 In the CBI theater, the military police were faced with two kinds of traffic problems. Traffic through a tortuous unexplored jungle, on a road still under construction, which has since been named the Stillwell Road, and street traffic in ancient foreign cities, not yet geared to the high speed of modern war. One such foreign city is Calcutta, India, metropolis of the Orient, home of three million Hindus and sons of Mohammed. Capital of the province of Bengal, second only to London as the largest city in the British Empire, Calcutta is the spillway through which all Allied supplies pour into Burma. To its steaming harbor on the Hoogley River, 80 miles inland from the Bay of Bengal, ships arrive daily from America's assembly lines. But from Calcutta's docks to the foxholes of Burma is a distance of 1,000 miles, first by rail across the face of India to Lido, where the Stillwell Road begins. This then is the main artery to the fighting heart of China, from Calcutta to Lido to the old Burma Road. The first American convoys began moving through Calcutta in June 1942. Almost overnight, this ancient city, because of its geographic position, became the most strategic depot in the CBI theater, and with its new importance, new problems arose. Its native population, their customs, their very religions, were set to a temple much too slow for the swift deficiency of a modern army. United States military vehicles found themselves disputing the right of way with rickshaws. Ox carts. The city transit system. Pedestrians. Bicycles and civilian cars. Calcutta was a veritable obstacle course in traffic control. The MPs had a rough assignment when the base section commanding general gave the order, an order to apply modern principles of traffic management to a city not even accustomed to walking on sidewalks. From what the military police did here, we can learn what to do in similar situations throughout the world. First step in the preparation of any traffic control plan is reconnaissance, estimate of the situation. The traffic control officer and his sergeant major went out with their notebooks. They noted streets where pedestrians held up traffic. They examined intersections where accidents occurred frequently. They studied the constant problem of congestion. Notes taken on reconnaissance were studied in conferences with MPs of other nationalities in the area and with the local civilian police. There are two ways to approach control problems, provide better traffic facilities, or make better use of existing facilities. Calcutta's MPs did both. Calcutta is a big town about the size of Chicago, USA. They organized a fleet of radio patrol cars. These cars, because of their mobility, could do the work of a regiment of MPs on foot if the drivers could maintain communication. So a central transmitter and receiver station, an SCR 808, was installed in the Provo Marshall's office. Two relay stations were set up in outlying parts of the city, which could communicate with all the jeeps on patrol in the city. Those on the outskirts checked in hourly by phone. Military police headquarters was connected to this radio net by a direct telephone wire to the Provo Marshall's office. Thus the traffic control officer at MP headquarters could instantly get in touch with any patrol car cruising within radio range. When the organization started, the patrol section consisted of one officer and 13 enlisted men. There were six radio cars. Jeeps conspicuously painted. Each had an SCR 610 in the back seat. Their radio range was the city limits of Calcutta. The patrols were assigned beats throughout the city. A small fleet of radio cars can be as effective as a policeman on every corner. On their street patrols they worked closely with the MPs from the British Army. The native police were also included in the control system. Cooperation was important. Together these men formed a team that could legally deal with the drivers of all vehicles in Calcutta. Taking a personal interest in these patrols was the base section commanding general. He had in his car a radio set with which he could contact personally any cruising jeep. Frequently he came out to get an on the spot look at their problems. And their problems were many. The MPs couldn't be everywhere. They were one battalion. The city of Calcutta covers 32 square miles. They depended heavily on traffic signs which they made themselves from whatever scraps of material they could salvage. They had also discovered how to make their warnings demand attention. Back at the docks the patrol car system was paying off. As a convoy assembled the MPs discussed with the convoy commander the route to be taken through the city. When called upon for an escort one patrol car took the lead. As the convoy got underway another took its place at the rear. Other cars were stationed at certain danger points until the convoy passed. These assignments varied not only with the convoy's route but they were also changed daily so that MPs were frequently seen in different sections of the city. This facilitated the movement of traffic and gave the appearance of a greater traffic control force than the actual strength of the MP battalion. When the convoy approached difficult intersections the lead patrol car pulled ahead and stopped to clear the way. They also set a steady speed. This helped the last vehicle in line from having to speed to keep up. Accordion action. And every MP knows what that can do to a convoy. Radio communication was maintained by the two patrol cars at the head and at the rear. Each periodically reported to MP headquarters where the convoy's passage through the city was checked according to the schedule previously arranged. But despite all precautions accidents occasionally happened. Accidents which by themselves could jam the streets or as in this case by the crowds of curious idlers they collected. An Indian policeman ran to report one on a street where the convoy was due to pass. The desk sergeant at MP headquarters took down the information. An accident blocking the street might hold up a convoy of vital supplies. He called the switchboard operator. The operator plugged the sergeant's telephone line into the remote control radio circuit and the traffic control system went into action like clockwork. Without leaving his desk the sergeant was able to contact the patrol car cruising nearest the scene of the accident. The location of the accident was given in seconds the patrol car was on its way there. The need for reporting all accidents immediately was constantly stressed to the native policemen and army drivers. Not only was the threat of a convoy delaying roadblock often quickly relieved but the MPs could conduct an investigation on the spot to determine the circumstances and who was to blame. This was a great improvement over the time when the MPs were informed of an accident days or weeks after it happened. But most accidents were of a minor nature and were disposed of quickly by the MPs with a minimum of misunderstanding and hard feeling. Records showed that in most cases the army driver was not at fault. The scene of the accident had been cleared by the time the convoy arrived and it rolled on to its destination, the Barrack-Paw Railroad Yard. And here the MPs' duty in Calcutta ended. Both the supplies and the vehicles that carried them, for trucks were also part of the supplies here, were turned over to the railroad for the next step in their journey to the fighting front. This came at Lido where the railroad ended and the Stillwell Road began. Here the MPs established their traffic control stations which grew in numbers as the road was carved out of the jungle behind the advancing battle lines. They placed these stations at designated mile points along the road. Those stations before mile 100 were permanent. From this point on, as the road approached the front lines, the posts were temporary. When this picture was photographed, the road extended only as far as war is up. Today, however, all stations are permanent because the Lido Road has been completed and is a part of the overall Stillwell Road. The armies of three nations used Lido as a point of operations, a base of supply. The problems here were much different from those in Calcutta. Calcutta's MPs had a problem in city traffic. Lido's MPs were working with an army in the field. And Lido's 16-mile unloading zone was one of the most congested areas in the CBI theater. Supplies and armored vehicles had to be unloaded from flat cars right onto the main highway, which was already jammed with traffic. From their Lido headquarters, the military police maintained highway patrols 16 hours a day. Other patrols were assigned to specific points throughout the area. Traffic control station number one was located at the northern entrance to Lido. It was the checking station for motor vehicles coming into Lido from India. Here, after every vehicle had been thoroughly searched for liquor, opium, and enemy agents, the driver's trip ticket was examined. If everything was okay, he was allowed to proceed into town. These vehicles were driven by Chinese as well as Americans. And, as in Calcutta, traffic regulations were enforced by teams. Also similar to Calcutta's control system, Lido's MPs had patrol cars. Typical was their job of leading convoys to the local motor pool. Its entrance was a curve that was almost a right angle on the main highway, constantly jammed with traffic. As the convoy approached, one MP stationed himself on the highway to stop the main stream. Another moved into the motor pool to halt vehicles coming out. In parts of Lido's combined truckhead and railhead, over 8,000 vehicles passed a given point every 24 hours. MPs assigned to take traffic counts determined the hours of peak congestion when there was an average of one vehicle every five seconds. As a result of these traffic counts, MP power was conserved. They were stationed at the points of heaviest flow at the hours they were needed most. One of these points was near the north entrance to the Lido area, where the highway crossed the Ding Hing River over the same bridge the railroad used. With trucks and trains using the one right-of-way, strict control was necessary. Phase changes were handled cautiously. Somewhat relieving the congestion here, an MP shuttled part of the traffic, particularly the lighter vehicles, to an engineer-constructed ponten bridge a mile upstream. But the police problem remained the same, one-way traffic. An MP was stationed at the first ponten to enforce the proper distance between trucks. Out on the open road, despite the MP's vigilance, there were violations. Let's go, Joe. Speeding on curves was extremely dangerous anywhere along this road. Drivers caught doing it could expect the fullest through-channels fury of the Provo Marshall. The MPs ordinarily approached the driver from the rear, but in this case they came directly over because they knew him. The MP battalion kept exact records of such offenses by organization and monthly reports indicated where driver discipline or training was unsatisfactory. Traffic control station number two was located four miles east of Lido. This was the eastern gate to the Lido area, and here outgoing vehicles received another check. On the other side of this barrier line, the stillwell road entered open country and became the damnedest highway in the world. Over the Naga Hills, through the Hook-Wong jungle, through the traffic heat and the monsoon's mud, to the Japs. It was 200 miles to Warsaw. The engineers built the road. The MPs kept its traffic under control. Traffic moved quickly from the foothills near Lido into the Naga Hills. MPs from traffic control stations three and four patrolled this part of the road where the steep mountain sides and sharp curves were always a source of trouble. The India-Burma boundary and the crest of the Naga Hills were crossed at Pangsaw Pass at an elevation of over 4,000 feet, but driver's trip tickets were not checked at the traffic control stations here. They were merely bases for the patrol cars. Down in the jungle, all vehicles were halted at traffic control station number five, where the natives from the neighboring village of Logli occasionally came to pass the time of day. The MPs here recorded the number of vehicles passing through each month. From here on along the road, each control station furnished up-to-the-minute reports of the road condition ahead, and the news was usually bad. Along the steep, drainage slopes of Burma, there were many places where rains regularly reduced the road to one-way traffic. At such points, defile control was applied. An MP was stationed at each end of the defile. Traffic was allowed to take turns moving east and west. Moving east, halfway to the front, traffic was more restricted. Number eight was the last permanent control station. Beyond their mosquito net station here, the MPs had only temporary outposts, subject to the demands of road construction and the shifting battle line, subject also to the weather. During the monsoon, the road became a river of slime. Rainfall reached more than 200 inches a year, over 16 feet. Early every summer, the engineers had to build a two-mile causeway over the hard surface road. It became completely submerged by high water. This stretch of road required strict traffic control. Every trip ticket had a priority. An MP rode in the lead vehicle of each cereal. It was his duty to keep the line moving within the required speed limit of five miles per hour. This snail's pace continued along the causeway for 10 miles. Beyond the causeway, a corduroy road of logs and planking had been laid. This stretch was above the high water mark, but still a veritable swamp. At the log road's end, the MP in the lead vehicle jumped out as the convoy moved on over one of the road's 700-odd bridges that was still under construction. Another defile. The movement of vehicles in situations of this kind wasn't possible without MP supervision. The MP's well-camouflaged advanced headquarters was located at the road's 180th mile. The rest of the road was patrolled from this station. But near Warsaw, near the road's end, heavy rains and flooded creeks had washed away completely the supports of the Wara River Bridge. The engineers had come in. Any obstruction to the road or change in traffic conditions quickly brought MP officers to the scene. Was there the possibility of a detour? Could a one-lane bridge section be thrown up quickly? Should convoys on the way be halted far back up the road to avoid congestion here? These questions had to be answered. They had to be answered with a plan. Planning. That was the solution to traffic control problems. Planning. In the ancient streets of Calcutta and in the map-cluttered conference rooms. Planning moved a mountain of supplies through the city. And on the Stillwell Road, planning kept an endless conveyor belt speeding to the battlefront. The Stillwell Road was completed January 2nd, 1945. And the first convoy traveled from India to China. It was a great moment. For China and the Allies, it was a major victory. And the military police claimed no small chapter in the history of this great supply line. They were on the job to the end of the road. They will be on the job on every road. Till an American MP is directing traffic on the corner of Yammer Street and Cotto Avenue in Tokyo.