 Today, I am going to explain the limits of artificial intelligence. The limits are nothing but the criticism to artificial intelligence. There are many philosophers as well as scientists. They have raised view against artificial intelligence. It is because of the way artificial intelligence has explained the concept of mind. It is not acceptable to many philosophers as many scientists. Because the way they have explained it is a kind of azif way of explanations. And it is a kind of mechanistic explanations. The AI scientists are limiting the concept of mind. The critic of AI shows that the limits of artificial intelligence. The computer science working for artificial intelligence design in the appropriate hardware and programs which simulate the human mind. For them, the mind is the software and the brain is the hardware in which mind works. Thus, they explain the human mind on the model of a computer. The artificial design computing machines, it constitutes the bulk of the field as cognitive science field called artificial intelligence. These machines do not prefer to replace human mind, but simulate it by various method of cognitive modeling. There are some general argument against artificial intelligence. Over the past decades, as we have seen that electronic computer and computer technology has made a great stride in the sphere of knowledge and has replaced us in our dealing with the world. The computer of today are much more developed and sophisticated than the mechanical calculator of yesterday. Already computer are able to perform numerous tasks that had previously been exclusively provenance of human beings with a speed and accuracy that for outstrip anything than a human being can achieve. Moreover, the advent of computer technology has given a new directions to our understanding of intelligence, thought and other mental activities. We are inclined to raise such questions like what does not think or feel to do any other activities, because these questions are very important questions. Besides, we may raise some other questions like to what extent our minds functionally depends upon the physical structure which they are associated and are mind subject to the laws of physics. If so, what are the laws of physics? Of course, to ask for definite answer to such questions would be very difficult to reply. These questions are eminently philosophically in nature, because in the philosophy of mind we are interested in understanding the nature of mind, thought, intelligence and etcetera as it enables us to appreciate the notions of machines, a mind and machines intelligence. Here, the AI scientists are committing two kinds of error. One is the error of functioning and error of conclusion. The error of functioning are due to some mechanical error or illiterate faults which cause the machines to behave otherwise, then it is designed to do. In philosophical discussions, one likes to ignore the possibility of such errors, because we are discussing abstract machines. These abstract machines are mathematical from rather than the physical objects. By definitions, they are capable of erroring the functioning. In this, we can say that machines can make mistakes. However, the machines commit error of conclusion, because they can make mistakes, moves in the functions and these mistakes are in the errors of arguments. However, when it is said that it is impossible for a machine to be conscious, it is not always clear to what extent that is intended to be a logical object and to what extent empirical. Empirically, machines are not conscious, but this cannot be proved logically. Robots are well known for duplicating human behavior. For a robot, X hypothesis is capable of behaving like a human being. We have no doubt that a human being is conscious when he or she is doing work, though a machine might do the same work. We are not inclined all the later conclusions. Thus, it is taken for granted that humans are conscious, whereas of machines who require whenever they are capable of consciousness or not. We know the questions of consciousness is appropriate in the context of human beings, but not in the case of machines. A machine is essentially distinct from a man, so far as consciousness is concerned. The machines intelligence and machine behavior are not indicative of consciousness at all. Here the questions are asked, is it blind prejudice to accept that machines are consciousness or what is the lack when they can do so many things. They do what humans do, yet they cannot be treated at par with human beings. The obvious answer to this is that the robots have no consciousness. They are only machines imitating human beings. Therefore, even if a computer does exactly what a human being does, it can never be ascribed consciousness or mind. It never does anything creative or new or which is something unpredictable the way human beings are doing. Its output is the result of its physical structure, its program and the input it is given. A human being on the other hand initiates novel, creative and unpredictable actions. Thus, a human being stands on a different path, moving from the computer. This argument can be led against artificial intelligence, since there is a wide logical gap between human beings and computing machines. Computer not only lack creativity, but they lack basic capacity to learn. Many people take unpredictably as an evidence for originality and fear that if it is true that mentally bottoms out in straight forward mechanical processes, we eventually will be able to predict everything about people and at that point human life will lost its joy and mystery. Hence, we can argue that people are creativity, have conscious mind, machines have no consciousness and no creativity. Therefore, there is no mind at all and to say that machines have mind it is one kind of a jiff way of explaining the mind. It is a kind of secondary sense not in the primary sense of mind. Let us see some of the most philosophical argument which has been raised by John Sol and John Sol's argument against AI is one of the classic argument against artificial intelligence. Sol's main intention is to criticize and overcome the dominant traditions in the study of mind both materialistic and dualistic. For him, consciousness is the central to the mental phenomena. We think of our self as conscious, mindful, rational agency in the world and science tell us the world consists entirely of mindless physical particles. But the question is how can we match these two conceptions according to Sol, can it be the case that the world contains nothing but unconscious physical properties yet that it also contains consciousness, can an essential meaningless world contains meaning and these questions are very important according to Sol. But Sol says that he believed that mind body problem as a simple solution, one that is consist both with what we know always neurophysiology and with our common sense conception of nature of mental states like pen, pens, beliefs, desire and so on. But before presenting that solution, he is asking a question why the mind body problem seems to intact a blue, why do we still have in philosophy and psychology after all these senses mind body problems in a way that we do not have to say a digestion stomach problem, why does mind seem more mysterious than other biological phenomena. Moreover, if we see Sol's thesis that his problems spills over into contemporary metalistic interpretation of issues of mind, a metalism as questions like how should we interpret the recent work in computer science and artificial intelligence and that making intelligent machines, more particularly does the digital computer give us the right picture of the human mind. Thus, the central is that what is the relationship between ordinary common sense explanation of people's behavior and its scientific mode of explanations. Sol seeks to answer these questions in his attack on metalism in his philosophy of mind. Sol suffer a biological explanation of mind according to which mind is a biological offset of the brain. In order to distinguish this view from other in the field, Sol calls it biological naturalism. Mental events and processes are as much as part of our biological natural history as digestion, metosis, meiosis, enzymatic secretions, all these things. The biological naturalism raises many questions of its own, but one of the fundamental question is what about the great great of our mental life, pains, desire, tickles, thoughts, visual experiences, beliefs, tits, smell, anxiety, fear, love, hate, depressions and relations. Again, some of the philosophical questions which were raised by Sol are like what exerted consciousness and how exactly do consciousness mental phenomena relate to the unconsciousness. What are the features of the mental phenomena such as consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental positions and how exactly do they function? What are the causal relations between mental phenomena and physical phenomena and can we characterize these causal relations in a way that avoids epiphenomenalism. Sol's biological naturalism provides an effective counter argument to the currently fashionable computational theory of mind according to which the mind is a computer program. According to this theory, the mind is the brain and the program is the hardware. In short, mind is as a computer program implemented in brains. In Sol's word, if you see the brain is just a digital computer and the mind is just a computer program. One could summarize this view and he calls it as strong artificial intelligence or strong AI saying that the mind is the brain as the program is to the computer hardware. The notion of strong artificial intelligence is called by Dennett as we have seen already this view that Dennett says that this strong is a kind of computational functionalism. Both the discipline of artificial intelligence and the philosophical theory of functionalism converge on the idea that the mind is just a computer program. For both, the theory is the human mind is a computational system that realize programs. That is, it is a formal device that produce functions of various kinds called the mental functions. It is a system which functions with digital right inputs and outputs so that the resulting activities are treated as mental activities. The strong AI, the strong artificial intelligence have been complained that there will be artificial brains and minds which are in every way equivalent to human brains and mind. Here, John Sol has taken how about Simon's view that machines that can literally think there is no questions of waiting for some future machines because existing digital computer already have the same sense that you and I do. That is the idea of thinking machine in no more a dream but a reality hence the legitimacy of strong artificial intelligence. Sol reports the very idea of strong AI and his argument against has nothing to do with any particular stage of computer technology. It is important to emphasize this point because his temptation is always to think that a solution to our problems must wait on some as yet uncreated technological wonder. This reputation has to do with the definition of digital computer and the idea of artificial intelligence and the idea of artificial intelligence which is underlying in it. As we know the concept of digital computer is its operations can be specified purely formal structures and it functions in the formal structure, it functions in the sequence of symbols. Symbols are 0 and 1 printed on the tape but the symbols have no meaning because they have no semantics or they are not about the world. They have to be specified purely in terms of their formal or syntactical structure. By definitions our internal mental states have certain sort of contents. Sol says in other words the mind is more than syntax and it has semantics. The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply that a computer program is only syntactically and minds are more than syntactically. Minds are semantics in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they have no content. The content you will find in the case of human mind. Sol presents a thought experiment about a change room argument for refuting the possibility of strong artificial intelligence and the possibility of Turing machines. This is called change room argument and his arguments are against artificial intelligence and against Turing test. Let us see what Turing test is explaining imitation game. If you see the imitation game in the Turing test includes a video signal so that the integrator can test the subject perceptual abilities. You know to pass the total Turing test the computer will need computer vision to perceive object and robotic move to them. Again the issue of acting like a human is the primary concern of the Turing test because Turing test shows that machines can interact with human beings the way human beings interact among themselves that is machine can behave the way the human beings and dogs. Turing said that this kind of things is possible with the help of imitation game. The Turing test proposed that the computer should be interrogated in the place of human beings. Turing test deliberately avoided directly physical interaction between integrator and computer because physical limitations of a person necessary for intelligence because in the case of Turing test if we see that Turing has explained this imitation game and this imitation game is played by a man and a woman and an interrogator who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in apart from the other room and the object of the game of the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He or she will ask the questions that the interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B a man or a woman. It is the object of in the game is try to cause she to make the wrong identifications and the his or answer therefore might be give you any kind of wrong informations because the tones of voice may not help the interrogator. The answer should be written or better still be type written. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter for perfect communications. Alternate one and intermediately can repeat the questions and answers. The object of the game for the second player B is to have the interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add to her answer such things like I am the woman. Do not listen to him but it is of no avail as the man can make similar remark. Now we may ask the questions what will happen when machines will take the part of the A in the game. Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when game is played like as he does when the game is played between man and woman. This Turing thesis plays vital role from this imitation to Turing test and Turing text to imitations. This is one kind of important thesis and Turing has been arguing that the possibility of man machines. And here Turing thesis says that the interrogator and the questions and responses to humans and the computers and he says that I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted. And to this thesis Jansall has used his change room argument and he says that it is very difficult to imitate or simulate the human mind the way Turing predicting. But he is denying and he has been criticizing that Turing thesis is impossible and that impossibility he has shown in his the change room argument. He asks questions to imagine that the computer programmers have written a program that will enable to simulate to understanding of Chinese. For example, if the computer is given a Chinese it will match the question with its memory or database and produce appropriate answer to the questions in Chinese. Suppose that the computers answer are as good as those of native Chinese speaker then the question is does the computer literally understand Chinese in the way the Chinese speaker understand the Chinese. Again let us imagine that someone is locked in a room with several baskets full of Chinese symbols. However, let us imagine that he or she does not understand a word of Chinese and he or she is given a rule book in English for manipulating these Chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulation of symbols purely, formerly that is in terms of their syntax, but not their semantics. So, the rules might say take a squiggle, squiggle sign out of basket number one and put it next to squiggle, squiggle sign from basket number two. Suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into room and he is given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that unknown to him the symbols passed into the rooms are called the questions by the people outside the room and the symbols he passes back out of the room are called answer to the questions. Further the questions are so good at designing the program in the Chinese room can easily manipulate symbol so that very soon the answers are indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speaker. In this case man the Chinese room manipulates Chinese symbols mechanical without understanding what they mean. Yet his answers are indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speaker. The above situation shows that a computer has syntax, but no semantics indeed understanding a language having mental states at all involves more than just having a bunch of formal symbols. It involves having meaning utter to those to those symbols. At a digital computer a defined above cannot have more than just formal symbols, because it operates as such as in terms of its ability to implement programs as these programs are purely formal they cannot have semantic content. The supporter of a AI argues that we can feed the understanding of Chinese into a robot. If the robot operates Chinese symbol property would not that be enough to guarantee that understand a Chinese. Shultz replies that robot lacks consciousness understanding even though it might behave exactly as if it understand Chinese it would still have no way of getting from syntax to the semantic Chinese. Thus there is no way that the supporter of strong AI can argue that the mind consist of purely formal and or syntactical syntactic operations and the mind is nothing but a computing machines. So, all Chinese argument is concerned with the issue of understanding and the question of questions whether an appropriately or sophisticated computer actions can be said to have mental properties. It is concerned with some programs that purport to simulate human understanding by providing replies to questions in Chinese by following a purely formal rules. However, they expect the appearance of understanding that is involved in the computational output when it from the computation understanding is actually experienced by the computer performing manipulations that enact these computations. Shultz argues that mental quality of understanding cannot be just computational matter. It is because the computer is unable to duplicate human intelligence though it has the ability to simulate the later. Here the key distinction is between the duplications and simulation and no simulation by itself ever constitutes duplications. At the end of the argument he says that it is very difficult to make the distinctions because computer programs are non biological, combination is biological, no biological computer program can excite biological cognitions. Organizations from semantic, computer programs are purely syntactic, cognition is semantic, syntax alone is not sufficient for semantic, no purely syntactical computer program can excite semantic cognitions. But Turing in his paper computing machinery and intelligence suggested that the machine intelligence in the form of imitation again and that as we have seen accordingly, if a computing machine can give a response to questions that make it impossible for us to distinguish this computer from fellow human beings then we can test whether a machine can think or not. Shultz's objection to Turing test on the ground that normal criteria we apply in ascribing intelligence to persons based on behavioural biological and phenomenal evidence according to him. The normal human beings have intentionality, consciousness and free will which computer lacks. In effect to this he says that the way Turing machines we have been explaining is not acceptable to explain the concept of mind because computer program is not sufficient for the position of our kind of mentality. Mere exhibition of a formal accurate operation does not suffice to make the operation intelligent in the human sense. The fact that human beings have intelligent operations of the mind is biological conditions and cannot be transformed to non-human machines and these are the some of the arguments of John Shultz and these arguments are going against the possibility of strong artificial intelligence and Turing machines. Although there are some more discussions on John Shultz thesis on biological naturalism which my colleague Professor Ranjan Panda will be explaining. Now we will see the second argument against AI which has been raised by Hilary Putnam and Hilary Putnam's argument against artificial intelligence plays vital role to argue against artificial intelligence and in this sections we shall discuss the reasons that led Putnam to propose the functionalism as a theory of mind supporting artificial intelligence and the reason is subsequently led him to abandon it. In the past phase Putnam was arguing for the existence of the functionalistic theory of mind and after sometimes he is arguing against the artificial intelligence and the possibility of functionalistic model of mind although he has proposed two model of mind, isomorphic model of mind which is one kind of functionalistic theory of mind and multiple realizability model of mind which is also another model of mind. Because of the way he is going for and going against the functionalistic model of mind or artificial intelligence model of mind in this way we have divided the Putnam's view into two categories firstly one is early Putnam and secondly is later Putnam. In the case of the early Putnam shows that human being is an automations mind is a computing machines the later Putnam however has found that his earlier thesis was wrong as mind can never be reduced to a machines. But he says that functionalism is the view that mental states are defined by their causes and defects it holds that what makes an inner state is not an increasing property of the state. But rather it is relation to sensory simulation input to the other state and to behavior output and according to the functionalistic all these functional states are multiple realizable in different kind of machines and development of in computations has given inputs to functionalism first the distance between software and hardware suggested that the distance between functions and structures secondly since computer are automated they are demonstrate how inner states can be causes of output in the absence of a homunculus. Thirdly the Turing machines provided a model of functionalism according to Turing machine functionalism is psychological state is identical to a Turing machine state. This Turing functionalism is large developed by early Putnam thus in short functionalism may be defined as a theory that explains mental phenomena in terms of external input and the observable output it explains mind as complicated machines as we have seen in the section of on functionalism. In this connection Putnam points out that the traditional mind body problems are only linguistic and logical in character. All these relating to mind body problems are concerning the computer systems capable of answering questions about it is own structure and have nothing to do with the unique nature of subjective experiences. One kind of puzzle that is discussed sometimes in connection with the mind body problem is the puzzle of the privacy. In the functionality theory of mind however privacy as a category as a category disappears altogether as there are no qualia anymore linked with the human mind. Now the questions does the computing machines have intelligence consciousness so on in the way human beings do. According to Putnam since mind is a Turing machine the whole human body is a physical systems obeying the laws of Newton and physics. The universe as a whole as a machines too thus Putnam's argument shows that the whole human body is at least metaphorically a machines. Putnam has taken the robot to be a psychological isomorphic to a human being. However it can be seen that this is not actually possible because there is the epistemological metaphysical and moral arguments so that there is no isomorphic relationship between mind and machines and mind. And this isopharmic relations you will find in the case of program and its hardware but not in the case of mind and machines therefore there is no isomorphic relationship between mind and machines. And he says that we cannot simulate the human mind and we cannot duplicate the human mind because there is a distinction between life and consciousness. This we have taken from Paul Jiff and a robot is not living being or living entity so cannot be conscious and this semantic connections shows that a robot is not alive. Thus from Paul Jiff's argument it is clear that Putnam is wrong in holding that there is no isomorphic relation between mind and robots. The theory that he proposes provide a complete discussion of a psychological state as a Turing machine is a utopian project because Putnam says that while arguing against AI artificial intelligence the latter Putnam points out that pessimism about the success of AI in simulating human intelligence amounts a pessimism about possibility of describing functions of the brain. The latter Putnam mentions that functionalism is incompatible with our semantic externalism because the mentalistic view of mind does not square with meaning and representation developed with the semantic theory. The semantic theory possesses an externalist relation between meaning and external world. Putnam takes meaning not as a mental or a psychological content but as a content and conditions by the external world. Putnam has rejected the computational view of mind on the ground that literary machines would not give a representation of the psychology of human beings and animals. For him functionalism is wrong in holding that this thesis that propositional attitude is just a computational state of the brain. For example, to believe that there is a cat on the mat is not same thing that there is no physical state or computational state believing that there is a cat on the mat. Therefore, it is not right to hold that propositional attitudes are semantically or conceptually reducible to computational predicates according to Putnam. This is impossible because propositional attitudes express to the intentional state that is to say that they refer to the various states of the world. Therefore, according to Putnam, functionalism is wrong in saying that semantic and propositional attitudes predicates are semantically reducible to computational predicates which can be realized in a physical system like the human brain. There is no reason why the study of human cognition requires that we try to reduce cognitions either to computation or to brain processes. The reductionist approach of functionalism gives one kind of inadequate picture of the human mind and it gives one kind of insufficient explanation on the mind and this inadequate and not sufficient explanation on the mind is not acceptable to Putnam and Putnam says that neither any kind of isomorphic nor any kind of multiple realizability model of mind existing. The thesis which have a proposed completely wrong and this thesis may give one kind of picture to understand the scientific explanation on mind, but it is not explaining the theory of mind which we have shown. We will see some of the Dreyfus argument against artificially intelligence and Herbert Dreyfus is one of the computer scientist and one of the most important philosopher. Dreyfus argument against AI. Dreyfus shows that and what computer students cannot do. Two books are classic books which are against the limitations of artificial intelligence. In these two books he argues that the research in artificial intelligence was based of a mistaken assumptions which includes psychological, epistemological, biological, ontological assumptions about the nature of human knowledge, understanding and we will see now all these assumptions and all these assumptions are based on in different ways. The logical assumptions is that the mind can be viewed as a device operating on its beats of the mind according to a formal rule. Thus in cycle is the computer as a model of mind is considered of by the cognitive scientist. The epistemological is that all knowledge can be formalized in your term of logical relations and more exactly in terms of Boolean functions. The logical calculus which govern the way the beats of related according to rules. A biological assumption is that brain has neurons which operate so as to process information in the brain according to neural network. The ontological assumption is that the computer model of mind presupposes that all relevant information about the world everything essential to the production of intelligent behavior must in principle be analyzable as a set of situation predetermined elements. The psychological epistemological, biological and ontological assumptions has assumptions have this in common. They assume that man must be a device which calculates according to rules of data which takes the form of atomic facts. Dreyfus argues that all these assumptions can be criticized on philosophical grounds and each assumptions leads a conceptual difficulties. He says that philosophical science one finds that an assumption that machines can do everything that people can do followed by an attempt to interpret what this body boards for the philosophy of mind. While among moralists and theologicians one finds a last ditch retransment to such highly sophisticated behavior as moral choice, love and creative discovery claim to be beyond the scope of any machines. The assumption that machines can do everything that human beings can do is definitely for a human capacity exceed that of machines. All these ever mentioned assumes because they are more than they can prove. The idea of that human mind functions like a digital computer is according to Dreyfus in a adequate and misleading. Dreyfus in his article on misrepresenting human intelligence points out that the research in AI or artificial intelligence has misrepresented the nature of intelligence because it emphasizes that the computers have capacity to understand language processing, pattern recognition, the problem solving, etcetera. But this is only a poor imitation of what human beings can naturally do. Dreyfus pointed out that AI field of research dedicated to using digital computer to simulate intelligent behavior soon came to be known as artificial intelligence. Once you not mislead by the name, no doubt an artificial nervous system sufficiently linked to the human one and with the other features such as sense organs and a body would be intelligent. But the term artificial does not mean that of course in artificial intelligence are trying to build an artificial man. Some of the lectures will be in the next lectures.