 We tried to make also ourselves well known, but I could imagine that not everything is known about Europol. During lunch we discussed about the need of fusion sensors and more or less Europol is something like this is the center in which we bring together all kinds of law enforcement agencies looking into organized crime and terrorism. We don't have any investigative powers, so we are supportive agencies giving our support to law enforcement throughout Europe and even beyond Europe by doing three things. First of all, doing the data analytical work in which we have a lot of data coming in from the member states on organized crime and it's our task to see where the relations are. Secondly, build up expertise in a different field than we have been discussing about the digital crime. That's something we took up three years ago with setting up an EC3 and we give support to live investigations, do the coordination on big events. We have 950 people working in DH, of which more than 200 are liaison officers, coming from 43 different countries and I would flag only this one because that's unique. I don't think there is one place in this world, well in Washington probably there are also more than 200 liaison officers, but all those officers are in one building and you can directly walk through Europe by just changing the floors. Those 200 officers represent 73 agencies from 43 different countries. So one of the, well, abilities I had as being responsible for operations directly after Paris is in the following morning call all member states to come to the office and discuss with me what kind of activities we should undertake. And this is a very powerful instrument that should be used I think even more. We are supporting more than 800 high profile investigations throughout Europe out of 30,000 that are reported to us every year. We have a system in which we share 700,000 messages throughout the member states to law enforcement parties and we make more than 4,500 intelligence reports every year which we try to identify a link between an ongoing investigation let's say in Finland and in Slovenia or between different countries. Our budget coming from, because we are a European agency is something like 100 million, well enough about your poll but then you have a little background of what we are doing. What's the threat? Well I already mentioned that I would have been here during November but then 13 November occurred and the attacks in Paris took place. But you could also see it as the first, well, urban warfare or Mumbai start of attack within the European Union that we were facing at this moment. Done by Ingy Massey as the word raised since 2013 and more or less standing for those who are going into a fight without or with the expectation not to return. And that's what we have been seeing also by nine attackers at that moment. What we also saw is from our point of view while using military tactics into the way of ISIS operating within the European Union and that is something new. If you look at it, it would be something like special forces and it's also not so strange if you look at the background of those who are at the top within ISIS they have an army background still coming from the Iraq war from a few decades ago. Also the international dimension in the planning that was in there. Not only by, well, attackers coming from different member states but also the traveling that went on before the attacks. It was also clear, it's mentioned in the press that some of those perpetrators were making traveling throughout the European Union, visiting Hungary, being in Austria, Germany, other places. So there's a strong international dimension into this. And surely it confirmed the capability of ISIS to plan and sustain an international strategy and also to, well, act on it. In the beginning I think there were still questions, is this a last resort that they are taking because of the pressure that the forces are putting on them in the conflict zone or is this a real strategy? I think, I'm afraid I have to say probably it's the latest one, really a strategy for there. And in that way I think we also mentioned that we see it as the most serious threat attack and also threat coming towards the European continent since 10 years, actually. And it's not only a perilous attack, it was also the attacks that happened before. For sure we all remember Charlie Hebdo, but we also had then shortly after the vivier raid in which two perpetrators were killed and as it shows afterwards already being connected to the ones who were also active in Paris. We had the free speech debate in Copenhagen. We had the Barden Museum in Tunis. We had the attack on the hotel also in Tunisia. We had the telestrain traveling. And in that way also just before the 13 November attack we had also the Russian jet that was brought down probably also related to what's this. So we have learned something at least from the capability that ISIS has. It's able and it has capacity to strike at any time at any chosen target. We also think that the local operations and the local operators enjoy tactical freedom to choose. What you see is that it's not only fully directed from let's say a central area in Syria or another place, there is also some local activity. If you look at the perpetrators in Paris you see all three, well, threats that we are seeing. You see people coming with migration and being a foreign fighter. But we see also five of them having lived for a long time in Belgium and France and being radicalized. And finally those who left before, years before, went to Syria and came back. So we have all three threats that we are seeing now, not only foreign fighters that are returning but also the radicalization that took place in our own countries. So that's also the reason why I say that ISIS terrorism is also strongly domestic based and also locally based in this field. And there's a change in the radicalization process from let's say a long term of radicalization into a very rapid recruitment that's getting more and more. If you look at some of the perpetrators and the attackers in Paris, some of them had links with organized crime, with drugs crime only three or four years before. So you see also a change in the background of those. The group structures are, and we discussed this also during lunch, no longer so much linked to religious reasons but more to peer pressure and also the social links that are existing. So there's a different way of looking into this. And there's a strong preference as we have been seen for soft targets instead of well, making a text towards let's say state. And especially if you look, and it's not so long ago that the video film was published in which, well, all nine attackers were shown. You see that the structure of ISIS training is in a way that's emotionally detached from activity. So in that way also even bringing more fear towards us, I think, than you would assume by somebody who's been radicalized on the long term. So what's our answer? Why, and that was the topic also, what was mentioned. Why should we step up and how to step up? First of all, I think we try to learn from as law enforcement agency of the things that are happening around us. So making sure that we understand also the digital society in which we are in and also taking lessons from earlier involvement in this. I mentioned already the cyber crime unit we set up three years ago. And we try to have this as a center which we bring all different expertise together. That's the way that we're looking into the ECTC, the European Counterterrorism Center also, in a way we bring not only terrorism expertise in there, but also especially on social media, on fraud, on firearms, on financial investigations. And in that way also by working together in a fusion way, I think we are able to, from as Europe all as an organization to support member states much stronger than we did before. And actually we started with the idea of the ECTC after the Charlie Hebdo attack. And as a responsible manager, I thought, well, let's start. And then after a few years, we will have a big case in which we can well show the other way of working. And to be honest, the other, well, it turned around because then the Paris attack appeared. What we try to do is run in, within working in an ECTC, actually that was not launched but already in place, to support with financial intelligence. Within six hours, because of the program we have with the United States, Travis Financing Tracking Program, we were able to give the first deeds towards the investigators in France. We tried to deploy people to Interpol in Belgium, but also sending social media experts with an Arabic background towards the investigators in Paris. And also as a result of setting up and monitoring the response team, we had more than 60 officers working for the first two weeks and a 24 hour basis to support France and Belgium with the investigations. And the way that support was given was not only being making analytical schemes of who was involved and what the relation was between this, but also trying to find links between those who were responsible for this and their background, and trying to identify the network. Because I think to be honest, what we have seen is attackers, but we haven't until now resolved the network that was behind. I think you're all aware of the fact that there were safe houses, more than one. There was an infrastructure. There were also explosives made in which the supplies for this are still not being detected. So we came up in the French case with more than 75 reports and also more than 1,200 messages exchanged between the different member states. So in that way, I think we can do things by giving direct operational support. That's the first pillar which we try to engage now within the European Counter-terrorism Center. The second is on enhancing connectivity. Ring the CT community closer to each other. So since the 1st of January, we operate a system in which all CT units can exchange information on a confidential level throughout Europe and in the future also it will be attached to other areas within the globe. We are trying to increase the information exchange. Well, I had an interview for the Irish radio and the question was, did we until now exchange enough information? And the answer is no. We have to step up and build on trust in exchanging information. To give you one example, we had one European information system in which, in a hit-no-hit system in which we also tried to set up, well, the travelers and the terrorist information. Back in 2015, early 2015, we had 18 entrances in there. So 18 people that were connected to this. At this moment, we have more than 3,700. Because of the step up that also I think law enforcement saw that it's needed to have this not only country approach but have a pan-European approach towards this problem. So in that way, I think there is a strong need to counter and to support the information exchange even more. And especially because with most of the attackers, we see also relation with organized crime. Combining the fact that there is a strong and very rapid recruitment and medicalization process of those who are, well, already a peer group and especially a group in crime, this is the risk that if we don't apply also the knowledge of organized crime into this, we will miss something for the future. The last thing I would like to mention, so we have the pillars in giving operational support and enhancing the connectivity, supporting information exchange by building different databases. And finally, it's on countering the violent extremism online. And that's the IU unit that was mentioned before. And then it's, I think, especially also about, well, making sure that we find our ways how to react with the social media in this. And I will come to this a little bit later. What's now the role of the ECTC? So this center that was set up just a few weeks ago. I think it's a major step forward for the European Union in building trust, but also now having on a platform level a fusion center that could give support towards the member states. And I'm not sure if you saw probably a hard talk on the BBC last week in which my director was interviewed. And while the interviewer kept saying, well, how many people does your poll I have? And how many people do you have in the country unit? And how many in migration? And the numbers are limited. So in the ECTC, we have 40 people. And hopefully we can engage or enlarge this into 70 or 80. And there was a little bit of laughing about the fact, well, how can you do something with this? To be honest, on one hand, probably we should invest more. On the other hand, the digital work makes also it's not about the amount of people you have. It's about the platform and the network that you can create. And I gave the example also of, let's say, Uber or B&B. Well, there are the biggest taxi company and the biggest hotel company in the world, but they don't own one hotel room, one car. It's not about having this installed. It's not about having your poll or your poll agency of 3,000 people. It's about making sure that you have this platform, that network, or really up to date. And that's what we are. It's an info hub, an intelligence provider, and a service provider, and a coordination platform. That's the thing that we are striving for. And in that way, also for the future, because your poll is a law enforcement, it's not on our intelligence services. But now, having this ECTC, this should be also a counterpart for the European Intelligence Service meeting each other on a regular basis and trying to connect with us. The motto I have for law enforcement is collect your information and connect with us. The motto for intelligence services, well, connect with us and check your information. You don't have to give it to us. There are all ways of anonymization that you can use in which you can check if there's anything available. But you are on the front end of, well, trying to fight this crime. And that's the way how to do it. Now, finally, I think back to the digital world, because I promised to say something about this. Also, if you look at the trends that we're seeing, I think you all recognize it's about, well, three trends, big data. So the difficulty and the possibility to use big data to also make sure that you understand what's going on, that's, I think, a real challenge, but also an opportunity. If you realize that 90% of all data that is stored within the European Union has been resembled or brought together within the last two years, so that's the amount of increase that we have in big data. Well, the hyperconnected world, everything and everybody is connected. We have already more than 3.2 billion users of internet. But we have more than 20 billion devices connected to the internet. So the hyperconnectivity is also something that we're looking in. And finally, the increased, well, disappearing of boundaries. Boundaries in time, it's possible to now have direct contact with or even use many seconds to do your dealing at the trade market. Actually, there's now built a line between Ireland and the United States that will give you only 16 milliseconds of, well, increased time. But this will mean a lot of transactions. And the 200 million that's invested in there will be paying yourself back within a few years. But also in volume and also in distance. Well, we are used to the fact that we are doing business all over the world. And that's what I'm mentioning in those three trends, because the digital revolution has also its impact on law enforcement. Every internet user can be a publisher now. All of you, you can put everything on the net. And sometimes you know it's also, well, goes viral in a way that your information is there. So I see opportunities and intelligence as it goes for the digital world. First of all, let's talk about the opportunities. It can improve law enforcement's crisis response. Going back to Paris, I think we also do the pictures of the Bataclan. The social media use of social media, by those who are inside, made also clear for the French police that they should, well, not wait too long and get into this theater. So the crisis response by using social media is an opportunity. The crisis monitors and crisis detectors, I think it's also a way to make sure that you use this information to see what's going on. Also, by using geolocation, one of the things that we provided to the French police is that the IRU units, or the Internet Refill Unit, used capabilities to see how many people at a certain moment were in the surroundings of the places in which the attack took place at this moment. We identified 366 social media accounts being in the neighborhood. And the reason for doing this was looking for witnesses, was looking for those who could say something about what's going on. So using social media in that way, people that are publishing at this moment, is also an opportunity for police to improve the way that you are doing business. But on the other hand, there's also some challenges. First of all, the leakage of information. While we as the police officers, we were used to keep the information within our boundaries. That's not possible anymore, because everything will be published at every moment. There can be an information overload in a way that you get so much information, you don't know how to act. And also, with something that's happening in society, I think, you also, as a communication office, you have to be prepared to react what's going on. You cannot say we will come with a press release within one hour, because it's out there. And everyone can follow it at that moment also. So how to prepare for this? And it can also be that you get the wrong information. That's deliberately being shared towards you, and you will act on this field. So we have to find our strategy in this field. How does ISIS do this? Well, they have the media, Mujahideen, so to say. They are really focusing, learning also from what has been, well, the first users by Al Qaeda, but even also trying to get into a competition with each other in using the media in a way that it's been profitable for them. Profitable in a way that they use it to fear us, to bring fear to the people, but on the other hand, also to glorify the things that they are doing, and also trying to recruit people in that way. And I think there are three things that we should look at or more or less giving us problems. First of all, the resilience. They moved from, let's say, from a broadcast model in which in the past you had preachers that went out to cities and did the preaching towards a dispersed form in which every moment, every day, there is messages about this. We have more than 50,000 accounts on a daily basis that produce more than 110,000 tweets that's out there. It's the phone that you have that's at this moment more or less the one who brings you that information towards also those who are available. It's also about the second difficulty that we have is about the speed. If you look at the hashtag Paris Burning directly after the attacks, we had 7,500 tweets within the first 50 minutes. And if you see it, the claim that was then lighter on the internet, it was directly from the start on 20 URLs. And after two weeks or more than 340 URLs. So the way of being able to publish your information, that gives us a lot of difficulty. And finally, the agility, so to say, also the fact that ISIS tries to even piggyback on things like the World Cup, we've seen this before. Or also to bring in new apps that could be used to get the latest information. What we also have been seeing is automated botnets that create attacks or spread the news towards a bigger audience than probably it would be possible if not using this. And also something like the translation service. So to translate Arabic into all kinds of languages in which they could reach out. We are trying to set something against this. And that's the IOU, the internet referral unit. It's not about a unit that takes down every Twitter account. That's not possible. And it's also not our aim. We go for quality instead of quantity. We bring together GADism expertise, language capabilities in different languages, also Arabic and Russian. We try to be the single point of contact for member states and for the industry so that they know how to reach us. And we want to develop jointly with the private sector. So the internet referral unit flags violent content on the internet. But not using any judicial power to remove it. Just flagging it, bringing it towards the provider and saying, well, this is in our view in not in agreement with your terms of reference. And if this is the case, then also Facebook, Twitter has the obligation to take it down. And that's what they're doing in a way that we have been now just in the last weeks referring 2,000 messages, 2,000 candidates, of which 88% were taken down by the providers. And that's not the amount that you see if you see how much is being used. But it's more about those who are really making the difference, those that deliver translation service or those that are responsible for setting up botnets. In that way, I think we try to bring on board our support towards removing violent content. And it's also about organizing the industry in the way that now we reach out to every different provider. And you know, it's very easy to change from provider. But if we identify violent content, that's clearly not online, and it's glorifying violence, then there is no, let's say, trusted partner in which you can share this with each other. So one of the proposals that we are making together with the industry is to see if you could set up that once a certain video is being seen as a violent content, that there could be a third party, a trusted partner, which all those different IT companies could log in and directly don't have to go to the total process by themselves, but in that way also multiplying the effect that we have. Well, this is just up and running for six months. We were able to have a lot of products, strategic products, because I think that's the only thing I want to say. Getting expertise on how it's being used, how the role of women is in social media. These are some of the examples of the products that we are making. It's clear, I think, I'm trying to say that there is a threat outside in which we have to respond. There is not one solution. It's also clear for me that law enforcement cannot solve the problem. It's more political problem, society problem, but we have to bring our share. And our share is partly by setting up something new, being a fusion center and being a platform using also what we see in society and translating this on a European level by giving support to the member states. The threats that we see as our priorities at this moment are cyber and cyber and all organized crime, but also cyber related to terrorism is migration. And there you see more or less the same problem as it goes for having not only a country approach, but the need for a pan-European approach and finally also on terrorism. Well, we are ready to build those platforms. That's also our task. Our motto is to make Europe safer. And that's what we're trying to do and also working together with law enforcement in a way to set up new things.