rationale for this was actually provided by Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Kristia Freeland. She argues that in essence during the Cold War the West got lucky. The Soviet Union self-isolated so the West was free to construct a liberal open order and there was no contradiction between engaging in trade and investment relations, everyone prospering together in military security. In contrast in the present, China has embraced the global economy and so this creates a tension between economic integration on the one hand and military security concerns on the other. That is the intellectual justification for what was called decoupling. President von der Leyen of the European Commission more politely called derisking, which you just referred to. In the case of the United States, these two concerns have been met by two sorts of policy thrusts. In the case of the geopolitical objectives, the concern centers on semiconductor chips. The two main policies have been the CHIPS Act of the United States and then a set of export controls aimed at restricting export of chips and manufacturing equipment to countries of concern, mainly China and Russia. In the case of climate change, the thrust has been through two big pieces of legislation, the Infrastructure Investment Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, often called IRA. And for these remarks I will focus on electric vehicles and batteries. In both cases the policies are complex, they're not entirely transparent, they make considerable demands on government competency and ability to implement effectively and they've caused heartburn in partner countries. The CHIPS Act allocates a bit over $50 billion for subsidies for production and our research and development over the next four years. It prioritizes supply chain security, that is to say chips currently made in Taiwan. It is open to both domestic and foreign firms and particularly interests of firms from Taiwan and Korea and it excludes China and Russia. And companies receiving that funding have to, I cannot build new capacity in China for 10 years. The export controls aim at deterring high end production in China, which means that the policy is dependent on third party cooperation. This is a case where the US government got lucky that the nature of the semiconductor industry is there are some choke points that require minimal cooperation from third parties in order to implement. But there's no guarantee that will be the case in the future with industries of very different industrial structure. Think for example, biotech. The US is not alone, Europe has its own CHIPS Act. Japan has adopted a similar set of reshoring or friend shoring incentives and for example is providing subsidies for an American firm Micron Technology to build a plant in Hiroshima. So while the US is leading the charge, it is not alone. In the climate change, again I'll just focus on electric vehicles because that's where a lot of the current trade action is. The US legislation creates consumer incentives. It builds out the charging infrastructure, encourages domestic production. But the way it did it had a strong domestic preferences, which caused problems with our partners. And one of the things you need to understand about this legislation is the IRA is a thousand pages long. The Congress didn't know every detail of what it was voting for when it enacted it. It has all sorts of unintended consequences. One of these was to make those consumer incentives apply to American-built automobiles but not ones from Korea or European Union. Who understandably got upset? Some enterprising bureaucrat at the Department of Treasury who probably deserved some sort of Nobel Prize in Applied Economics discovered that there was a provision written for trucks which are normally leased which if reinterpreted could be applied to cars and the Koreans and the Europeans could continue to export to the United States and get the consumer subsidies. Likewise, the legislation incentivizes use of non-Chinese minerals in the production of the batteries for those cars. And it's created because of our vision that essentially endorses production and free trade partners. It has created the strange phenomenon in Washington where Korean firms who build the batteries are lobbying the US government to conclude free trade agreements with Indonesia, Philippines, Argentina, and other potential sources of supply. It appears to be kind of a software patch so to speak and it wouldn't be surprising if the Congress went back and revisited some of these provisions if the Congress could actually act which given the dysfunction is an open question. Implementation is complex. It depends significantly on administrative regulations. It's not transparent. It is costly to remain informed and that non-transparency creates opportunities for political capture by special interest. Europe has its own CHIPS Act. It also has the carbon border adjustment mechanism or CBAM which is going to create problems as well. So more broadly the European Union is tackling these problems with an emphasis on taxes. The United States is emphasizing subsidies and tax provisions and there is a need to bring to reconcile these differing approaches to generally commonly shared goals. There is a real question to me whether the US government is currently constituted is up to the task of implementing a policy as complex as this one. And I heard that President Macron has closed ENA, the French School for Training Public Administrators. He might consider reopening it in the United States. Excellent conclusion if I may Marcus. To be frank, the name is different. I'm not sure that the education will be that different but we will see. So...