 That brings me to Marcus Brand. Marcus, you've been very vocal and have been monitoring the news and developments related to the military's polls. Could you tell us what broadly are the military's plans and how far are these plans from the internationally recognized standards of the free and fair election. Thank you very much. And I would like to propose to start by zooming out and reminding ourselves in which context we're even talking about this upcoming electoral exercise. We are in a situation where we are two years into an unconstitutional coup that was clearly and loudly condemned by the international community all the way up to the UN General Assembly. And that unconstitutional coup followed an election held in November 2020 that was widely seen as reflecting the will of the people of the country, even though we all score of course all remember the shortcomings of that election. But it was by and large a reflection of the will of the people of Myanmar, and it was recognized as such by people inside the country and outside. Following the coup, which I'm not going to go into detail about why it was unconstitutional and how it was unconstitutional, but that is clearly established. We also had the illegal and invalid cancellation of the 2020 election result by an illegally constituted so called Union Election Commission that is now physically occupying the UEC building in Nipetaw. That in itself did not have any constitutional basis. Neither the formality nor the merits justified this act of canceling the 2020 election results. Instead, we actually have a relatively recognized parliament in the form of the CRPH that constituted itself a few days after the coup. And has in the meantime had many, many meetings bilaterally with parliaments and inter-parliamentary organizations around the world, including most recently the inter-parliamentary union assembly in Manama and Bahrain. The IPU considers the CRPH the representative of the parliament of Myanmar and so do many other parliaments around the world. And of course we have the statements by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council that demand the reinstituting that elected parliament. If you want to know more about the details of why exactly the regime in Nipetaw is illegitimate and illegal, I strongly recommend you to read Tom Andrews brilliant paper that we published that we presented in New York at the end of January. That also lays out clearly how the regime is struggling to maintain control across the country. So, starting with the unconstitutionality, the regime has dug itself deeper and deeper into illegality and unconstitutionality, and there is simply no way out. The 2008 constitution is can be considered defunct because it has lost its moral legitimacy. And the military itself has been moving the goalpost repeatedly extending the deadline that even the state of emergency provisions, let's assume, you know, the state of emergency was constitutional, even if you look at those provisions the military has now moved the deadline beyond all possible interpretation of the wording simply by arguing necessity. And whenever regimes start arguing with necessity, you know that constitutionalism has lost has been lost completely. So essentially what we have here is a regime that is seeking to organize an electoral exercise as a way out. That is essentially an Orwellian psyops attempt to complete, continue and consolidate the coup. And this electoral exercise is nothing else than part of the coup itself, it is the process that began with the coup, and it must therefore be equally condemned and not assisted in the same way as you wouldn't assist the coup itself. And that is also why idea international idea has taken the quite unusual position as a need the governmental organization supporting elections and democracy to not even consider this an election. We don't really know about whether it's not a free and fair election. We don't even consider it an election, and we also do not list it in our global elections database that lists all electoral events around the world and we have made a statement together with a few other organizations that are committed to the liberation of principles for international election observation that we published on the 31st of January. That is together with NDI unfrail. Also the group the Madrid supported this several other renowned international election actors also supported this statement but preferred not to make this public. So in this statement we very clearly distanced ourselves from this electoral exercise. Now what we actually have. And, you know, Thompson I'm, I want, I'm getting a bit nervous when you say we've been monitoring this election we are not monitoring with obviously following the events but we certainly do not consider this anything anywhere remotely like an election observation. We of course follow what's been happening and we now know that 52 political parties until yesterday have applied for re registration. There is also a process of redistricting going on because the military has finally figured out how to gerrymander. There are electoral districts for its own advantage. And there is talk about a change to a PR system, which of course has been discussed that is proportional representation from a very classical first possible system which Myanmar has practiced for many years. I would say we have also published a paper on this back in November that explains how this dangling this proportionality in front of especially ethnic parties is a misleading effort to gain their support but would not actually necessarily increase the representation or the chances of smaller parties to be represented in inside an elected body that comes out of such a system. So what are the glaring faults if we if we even look at this as something like an election. Well first of all that the parties that one, almost 90% of the seats in the 2020 elections. are excluded from this exercise. Another thing we have to note here is that of course also the Rohingya are excluded from this electoral exercise and we all remember the controversies around the exclusion of Rohingya in 2020. And of course has not come become any better under the current circumstances so anybody who wants to support a reintegration and rehabilitation of Rohingya must of course also demand that Rohingya and Rohingya candidates must be able to fully participate in any genuine democratic election in the future. And of course we have you know the lack of control of the military over large parts of the country, or contested control which means that no proper election could be held but even where there is relative calm and safety. It's supposedly quite calm in Golden Valley in Yangon these days but there are other parts that have a, let's say, a veneer of normality, but underneath a climate of fear that certainly does not allow the freedom of expression and open competition for political mandate that you would expect from an electoral environment. So the outcome of this exercise in the eyes of the military is some kind of fake parliament as a state show of legitimate government. But we have already made very clear that, at least from our perspective, we would not recognize such a parliament that would come out from such an exercise. I would like to come back to some text here, you know this may sound a bit boring to read this, but the UN General Assembly in June 21 has actually made it very clear what still actually is the baseline for what the international community should be asking for. In its resolution that was very broadly supported in the UN General Assembly. GA asked, called upon the Myanmar armed forces to respect the will of the people as freely expressed by the results of the general election of 8 November 2020 to end the state of emergency to respect all human rights of all people of Myanmar and to allow the sustained democratic transition of Myanmar, including the opening of the democratically elected parliament of November 2020, and by working towards bringing all national institutions including the armed forces under fully inclusive government that is representative of the will of the people. And this is quite extraordinary because here the UN General Assembly essentially asked for constitutional change of Myanmar, asked for a significant revision of the terms of the constitution, which exactly do not foresee such a civilian control and oversight oversight of the armed forces. So, the general assembly actually went further than asking for an end of the coup end of the state of emergency and then the parliament, but actually asked also for bringing the armed forces under civilian control. And this call was repeated by the UN Security Council resolution 2669 of December last year, which also urged the Myanmar military, not the state of Myanmar notably, to immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners including, quote, President Win-Mint and State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi. So the UN Security Council in a binding resolution, it's not enforceable under Chapter 7 but it's still binding on the international community, still considers President Win-Mint the head of state of that country and the elections as valid and asked for an immediate end of the state of emergency. What does the Myanmar military do instead? Ignore this, completely deny any of this and go ahead with its preparations for its so-called elections. As I said that 52 political parties that have already registered until yesterday are interesting to look at a bit more closely. You might have the impression of 52 political parties that's quite a lot of, you know, high number, you know, maybe this is actually representative, but let's have a look. Eight of these 52 are newly established, 44 of them already existed before. But even of these, one has to also note what the military is trying to do is to organize an election not only for a union parliament, but also for the state and region parliaments because according to the 2008 Constitution all of these elections take place at the same time. So when we're talking about seats here, we're talking about seats in the two union houses, the Amiota Luta and the Bituluta, but also in the 14 state and region assemblies. And of these 52 political parties that registered, only 12 parties signed up to compete at the union level. The other 40 will participate only on the state and region level. Of these 52, 42 never won a seat in elections before. Only 10 parties of these 52 won some seats in the 2020 elections. Altogether about 19 parties won seats in the 2020 elections. And 10 of these are now among these 52 that registered. These 10 together won 125 seats. That is 11% of the totally elected seats in 2020 at both union and state and region level. And these 52 parties at maximum represent something like a 10th of the people that were selected as their representatives back in 2020. And I should also say that back in 2020, it was quite significant that despite the cancellation in the number of constituencies. 95% of all seats could be elected. That was 1117 out of 1171. 95% of the seats at union and state and region level were actually elected and are still considered actually in by by the electorate as, as holding their mandates. What I wanted to say is that we also conducted a survey at the end of last year inside Myanmar with the respected survey company that preferred not to have its name mentioned but they know how to do their job and they found that of all organizations and entities. The NLD maintains the highest rank in terms of favorability. And 76% of all respondents said that they hold favorable or very favorable favorable view of the NLD, similarly high levels for the PDF ethnic armed organizations and the interim institutions. And the ranking of here also is quite significant because that includes a large majority also of people in the central one are low lands. And the large majority also supported the 2020 the validity of the 2020 elections, and did not want to repeat the election under the military's terms. We want to support a change of the 2008 Constitution, and want to get rid of dictatorship, and want to have genuine federal democracy. And that is what we are trying to support together with our peers and partners in the international community. We are urging all of the member states of international idea, but also others and other organizations to not even provide technical material or symbolic support to the sham elections organized by the military, because we believe that under the current circumstances it is impossible to hold a genuine democratic election. And that reflects the will of the people of Myanmar. Thank you. I think the next one I maybe can I can ask Marcus, we have a question about. I mean we talked about, obviously this very overwhelming popular position to this to this move by the military, but we also see some likely actors taking part in this show. In terms of politicians like who to who G and that a kind who is now the winter social welfare minister, and some of the ethnic parties, perhaps, who do you think are likely to get involved in Myanmar and do you see any strategy from the US DP. Well, I think the strategy is quite obvious in the sense that it's back to the roots of being a willing part of the military establishment and maybe I can also add to to when I mentioned the parties of these 52 political parties that registered until yesterday, that all together one 125 seats back in 2020 of those 125 71 were US DPCs. So, let's say among these registering parties the US DP is maybe the biggest. Then the national organization that one unity party and then our national party are all above like 1112 and 15 seats respectively and all the others had less than one seat, less than 10 seats, some of them only one. So we're talking about a relatively small segment of, if you can consider that even the political part inspector. And with the US DP clearly being, you know, the only national party that, you know, you can even consider that a party, but it is an extension of the military system that is more than just a military that has taken over. Government institutions by force, but it is sort of the entire military establishment that is sort of reasserting itself to this. And it is really about, not just about, you know, constantly setting up a new parliament but it is for the fundamental question of whether the expression of the will of the people of Myanmar that has been repeatedly. Very, very clear in 1990 in 2012 in 2015 and in 2020 than whenever the people are being asked, they basically say they don't want people. And that is the fundamentally what the military refuses to accept. And that's why, in all of these detailed discussions about military installations and also whether they take place this year or next year when it allows not saying the chairmanship and all these kind of details. It's actually decided on the central point is whether the international community sells out the people of Myanmar to a new server that has taken over government by force. And then we look for some short term gain of practical arrangements or infrastructure projects or whatever it may be or for peace of mind. But it is fundamentally clear that, you know, whether people support the NLD or not and I don't want to sound too much as a pro NLD figure here but it is very clear that the NLD remains the most. The strongest political force in the country, especially among the majority population but not only one should add and there but there are also many others and and I would also like to say that when you draw this historical careless. It's also important to see what's different distantly. And, you know, the, I spoke about things that say the insistence on the 2020 elections results, but that is, you know, leading us a bit into constitutional unchartered territory because at the same time the 2008 Constitution is gone. So how can there still be an electoral ballot on the election that is placed in the event. And there you have to basically say that this was a political mandate that has transformed into something else. And that's why it's important that these elected MPs are not claiming to be the sole representative of that have the monopoly of representation of people, but they have joined forces with other groups in the NCC not that it's easy as we all know. It's quite significant and quite significantly different from a certain precedent that they have come together with these other forces to share power in a collective exercise of decision making. And that is why also I think there's a particular strength in this in this effort and not only that this is not only about regaining power, but this is really about rebuilding the country as a genuine democracy has also laid down in the map on the principles and policy charter that and the policies stated by the energy like even in your rehabilitation that I think it's, you know, with the international community should look at what is coming next in Myanmar not just as how do we make sure that this this peace and quiet, but how do we use this opportunity for this country to finally get out of its 7080 years of miserable history to establish proper, proper popular rule by the people and where everybody regardless of ethnicity and religion can feel at home and non-discriminated, and that is the promise that these insurance institutions have made. And there, and I think we should take them by their word and support them. And that includes having an election whenever the time is right, but a proper fair election one that is inclusive one that is properly based on fundamental rights on freedom of expression freedom of association assembly etc. There is absolutely no point in organizing and like even if the military went out of power tomorrow, it would be pointless to have an election in the next few months. The situation is far too fragile and far too unstable to have any kind of proper democratic electoral exercise in all parts of the country. There has to be very pragmatic on finding solutions, but solutions that don't extend the problem that brought us here, which is military claim to move against the people, but actually overcoming that as we always said in his very good statements and getting this time is up now and that the people no longer support this and we appeal to the international community that they should support this very clear call by the people for assistance in this regard. Let me also, since I have the floor. Thank you very for raising this whole issue of violence, whether you call it electoral violence or other kind of violence. And I also want to be very clear that, even though we may condemn this electoral exercises illegitimate, but we do not condemn any individual who may be also forced to participate in these exercises, whether it's as doctors as electoral officials, or even as political parties. I think these political parties that some of them that had to register with the threat of otherwise. It's not an easy mission and dissolution. It's not an easy choice to make. So I think one has to be very careful and I appeal very strongly also to all people in Myanmar to not confuse legitimate right of self defense against indiscriminate violence which certainly exists with random violence against those that are, you know, intended to, to stage show an election, but I don't think that any election officials or polling stations make legitimate targets for this movement if it wants to be a democratic revolution. The question I would like to ask is, should the international community. I mean, you've gotten scientists to UN. Should they be engaging with the junta to negotiate a settlement away out of this in some way, or even if the endpoint is completely in control over the military at some point, do you negotiate with the military to get to that endpoint or do you just basically demand total surrender and support the opposition. I think one would think is actually a step forward in that direction is it not with the American administration is at least recognizing support for the opposition's legitimate, even if it's not military aid. So I'd like to ask, do you think the international community should be doing this and then like, so I would like to say that there are several people in this room, but probably better place to answer your question, because they are professional diplomats and think about these things. But, I mean, I have already made it clear what me personally but also our organization would like to see the sense of not supporting the sham elections exercise in any way. And not to us to say what diplomats in the end gone in the door is the politicians or special envoys should be saying we're talking to them we're trying to support as much as we can through factual information through giving our advice reference to international standards. That's really beyond our scope in a way to address but I would like to add that it's not just because we don't, we have a certain preference for an outcome I just don't believe that negotiating with the military some sort of new power sharing deal or new transition deal will actually achieve the desired result. It's a complete delusion to think that that the military can be talked into reason, and all of a sudden, accepting that it will have to transition out of power over time I think that they need to be very as told as clearly as the people of Myanmar have been given to them by the international community that they no longer have any legitimate role to cover. And I think the people of Myanmar have been very very clear over the last two years and have sacrificed and have paid a huge price, and therefore I believe the, the minimum of the international community, not even talking about responsibility or anything like that, but the minimum is to, to not undercut that very clear demand from the people, and to not try to delude ourselves that by agreeing on some sort of a deal with the military regime in Nepal we can all of a sudden switch towards a peaceful stability I just don't see that I just cannot really comprehend anybody arguing that, and that is also why it's interesting when we argue against these in this electoral exercise because I actually have not done some just tried very hard to do some more work and do some but it's actually really hard to argue for these elections. And I haven't even seen anybody I've talked to many diplomats from countries that kind of have a bit of a soft spot for this for this scenario, but even they can't give me a proper argument why that is better. It's easier than confronting the main theory. That's why it's, you know, accepted as sort of a practical realistic way. Marcus, would you like to call. Okay, so on the first question what public position should the interim institutions take on violence against activities related to the sham elections I think acting president in one of the law has already made a quite clear statement. I think it should be repeated and even more clear that when these interim institutions resort to the right of self defense in their, in their arms struggle. And as the also also do to legit to basically legitimately, legitimately, legitimately deploy violence. This cannot extend to civilian bystanders in innocent victims and randomly attack anybody is the same discussion similar also with CDM and within the CDM movement I think one has to look very carefully into what is what are the boundaries here and when exercising in violent resistance as a last resort, you have to really know exactly and be sure that this is really justified in the extreme circumstances. And I think when, but when it comes to the question of what other what else should the interim institutions do I think it's important, important to follow with that question because the interim institutions should not only take a reactive stance to this electoral narrative put out by the by the military but should actually really try to genuinely be the best government possible and that also means for the NUG for example to work with local structures under the eos and wherever communities recognize themselves and to be to actually live up to the promise of the federal democracy charter to be inclusive responsive accountable government, even in this interim period to move ahead with the work on a transitional movement and towards a genuine federal democratic union in the future I think the people I mentioned the survey before we can be quite clearly see that a lot of people in Myanmar actually support this overall move towards a more inclusive society towards more accountable institutions, but most of them have not heard about the federal democracy charter. So in a way they intuitively support what's in the federal democracy charter, but they don't actually know what these interim institutions are doing and what this is all about so I think communication is an important element here as well. And on voter turnout. I think one has to be very careful to even use such a term in this context because I mean the military could, in an extreme case, force 100% of the people at gunpoint to go and vote that would not be a voter turnout I mean you can't use a term from from a normal electoral context to compare this with with this kind of exercise so a lot of people who would turn out to vote would be forced to be compelled would be somehow manipulated into doing it and it's very hard to tell why exactly anybody turn out, then of course it's a big question of even if people are forced into polling stations, what do they actually do with the ballot and there is of course many ways of, you know, even you are pretending to participate to turn out but then throwing an invalid ballot and then but then of course there are many ways of manipulating that as well so it one has to be very careful in not falling into the trap of the narrative of the framing of this being any kind of election and the vote turnout in the 2020 elections was actually quite significantly high with about 72% despite the COVID situation and so it was in most part of the parts of the country a quite remarkable turnout and therefore also I think one can have confidence to a large extent in the electoral result of 2020.