 Welcome, everyone, and thanks for your patience. We're really excited to have you all here today for, I think, what promises to be a very important conference here at the National Security College. I'll begin by acknowledging and celebrating the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and paying respects to the elders of the Nunnawal people past and present. It's a real pleasure to welcome you here today to the National Security College here at the Australian National University. My name is Rory Medcalf. I'm the head of the college. I know some of you, I don't know all of you, but I welcome you all to this conference. And I congratulate my colleagues, notably Associate Professor Michael Clark, on putting together what I think will be a very significant two days of discussions leading into a major research project. Now, hosting international conferences like this is becoming a key part of the contribution that the National Security College here is making to the policy debate in Australia and also globally. What we're trying to do is ensure that our teaching and our research has impact and relevance. Now, conferences like this, of course, combine the expertise of our academic staff and visiting and affiliated academics and the policy awareness of our policy engagement team to ensure that we're connecting with real world issues and challenges. This is the third such conference we've hosted this year. In March, we convened an international forum on maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. We've distinguished speakers from Japan, India, Indonesia, the United States and China. In February, and in fact, I should say the report of that conference is among the many documents that we'd be pleased for you to take out in the FOIA. In February, we convened another conference, a week-long set of cyber security discussions focused around the emerging threat and policy landscape in this space with leading speakers and researchers, again, internationally, in that case from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, as well as senior figures from industry and policy. And next year, we're looking to convene conferences on women in national security and fundamental questions about what is national security. And yes, perhaps that's the first conference we should have held. But anyway, it's a rapidly expanding agenda. Now, like the other conferences we hold here, this event is on the public record, so I want you to be conscious of that. We certainly don't want you as the conference participants to be silent throughout proceedings, and we do seek your participation in the discussion and Q&A sessions, but please bear in mind that we are being recorded, so please keep your phones on silent. Tweet if you wish, but keep your phones on silent. If there are things that you wanna say or questions you wish to ask that are off the record, our visiting speakers and our resident experts will be here to speak with you during the breaks, so please make use of that. Now, these events are, I think, quite singular contributions that the college can make to the national and global policy debate, and they complement what was, I guess, our original core business, which we remain very strongly committed to, of academic education and executive and professional development for large numbers of Australian government officials. Now, I don't wanna steal Dr. Clark's thunder because I know that Michael's put a lot of thought into framing today's and tomorrow's discussions, so I won't say a lot about the substance of what we're going to cover, but I would like personally to introduce and welcome our very impressive array of international speakers, some of whom I know and some of whom I guess I don't know yet, but all of whom I look forward to getting to know over the next few days. So I certainly welcome Mr. Raffaello Pantucci from the Royal United Services Institute, Andrew Small of the German Marshall Fund, who, of course, has written the recent very good book on the China-Pakistan axis. Now, Andrew, I know, is on his way. I'm assured he's on his way, so we're working him here a little bit later in the morning. Associate Professor Sean Roberts of George Washington University, Ms. Julia Thamilaro of Columbia University, Professor Mei Jiangming of the People's Public Security University in Beijing, and it's a real, I think, privilege to welcome distinguished Chinese scholars to this conference because, after all, this conference is very much about China's challenges with terrorism and counterterrorism. Also, Professor Lu Xue from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. And then finally, Ms. Stephanie Kan Liye, a research fellow at the Roger Rutnam School of International Studies in Singapore. So I really, I think, distinguished a ray of speakers as well as, really, a growing field of Australian experts in this area. Now, together, along with your participation as scholars and policy analysts, I believe that our panel of experts over the next two days will bring together really quite an unprecedented range of insight and views on a subject that is often neglected in international academic literature and policy forums. China's challenges with terrorism and with counterterrorism. This conference brings together leading Western and Chinese experts on China's problems with policies to combat terrorism. Participants will provide what I think we could argue is perhaps the first systematic scholarly examination of this problem through a focus on four domains. And please keep these in mind as we frame our questions and discussions over the next two days. The four domains are the scope and the nature of terrorism in China and its connection with developments in Central Asia, in South Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the evolution of China's legislative measures to combat terrorism. Third, the institutional evolution of China's counterterrorism bureaucracy. And we know that every country has challenges in that space. And then finally, the scope and the nature of China's counterterrorism cooperation with international partners. Now, security analysts spend a lot of time thinking about China. And other security analysts spend a lot of time thinking about terrorism, but really, do we see these two conversations brought together? So with that point, I want to welcome you to the conference and I look forward to your insights and your deliberations. I guess I'll formally introduce the first session. It's quite fitting, of course, that our convener for the conference associate professor Michael Clark will give the introductory remarks really to frame the whole conference with a presentation on terrorism and counterterrorism in China, exploring the internal, external security nexus. And I'm delighted that we're joined by Dr. Anna Hayes, a senior lecturer from James Cook University as a discussant. Michael, over to you. And as you're giving all your speakers half an hour, I'll give you half an hour. Thank you. Thank you, Rory, for that introduction. And I'd like to second, Rory, as welcome to you all, what is the first day of hopefully some very interesting discussions. As Rory led quite nicely into what I'm going to speak about this morning, and in particular, in terms of framing the overall research project that is really centered on this conference, is really putting China and the issue of terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and national security in China into a comparative perspective. And this point is really rammed home, I think, if we look at some of the literature that emerged after 9-11, particularly in the West, there was a key focus on the impact of counterterrorism legislation and policies on national security. And in particular, a major critique here was that this privileging of national security in the name of counterterrorism had, in fact, weakened key aspects of liberal democratic governance. With respect to China, there was very little discussion for most of the immediate period after 9-11. And this was really about, I think, driven from a number of assumptions. The first one was that China actually didn't have any real threat in terms of terrorism, didn't face one. The additional assumption was as a one-party authoritarian state that it did not especially need an explicit counterterrorism apparatus, including legislation and so forth, to justify counterterrorism measures. However, this failed to take into consideration some of the key contextual elements to the story, of which there are really three main ones. The first one really concerns the contextual embeddedness, if you will, the specifics of China's experience with terrorism, which until quite recently has by and large been isolated to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the far northwest of China. And this particular narrative is shaped really by two core dynamics, the integration modernization of what has traditionally been an underdeveloped frontier region. That has not very often been strongly controlled by Chinese states over a long period of time. An additional theme or narrative, particularly highlighted after the events of 9-11, has been the linkage of Uyghur separatism and terrorism with currents of radical Islamism, most particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also increasingly into the fractured Middle East of Iraq and Syria in the rise of Islamic State. Overlaying these major themes has also been China's growing power and presence and interests throughout varying various key regions of the globe, such as the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia. So China's terrorist threat really encompasses what Ericsson and Reinhard term, the interpenetration of the internal and external security domains. It operates from the domestic context, i.e. in particularly Xinjiang, and also increasingly at the global and transnational level due to China's growing presence around the world. So the key question that this paper, the written paper that this presentation is based on seeks to answer is really, well, how has this conditioned government responses to terrorism? How perceiving terrorism, the terrorist threat to China as a transnational threat, how has this affected Chinese views of the threat and responses to it? So really the paper develops a core framework based on Reinhard and Ericsson's 2009 paper, which really is framed by five core issues, problems, perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Each of these comes with a sort of core question, problem, fairly obvious. When you first think of it, what is the problem that we're talking about here and how do we define it? Perceptions, when and how has a particular issue been perceived as transnational? Policies, how has this identification of an issue as a transnational one? How has this affected state policy? Fourth, the politics of the issue. How has this identification of an issue as transnational? How does this affect the politics of the issue within a state and also its implications externally? Finally, polity. How have the state's institutional structures been altered throughout this process? So these are sort of five of the key questions that I look at in some depth in my written paper. So in terms of argumentation for each of these particular answers, sorry, questions that are raised by this particular framework, I suggest that Uyghur separatism and terrorism has indeed become increasingly transnational in nature. In terms of delineating the when and how of this particular question, two core issues that are front and centre are the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of Central Asia and also the increasing scope of radical Islam in neighbouring Afghanistan in the early 90s. And the second issue, of course, is the events of 9-11. Both of those issues have affected how China has perceived the Uyghur terrorist threat in different ways. In terms of policies, I suggest that state policy has in fact been effectively securitised, both domestically and in a foreign policy setting. And I'll talk a little bit more in depth about what I mean by that shortly. In terms of politics, I would argue that the identification of the Uyghur terrorist threat as transnational in nature has in fact increased marginalisation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and China more broadly. In fact, has intensified a number of pre-existing forms of marginalisation in the region. Internationally, it also touches upon what Gardner-Boveington has termed representational politics. And this is something that is engaged in by both the Uyghur diaspora, both the violent and nonviolent aspects of the Uyghur diaspora, so various terrorist organisations, but also Uyghur advocacy organisations based in the West, such as the World Uyghur Congress, which attempt to frame the Uyghur issue in a particular manner to appeal, in many respects, to what I would call a liberal internationalist perspective. The Chinese state also engages in this representational politics through the release of various official white papers, for instance, on economic development and social development of Xinjiang, white papers on Uyghur terrorist organisations. So both of these actors attempt to shape global perceptions of the issue. Finally, in terms of the polity, how has this process of transnationalisation, how has this affected China's institutional structures? I would argue in the paper that greater transnationalisation coupled with the securitisation dynamic both domestically in Xinjiang and also in China's foreign policy leads to some interesting parallels with the concept of the national security state, which of course was popularised in some senses in the early Cold War period with respect to the United States, whereby national security is almost privileged as a core function above all others for the state. So in terms of sort of digging down a little bit deeper into each of these parts of the framework in terms of the first issue of the problem, I suggested that Uyghur separatism and terrorism has increasingly become transnational in nature. However, it's also important to briefly note how I frame or define the issue of terrorism. And essentially I follow Bruce Hoffman's definition as terrorism is constituting political names and motivation, violence or threatens violence, has a psychological impact beyond an immediate target, perpetrated mostly by subnational or non-state actors. And he argues that it's a deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. So what of transnationalisation? How can we conceive of this particular issue? Now of course this has become something of a buzzword in security studies post the Cold War. At its most basic level it stems in some ways from the collapse or the tight bipolarity of the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War but also through rise of processes of globalisation, the freer movement of capital, people, goods and so forth and information. And so in some ways transnationalisation constitutes a dual challenge to the Westphalian concept of the state, both internally and externally. Internally it challenges in some respects Max Weber's sort of classical notion of the state as having the legitimate monopoly on violence within the state. Externally it also modifies in some ways the Klaus Witzian notions of the state's use of military means to pursue political objectives. And transnationalisation in the context of what we're talking about sort of coalesces with a lot of the literature on the so-called fourth wave of terrorism. The terrorist groups and organisations that have essentially emerged in this period post Cold War, which many observers see as a recrudescence of religious ideologies and shaping and framing terrorist motivations and struggles. So in terms of Xinjiang itself, the transnationalisation issue is an interesting one. And I would argue that the transnationalisation of violent Wiga terrorism and separatism has in fact been driven by a number of push and pull factors. And particularly the core push factor has generally been a perception of repression or marginalisation of Wiga's and Xinjiang itself. The pull factors have also been China's greater openness and integration with regional and global systems, particularly in economic setting. So both of these push and pull factors have combined to produce both militant Islamist separatism but also nonviolent forms of what Drew Gladney once called virtual or cyber separatism. And this is the form of separatism that is most often practised by a number of Wiga advocacy groups based in the West, such as the World Wiga Congress, explicitly nonviolent but aimed at shaping global opinion about the Wiga issue. Theoretical sense in terms of the security studies literature, this suggests that the transnationalisation of Wiga terrorism and separatism is in fact consistent with what Catherine Sikin and others have termed transnationalisation, mobilisation networks with the fact that both the violent and nonviolent forms are united by the desire to bypass what they perceive to be the blocked institutions of the Chinese state. There have also been a number of key phases of Wiga separatism and terrorism and I'll hopefully only note just a few major ones as Dr. Sean Roberts will speak at some length later on this morning about some of these issues. A very general sense from 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Wiga separatism was generally limited in nature, limited in geographic scope and largely driven by secular and nationalist ideological perspectives. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called Islamic revival in Central Asia and Afghanistan, however that picture has changed. Now this period, the post-91 period also went parallel with China's continuing reform and opening efforts, which were felt in Xinjiang through a variety of processes, not least economic opening to Central Asia, which also opened Xinjiang itself to external influences from Central Asia and the wider region. Post-911, and this really touches upon that issue of the representational politics of the issue, China has deployed a Wiga terrorist narrative in which Wiga is not only a terrorist, they're defined as extremists, but also in league with hostile external elements, for example, Al Qaeda. And this particular narrative has of course some basis in fact, as Sean will also note later on this morning. With a number of small Wiga militant organizations based first in Afghanistan prior to September 11 and post-September 11 in the Afpak tribal regions and allied to varying extents with the Afghan Taliban and also one of Central Asia's most resilient, until recently resilient militant groups, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan. Since that time, particularly since 2013, there has been mounting evidence of radicalization. For example, the Tiananmen attack in 2013, where a number of Wiga's drove an SUV into the barricades in front of Tiananmen Square, the infamous Kunming knife attack, Kunming train station in March 2014, and also a number of attacks in Arumqi, Xinjiang's capital. In terms of the evidence here, there are a number of clear linkages, perhaps to wider dynamics in regional and global jihadist tactics in particular, the utilization of suicide bombing, for instance, in Arumqi, a tactic that has had previously not been seen in Xinjiang itself. So this suggests a shifting center of gravity for the Wiga terrorist threat for China from the Afpak border regions to Syria, in particular via Southeast Asia, and the so-called Wiga underground railway. And again, a number of speakers will touch upon this in a bit more detail later on. So this carries with it a number of implications for China. The first is the connection of groups such as the Turkestan Islamic Party, with currents in the wider Middle East, in particular what's occurring in Syria at the moment of the rise of Islamic State and various other radical organizations. Secondly, it also raises the potential for new variables into key relationships that China has throughout the region. For example, in Southeast Asia, the picture in the bottom frame here of hooded Uighurs being flown back to China was as a result of the controversy in Thailand, where a number of illegal Uighur immigrants were deported or extradited back to China, and this was followed by the Arawan Shrine bombing attack soon thereafter, in which Uighur militants have been implicated to various levels. So the evidence seems to be mounting that Uighur terrorism is in fact taking on an intensified transnational dynamic. So how does this affect the other core framing questions that I set up earlier, so perceptions, policies, and politics? And I argued at the beginning that this has really been framed by a securitization process. And it's important to note here that Fiona Adamson has argued that transnationalization can in fact act as a cognitive threat amplifier, so amplifying existing threats. And in the case of Xinjiang, I think this is particularly pertinent, whereby particularly in the post-911 period, the Chinese government has been much more aware and concerned with the political implications of Uighur identity and also the dynamics of socioeconomic underdevelopment. And this is seen through a number of factors. At the end of the Cold War, China attempted to develop a strategy of double opening of Xinjiang, that is to integrate it more forcefully with the Chinese state, but also to open the region to neighboring countries, particularly in Central Asia. And this resulted in China's developing an activist diplomacy in Central Asia. Within Xinjiang, this has been coupled with what I would term a developmentalist agenda. And this is particularly seen by a number of major developmental campaigns that have been launched by Beijing since the end of the Cold War. The first is the Great Western Development, launched by President Jiang Zemin in 2000, and also more recently President Xi Jinping's One Belt, One Road concept and strategy, which is about creating Xinjiang in some senses a conduit for Chinese power and economic linkages and integration with the wider Eurasian region. At the same time, however, this is coupled internally with debates and policies that seem to suggest that ethnic culture and in particular Islam is a barrier to modernity and integration. And this is seen through a variety of measures. Again, that some others contributing to conference proceedings will touch on in more detail than I have ongoing so-called strike hard campaigns by Chinese police and paramilitary authorities aimed at in particular so-called illegal religious activities. And this is really aimed at the key question as of the political implications of key aspects of Uyghur identity, profession of Islam in particular. It is also seen through a variety of longstanding issues to do with political, economic, and demographic marginalization that are perceived by the Uyghur. And these particular slides give you an idea of some of that process of securitization in the domestic context. The one on the left here is from the Ministry of Public Security's release Citizens' Counterterrorism Handbook in 2014. The caption there is describing characteristics of a potential terrorist. And the other two slides were put up on a social media website soon after the Kunming attacks in 2014. So very much aligning with Gardner Bovindan's idea of China playing a role in representational politics, trying to present not only two domestic audiences, but also crucially to international audiences that China does in fact have a real problem with terrorism. In the foreign policy domain, there is also key elements of securitization at work, not least within China's core relationships with a number of the Central Asian states, particularly in what is now called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has originally developed the Shanghai Five process in 1996. This process has evolved over the decades to become what one scholar has termed the status to multilateralism, focused on the protection of sovereignty, borders, and regime security. And this agenda is reflected in the SEO's security agenda. Very much focused on counterterrorism cooperation. So the organization opened the Regional Antiterrorism Center in 2004, which has played a role as a coordination point for the security services of various member states. 2005, the organization also signed a non-assylum pledge, i.e. that member states would not permit illegal refugees to seek asylum in their particular country. More recently in 2009, the organization adopted an explicit counterterrorism convention. Another key aspect of the foreign policy developments here are also, again, in the realm of Bovington's idea of representational politics. I've already touched on the Chinese agenda to frame Uighur terrorism and opposition in a broader sense in a particular way, particularly through the narrative of the war on terrorism. The Uighur diaspora, however, has developed multiple narratives that touch upon key issues to do with the stuff of politics, as Bovington calls it, in Xinjiang itself, i.e., our particular meanings and understandings of the Uighur struggle. And again, as I touched upon earlier, this can take violent forms, such as those as the Turkestan Islamic Party, and nonviolent forms, such as the World Uighur Congress. Finally, of the polity, how has this transnationalization of Uighur separatism and terrorism affected the institutional structures of the state? So, Reinhard and Erickson defined the polity quite broadly as the institutional structures that shape how governments act. And in the most basic way, in Xinjiang itself, we see the impact of the transnationalization of Uighur terrorism separatism through an increase, a rapid increase, in the provincial government's counterterrorism budget and also increased levels of surveillance by security forces. In a nationwide setting, however, perhaps the key note in recent times has been Xi Jinping's creation of a National Security Council in 2014 and the passing of explicit counterterrorism pardon me, legislation in 2015, which is worth touching upon briefly. The NSC itself is quite interesting and obviously in a very early phase of development. However, it's important to note President Xi's concept of holistic security, which he sees as lying behind the need for a National Security Council. Interestingly enough, in terms of the priority areas, there are 11 priority areas, but terrorism and homeland security ranks very highly on this, demonstrating President Xi's interest in combating Uighur terrorism, particularly in Xinjiang. In terms of the counterterrorism legislation itself, it defines terrorism as any advocacy or activity that by means of violence, sabotage or threat aims to create social panic, undermine public safety, infringing on personal and property rights or coerce a state organ or international organization in order to achieve political, ideological or other objectives. So if we contrast that, for instance, with Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism, there are some key disjunctures. In particular, at the very beginning, the notion of advocacy or activity opens up a variety of means, possibly for abuse of that particular definition. Finally, and controversially, the new counterterrorism law also contains, according to some analysts, provisions for the Ministry of Public Security and the PLA to seek approval from the Central Military Commission to conduct counterterrorism operations abroad, which takes on added significance if we think about China's growing role in certain regions of the world, particularly Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also in the Middle East. And this is of some note, given that Chinese citizen, Feng Lazi, was executed by Islamic State in Iraq in 2015. So to conclude, what does this mean in a very broad, broad setting? I'd suggest it has a number of affinities with the idea of the national security state. And Naurin and Ripsman in their famous article in 2005 suggested there was three common understandings in the Western literature during the Cold War. The first is the protection of borders, physical assets by military means. The second is an institutionalized provision of security. And in particular, it's prioritization over other functions. Finally, and perhaps generically, a notion of the institutions and structures and processes by which a state conducts foreign policy. I would suggest that the picture that I've tried to map this morning and also in the written paper has some affinities with the second dot point, the institutionalized provision of security, in particular through the creation of the National Security Council. So in closing, there are a number of core themes that I hope I've emphasized throughout my remarks and that we may come back to throughout today's and tomorrow's discussion. The first issue is this issue of transnationalization. How do we conceive of it? What are its effects? And in particular, how states see security issues and how they respond to them. The second issue relates to the contextual element that we're talking about here, which is in Xinjiang itself, dynamics of securitization. Second issue is does the National Security Council, the formation of the National Security Council by President Xi, does this develop a blurring of the lines between what we might term state regime and national security. So there are key distinctions to be made between each of those concepts. Finally, and reaching into the foreign policy domain is the transnationalization of Uighur terrorism and separatism really develops new variables, introduces new variables into a number of key regional dynamics for China, most particularly in Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also further a field now in the Middle East given linkages of a number of Uighur militant organizations to events in Syria. And I'll finish. Yes, thank you. Michael's paper really does provide an excellent starting point for the symposium this week. In particular, exploring the internal external security nexus as outlined by Johan Ericsson and Mark Runhar. And applying that nexus to terrorism and counter-terrorism in Xinjiang. And he's provided a really solid overview in the paper, the written paper of fourth wave terrorism in both a global setting and in China in particular. Now put simply, and drawing on the works by Ericsson and Runhar, as Michael's already discussed this morning, the internal external security nexus refers to the shape of security in the post-Cold War era and the security sphere. And so they argue that within this environment there has been an interpenetration between internal and external security issues and threats and that as a result of this government responses to security related problems have become conditioned by this nexus. Now Ericsson and Runhar identify those five dimensions, so problems, perceptions, policies, politics and polity, which can be used as reference points for analyzing transnational security threats. In the written paper, Clark has successfully applied these dimensions to his analysis, allowing him to make a solid case demonstrating that in the face of the emerging transnational terrorism threat, the Chinese government has been compelled to come to terms with the internal external security nexus, as it applies to terrorism in Xinjiang and beyond. And in addition, the paper does not assume that Uighur terrorism has become transnational, but rather the paper unpacks the current situation and conclusively demonstrates that increasingly transnational nature of Uighur terrorism following the end of the Cold War and most especially post-911. And herein lies Clark's overall argument that in the post-Cold War era, especially in the post-911 era, a number of domestic and international factors have resulted in Uighur separatism and terrorism becoming transnational. And in making this argument, he highlights the role that history, politics, social cohesion and national power have all played in causing this shift. And furthermore, Clark argues that the Chinese state has responded to this shift by securitising these acts of separatism and terrorism and that in an effort to counter such threats, new institutional structures have been developed. However, rather than this being something unique to China, he also demonstrates that following 9-11, governments worldwide have sought to enact legislation aimed at detecting, preventing, prosecuting and eradicating terrorism. Therefore, while there are some content, context-specific characteristics when it comes to China's response to threats posed by terrorism, China's counter-terrorism efforts actually display some of the parallels with post-911 global trends. I felt a key strength of the paper is that Clark demonstrates how Uighur separatism and terrorism have become transnational in the post-Cold War era and he identifies the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of radical Islamism in Central and South Asia, the events of 9-11, the nature of China's governance in Xinjiang and China's increased openness to an integration with the global political order as key factors here. He also demonstrates their links to phenomena such as long-distance nationalism, virtual transnationalism and cyber separatism. And in doing so, he identifies the pull factors related to globalization and the push factors related to political and economic circumstances in Xinjiang. Now, it's particularly drawn to one of the key points made by Clark in this section of the paper. Here, he argued that alongside the increasingly transnational nature of Uighur terrorism, there has been a shift in the nature of Uighur terrorism. So over the past couple of years, Uighur terrorism has shifted to more indiscriminate attacks and there has been some increase in the sophistication of these attacks as well. Also, the geographic reach has also expanded, most notably to Beijing, the SUV attack in Tiananmen in October 2013 and the Kunming train station attack in March 2014. Now, of course, the rise of Islamic State and the Syrian crisis are also of keen relevance here. Clark identifies these issues as further complicating China's terrorism threat and making it ever more transnational in nature. As the profile of Xinjiang has now been raised among jihadists from other theaters. So furthermore, like other states worldwide, the Chinese government is concerned by citizens of China joining IS and fighting in Iraq and Syria. Of particular concern is that these fighters may return to Xinjiang more skilled and with more links to other terrorist groups and fighters, as well as the real potential of them forming links with Uighurs still in China. And that in doing so, they may incite them to commit terrorist attacks in China or they may be recruiting them to join the front lines in Syria and Iraq. So this is one aspect of the paper I would have liked to have been covered in more depth. However, it's already very long. So maybe this is best reserved for a paper of its own. One really excellent discussion point included in the paper is Clark's analysis of the beauty project in Xinjiang. So he draws on the work of James Leibold and Timothy Grose. So one element of the beauty project has been the linking of traditional and religious practices to notions of being backwards and representing religious extremism. Now, this is not sound policy. Encouraging Uighur women to unveil and not only that, but to promote unveiling as representative of a modern lifestyle. Well, at the same time, reducing the role of women to being entities that represent, and I quote, the love and beauty of the world, end quote, is not sound policy. And you could argue it's quite insulting and quite frankly ridiculous. It also demonstrates just how little knowledge policymakers have when it comes to Islam and the social and religious traditions that are important components of the enactment of the Islamic faith. So these policies will have the opposite of what they intend. And it was refreshing to see this kind of analysis in a paper that largely examines state security and national security. Because it's these continual threats and erosions of human security in Xinjiang that are giving rise to increased push factors there. Now, one suggestion I have for the paper is that the Kashgar Dangerous House Reform program may need a little more consideration within the paper. Considering Kashgar has long been considered the spiritual heart and the cradle of Uighur civilization, I feel there needs to be some more discussion of this in the main body of the paper. However, again, I can see spaces in short supply here and you can't cover everything in one paper. Michael rightly identifies the problem with increasing Han migration to the region and that the renovation of the old city has led to demographic dilution and economic disenfranchisement. However, I also think that the Uighurs are well aware of the significant losses of heritage and culture that have also been part and parcel of the renovation program. And when I was in Kashgar in 2012, almost every Uighur I met lamented to me, if only you'd come here four years ago, you would have seen our beautiful city. So I think there needs to be some recognition of the significant loss of cultural property alongside the discussion of demographic dilution and economic disenfranchisement. My final point is that I found the discussion of Xi Jinping's presidency and the policy directions that he's taking to be quite illuminating, especially the statement that, and I'm quoting you here, the threat of terrorism in Xinjiang has been instrumentalized nationwide to assist the CCP's efforts to maintain stability. End quote. So Clark draws on Tom Cliff's work here to demonstrate that this is not just about preventing terror attacks on Han civilians, but it is also about doing potentially unstable elements of the Han population itself. And so to that end, I would really like to know just how potentially unstable the Han population might be at this juncture. So overall, Clark's paper has two significant outcomes. Not only is it a paper that makes a solid contribution to the literature, analyzing terrorism and counterterrorism in China, but by using weaker terrorism as a case study, it also demonstrates the utility of the internal external security nexus as outlined by Ericsson and Reinhardt. Thank you. Thank you very much for those comments. I might, before going to the audience and the participants, I should say, to get some of your responses and comments, not only on Michael Clark's introductory paper, but also on your own response. Michael, I might sort of tease out your analysis a little bit more myself first. And particular, I guess, you've focused on this domestic, international, this external internal nexus in China's CT responses. And I think there's some interesting parallels there with the experiences of other countries. One of the challenges we have at the college here is to identify what's distinct about national security in this era. And it often is that the boundaries between internal and external security are really breaking down. I think, of course, the question for policymakers is how do we respond? So I'm just wondering if you can say a little bit more about how you see Chinese policy evolving and maybe are there other opportunities that China is seizing or opportunities that China is missing to have a more effective response to the blurring of these external and internal forms of, I guess, security challenge? Thanks, Rory. Yeah, a very interesting question. In terms of internally, I think there's a link, again, domestically and internationally. Most recently, of course, with the one belt, one road strategy, which many have seen as simply an outward oriented strategy, focused on the projection of Chinese power. But I see it as, in fact, being quite intimately linked with China's process of project of integration in Xinjiang, but also other key ethnic minority frontier regions such as Tibet and also, in some ways, Yunnan as well. So there is an interlinkage, I think, in Chinese thinking between security in the frontier regions and China's ability to continue its rise, in a sense, to great power status. So there's a core linkage there. Internally, I think the Communist Party has missed a few points by which they could reform their approach, particularly after the July of 2009 riots in Arrumqi and also, more recently, after the spate of a recent terrorist attack such as in Tiananmen, Kunming, and also in Arrumqi itself, to take stock and actually be more reflective on the architecture of Chinese policy in Xinjiang, the core drivers of a Uighur grievance, for instance, not simply to somewhat reflexively blame everything on extremism and separatism, but rather to take a hard look at what, in fact, might be driving many Uighurs or at least increasing numbers of Uighurs to radical forms of Islamism and also towards violence. But at the same time, we also need to stress that the vast majority of Uighurs are, in fact, not involved in many of these militant organizations and, in fact, quite removed from them. So there needs to be a balanced struck there. Internationally, I think there has been some effort by Beijing to look into multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Of course, the most immediate one is in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but there also have been some lower level discussions with Washington, for instance, about some shared counterterrorism objectives, particularly with respect to Afghanistan when U.S. forces finally are withdrawn from that particular region. So there are a number of different parameters there, internal and external, for China to consider. So please, if anyone has a comment or question for either of our speakers, the presenter or the discussant, now's your chance. Please get my attention and we'll pass the mic around. Thank you very much for the presentation. I'm Mark New York with the National Security College. I just wanted to ask about the implications of China's counterterrorism and security policy, possibly on foreign nations. How you spoke about the capacity of counterterrorism organizations to operate overseas. Does this have implications at all for Hong Kong or does this have implications for Taiwan, which have separatist elements or which want greater independence and those sort of issues? So could these powers be expected to be implemented or used in other sections of armed security and type issues? Thank you. Sure. So I suppose you're referring directly to the counterterrorism legislation of 2015. Yeah, I think that that's a good point. For those of us who were focused primarily on Xinjiang, we sometimes take a lot of these official pronouncements. This is specifically about Xinjiang and a lot of the time they are. But I think in this instance, it is important to note that it has a nationwide reach and in particular recent developments in Hong Kong, for instance, would suggest that. I am not an expert on Taiwan so I would not feel qualified to answer that question. However, I think what's important is the broader implications of that counterterrorism legislation itself. So one is the fairly broad and elastic definition of terrorism itself. So it encompasses advocacy, for instance, which in our lexicon would not be defined as relating directly to the use of political violence. The additional one, however, is also its provisions to undertake operations abroad. Again, to sort of underline that, I mean there's been no signals that this in fact has been directly considered, but it's interesting that there's now an official pronouncement that this is actively being considered. So this is a big step away, for example, from China's long-held principle of non-interference and intervention in the external affairs of others. But that process has been entrained for a while if we also think to China's maritime activities, for example, the anti-piracy missions in the Gulf and so forth. So there is a trajectory here that's pushing China in certain directions and in some ways, given its growing power and interest beyond its immediate region, it almost could be conceived as a natural extension in some ways. Thank you. My name's Raffaello Pantucci. I work at Russi, a think tank in London. Thank you for the invitation to come here. It's a real pleasure. And you've got a really interesting agenda coming up. And I really appreciated Michael's sort of opening, framing of the conference and I think reading the paper before, was really interesting. There was one comment and one question I kind of had. The comment was, one of the interesting things I've always thought, and in some ways you touched upon this when you're talking a bit about the Belt and Road and how the Belt and Road is kind of connected up with what China is doing at home. I think one of the underlying assumptions I think that you see in China, you hear in a lot of other countries as well, is this question development equaling stability. And that in some ways is one of the kind of underlining drivers that I think you see as to why you've seen such a big economic pushing to Xinjiang to try to develop the province, but also in terms of some of the outward impact that I think China has, thinks it might be having with all the sort of surge of financing and funding that we're seeing under the Belt and Road in sort of fundamentally unstable countries. But I question a little bit that connection sometimes and the question of development equaling stability and that ultimately delivering a sort of a fully secure environment does not always clear to me. Poor people aren't usually terrorists. Poor people are more preoccupied with feeling themselves, having a house over there, roof over their heads. But at the same time it does seem to be some sort of connection there. So I'm wondering a bit in your looking at the legislation and what China is doing in some detail, how do you see that sort of connection and what would your thoughts be on that sort of development equaling stability link? And then the other question, which in some ways picks up on what the last question was talking about, which is sort of how does, you were looking very specific at Xinjiang and Uyghur terrorism, but what impact does it have beyond? And I think you commented a bit on the sort of external implications on that, but what about the internal ones? Because then if we look at China, there is Tibetan separatism. There are other sort of forms of separatism. How has that been sort of addressed in some of the legislation? And then the other question is if we look at some of these other incidents that we see in China, like these sort of stabbings at kindergartens or these sort of individual bomb makers who will sort of blow up a county building because they are angry at the state in some sort of way. I mean, in a way that is terrorism, it's anti-state activity. How does that sort of fit into this context as well? So it's quite a long set of rambling questions. Okay, yeah, so lots there in terms of the development and stability kind of relationship. Yeah, it's a very interesting one. In Xinjiang itself, I think it's very clear that that has been an underlying assumption of state policy for many decades now is that the delivery of economic development and modernisation will effectively resolve the separatist question. And this has been externalised, I think, with the One Belt, One Road. I mean, if you look, for instance, at Chinese discussions of the China-Pakistan economic corridor, which perhaps, again, some speakers and I think Andrew Small might have some interesting things to say about that as well. I think that logic underpins that particular project as well. And also, for example, China's involvement in Afghanistan, again, that key link. But I think there is a sort of a missing element to that and as Lucky says, most poor people are not terrorists. So it seems that, again, there is a lack of flexibility in Chinese thinking about the relationship between economics, terrorism and political violence more broadly. And with respect to the specific issue of Xinjiang, I think it misses key elements of the political implications like a note of cultural identity and the ways in which that modernisation agenda is implemented, how that affects negatively. Weager perceptions of the longevity, for instance, of various cultural markers and practices. In terms of Tibet, I think there are, again, there are similarities to be made between China's handling of Xinjiang and Tibet, but they are, of course, very different in their own ways. In most of the historical sort of period, post-1949, of course, the Tibetan diaspora movement centred on the Dao Alam, of course, was explicitly nonviolent. In some ways, that has changed over time as well with generational change and so forth, but you still don't see the same deployment, for example, in Chinese statements in the foreign policy realm that deploy that same language of the war on terror, for instance, with respect to Uyghur separatism. Sorry, with respect to Tibetan separatism, so I think there is a key difference between the two. In terms of the wider issue, for example, of so-called anti-state behavior, more broadly across China, there are interesting dynamics that are related to, for example, just simply the criminalization of anti-state behavior. So viewing terrorism, for instance, in that context simply as a crime, whereas similar incidents that may occur in Xinjiang are somewhat reflexively regarded as terrorism, as having an underlying political motivation, even though further information comes to light, they may not in fact have political motivation. So again, there's key distinctions between Xinjiang, Tibet, but also Xinjiang and the wider Chinese context. In Tibet, there's been some really excellent stuff, research done, the scholar's names alluding me at the moment, but in terms of disempowering development, and so you've got development taking place, anti-fisher, is that? Yes, thank you. I knew it was Andrew somebody. Disempowered development. So you've got these development policies, which are improving development within the region, but it's actually disempowering local communities because they're often being supplanted by new migrants to the area. And even within Xinjiang, you see that yourself with old Han and new Han in the region. So old Han migrants have been there for 50 years, who are really concerned by what's happening to their local area by new Han migrants who are there to really take money and then get out of there. And so it's disempowering development, absolutely. Thank you, Michael. My name is Adam from the University of Adelaide. I have a comment rather than a question. As I think we got from Mr. Turkistan, also known as Xinjiang-Ugurtan Muslim region, I blame everything on China's authority, especially the local authority in East Turkistan, culturally, religiously, or education. For example, when I was in high school, I think the year 10, May and the rest of the classmates was arrested because of the practice of religion, like we just prayed. And they took us to custody for two weeks, and then we expelled from school. And May, I think, I'm the only one who studied college and all the way through to Australia. But how about the rest of the class, like 30-plus students? Not everyone else is choosing the right way. I mean, different path. So I just, my main point is whatever is rising against China's government is the result of China's policy towards toy goods. Thank you. Sure. Again, I think you make an interesting point. And James Leibold has done some work and made some arguments about this and others, too, that there is a distinction between, for example, the policies set in Beijing and how they may, in fact, be implemented on the ground by local authorities. And so this is, again, something we have to take into consideration with respect to China's policy in Xinjiang. But others, other members of the panels today might have a little bit more reaction to that than I at this stage. Thank you for that comment. I think that's an important contribution to the discussion. Are there any more comments or questions from the room at this stage before we wrap up? We've certainly got time for a couple more. So if there's any other, please, the gentleman over here on my right. Thanks, sorry. We're giving you sort of the full workout. Thank you. James Leibold from La Trobe University. There's a lot in your paper, Michael, and I really look forward to reading it. And I like this idea of a national security state. Just a comment and then a question on the previous question about terrorism in its uses in the Chinese domestic political context. Certainly, it started to be used after 9-11, but really in my reading of the domestic political discourse, it really has only been in the last couple years that it's really become a kind of priority and has been legislated. In fact, if you look back, I don't have access to internet here, but I was trying to look up, I think in 2005, when there was concerns that Taiwan might declare itself independent, the PRC passed a law that I think was called the anti-subversion law. Yeah, secession law. And so that was framed in terms of secession. You don't, you know, the issue of terrorism really is quite a recent one, and as I've argued, really has an ethnic face in the case of China, primarily a Uyghur face, but in some contexts, it's also a Tibetan face. My question for you, Michael, is I noted that you kind of used the phrase several times with a hyphen between separatism and terrorism. I wonder why you chose to do that and why you didn't distinguish those two, because I think in my reading, the situation we see is kind of a move over the last couple of decades from defining the problem as one of separatism to now one of terrorism. So I wonder if you might want to respond to that. Yeah, sure. I suppose I should have made my justification for that clear, because in the written paper, I track, I suppose, the historical development of it. And so in a historical sense, so for most of the 20th century, you would define most of those incidents as separatist in nature, so driven primarily by a desire to separate the political community from Beijing. I think the label terrorism, particularly in the post-911 context, is wrapped up with this discourse about radical Islamism, and it again points to that perhaps an ethnicization of the discourse of terrorism in China, like you say, it has a Uyghur face primarily. So as an attempt to, perhaps not successful, an attempt to encompass both of those aspects of the problem. And of course, they carry different implications. When, for example, James Millwood's paper back in 2004 about violent separatism, he made a very clear choice to label it as separatism, not terrorism. And in many senses, he was looking back to some of those historical examples of Uyghur opposition and efforts to separate from the Chinese state. But if we fast forward to now, I think the label of terrorism conjures up, again, images of Islamic State, and in a sense, some debounded concepts of political community. And there was Philip Cherney's paper I cited quite extensively in my written work, where he talks about pervasive insecurity from below and sovereignty-free actors. So I think when we have the label terrorism and particular idea of transnational terrorism, it really echoes those kind of sentiments, which pose a different set of challenges and implications for the state. Before we wrap up, I might, I guess, reframe a little bit of the conversation going forward, because I think, Michael, you're opening paper, and I know we've got some very range of valuable contributions from our other presenters over the next two days, papers that draft papers. I think has really enriched the dialogue about the way China is framing the problem, the way the challenge has evolved, the complexity of the challenge, the gray areas, but also, I think, as an institution that's very much interested in developing policy ideas here at the college, I think it would be very useful to hear some thoughts either now or further on in the conference about what this means for the policy choices of other countries that are engaging with China in counterterrorism, because I think the counterterrorists, I guess, infrastructure and policy suite and capability suite in this country and globally has developed very dramatically in the past 10 to 15 years in response to a very diversified set of terrorist challenges. The big question ahead will be about how do we engage with partners like China and counterterrorism with all of these complexities on board? So I don't know if you want to offer any kind of introductory thoughts on that now, or whether you want to save that for a bit later in the conference. That's just kind of a marker I'd be interested in putting down. And I think, and for you, given that I know your expertise relates to Central Asia and the 1.1 road as well as China itself, any thoughts that you have on China's engagement with other countries in the region would be useful as well. So I'll leave those two thoughts as markers for a moment just while we see whether there's any other comment or question from the group or in the response to any other comment or question from the group. I'll give it a moment. Otherwise, I think we've introduced the conference well. We've had a good warm-up. Michael, I don't know whether you want to speak any more on that policy issue now before we move to morning tea. Yeah, just a quick initial thought there. I think the issue of greater counterterrorism cooperation between China and various international partners has been canvassed in various ways. I mean, obviously, China does have an existing infrastructure of multilateral CTE cooperation in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet the ability of that organization to implement various aspects of that agenda has been hampered at various stages by I suppose the contained geopolitics and great power politics within that organization itself between China and Russia in particular. More broadly, the issue of CTE cooperation was canvassed particularly around 2011, 2012 between the US and China with respect to Afghanistan. Now, those talks have not necessarily progressed as far perhaps as some partners to that discussion would hope. The key issue, I think, overlaying all of this in something that China and also its international partners, particularly in the West, I have to grapple with is the specific complexities with the way in which China perceives its own terrorist problem, which is primarily through the lens of Xinjiang and also the one belt, one road strategy, which sort of projects that lens beyond China's frontiers. So I think there is greater complexity that has to be taken into consideration for international partners. Give me those comments, Anna. Just in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative, I'd agree with Michael that it's as much about territorial integration as what it is about economic opportunities outside of China. I think it's an interesting policy and it's one that's a watch this space. I was at a conference in Beijing recently and there was discussion of how unsettled Afghanistan and Pakistan are. And one of the experts talking about the Belt and Road Initiative had said, well, you know, we're prepared to wait. And they said, well, what's the timeframe? And he said, well, if it takes 100 years, we'll wait 100 years. So this is a real long-term thinking as well. And so I think that's an important dynamic. It really has the potential though for increasing both push and pull factors as you've identified in relation to this issue. And so I think the Belt and Road Initiative is of really significant importance for Xinjiang and the Uighurs. And it's definitely an area that we need to assess critically. Just a curly question for you for both. Will one built one road, particularly the belt, the overland component of that project make counterterrorism for China more difficult? Any initial thoughts? Well, that was the question that was posed of some of the people presenting at the conference. And they're convinced that it won't, that it's actually going to lead to stability because they're talking about development equaling stability. I myself think potentially it's going to really have that disempowered development effect. And you can already see that in Kashgar. And I think Kashgar as a hub centre in Xinjiang on the Belt and Road Initiative. Because they've moved on now. It's no longer one belt one road. They're calling it the Belt and Road Initiative. So it's always nice when there's a change in terminology. But I think Kashgar is really at a critical junction at the moment. And a lot of what is occurring in Kashgar is about the Belt and Road Initiative and securing it as a significant hub. And there's a lot of hum migration to the city. And that's having a destabilizing effect. Yeah, I would agree with that. In terms of sort of a very general sense about the Belt and Road and its relationship to whether or not CT cooperation between China and various partners in the region will become easier or more difficult. I tend to think it will actually become more difficult. In particular, this issue of transnationalization, it seems that China in the post-1991 era has very much attempted to harness, I suppose, the benefits of globalization for its own state-building project in places such as Xinjiang, but hasn't been prepared for some of the blowback of those processes of globalization. So greater openness and integration and economic sense also carries with it the potentiality for malign influences, however one wishes to define them, coming back in through those networks and processes. And Sean, you've written a little bit about this in the Frederick Star book in 2004 about the overland trade between Kashgar and parts of Pakistan as well. So those similar processes may return in that central Asian context. And I think that, again, that's something that China, perhaps, hasn't grappled with conceptually as it perhaps should have. Thanks. I think we've got the threads of quite a few important academic and policy conversations for the next two days. We'll take a break for morning tea now. I just want to ask all of you again to join me in thanking Michael Clark and Ana Hayes. Thank you. Well done.