 All right, we're going to be debating does a soul exist and Eric you got 15 minutes on the floor, so All on you my friend All right, so I'd like to first think James and modern day debate for the invitation and to Leo for participating in this debate Now the question for this debate is does a soul exist now? I want to start by giving you two things this debate is not to begin with this debate is not a scientific question And this is a case for a few reasons first to say otherwise would be a category of fallacy The soul if it exists would be a non-physical entity and science by definition is a discipline that can only study the physical Thus while science is a wonderful tool for investigating the physical world It has nothing to say about the non-physical in fact science and principle cannot even ask the question much less answer it and Some of the world's leading neuroscientists such as a late Nobel Prize winner John Eccles Jeffery Schwartz and Mario Beauregard all believe in the soul and one can't say they believe in the soul because they don't understand the neuroscience and Given that these are some of the world's leaders in neuroscience Moreover any view regarding the nature of consciousness of the soul be it dualism my view or physicalism Leo's view will be what is called empirically equivalent Meaning that there is no piece of empirical data that one could give that would specifically lend support to one of you over the other But differently Leo and I will agree on all the empirical data But our conclusions drawn from the data will be philosophical in nature and not scientific This is because the questions surrounding tonight's debates are philosophical questions about metaphysics not science and as atheist philosopher of science Michael Rue says Science does not ask certain questions. So does to no surprise that it does not give certain answers So appealing to science to answer the question tonight would be like appealing to a ruler to measure your weight It is simply the wrong tool for the assessment Second this debate is not about the correlations between the mind and brain Well, there's much to say here and I'll touch more on this later Suffice to say that no dualist denies correlations, but again, we can get to that in our interaction Let's start with the definition. What is a soul? The soul is an immaterial substance that possesses consciousness and animates the body That is to say the soul is a stealth the conscious subject And with that being said my case for the soul will be argued in two basic contention The first is that consciousness is not physical that is to say neither identical nor reducible to anything physical like the brain and Two that I am more than a brain body. I am a soul Now in order to understand the arguments I'll be providing for these two basic points It's important to get a foundation and grasp of what is known as Leibniz's law of the industry and ability of identicles But for sure it would just call it the law of identity or Leibniz's law According to Leibniz's law if two things in question are the same say some a and b Then whatever is true of one is going to necessarily be true of the other and vice versa But in philosophy when we say two things are identical We simply mean they're the same thing and this gives us a test for identity Because if in principle you can show that there is something true of one that is not true of the other or vice versa Then it follows that the two are not the same thing So with this in mind we can go to the my first basic contention that consciousness is not physical And let's say for the sake of argument that Leo is correct and that physicalism is true Which is a view that human beings are purely physical objects composed of purely physical properties in part The reason this is important is because if Leo wants to argue that physicalism is true Then how to demonstrate to us that consciousness if it exists is Identical or reducible to something physical like the brain and given in Leibniz's law This would mean that whatever is true of the mind must necessarily be true of the brain and vice versa However, if it cannot demonstrate that this is the case and in principle We can show that there is something true of the mind that is not true of the brain or vice versa Then given Leibniz's law of identity It would follow that consciousness cannot be identical or reducible to the physical given that they possess different properties and thus physicalism would be false And while there are many ways to show the non-identity between the mind and brain for the second time I'll just list a few First take a state of my mind like my thoughts or beliefs My thoughts or beliefs could be true or false, but no state or region of my brain is true or false Now Leo takes a functionalist physicalist view of the mind in which mental states are reducible to functions of the brain But now how the same problem arises Again, my thoughts can be true or false, but functions aren't true or false I don't even know what it would mean to say that a function is true or false After all a toilet fleshen is a function, but toilet fleshes aren't true or false My brain can be seven inches long, but the smell of a rose or taste of a banana Which is in my mind is not seven inches long Moreover, my mental states are accessible only to me whereas my brain states are not for example A doctor can open up my skull and look at my brain, but she doesn't open up my skull and look at my thoughts This is because consciousness is a first-person direct private or privileged access kind of thing accessible only to me So while a neuroscientist can know more about my brain than I do You could never know more about my mental life than I do. In other words, you can see you can see my brain functions But she won't see my thoughts Now while there are many more examples we can go through the point is simply this If all the properties of the brain are physical and all the properties of the mind are not physical Well, then it follows that consciousness if it exists cannot be identical or reducible to the physical And if it cannot be identical or reducible to the physical then it follows that physicalism is false Now at this point it would be crucial to pause and make everyone aware of the fact that Establishing a pause or dependence relationship between two things is not the same thing as nor does it establish identity To illustrate suppose a guitar player pops a string While he's playing and the song and is no longer able to continue playing the music Note how it's easy to establish a cause-and-effect or dependency relationship between the musician and his instrument But clearly this wouldn't prove that one is identical or reducible to the other and Similarly, it's easy to establish that you you affect parts of my brain such as with Alzheimer's narcotics or brain damage It will have a cause-and-effect correlation with the functions of my mind But as before this wouldn't prove that the mind and brain are identical to each other because as I just mentioned Pause or dependence relationship is not the same thing as nor can it establish identity So if Leo wants to show that physicalism is true He's going to have to do far more than show that there's a cause-and-effect or dependency relationship At the very least he's going to have to show that they necessarily share the same properties And that is that there is nothing true of the mind that is not true the brain and vice versa And unless he can do that then his belief in physicalism is unjustified Now another thing to briefly mention is the irreducibility of consciousness Which I won't have time to go into detail but consider what the following three atheist philosophers have to say regarding the issue Atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel has pointed out in his book mind and cosmos that you cannot get mind from matter The problem is that you can't simply rearrange particles of matter and get something like consciousness coming into existence Any more than rearranging the red bricks of a house will give you the color blue In other words consciousness is not something that you get by simply rearranging a physical structure Hence Atheist philosopher Thomas McGinn says that any naturalistic explanation for consciousness Coming from matter would border on sheer magic and note that to simply point out correlations or Whole consciousness emergent or supervenient doesn't solve the problem either because as atheist philosopher Jagwan Kim would argue Correlations are not explanations, but are in fact the very thing that need explaining So slapping the label of emergent or supervenient only gives a name to the problem, but it doesn't solve it Now using limeness's law of identity once again Let's look at the second point that I am more than a brain and body to begin with Let's suppose again that Leo's correct and then that physicalism stroke if this is a case and I am identical and reducible to nothing more than a brain and body then human beings would be what we call Philosophy a myriological aggregate, but we'll just call this an aggregate for short Which is a collection of separable parts held together in a certain structure So things like watches cars or Lego bricks are what you would call aggregate Again a collection of several parts held together in a structure, but it's important to note that for aggregates their existence and identity necessarily depend on their parts and structure to illustrate consider this car if I were to replace the tires of this car Would it still be the same car? But before you answer that question Suppose I were to replace every single nut and bolt of this car every part windshield bumper. Is it the same car? But before you answer that question Suppose I took those replaced parts put them back together and you'll now have two cars and Then we could ask which of these two is the original if any Now regardless of your answer one thing is clear and that is that for aggregates They do not retain what is called identity through change or part replacement So with this in mind consider my first argument premise one. I'm either purely physical object or an immaterial soul To if I am a purely physical object, then I do not retain identity to change as a thought experiment Suppose I committed a crime seven and ten years ago It's now known through science that every seven and ten years human beings replace virtually every cell in our bodies Well, suppose a detective comes at my door and says that they just now found the evidence to convict me But clearly I couldn't argue that the person they're looking for no longer exists because that's a different set of properties and parts why because we all intuitively know that we do retain identity to change a part replacement and That's what would follow that therefore. I'm not a purely physical object. Therefore. I am a soul Or consider an argument put forth by a secular philosopher Jagon Kim. He says something like in 2011 this spring body did not exist However, I did exist in 2011. Therefore. I'm not identical or reducible to a body. The second Indivisibility of personhood Promise one. I'm either a purely physical object an aggregate or an immaterial soul To truly physical objects can be divided and exist in various percentages or degrees Illustrate if I were to cut a table in half and burn one side It would make sense to say that I have 50% of a table But the same cannot be said of me for example if you were to cut me in half stay my arms and limbs Note that while it would make sense to say that I have 50% of a body It wouldn't make sense to say that therefore I am 50% of a person and yet this is exactly what it would have to mean If physicalism is true Moreover, consider the fact that men are typically larger than women if Physicalism is true and personhood is grounded in something physical and if we grant value to persons Then this would have to imply that having more master and matter would mean that you matter more But clearly this is absurd. Men are not more valuable or more persons and women and know how the same thing can be said of the brain Consider something like dandy walker syndrome or an insomphalic disease or operations where some people are missing say 30% of their brain But note this wouldn't mean that they're only 70% persons There's still 100% persons that have lost function, but personhood isn't grounded in something physical like your functioning Thus I cannot be divided or exist in various percentages or degrees. Therefore. I'm not a purely physical object Therefore I am a soul Next is the argument from free will From this one I'm either purely physical object an aggregate or an immaterial soul If I am a purely physical object, then I do not possess free will Now concerning free will I'm more specifically talking about libertarian free will which can be defined as being the first mover of one's will or actions That is to say you are not caused to act or will by something prior or external to yourself However, if naturalism is true then a secular philosopher Jaguon Kim argues the law of closure closure of the physical must be true And according to this law no physical event has a non physical cause Consequently this would entail that on physicalism every thought decision belief and behavior was causally determined by physical events external to and beyond one's control But differently this would mean that if Leo rejects free will then his very decision to be a physicalist was not necessarily the result of rigorous research And freely following the evidence where it led and freely come into this conclusion But rather it was something who was causally determined to believe by prior non-rational factors beyond his control and he could not have believed otherwise So if one gives up free will one must pay the intellectual price tag of giving up two things namely more responsibility and intellectual integrity This wouldn't tell that if there is no free will and determinism is true and there would be no foundation for more responsibility or intellectual integrity for any belief that he holds to Yet if human beings are morally responsible for their actions and intellectually responsible for the beliefs that they hold to and freely follow the evidence where it leads Then it follows that we do possess free will which means that therefore I am not a purely physical object therefore I must hold Now I will say that if Leo wants us to believe that he freely came to be an atheist or physicalist based on the intellectual reasons And if he believes that people are held morally accountable for their beliefs and for what they do then human beings cannot be identical or reducible to purely physical objects So in conclusion I provided two contentions for the existence of the soul in answer to the tonight's debate does the soul exist And these were one that consciousness is not physical and two that I am more than a brain and body I am a soul and we can summarize the case as follows One the non-identity of mind and brain that if consciousness exists it can't be physical and for the second point identity to change that is that if you're the same person from one moment to the next And if everyone is equally valuable despite the amount of master matter they possess then they are then they are indivisible as persons And if people are morally responsible for their actions and rationally responsible for their beliefs free will then it would follow that physicalism as false So here's the irony for tonight's debate The fact that Leo is arguing for physicalism tonight automatically presupposes note that one everyone here is conscious that two you'll be the same person at the beginning middle and end of this debate Three that everyone here is equally valuable and four that everyone here is free to follow the evidence and freely change their mind on the topic Which means that even if you're convinced by Leo's case that physicalism is pro then ironically this would only mean that the soul exists and therefore physicalism would be false Thank you Alright well thank you for that we're going to kick it over to Leo for up to 15 minutes for your introductory statement and thank you everybody for being here Floor is yours I don't know if I'll need the full 15 minutes just a few points of contention I have immediately with the concept of the soul One of them is actually brought up and talked about by Higuan Kim who Eric mentioned a number of times I believe he caused it the causal exclusion problem or the pairing problem And it's this idea that if the soul as Eric has already conceded is a non-physical thing then the soul is ignorant to spatial proximity And the question then is why can my soul only affect my brain body why can I not affect Eric's brain body or Ryan or James brain body or any of you After all if the soul doesn't care about spatial proximity then it shouldn't matter the brain body the soul can affect it But that's not what we observe Another way you could look at this is say that you had a leg amputated If the soul is ignorant to spatial proximity it shouldn't matter that your leg is not physically connected to your body Your soul should still have some control over your leg Another thing that we do not observe And for me this issue I find to be a big deal with things like substance dualism and soul That we can only affect our brain bodies and only in an intact way The second problem that I have is more of a causal problem with the concept of a soul How does the soul causally interact with the world? How does my soul cause me to raise my hand? And if the soul doesn't causally engage with the body then how does it cause the body to do things? How do things happen because of my soul if not through causality? I would argue physicalism has an explanation for both of these points Number one, I can't affect my leg if it's been amputated because I don't have a soul I just have my physical body and my physical brain and all of the various functions and processes that it engages in You separate apart from that you no longer have any control over that part of your body I can't affect anybody else's body because of physicalism Because I am, this is me, I am a brain body But I'm not just that brain body, I am all of the various functions and processes that it engages in As the whole system metabolizes throughout my life And physicalism can explain how things happen causally Because causality, at least according to most metaphysicians, is going to be considered some sort of physical process happening through time So I can raise my hand because of the physical signals going on in my brain That transfers through all of my nerves that then affect the muscles that cause the changes in my arm to raise up So physicalism seems to account for these two problems where I don't see, at least yet How a soul can account for these issues that I have And my final issue is that the soul seems a bit superfluous As Eric has already admitted, the soul isn't a physical thing and it isn't an empirical thing either We can't use empirical science to understand what the soul is So for me, all that means is that the soul as a concept, as a thing, if you will Does not immediately harmonize with the ontology of the world around us It doesn't fit in with physics, it doesn't fit in with chemistry, it doesn't fit in with biology Or any of the other means through which we could understand the world and how all the things that happen in it Like us raising our hands and driving our cars and doing all of the actions and the behaviors and having all of the beliefs and the desires that we do Doesn't seem that it can account for that And to me, that just means that it seems kind of like a useless concept The concept that the soul doesn't provide for meaningful causal explanations of what is going on in our bodies and in our brains It doesn't serve as an explanation for anything, it doesn't seem to fit into some sort of theory that we can use to explain things And predict things going forward into the future Also, when is the soul obtained? When do we get our souls? When we're conceived? Two months into carrying a child? When we're born? Some point after we're born? When do we get a soul? What kinds of creatures does a soul obtain within? Do dogs have souls? Do cats have souls? Do fish have souls? So these kinds of questions seem to show a level of sort of vagueness or vacuousness to the concept of a soul Which I would argue lends to its superfluousness, this again might be strong Its uselessness in helping us understand the world around us So for me, I look for things that we can use to actually help us explain and understand the world around us And it just doesn't seem that a soul is a concept that is going to be useful in doing that And I think it is for that reason that the concept should be rejected And that's all I have to say Alright excellent, we're going to kick it into an open discussion So 50 minutes on the floor and I usually hand it over to you Eric, where you just listened to all that So for some response Yeah, so thank you for the opening It seemed that, so as my friend Cameron Bertuzzi, I may know if the captioning Christianity likes to say questions are an argument So I didn't hear an argument as to the soul not existing or the sense of the soul doesn't Because I heard a lot of questions of how does this happen I think the first thing I'd say and then feel free to when everyone responds Is that you're essentially looking at epistemic questions of how something works To the case that I'm providing is an ontological answer to how we know that there is a soul to begin with So for example, my son uses an iPhone and I can assure you he doesn't know how it works But it doesn't fall from there that therefore there is no iPhone So I don't see how, even if I said I don't know to all your questions, how would that prove there's no soul I think it would show that, well the soul is superfluous It can't really offer any explanations for anything If we don't know how the soul affects the body to do things If we don't know why the soul can only affect a single brain body Then that just seems that it's not saying anything more It's not providing us with anything over and above the physical mechanisms that we already utilize At least I should say that we, the neuroscientists and all of them Already utilize to understand these kinds of actions and behaviors that we engage in Are you conceding that all those questions don't prove that there is no soul? Don't prove that there is no soul, no Or don't give evidence to it But they weren't just questions, I mean there's the pairing problem Which you seem familiar with Jaguar and Keem, so Jaguar and Keem and Jaguar I've heard it both ways, I don't know how it's pronounced And then the interaction problem, which states that it is a question Does the soul causally interact with the brain body? I would say yes Okay But how? I mean, but going back to, I want to make sure that this point is clear That again, if I say I don't know Note how that doesn't affect any of the arguments I gave Because the arguments I gave were that So if I can read a quote from J.P. Morlin and Brenna Ricklewell's new book The Substance of Consciousness In answer to that kind of causal explanation question They say substance dualism is not intended to provide a causal explanation For the occurrence of conscious states Substance dualism is an ontological theory as to what sort of thing Must an entity be to capture adequately several features Not of mental states, but of the thing that has them In other words, I'm not giving an epistemic answer to Here's how this works, but rather that if something like the mind exists It would have to have a subjective center of consciousness that possesses it So all the questions you're asking And go free to take it where you want from here I just want to make that point clear That none of that would affect any of the arguments that I made So I'm a little confused on some terminology Can I ask what you mean by subjective center of consciousness That I'm a subject, that I'm a conscious subject I mean I would agree with that, but I don't think that that can only be true Under a substance dualism Which maybe you weren't necessarily saying that, but I think so You think so? You don't think that you can be a conscious agent Under physicalism? I don't think so, no Why not? So what's interesting is one of the things you brought up was That substance dualism doesn't harmonize what we know about the world Now what's interesting is, so you believe consciousness exists? Of course Okay, so are you familiar with Eliminative Materialists? Yeah, I am not an Eliminative Materialist But they would give the very same argument that you just gave As to why we should eliminate conscious entities Because they are in no way harmonizing with anything physical I think they do I think they harmonize with the various neurophysiological processes That occur within the central nervous system I think that's what consciousness is And it seems, and this is why I asked a lot of those questions That from what we can understand within the field of neuroscience That that's what it's showing us That we can go into the physical brain, change things about it And that changes the sort of mind that people have We also have split brain patients There's a guy, I can't remember the guy's name But he's split brain And he's both an atheist and a theist And both sides of his brain can argue with each other I would wonder how the concept of a soul would account for something like that Right, so we're going back to accounting questions But I want to take one thing at a time here I'm trying to think of the first thing you brought up Oh, you're saying that the mind just is the brain No, I don't think the mind is the brain I think the mind emerges from the neurophysiological processes Of not the brain, the central nervous system Because I think all of that is important to our consciousness Even the neurons in our gut have been shown to be important to our consciousness So note that at the beginning of my opening I said the two things that's made us not Not a scientific question and it's not about the correlations of the mind and brain That seems to be the very thing you're arguing Now, granted, we didn't exchange openings But I think it's telling here that I think most of the arguments against sumptuous dualism Are really strong men that don't address the actual issue Two physicalists, Nobel Prize winners who are physicalists They don't believe in the soul, they're naturalists Francis Crick and Christoph Cox They acknowledge that one of the main attitudes among neuroscientists Is that the nature of consciousness is a philosophical problem And so best left to philosophers So even the neuroscientists are saying it's not a scientific problem And I don't even see how in principle neuroscience could settle anything Now, again, I would agree that there are correlations But I've already just said it in my opening So I don't see how that would do anything to anything that I presented Two things there, not just, I mean, I do think you were doing this No offense intended, but people making those statements seem to me to be ad hoc Dismissing science as having any place in this discussion I just think that's false, I think that science has and can and has Said a lot about consciousness There was another thing I wanted to say What was the second thing you said after that first point? And by the way, if there's anything, because there's a question you asked I haven't answered So I don't want you to think I'm trying to dodge those What you say was the second thing What I remember was just that the main attitude of neuroscientists So in other words, it seems that you're disagreeing Oh, I remember, the correlation thing I would agree with that general principle that correlation doesn't equal causation But I would say that causation is correlative So we can use correlations to understand causative relations So I don't think that you're really doing this here But I do oftentimes think the whole correlation causation thing can be abused Again, I don't really think that you're doing that here But just to reiterate, correlation does not equal causation I agree with that completely But I think causation is correlative And I think that when those correlations are strong enough Such as if I hit somebody in the head with a bat 100 times And all 100 times they get knocked out I think it's reasonable to say that hitting somebody in the head hard enough Can knock them out That there's a causative relation there And I think that the correlations between what the brain and the central nervous system And even other parts of the body are doing Correlates so strongly with our consciousness That we can say that consciousness has a physical basis of some sort Okay, so a few things Because I'd still be curious to what the mind is on your view But it seems that you disagree The mind is what the central nervous system does The way that I would just answer that I'll answer it a little bit differently So let me go to an asset now And my argument wasn't that correlations aren't causation My argument was that establishing a cause and effect or dependency relationship Is not the same thing as establishing identity But you seem to agree that the mind is not the brain No, I don't hold to identity theory Okay, so how do you identify a mental state? I'm not really sure what a mental state Or even a physical state Or something like a quantum state is Because I believe that the whole of physical reality Including us and everything going on inside of us Is processual So the whole state thing Looking at things that states is sort of this definite Instantaneous instant is something we do It's sort of a convention that we do But states don't exist in reality So for me, I'm not sure what a mental state is But I'm equally as unsure to what a physical state would be as well Because the state language confuses me So I'm not sure what a mental state is So you believe we have thought? Yes That would be a mental state Well, I would consider it as a mental process rather than state How can a mental process be true or false? I don't know what that means How can a process be true or false? Well, I don't think it is Just like the processes in the sun are true or false Right, so that was one of my arguments Was that the mind and brain aren't identical And I appeal to your view of functionalism If you're going to say that the mind is a function of the brain Well, my thoughts, which is a mental state, can be true or false But a function isn't true or false That would automatically show that they're not the same thing Of course, the content of your thoughts can be true or false But I'm a nominalist, so that content doesn't really... Like it's not... Well, I think you're thinking propositions I'm talking about the thought itself Thoughts exist and they're grounded in thinkers So when it comes to the philosophy of mind The two main questions is What is the nature of mind or mental states And what is the thing that possesses it I argue that consciousness is not physical And it's possessed by a material substance On your view, the mind is a process of the whole system Is what I hear you saying And it's possessed by what? That's that system and it's processed And that would be... That question I have to think about in the sense that Being possessed by... I don't know if that's the language I would use But just for the sake of the discussion I would say possessed by the system And it's various processes and functions So how would you respond then to my argument Of the non-identity between a process and a mental state Like a thought or belief? I don't see an issue there, I guess So the mind is a process of the brain Mental states, like a thought, can be true or false Processes can't be true If the thought is propositional I don't know what it would mean For something non-propositional to be true or false But for me, that's going to be the content Not the thought itself, but the content of one's thoughts So you can have thoughts and then I can have thoughts of And if I have a thought of something propositional That propositional content would be true or false But obviously the processes and functions which produce it Would not be Just like it can be true or false If the sunny meets the electromagnetic radiation But the processes that produce it Produce all of that electromagnetic radiation Are not going to be truth functional I don't think you're doing this intentionally But I think you're making it more complicated than it needs to be I have a thought, grass is green That can be true or false The proposition that grass is green can be true or false And my belief that grass is green Can also be true or false But the process, the brain process is not true or false No, of course not So then how can mental states be processes of the brain? I guess I'm not understanding where the objection is I don't know why the processes would have to be truth functional Just because the content of the thoughts is truth functional Because if that's, if you're identifying a mental state As a process of the brain Then whatever's proved that mental state Would have to be true or the brain state If they're the same thing Because that's how identity works Well I don't take identity I take functional process or process functionalism as well So when I ask you how do you identify a mental state Or if I ask you is the mind a process of the brain That word is, I'm using it as an is of identity So I guess I would just ask Then how do you explain Well I would probably use it as an is of predication We can predicate about the central nervous system That it produces what we call a mind So you are taking a reductionistic approach No, I'm taking an emergent approach So there's two types of reduction It sounds like you're taking a causal reduction Which let's call it emergent So it sounds almost, and I don't know if you're curious It sounds like you're at least a property dualist If you're saying that you have, okay So can you define then what you are? I'm what I call a process functionalist Can you explain that for me? That what we call consciousness is the processes And the functions of the central nervous system in the body As the body continuously metabolizes throughout your life So that metabolism stops, so do you So at best you're showing that there's a dependence relation The consciousness depends on the functions and processes of the central nervous system How do you know what sensations you have? I feel them So you're not looking at processes, you're just introspective My perceptual senses are related to those processes and functions I didn't say they relate I'm still trying to get at the nature of a mental state That would be my view, is that my perceptual senses relate to the processes and functions I agree with you there, I have, again, as I said I perceive through my perceptual apparatus that I have Which are a result of the processes and functions And the structures like eyes and nose and tongue and ears But I didn't have those, I wouldn't have those senses But going back, as I said in the beginning My little dualist denies that they're correlations Or that the processes are correlated to that But the soul is immaterial, right? So it shouldn't need eyes to see, right? So is the mind, the mind is immaterial as well But the soul shouldn't need eyes to see, right? While I'm bodied I would think it does Why? I mean it doesn't depend on the body, it's an immaterial thing So where are you getting these notions from, I'm curious What do you mean? So you were talking about some of the questions you asked Let's go back even to the beginning If my leg were amputated why can't my soul interact with that My soul with this body And then you're saying that the, what was it you just said That the soul, why does it need to Yeah, why doesn't the soul, why can't the soul still see Even without eyes that the soul is non-physical So I think the soul can still see even without eyes So how come people are blind if we have souls? Well because they're in body So if you were to put me in a body So why does the body matter to a non-physical soul When the body is physical? So this goes a lot deeper, which I don't mind going here So I take a, I do see and view the soul You ask when do we get a soul Which I don't think again is relevant to the existence of the soul You're again asking epistemic questions Not ontological questions But I suffice to say I take a view of the soul It's the soul that actually forms the body So on my view you're not going to have a body Without a soul at conception Because it's the soul that's going to be forming the body But let's say you put me in a car and you wielded What do you mean the soul forms So I would think it would be all the nutrition That the mother intakes that helps to build If the mother died any fetus she was carrying Would ultimately die as well Sure, right But again, all you're pointing to are correlations Causes an effect on dependency relationships Which I don't agree with Which I think is enough to show that the concept of a non-physical soul Doesn't really seem to provide Okay, so Anything, it's not telling us Especially if it's non-physical But then seems to be dependent upon some physical structures Why would that, I'm curious Why would that be a problem? How is that an argument? Because the soul is non-physical Something non-physical shouldn't depend on physical things To do stuff Why? Because it's non-physical Now you're just being circular though Like what's the argument? That it's non-physical Non-physical things don't interact with physical things How do you know? How would we detect a non-physical thing interacting with a physical thing? We'd have to be able to measure that But you're the one making it happen You're the one making the claim We've never measured it So I suspect it doesn't happen How would we measure it? We measure physical causes and physical effects How would we measure it? You don't measure non-physical How would we measure a non-physical? I have no idea But you just said that it can't happen I think that's part of the problem Well you just said it can't happen And I asked you how You said because it can't measure it And I asked well how would you measure it And you said you can't Yeah So you don't see that as a circular As you mentioned the universe is causally closed I don't know what it would mean I don't think the universe is causally closed That's fine Show me a cause that is non-physical So again, so these are your claims So you would bear the burden of proof here And I think we're kind of jumping all over the place I want to go back to again just Because I still don't think we've I've gotten an answer to my first contention That the mind and brain aren't identical Or that the mind and... Well I've already agreed With that point that they're not identical Right I could take a brain from like a laboratory Some medical laboratory I don't have consciousness Because it's not the structure Well the structure is obviously important Because functions and processes take place In the structures But the structures themselves Are not what matters When we're trying to understand consciousness At least not fully It's the functions and the processes That the structures are engaged in So earlier I asked you how you know When you're in a certain kind of mental state You said you feel it How would it not be the case That if consciousness is just a process Then how is it not that if I open up my skull I could just be in my mental state Is because that... I mean you can't see neurophysiological processes That's at a scale that humans don't see So let's say we got really good eyes We could see them with the proper technology To understand various electrochemical processes And all of those neurophysiological processes Going across the brain If we could map that We would probably... In fact we have sort of looked at people's thoughts Obviously that language is a little flowery But we know that we can put certain devices On people's heads They can think of a word And then the computer can display The word that they're thinking So going back to my question So you're saying you can see people's thoughts And I know you said it was flowery But that's exactly what I'm asking In a sense yes We can see We can detect in the brain what's going on That maps to what a person is thinking Accurate I'm asking about correlations I'm asking about specifically the mental state The mental state is a process Then looking at the process Would mean you're looking at the mental state Yes? Yeah you're looking at those mental processes Being carried out in the brain You're watching the way that the ion channels And all that stuff are working You would be watching consciousness Okay so then we can see Consciousness by looking at process So consciousness just is the process Yeah consciousness is the processes And functions that occur across the central nervous system So then I go back to what I said in the beginning How is it the case that they have different properties My mental states don't share the properties Of physical processes How do you account for that? What do you mean like I can think of a unicorn Even though a unicorn isn't physically real Like something along those lines That's good Because we can conceptualize things We have an imagination Right but that means that they're two different things They're not the same thing I don't think it means that they're two different things Well the mind and the physical brain I would say are two different things But the mind emerges from the brain And what it does Okay so even again If I grant that And for the sake of argument let's say I do You still have two things at play Something physical Causing something else to emerge I would say something physical Causing something physical to emerge Okay so can you name One property of a mental state that's physical One property of a mental state I don't know what you mean by mental state What is the property of like mental processes Would be like the whole ion channels And all that stuff would be a property Of mental processes When you watch these processes play out You're watching the mental process So the question of how do you identify a mental state Is one of the most basic questions of philosophy of mind You're telling me that you don't understand that Now I'm not trying to point fingers or anything But it's a complicated issue I understand that But this is one of those basic things Where you have functionalists Token, token identity theorists Type type Eliminative materialists So for a functionalist now to be fair Some functionalists will say that They're not going to specify anything in particular Nevertheless it still seems that if you're going to call it Something physical which you have You're gonna have to show that they share the same property Well see it seems that you're thinking There's two different things A physical thing and then Something else that needs to share properties With the physical thing I'm saying no there isn't this other thing There's the physical thing And the processes and functions that it's engaging in So going back to So then consciousness is physical So I ask again What Name a physical property that a mental state has What I mean by a mental state I would define consciousness ostensibly Now I would say there are five states of consciousness Thoughts, beliefs, sensations, desires and volition You said that those were states of consciousness Mental states, yes Okay Yeah I would consider those probably Would I consider those dispositions? I don't know I would consider a lot like beliefs and desires And stuff like that as stances And I think stances are also physical things And our brain that emerge from what the brain does I don't think that like The mind is separate from the brain And all of the physical functions and processes I never argued that I know that I was clarifying my suggestion But in other words how would I still don't feel like I've gotten any answers here So maybe I'll let you ask me something I'm just curious how the soul explains What's going on in our head So again as I quoted earlier The soul is not meant as something to explain how It's describing the properties of the mind And pointing to the kind of thing That would have to possess or ground it So If the soul doesn't explain Which is what it sounds like you're saying Why would Then why do I care It doesn't seem like it's telling me anything Well I would say first we should care what's true Right Second Again I don't want to go through my whole opening again But if consciousness is not physical Which so far I haven't heard an argument that it is Then it would need to be possessed by some immaterial substance I don't see how brain functions can possess thoughts or beliefs Well I don't think consciousness is something possessed I think it's a process Of course So can there be thoughts that no one possesses Can there be thoughts? No Thoughts aren't something separate from a brain Okay And it's processes in the consciousness that produces them So again Thoughts aren't a thing out there that a brain grabs and uses I agree I agree this is why I said there are two basic questions In the philosophy of mind that everybody starts within this field What is the nature of consciousness and what possesses it So by the fact that you say no There are no thoughts that are just kind of floating out there They have to be what was the word you used That they're a process of the brain Then your answer it seems that it's possessed by the brain And then my question is how does they thought How is that grounded, possessed However you want to hash that out But those are both words used within philosophy of mind How are brain processes thinking Or having beliefs about things That's what the brain processes are That's what thinking is The thinking is those processes and functions in the brain Which can't be true or false Of course They're processes They're not propositional They're not propositions But mental states can't Okay we've agreed mental states can be propositions Yeah Okay Your thoughts can think propositions Can a process be propositions No it's not a proposition That's dealing with things like epistemology Maybe a little bit of logic Of course thoughts aren't going to be true or false They're not propositional things Your phone isn't true or false Thoughts can be true or false The content of thoughts can be true or false So a thought can be true or false The content of thought can be true or false Processes can't be true or false Of course not So that would automatically show that You can't, I reduce a mental state to a brain process I'm not coming from a perspective of reduction So it's a causal reduction Or an emergent type of reduction My position is not a causal reduction It'd be a causally emergent Okay so in other words Like I said earlier Two types of reduction So let's just call it emergent So let's go to emergent Well emergent and reduction are not related To each other Okay Consciousness emerges From the processes and functions of the brain How exactly that gets to consciousness Is something neuroscientists are still working out Okay so here So I think it's a little bit ironic You asked how does this work Of the stolen body I asked you how consciousness emerges You're basically saying I don't know Well I'm not saying The thing is with what I asked you I don't think there is an answer With what you just asked me I think there is I don't know it A neuroscientist might Would probably be able to explain How consciousness arises Out of these processes and functions I'm not a neuroscientist I just don't have the answer to that And I think neuroscience is largely Relevant to all these questions Which is the modern attitude Of most neuroscientists Who are writing on the topic But okay so let's go to that The interaction problem I agree with William Hasker Philosopher of mind Who says that the interaction Problem is probably like The most overrated objection In the history of philosophy Because one like I said It's an epistemic question Not an ontological question Two it could be the case that The interaction between the soul And body is just basic and immediate Because you can mean a few things By asking how the soul interacts with the body One you could be asking For an intervening mechanism But I would say that Would lead to an infinite regret Where how does A cause Interact with B Well by way of C But then you can ask How does A interact with C To interact with B Well by way of B And you get into an infinite regret Wait wouldn't C be the way Through which A is interacting With B in that example But why couldn't you just ask For another intervening mechanism I mean even if it's F Okay so A interacts with B Through F then F is just a means And why would you just stop at One or two Because that's all it takes To explain what's going on Okay so then we can just say That it's a basic immediate action That's primitive and A Just directly interacts Why would you consider that primitive I mean you have A B and C It's not just A does something To B through nothing at all Well okay but again Why would it take to be primitive Is that there is no There's no sort of interaction Going on So basic and primitive Are also technical terminology I mean it's just immediate There is no intervening mechanism So it means for an action To be basic or primitive So that could be There would be no means Of interaction Right so it could be that It could also be the case That I've heard Morlin give The analogy of let's say That there is some type Of energy perhaps created by the soul But it's so minuscule in comparison To what's going on So for example if you could Wouldn't it be irrelevant to our everyday lives If it's just so minuscule That it kind of doesn't matter No no I don't think you're Understanding my point So let me finish the illustration I'm sorry I did it No no it's fine So suppose you could flip a switch That would release all the water In the Hoover Dam Now the energy it takes to flip The switch versus all the energy Released by the water is so wide In comparison that the energy That it took to flip the switch is so minuscule So I'm saying it could be that Let's suppose for the sake of argument The soul does create some energy The amount of energy it would take To release the amount of energy That's in my body would be Almost undetectable so to speak So that could be one explanation I've heard some people give explanations That there could be something similar To quantum entanglement Where you probably understand this Better than I do Where you have two particles That seem to be causally related And the distances so far That there couldn't be an exchange of energy It could be something like that I've also heard that Wouldn't it make the soul physical If it's utilizing physical processes But that would assume that you have to be Physical in order to interact with the physical Which I think is a question I would need to see an argument That non-physical things can interact With the physical Well it's your claim though Because there's never been anything Yeah and I would just say that Conservation of energy and momentum The second law of thermodynamics Proclude non-physical things For interacting with physical things So those work for closed systems And the causal closure Or conservation of energy I would say are Applying only to closed systems And purely physical systems But that begs the question Of naturalism and physicalism to begin with Why would they be confined To only physical systems? So this is what I've heard Morland argue And I've heard others argue on this But essentially that It's almost like a methodological Naturalist kind of approach Which I think is fair All things being equal But if we have reason to suspect There is something non-physical Then I don't think it would apply there So so far just to recap on The interaction problem I could say I don't know It wouldn't matter Because it's an epistemic question Not ontological question It could be an immediate basic Or primitive action It could be that there is Some energy created And it's not a closed system But it's so small It's almost impossible to detect And I forget which philosopher Even proposed that perhaps It doesn't create energy It just kind of What's the word I'm looking for Maneuvers it for like a bit of word I forget the exact quote But again at the end of the day I think there are fair answers to it But even if I don't understand How it goes back to If I don't know how my car works Doesn't mean my car doesn't exist Of course But I don't think souls are like cars Me either But I think you're arguing The illustration at the point Well I just I don't understand the usage Of cars there I guess then If souls are so dissimilar From cars Because now you might not be arguing This but as I can perceive it It sounds like you're implying If you cannot answer how this works Then we maybe shouldn't believe it exists Well but this is the thing Who out there does know How the soul does this Because there are people who know How cars work There are people who know How phones work There are people who can answer Those questions Who can answer them for the soul then So the answer is yes That is what you're arguing Right If Can you repeat it It sounds like you're arguing If we don't know how something works Then we shouldn't believe it Is that what you're arguing No I don't think that because Some individual does not understand How something works That they shouldn't believe it But if nobody can even Remotely figure out Or have a starting point For how something works I think that that That's cause for question That raises an idea I've given you three or four starting points That have been proposed For the interaction And I've also Of the soul And to reiterate This is an epistemic question Not an ontological question I still don't think That makes it unimportant For the discussion I still haven't heard an argument I've heard more questions I would like to focus on Some things I've argued So one of the things I argued Was identity through change Right Do you think that people remain The same throughout Part replacement and change Yes and no I mean I don't think I'm the same person I was when I was four But I think I'm the same person In some Probably like Maybe a legal sense Or something like that Like I'm still I'm still Leo Philius I was Leo Philius When I was four I'm Leo Philius now But Different beliefs Different desires Different aims Different stances You know People talk about this all the time They're a changed person I think that can happen I think people can change And I think they can become Different persons So they're talking about In the loose popular sense of identity Unless by person Your meaning Starts to interrupt Something more like Concrete than I would say Yes I'm the same person Okay so you do believe People I retain Identity through change And a concrete absolute Yeah It's a debate on Philosophy of mind So That was the word I was Originally like Concrete Right on Okay so It's possible that people Remain the same I don't see any immediate Contradiction And if there's no immediate Contradiction Then I can grant that it's possible Okay so If there is no soul And we're We are How would you define the eye I guess When you refer to the eye What are you referring to Some amalgam Of experiences And probably some Like Intrinsic genetic Biological factors That are developed over time Through a person's experiences Of the world So Builds this notion Of the self Of the eye And if you change You wouldn't be the same person Not in the concrete sense No So then you don't think Persons retain identity Through change in part Replacement In the concrete sense Yes Yes you don't think Or yes they do Well in the concrete In this more concrete sense We are the same person We have the same names The same family members All that stuff The various features Of our persons can change But I'm asking persons In the absolute sense Persons are concrete Are you the same person In the absolute concrete sense That you were when you were four Or am I looking at a different person That exists And the person that was four years old No longer exists I mean the second one Kind of intuitively does seem true To me Because of how I look at the world But I would say that concretely I am the same person I have the same name It's been me Living the same life I have the same mom But I don't have the same Various positions Instances and beliefs I don't look at the world The same way But those aren't essential to being a person So I guess let me ask I think Maybe not essential That one I'd have to think about Whether I think they're essential or not I don't know I'll agree tentatively For the sake of the discussion Agree what? That those are not essential To a person Right so then They would be kind of pointless To name those That those things have changed Right those would be accidental Proper Not essential property Okay So why did you name those as changing What would that have to do with Whether or not you're the same person What have to do with whether I'm not I'll ask you If you're the same from Throughout part replacement And you started saying Well I have different beliefs Different desires A, B, C, and D We just agree those weren't essential So it was the point I'm mentioning though I don't know I'd have to look back Think about why I brought that up And look back in the discussion Okay Because I'm sort of In the moment moving forward Fair enough So what is it I guess That would ground this concrete Identity to change I don't know if it would be grounded But probably reality The reality that we inhabit The fact that we exist The fact that we continue to exist But I'm asking How on your view Do we retain identity To change a part replacement I don't even understand Why wouldn't I guess Why wouldn't we Well if you're just A purely physical object I would say that Aggregates don't retain identity to change Why not Wait so if I had a cup of water And took one molecule of water out of it It's not the same cup of water Meriological essentialism is true Sure but let's look at it like Let's take a tricycle A tricycle by definition Is something with three will If you remove a will You could say that In a metaphysical sense A tricycle has ceased to exist And a bicycle has come into existence That's analytic Because it's true by definition Fair enough Nevertheless it shows us that Aggregates their existence and identity This is something I briefly mentioned In my opening Necessarily depend on the parts And their structure Well if it's defined analytically Like a tricycle is then yes I would say it depends Necessarily on having three wheels I don't think all of the properties Are going to be analytic So I think again You're arguing the analogy Not the principle But let me grant that So you're familiar With the ship of these So I use an example of a car So would you say that It's the same car Or at what point Does it cease to be the same car How many parts will have to change Before it's no longer the same car I don't know if you would make it Necessarily a different car I think identity has a lot to do With us and how we identify things Rather than being contained In the thing itself So if I bought a car I don't know a 2004 Ford Taurus And then I painted it blue And then I painted it red That's the same car I don't think making it red Makes it a completely different thing All together Still that one same Ford Taurus That I purchased So going back to So I'm asking ontologically I would disagree that identity is more about us Because if no one existed The law of identity would still exist That something is identical to itself So if we did not exist Things would cease to be identical to themselves That law wouldn't exist The law is an abstraction Convented by humans What it may refer to Might still exist But just like people who say The laws of logic would still exist Even if we didn't No they wouldn't You don't think they really No, that we Convented the laws of logic We invented the laws of logic Convented the laws of logic We abstracted them out of Our understanding of things around us As a formalized system of thought We didn't exist I mean this thing isn't going to Just magically turn into an apple But the law of logic that we invented That talks about that Formalizes that as a system of thought Wouldn't exist So let's look at a law A physical law If everyone in the world today Died would gravity cease to exist Of course not But the theories of gravity would So laws can continue to exist And laws describe something in reality But the laws describe I think can But the laws themselves Their abstraction I don't know what you mean by the laws themselves Are you talking about the words? Like the content of them Like gravity would continue to exist The law of gravity would not General relativity would not Because humans made those It sounds like you're using an idiosyncratic Use of the word exists Because I'm not talking about Like the phrase The law of identity I'm talking about Neither am I I'm talking about that concept As developed by humans I'm not asking about the concept There are certain laws You're asking about identity then Do things with this If humans didn't exist Say this laptop still did Even if humans made it It's just hypothetical This laptop would still be this Laptop would still be identical For itself Nothing's going to break The laws of logic Well the laws of logic Are invented by us But yeah I agree They don't break They're generally considered Universal and necessary Okay so Going back to This is what I'm saying I don't think identity is about Us or how we perceive things We're trying to describe reality The ontic The ontology of reality But going back to the aggregate thing At what point How many parts of a car Do I have to replace Before it ceases to be the same car I don't think it would Necessarily cease to be the same car But I think it just depends On who you ask Some people might say If I put bigger tires on it That's not the same car But clearly I would say that it is Clearly reality doesn't depend On who you ask Well certain features of reality don't I think that certain others do And I don't know if I would consider identity To be a feature of reality Or more something that We talk about with respect to it Okay So in my thought experiment About replacing the tire Would it be the same car I think so yeah Okay It's like if I change the oil It's the same car So replace every single part Same car Yeah So if I took the replace part Put them together Two cars Which is the original Which is the original Or the original Would be the one If you took all the original parts That were replaced To put them together That one would be the original car But earlier when I asked you If I replaced the tires That one was still the original car Well no it wasn't the original car It was still identical to itself Okay right But identity But right So it's still that car Which means the original Well that one But once you take all of the original parts And then replace them with new parts And then take those original parts And build that car again You've rebuilt the original car So if we stick to one And then that one is identical To that one And this one is identical To the paint And replacing the parts of this car Did it cease to be the original Did it cease once you replaced all of them So And then rebuilt the other car So if you just replaced all the parts And then did nothing with them That's still the same car Okay so I don't see how identity Would have to be dependent On something external to itself And identity is an intrinsic property I don't I'm not going to say that it isn't I just don't know if I agree if it is Well that's what you're saying That's what would have to be implied But what you're saying Because you're saying This car would still be the original Unless I put the replaced parts back together Then it somehow ceases to be the original In virtue of this one's existence Original yes But I don't think originality and identity Are the same thing So if something is the same It's going to be the original If we use original car As it is the same thing as In philosophy and mind And this car identical to itself Yes Okay Then no it's not original Because it's no longer identical To itself Because this one is all the new parts Not those original parts of that car Sitting over there So that one's the original And that one is identical to this self This one is now new And it's still also identical to itself Now if they're the same exact car They would be identical to each other There would just be a hate Safety between them But there would be one car There would be only one car Because you have the one built From the original parts And the one built from the new parts Everything's identical to itself And not something else Of course Well you can't have two things That are identical An electron and another electron Are identical to each other We're using I feel like you're using the word Identical in an idiosycratic Non-philosophy of mind jargon Kind of way Well I would probably use it more In the way that a metaphysician Would use it That's why I'm using it Rather than a philosopher of mind And if I had two electrons One in this hand And one in this hand They're identical to each other They possess the same properties So that's not So law of identity Is a basic One of the three basic laws of logic Lightning says Law of identity Is also a basic law And that's how identity Is typically used almost Virtually in and everywhere So I don't see how Well things can be identical To themselves But I also think things Can be identical To things that share All the exact same properties There would just be A high anxiety between them A this-ness between them So like I was saying I can have an electron In this hand And another electron In this hand And they're identical to each other There is no property about them That will differ You're using an identical In a non-philosophical way There I don't think I am So are they Literally the same Yeah There's just a high anxiety Between them A this-ness that separates them Is still being There are still two electrons There They're just identical So these two separate electrons Are literally the same Electrons They're not the same Electron But they are both identical To each other In that they are electrons That's what's meant by identity Literally the same thing I just don't take identity to me I think two things With all of the same Exact properties Are identical to each other That's how it's used In philosophy That's fine I know philosophers That don't use it That way In fact I know quite a few That don't use it that way Can you name some? I'm not going to I don't really feel comfortable Sharing their names And do stuff online And I don't know if they want me To share their names Fair enough So I'm still not sure If you think persons retain Identity through change Or part placement Absolute strict identity I think so If my leg got decapitated I'd still be who I am Okay Just be legless Or well one leg Sure So then that would show us That our personhood Isn't grounded Our identity Identity isn't grounded In the physical body Correct I mean if I removed Every part of my body I wouldn't even be Meaningful I wouldn't even be Human at that point And just be an amalgamation Of matter Sitting on the floor Of organic matter It used to be a human It used to be me Sitting on the floor So at what point Are you no longer the same person? Once all of my parts Have been removed Okay so at what point While you're still alive Are you a different person? Once all of my parts Have been removed There isn't I don't think there's a hard line Where that's going to happen Other than once It's been fully Completely changed Because if something's Been completely changed With brand new properties Of course it's not going to be Identical to the thing It was before Well it is if you have Something underlining that change Like an immaterial substance Underline change? Yes I'm not sure I understand that Right Underline change Yeah So I would actually argue That change presupposes The same thing So when an apple goes From sour to sweet There is something Underline that change That is Extending these Accidents from properties I think I might get There's something that gives Rise to the difference Over time Yes In the apple It's chemical structure I would still call that The same apple I would too But what is it that Underlies the change For human beings What is it that underlies Change for human beings With the physical changes We go through Because we are age Us ageing All that stuff Those are the changes That we go through They happen as a result Of us well Entropy And us ageing And going through our life So you mentioned Jagwan Kim earlier I'm curious what you think About his argument For identity to change That I don't know anything About his argument For identity to change It's the one I mentioned He says in 2001 This brain and body Did not exist But I did exist in 2001 And that's an argument Now I don't know if he's He's proposing it As he's explaining Some of the traditional Substantialist arguments So would you agree that Your brain and body Didn't exist in 2001 But you did My brain and body No, my brain and body Exists in 2001 That was alive Not this one Not the one you have now Well, of course Well Let's look at it Because in 2001 I was five going on sticks I think My body was smaller Different proportions Did you exist? Hair might not have existed In certain places at that time Like on my face That's what I'm referring to That All right That was good So if you mean same as An identical to that structure Of that body in 2001 Then no I mean Did you exist as a person In 2001 Yeah Born in 95 Wow But did the body Did you say wow as if I'm old? No, as if you're young Oh, okay That's a compliment Yes So you did exist in 2001 But the brain and body You possess right now Did not exist in 2001 If by brain and body You mean that brain and body In that structure at that time The one that you have right now The one that I have right now In this time That it wasn't the same one As the one in 2001 Because the one in 2001 Was smaller and different In proportions And because we changed Virtually More And more People might go to biology I don't mean it that way I think you understand what I mean This is a more evolved version Of that figure Right So So then that would show that We're not identical or Reducible to brains and body We're not identical Or reducible to brains and bodies As in we is in that Self or that I Yes I mean I think we are Reducible to brains But you can't say And bodies You can't Maybe not Because the brain and the body Is not in and of itself Consciousness What we are is consciousness We might be I love for you to unpack that We are consciousness What do you mean That the self Is just your consciousness And the amalgam of your experience Like I said earlier The amalgam of experiences What you said earlier Was a brain process That consciousness Is the process But the self The I The who you are Is that consciousness And everything that it experiences And develops over time That's why People can change Over time Let's talk about emergent Okay Now you've To be fair You've already said You don't know I would argue that You're not going to get consciousness Squaring into existence By rearranging physical matter This is something You know Thomas Nagel One of the world's Leading influential philosophers Of the past 50 years He was an atheist And his book mind in cosmos I wouldn't be able to How could you So a few things I don't Well the same reason That we can get temperature From atoms But atoms And temperature themselves So here's what I'm getting to You want to talk about emergence So first Emergence would be brute facts And I would say now You're bloating your ontology I think that depends on how One looks at emergence And it will By definition Emergence would be Some kind of Stewie generous property That is unlike the base parts So that is something That you can't predict First of all That's how emergence Was initially defined Something you can't predict Something that That's not within the base Parts You wouldn't even know That it was there to begin with But I would argue that You can't get that Structural ontology At best You're going to get Structural properties Not emergent property Well I would argue Some of those structures Are emergent Like temperature Is an emergent property Structural Structural emergence Is still emergent Okay But there's a difference Between supervenient Emergence And structural emergence Now if all you're going To argue is structural I'm fine with that One can argue both That there's both Structural and Supervenient Emergence Specifically with consciousness I would argue that's Probably You can grant that Because I think you can Only get structural But then But I think that's A very problem How do you get Consciousness Which is so unlike The physical Emerging from Just rearranging Physical matter That I don't know Again I'm not A neuroscientist I would Probably I might even Be tempted to ask I actually like That question But I Myself Do not know So that is literally The hard problem Of consciousness Right And you have You know The soul is so unlike Harmonizing what we know About the physical universe Is a very reason You have Eliminative materialists People who just deny Consciousness But you're not one of those And it's also the reason That you have now People What's interesting Is a shift That's happening In philosophy of mind Where even naturalists Are now I would say Punting to Pensychism Because I think it's Becoming more and more clear That you're not Going to get Consciousness From rearranging Physical matter Or some type of Pensychism That consciousness Probably was there To begin with The interesting admission I think they're making Is that consciousness Is fundamental I'm going to be honest I don't know if I would Agree that Pensychism is sort of Taking over amongst Naturalist Naturalists I talk to Are like Pensychism Their words Not mine Is kind of dumb So it's So a book That just came out Maybe this month Substance of Consciousness By JPMorlin My guy It's growing In philosophy of mine I think I might agree with that That within philosophy Of mine There are a lot more people A lot more interested In panpsychism But I think honestly That's been a lot more Theists as they run From substance dualism Because I don't think Yeah The ones I can think of Are not theists And I don't see why Theists would have to Go to panpsychism When at the core Of our belief You have an unembodied Mind What is an unembodied Mind What is an unembodied Mind Okay So that was an example I was looking for more For a definition I probably Specified that It's I would say A material substance That's not embodied What is an immaterial substance Those two words do Just genuinely Seen To butt heads With each other So to speak Well, I don't think so I think the reason People think that Is because they're not Familiar with the history Of philosophy The worst substance Was first coined If I'm not mistaken By Aristotle Substance just means to sub Which is below Stand So it's to stand under And Aristotle used a word To point to the thing That was standing And possessing And unifying properties Which is another thing I would say You need a soul for ontologically To unifying ground All one's properties And part So a substance Is the thing that Stands under the property And when Aristotle Coined the term Again, he was talking About immaterial substances So it only butts heads If you're not familiar With how the term Arrows to begin with What is an immaterial substance I would say it's a It's a first mover It's a thing that unifies Its properties into one class It's something that is If you want to go here The difference between Substances and something Like a car Which I would call Which would be an aggregate Is that for substances They are They exist ontologically As holes Prior to their parts For aggregates The parts exist Prior to the holes And I'll explain that Briefly If I were to take A tire from a car The tire remains a tire Which means it retains Its identity independent Of the hole By contrast If you were to sever my arm It would cease to be A human arm As Aristotle said It would lose its identity Which is evident by the fact That it would Decay in a few days And cease to exist So for substances You have the hole Prior to the parts For aggregates You have the parts Prior to the hole Now an immaterial substance Is a thing again That unifies It's prior to the hole Grounds and unifies Its properties and parts It's a continuant It's in its most Simple class You don't need to identify it By something lower than that Because it's a thing that And I see they're coming up here It's a thing that unifies Everything from your unified Visual field Which I didn't even touch on The thing that possesses your Which I haven't heard you talk about before So I am somewhat familiar With that as is Right on Unified visual field It's a thing that Grounds your identity To change The fact that you're A person that's irreducible And the fact that you have Libertarian free will Which we didn't even get On but it looks like We're about to get interrupted Oh no You're not going to get any trouble But we are going to move into The Q&A here So thanks for the discussion fellas What we're going to do is We're going to get everybody To line up here in front of That plug there That last plug So if you have questions Just make a little line here And we're going to get them Rollin' I think you are Hopefully there's no operations For me this is the story Because there wasn't in the way Young fella Mike's all yours Hello I'm Ozian Hi Ozian How are you doing Leo And I'm Eric So I did have a point of contention With one of the claims he made Is that all parts of the human body Replace themselves every seven years That's not true Different parts of the human bodies Replace themselves at different Period of time Specifically the brain Does not replace itself As far as we know So our neurological Central nervous system And so does that change Your opinion on identity If your identity is those Like he's describing This sort of like your Central nervous system And the bleach you had And to go back to Leo The heart does have Approximately 40,000 neurons Oh it does Yes I didn't know the heart Having I knew the gut there It sort of has its own Central nervous system That if the heart was replaced That part of the central Nervous system Would be replaced And people make claims That they feel like They're different people Whether that's true or not We can't really confirm But if that is the case Does that change your Opinion about identity So the question you asked me Note I was careful with my language I said your body replaces Virtually every cell Every 7 and 10 years And you're right Your brain does not replace cells But given something like neuroplasticity Your brain can wire differently When it loses certain parts of it What's also interesting Is I think neuroplasticity Lends credibility to the soul That it's not just A one-way causal street That if you affect my brain You affect my mind Because of something Like cognitive behavioral therapy We have also seen that The soul can actually Affect parts of the brain If you think differently Then you can actually Change the chemistry of your brain And this is something that Jeffrey Schwartz One of the world's leading Neuroscientists has showed Neuroplasticity is actually Very, very, very interesting I wanted to say to what you said Though this is just more of a comment Because it was actually a neuroscientist That I was talking to that said Instead of saying brain Say central nervous system And I think it's because There are neurons in the heart In the gut And I think even in some other places In the body That are actually quite important To the functioning Not just of the body But do help with the functioning Of consciousness itself And that's why I've started Referring to the whole Of the central nervous system Rather than just the brain Itself as an organ All right, your question Thank you And a really great discussion I appreciate both of you I'm trying to differentiate Based on your definition How a computer That I can replicate From one side of the globe to the next How is... It feels to me like By your definition It must have a soul Yeah And by the way The question for both of you I'd like to hear How both of you feel about that Yeah, I would say No, it wouldn't imply I would wonder and be curious Why you think it would imply that I don't know if you want To say why real quick Well, if you replace Every part of server And you move it Microphone Can't hear me If, you know You keep talking about a car Or some inanimate object that way But I can take a computer And I can take the processors And I can take the memory And the disks and all that And I can either Get rid of individual pieces And I would still identify it As that computer That particular server I could take that server And I could move all of the memory In every instruction And everything to a completely Different server Someplace else in the world And as an individual That's logging in that server It's the same thing to you Even though all the parts are different So is that a soul? So I would say First of all, I would disagree That it is the same I think that when it comes to aggregates Which is a computer A collection of separable parts All together in a certain structure I think the moment you begin To replace parts It's no longer the same object So I would disagree That the computer would be the same That's why I talked about the car Pricicle Even my friend Brexton Hunter Talks about if I told you I had Christopher Columbus's axe And you say, oh wow Let me touch it And you're like, well it is his axe But I replace the handle I replace this I replace that And I replace everything Then is it still Christopher Columbus's axe? Well no Because everything's been replaced So I would say the moment You begin to replace parts of an aggregate You no longer have the same object You still have the same server? I have it If I vote If I vote Just one second You did ask Leo a question as well We're going to give Leo a chance to respond Wait there was a question in there For me if there was You want to know your thoughts on it My thoughts on that same Yes I don't know a lot about computers I would just say I don't think computers Have souls Or humans Or anything Unless you listen to the right kind of music Then you've got soul Or if you wear shoes Then you have two souls Well assuming that You don't have an amp I've got a keel You have to like Jimmy Hendrix That's right I remember you made a joke about that You got a keel I'm just curious Do you believe that animals have souls And why or why not Yes I can give you theological reasons Or philosophical reasons Theological I think the Bible teaches it Philosophical I would argue that anything that has consciousness Remember there's two basic questions That are fundamental philosophy of mind When you get started What is the nature of consciousness What possesses it I think that consciousness being immaterial Would have to be possessed by an anterior substance Animals are conscious Thus I would say anything that's conscious Is going to require souls To ground those conscious states I just want to say quickly I think it's very consistent of you To say that animals also have souls Versus saying people say Oh no only humans can have souls Because we're special I do think humans are kind of special But Because we're manning God's image You can say that Alrighty let's carry on Your question I just wanted to ask about Like the evidences of like NDE's But to formulate my question I'll first start off by saying Both of you guys can answer this I want to start off by saying Thank you guys for coming and everything And engaging in the discussion I think it was pretty good With regards to NDE's When the body dies And there's no more metabolic functions Or anything like that going on But people seem to have accounts Of what they saw in like hospital buildings Or what they saw outside of the hospital buildings How would like a physical Perspective answer that And then what would be your response To that as well Eric Thanks for the question Thank you So for me I would say that As far as you know with NDE's Is CNS, Central Nervous System Activity going on I'm going to say long after death But long as relative there Because it's not like 16 days Or something like that But there is still some Central Nervous System Activity going on Even after brain death So for me I don't think That it's literally everything Has actually fully stopped working Also we have recreated Both NDE's near death experiences For those who aren't familiar With the abbreviations and stuff As well as OBE's out of body experiences Using a variety of chemicals I could cite a paper that shows How these chemicals react With certain receptors in the brain Chemicals that are created at death In mass and also at birth in the brain And how these when they attach To these receptors can produce These effects I'm sure nobody wants To sit here and listen To a two and a half minute quote From a technical paper So I'm not going to do that But I encourage everybody Regardless of what you believe To look into the literature Regarding both near death experiences And out of body experiences Yeah I would fully agree with that As well especially given the fact That a lot of NDE's are actually Being purviewed and published So for example you have the signs Of NDE's experience published by The University of Missouri Press You have a lot of other NDE books Being published near the experiences Evidence for existence of God Obviously that might be a little Bias you might think With evidence of the afterlife Handbook of NDE's experiences Where you have substantial purviewed A doctor signed off verified cases There's a lot to say I usually don't use this in my case For a soul because I don't think I need it I think you can go into a rabbit row But I definitely think When you look at some really Interesting cases of people Who have knowledge they should Not have had knowledge of Or even cases where There was one I believe What's her name? Pam Reynolds I believe Where she had this Really really rare kind of operation Where they have to like Put the body at a certain temperature To like almost freeze it They have to turn her upside down Drain all the blood from her head Then they put these things in her ears That are clicking to see If there's any brain activity So you have this body at a low temperature No blood in the head And she describes almost to the T What the operation was like While she was under And even to bring the person back You have to slowly raise The body temperature back up Slowly put the blood in You have a certain amount of time To do this and then revive the person She was able to describe all that So much so if I'm not mistaken With this in particular The doctor said that Her explanation was so detailed He could use it to teach a class On this rare operation So I think there's interesting things To be said there and I think Especially in a case like that The brain is not working Oh, you mentioned If I can respond to what Leo said So, shameless plug Because I haven't said anything about it I have a new book out Called The Lazy Approach To Evangelism A simple guide for Conversation with non-believers I would like to read that I've heard it's very good Even from a couple of atheists I know who have read it They have said it is a very good book I appreciate it So congratulations on it Thank you, thank you very much You're not, I like it Now I don't talk about NDE's But I do mention one thing Because I hear this a lot That we can recreate These out-of-body experiences And there's something called The God Helmet One thing I say in the book is It's like saying this I can recreate experiences At the beach So if you put probes on my head Tell me to think about the beach And you'll look at what parts Of the brain are lighting up And then let's say Leo's Never been to the beach Well, I get the beach helmet Put it on his head And I light up those parts of the brain And now he gets this experience Of being at the beach Although he's never been there I've actually never been to an ocean beach So I don't wait one time In 1999 when I went to Florida Were you the same person? You know what? Probably not I think the beach changed me That's right So the point is that Just because I can recreate Experiences of a beach It doesn't follow Therefore there are no beaches So I think And I'm not saying he uses As an argument But I do hear that Put forth as a reductionistic Type of argument that I think Just doesn't work And it's a silly objective A1, thank you for your question Thank you to our speakers Your question Come on up a little bit there Can I mind? Oh, hey there So one question I had I had a discussion With one of my friends A while back And I saw this video A few years back Of I don't know how accurate Was or how authentic The video was Of a head transplant That they were thinking About doing And so we Had the question If hypothetically there was Head transplant Where you, you know Put one head Put it on another body Would that entail that The soul is in the brain Or in the body And this is a question For either of you guys By the way Yeah, so that hasn't happened That story's been going on For a few years I know they want to try To do it It's some guy in Russia Has volunteered to be That candidate I wouldn't But they haven't Even gotten close To doing it But it's a good question Now I would say this As I said earlier I would say science Has virtually nothing For neuroscience When it comes to these questions But I do think There are some things That we can learn Or at least Inductively conclude About the soul In a a posteriori Kind of way That means after Back There are some things You can know without Leaving my chair I can know that A triangle by definition Has three points But if I want to know Whether or not It's raining outside So triangle three points That's a priori That's before investigation Whether or not It's raining outside That's a posteriori I have to get off And actually go out And see if it rains I'm going to start using that now I just thought of that I got to write that down Read more So all that to say Is I think there are some things Concerning the soul That I think On my view I hold to what's called A traducian view Of the soul Where you Can I ask Say that word a little Traducian As opposed to a creationist View of the soul I don't want to go into Those weeds And what's called Organicism Suffice it to say that Again My body is soul Intimately tied with my soul And one of the reasons I hold to that view Is because you look at something Like starfish If you were to sever A starfish arm That arm has a capacity To become a new starfish So you have a new substance Coming into existence Without reproduction I think that's the best Explained assuming Substance dualism is true On a traducian view Of the soul Where essentially When you have to That biological tissue Is infused with What's called Solish toti potentiality And when you have Something coming together Like in reproduction The soul For lack of a better word Comes into existence And there's a substantial Change Something like With a starfish arm Or twinning When the embryo splits I think that's explained On a traducian view Of the soul As opposed to What's called A creationist view Of the soul Nothing like the debate You had earlier Meaning that God has to Especially create a soul Every time a sperm And egg me All that to say is There are some things That we discover afterwards But I think that the body Is where I've heard Morelin put it An external realization Of an internal structure Meaning that if You look at the kind Of body I have It actually tells you About the kind of soul That I am It tells you about The capacities And potentialities That I have So I could say I don't know It may be that the soul Is specifically dependent On certain functional Neural systems Or certain parts So I don't know But I definitely wouldn't Want to be part Of that experiment So he's asking about Whether or not Because I know you I didn't get to that In my phone Did you want to come up And ask that in the mic By chance? I know we got a couple More questions here And then we'll get Wrapped up, but So you mentioned a Thing about the starfish And how when you Sever its limb It has the potential To grow into a new Starfish And now transferring that To the hypothetical That I said If you put the brain Or if you put the head On a new body Would that give you Will you still retain Everything All the knowledge That you've had Or the life that you've had Or would it be A whole different person? Yeah, that's a good question I would say the short answer I don't know But again That goes back to There are some things I think that You might need some Office story or I Kind of investigation But I would say that Someone mentioned Heart transplants And they feel like I think it was you That you feel like Different persons Think of the brain Like a CD if you will Music is not inside of a CD Like if I broke a CD I couldn't shake out The song, right? But what you have on a CD Or like a recordist Are grooves That when put in the right Retrieval system Will play certain music I think the brain Is somewhat analogous To that So if hypothetically I were to get your brain And swap it out for mine I think I would Have probably different Experiences Because there's already Certain grooves That come The baggage if you will Of grooves That come with that Particular brain I don't want to do that But as a hypothetical Sure Alright Your question Yeah, you say The soul's not a scientific It's not investigatable Through science, right? So but It's not a scientific question But you keep saying That the soul's intrinsic To our body Or claims like that So what is necessary About the soul For our bodies to function And if the soul Is necessary for our bodies To function It doesn't seem like A scientific claim And that it can be Investigated by science So what I said specifically Was it's not a scientific Question And one of my points Were that Was that for the most part All views regarding In philosophy of Most views Regarding in philosophy Of minor Which you would call Empirically equivalent theory Which means there's no amount Of scientific data That could lend support To one of you Of the other This is why One of the things I said this debate Is not about Are the correlations Or cause and effects Of the brain being damaged And you lose memory Like say with all time I would argue that the soul Much like a musician Using a guitar There's a string That's been popped So I can no longer play Certain notes I would argue it's the same With the soul Being embodied In certain parts Of the brain being damaged Or you can take A strict physicalist view And reduce it And say well no That the mind Just is the brain Or you can take A property doulless view And say well The mind is not physical But it's still possessed By the brain I have three different views All metaphysically different But they all agree On the empirical data So that was my point about I want to say one thing If I can I actually agree with Eric That the soul is not Really an empirical question I would obviously He would disagree I would say That's kind of a point Against it But I would compare it To something like Moral realism Versus anti-realism I don't think that's An empirical Or a scientific question Either I'm not an empiricist I don't know a few I don't think You are But I would reject Empiricism myself Obviously I'm sure Eric does But I would agree with him That I don't think questions Of the soul Really fall within the realm Of the empirics You had a clarification Did you? Or another question? Yeah, I think logical empiricism Self-contradictory I'm not an empiricist But not that I don't use Empiricism To investigate the world But it still seems like You're copying out a little bit When it comes to If there is some Necessary requirement For the soul to exist For our bodies to function In some way Then that still does seem Like a scientific claim That we can investigate Through science I'm not seeing So it seems like to me That if it's not investigated If you can't investigate it Using science Then it's not necessary to believe That a soul exists For us to exist So Can I pick this up again? I have two chapters in this book On what's called Scientist And I think that's what you're I don't know if you're familiar With scientism I'm not a scientismist Either I'm a natural Scientistic Just so everybody knows On the internet And in here Somebody who holds the Scientist I'm really sorry Scientist It's called a Scientistic That's the term Again, sorry So scientism You have weak and strong But essentially they'll say That science is the only Or best way to get Knowledge about reality I reject that epistemology So I'd say If you're starting there I would immediately disagree With you Okay Well, you just said that If we can But it seems like you're Making sort of empirical claims By saying that there's some Interaction between the soul And the body Can I maybe Steal man you To maybe try to Give stuff And I might Just let me know If I'm accurate I think Ozean might be Saying something like If the soul Maybe it might Not be something empirical Itself But if it's in some way Related to empirical things Like the body Wouldn't that mandate Some empirical aspect About the soul? Are you saying Something along those Yeah, we should be able to Be able to make predictions Based upon this Empirical predictions Based upon the soul existing And be able to measure Those results Based upon the soul existing It doesn't seem like We have to presuppose That the soul exists To investigate how our bodies Work Well, no, that's not My case for the soul So going back to Again, the cases for the soul Aren't necessarily Predictability, so to speak I have these basic In other words, it's not a Theory to explain something It is just reporting The experiences I have I can think about What I'm feeling I can be in pain Without knowing The neurological process I would argue that That's an ontological Distinction between Knowing nothing about My brain at 3 years old And yet feeling Pain at 3 years old In other words, I'm Not trying to predict Anything, nevertheless On my view that If your body Are deeply integrated If you want to ask About predictability Then I would say Go back to the Empirically equivalent No, I'd say that It's completely irrelevant Empirically equivalent Just means that That the empirical data You present to me or Leo Neither one of us Are going to disagree Of the empirical data I'm saying it's not Relevant to settle The question Because no matter What empirical data You provide Both views Are going to have Ways of explaining it All right. Any more questions? Will we give anyone To reserve or another question? We'll get away to you. Is that a A Colemanschwist VisPPI? No. Anarchist. Got Archie. Nice. Signted. So, I'm going to ask a Question and I'm going to Follow-up with the context Behind the question. As far as what is Consciousness and what Can have consciousness. One of the other Gentlemen brought up Networking as far as The transfer of information And everything. And I think a really Relevant subject to this Is A.I. There's this dust and they have these sort of dust and they have these short sci-fi movies are like 15 minutes long and in one of these sci-fi flicks it has and it's very it's very relevant to today and increasingly becoming relevant they're like on this ship and there's this scientist and he's got this patient and he's like all right we're going to end your life as it is now but you're gonna live forever we're gonna download your consciousness into the into the computer so we're gonna take every single experience that you've had throughout your life so the question so in addition to the first questions if you can download someone's entire consciousness entire experiences are they that same person if not what is a consciousness as opposed to having a soul or not having a soul like can a I have a consciousness and then what's the difference between human consciousness and artificial intelligence and consciousness yeah a good question I'm another shameless plug I was on capturing Christianity and I have the video on my channel as well I think I talked for about an hour and a half maybe two hours on AI and consciousness some other words I can't fit it all within a few minutes but but yeah you're welcome to go there but I'll say a few things I don't think you could ever download someone's conscience I go back to the CD illustration I could take a brain and put similar grooves on there but I want to call that downloading the consciousness on top of that I don't think AI could ever be conscious so an interesting argument against functionalism was actually presented by an atheist philosopher John Starle and he gives what's called the Chinese room argument fascinating argument and essentially in a nutshell he says suppose you're putting this in this box and there are two holes and beside and you can't get out of the box and beside you there's this book and it says that whenever a piece of paper with the squiggly squiggly line comes in this side then find the paper that has a squiggly squiggly line and pass it through the other side now let's suppose you get so good at this you know you look at the rulebook and you get so good at you know taking in and passing out pieces of paper you get so good at it that I mean it's just like you know really quickly happening now suppose that unbeknownst to you what's actually happening is that people are sending in questions in Chinese and you're responding with answers in Chinese and suppose you got so good at this that to the outside observer it looks like this box understands Chinese when in reality you don't understand a lick of Chinese and his essential argument is that imitating conscious behavior does not entail consciousness itself so well I think AI could get really darn close to imitating consciousness that would improve that it is consciousness anymore that the person inside this Chinese room imitating Chinese language shows that he understands Chinese. AI specifically I'm not sure but being a process functionalist I would say that if every neuron I have was replaced progressively with a silicon chip that could do exactly the same thing I would remain a conscious agent so I think that if the proper processes and functions are in place you can get consciousness. There's something else about what you asked that I wanted to respond to and I don't remember what it was because my ADHD brain is terrible at keeping things. Me too. You talked about downloading consciousness. Yeah downloading consciousness would you have different experiences? I would say yes because you would be experiencing the world from being downloaded in a computer just like I think if I perfectly cloned myself that clone would go off to have its own experiences and would eventually develop into its own person who may end up disagreeing with me on things because it goes out and has its own experiences and builds its own beliefs and stances on things based on what it goes through even though it was initially an identical clone of who I was so I think that fits with my view I think that that makes a lot of sense obviously I think he would disagree but within my view I think it makes them. Do you mind coming up and putting the question in the mic? We'll wrap this up right after this though this will be the last question then we'll wrap it up. So as far as consciousness is concerned between AI and human between what's organic and inorganic what would you define as like would there it's kind of difficult to to think of one being conscious or one not being conscious or both being conscious and then if they're they're both conscious what's the implication of that? Well for me the implication of that would be that we could sort of synthesize consciousness which I think if we if we could do it and with the the silicon chips and everything like that I was speaking more theoretically whether we ever actually do that I don't know but the idea that we could theoretically synthesize consciousness I think would be profound and probably be used for some bad things because we're humans and we like to use really cool technology to do terrible terrible things. Any final thoughts on the panel before we close out? Other than that this was a great discussion and I enjoyed it as much as I thought I was going to no. Excellent that's what we like to see. My soul is blessed. All right well we're gonna close it up there then everybody so anybody that's watching in online hit the like button we're gonna be coming back with Aaron Raw and David Wood you're not gonna want to miss that so anybody in this room right now hopefully we'll see you in a couple minutes and we're gonna close it out so big round of virtual applause for the speakers everybody and our in-house thanks for joining us we'll see you next time