 The following materials were developed as part of a program to aid in establishing an effective governmental response to the threat of international and domestic terrorism in Puerto Rico. Now I wish to present Mr. Aaron Katz, chairman of the Center for the Studies of Human Behavior, who has organized and brought together all these creative and great minds to prepare us and give us a talk on the most important aspects of terrorism with you, Mr. Aaron Katz. We know that the revolutionary terrorist has an ideological commitment to armed struggle. We hope that the sporadic activities that we've witnessed in the last few weeks might be the most extreme, but we cannot count upon it. In our approach to it, we have designed workshops, if you will, and we are preparing a videotaping which will remain behind as a permanent resource of your legal community and for your use. I'm going to describe the workshops that we will present, and then I'm going to present the people who will appear this week. We will this morning deal with international terrorism, which will provide you with an overview. We will then deal with terrorism in the future with a special application to Latin America and Puerto Rico. And lastly, we will offer several scenarios and thoughts dealing with terrorism in the future in Puerto Rico. Tomorrow morning, we will deal with the Pan American Games. That will be a seminar, I think, of great interest, and that will run concurrently on the following day with other sessions. A rapid cross-section of the materials that you will be offered will include a workshop on riots and strikes, the role of the Attorney General's office as an administrator, as a public prosecutor, and as a broker of experience, being able to channel the needs of the security community and make it intelligible to the legislature and bring out the tools that the security community needs to be effective and the tools that the prosecutor's office may need. We will deal with terrorist propaganda and its subversive effect. We will deal with problems of response to terrorist activity. We will discuss the development of denial systems. We will offer a seminar on threat assessment, on hostage negotiation, the media and emergency legislation. Now, this seminar has been made possible by a special grant to the government of Puerto Rico from which was offered to the Puerto Rican Crime Commission via the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Washington. This is part of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Assistant Administrator of LEAA, Mr. Perry Rifkind, who had a special responsibility and still does for the management and direction of Leah's counterterrorism programs was the primary force and energy in getting this going, for which we're very grateful. This project, from its inception, was watched very carefully by Mr. Rifkind to make sure that we would be able to bring it here. I'd also like to give a great deal of credit to the grant manager, Mr. Stephen Grammanger, who is Mr. Rifkind's special assistant on the International Affairs staff. That takes care of that. We are going to start the first seminar on international terrorism after remarks by Ambassador Anthony Quainton. Mr. Quainton, who is here this morning, was kind enough to come directly from Washington for these workshops. He is the principal and ranking American official dealing with this subject. He is the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State and Chairman of the National Security Council Working Group Committee to Combat Terrorism. He formally served as Ambassador to the Central African Empire. I think his remarks will be most germane and particularly useful. Ambassador Quainton. Let me say what a very great pleasure it is for me to be here this morning in Puerto Rico. It's my first visit to your beautiful island. And coming a little early, we've taken advantage of the chance to see and learn something about your country, your commonwealth. I'm here to represent the federal government in its concerns for terrorism and the recognition which the federal government has of your problem and of your concerns. And I hope that one of the results of this seminar this week will be that we will learn from each other that it will not be merely us talking to you, but you very much talking to us about those problems which relate to terrorism, which are of concern, so that those of us in Washington who have responsibilities for dealing with the management of terrorist incidents and crises will be better able in the future, whether that be at the Pan-American Games or in other contexts to help you with your problems. And I'm very much aware that Puerto Rico is on the front line of the battle against terrorism. I had only been in my job a few days when in early July, as you will remember, the Chilean consulate in San Juan was seized and hostages were taken and your police forces in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation had to deal with a terrorist problem. And that was my first experience with terrorism as a problem. It's clearly a problem not only in Puerto Rico, but around the world. I think it's safe to say, and you'll hear a good bit more about this from other speakers, that terrorism knows no boundaries, no geographic region of the world is spared, no political system is invulnerable. There is no east or west, north or south, right or left when it comes to terrorism. We are all involved, we are all affected. In the last decade there have been approximately 2,700 international terrorist incidents. And of those 2,700 incidents, almost 1,200 have affected Americans or American property. The United States is at the center of the problem, and Puerto Rico as a part is very much at the center as well. If I just remind you of those incidents which we have seen in the last few weeks, you will get some flavor of the range of issues with which I must deal in Washington and which potentially you must deal in Puerto Rico, the kidnapping of a Swedish businessman in El Salvador for which a very large ransom was paid. This is the seizure of the parliament building in Managua by the Sandinista revolutionaries, bringing in its wake, the freeing of many political prisoners, widespread disturbances, and a threat to one of the governments of Latin America. The seizure of two consulates, one here in San Juan and the other in Chicago. The hijacking of a TWA plane to Geneva just over the last weekend. Any one of these incidents could have taken place here. Any one of these incidents may take place here in the future. In every case we have seen that the innocent citizens of whatever country has been affected are the weapons which are being used by the terrorists. And since we must all be concerned whether in our role as bureaucrats for one federal department or another, for one Commonwealth department or another, or as legislators or as police officials, we are all concerned with the people for whom we work. And they are the weapons and they are the targets. As Mr. Katz suggested it seems to me that this seminar can be useful to us all in a number of ways. Set as it is against the background of this growing problem of international terrorism, which has affected you and will continue to affect you. It can be useful I hope in bringing a greater awareness of the nature of the terrorist threat. Who are the terrorists? What are their weapons? What are their techniques? How are their activities likely to evolve in the future? It can be useful in focusing our attention on the points of vulnerability in our own society. And we're not just talking now about the Pan-American Games, which is a particular point of vulnerability. But we're talking about a whole range of problems. Airports, cruise ships in the harbor of San Juan, power stations, consulates, parliaments. But our vulnerabilities are not just vulnerabilities which can be protected. If we are to be effective we must look to see whether there are vulnerabilities in our planning, in our ability to respond. Do we have the necessary legal authority in which to deal with terrorism? Have we done the necessary forward planning to deal with a terrorist incident? Do we have the necessary liaison structures between different departments of the Puerto Rican government, between the Puerto Rican government and the federal government, between the Puerto Rican government and the federal government and foreign governments if they should be involved? In essence, are we ready? And the third thing that I would suggest that this seminar might usefully do is to consider how we organize ourselves to respond appropriately to the terrorist problem. To ask ourselves whether we have adequate intelligence about the threat. So we are aware of who the likely terrorists are, that we have indeed established the appropriate liaison structures. And that whatever response we work out is a response which is appropriate to the threat, which does not result in any of the players at any level of government overreacting or underreacting. And that whatever we do, we do in the context of the civil and constitutional rights which are at the very foundation of the society we are trying to protect against the terrorist threat. I'd like to say a few words about the federal role, what we can do to help you and how we are set up to help you. How are we organized? Since 1972 when the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism was first established, there has been a growing awareness that the federal government needs to be better organized to deal with the terrorist problem. In September of last year the entire structure of our response was reorganized and under the direction of the National Security Council a special coordinating committee was set up to deal with all crises. And under that special coordinating committee a working group on terrorism chaired by the representative of the Department of State, myself, whose deputy chairman is the representative of the Department of Justice, Mr. Thompson Crockett, who's at the back of the room and who's with us for part of this week. This structure of a working group which has at its head an executive committee on which I represented the departments of defense and state, transportation, energy, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Justice Department, the FBI, the key agencies of the United States government who have a concern and who have a responsibility and who have a capability to deal with the problem. These committees are not just focused on policy but on a whole range of other issues which we hope will generate decisions and generate planning which will be of use to us all. We are focusing on the research and development needs for combating terrorism, on the preventive security needs, on analyzing the vulnerabilities, on seeing what international initiatives can be taken and need to be taken to mobilize an international consensus behind the fight against terrorism. And of course we are looking very closely at how we should manage a crisis and what kind of contingency planning we should do to anticipate the crises which may well lie ahead. We're trying, and I would be less than honest with you if I didn't say we have a long way to go, but we're trying with all the dispatch of which federal government is capable to develop a comprehensive program which will permit a selective and a flexible response to any terrorist incident which may arise within a framework of the basic policy which is one that we will not make concessions to terrorists. And that of course lies at the very heart of the United States government's view of terrorism. If we are to eliminate the threat, it must be clear to would be terrorists that the United States will not be held hostage, will not pay ransom, and will not make concessions to those who threaten our society. The committee structure which we have set up and which I described to you very briefly is one which makes it possible for us to create the necessary nexus of interrelationships that I suggested earlier was so important that we get to know each other so that we can work effectively in a crisis at all levels. And we are active in our effort not only to coordinate more effectively within the government, but to develop to the degree possible an international consensus which can be used to support those policies which we have adopted. We cannot deal with terrorism alone or in isolation. Puerto Rico cannot do it alone. The United States cannot do it alone. We have begun to make progress. The area of greatest progress and where there is the greatest consensus is in the area of aircraft hijacking. There are a series of international conventions signed at Tokyo, at the Hague, and at Montreal where over 90 governments have agreed to take the firmest possible action to control and deal with air safety, air piracy, international hijacking. Last November, the United Nations, there was a consensus resolution of all countries that greater efforts should be made in this direction. And most recently our own government at the summit at Bonn joined with its six closest allies and some of those allies are represented here today, British, our Canadian and our German friends, but also the Japanese and the French and the Italians have joined together in an undertaking at the presidential or prime ministerial level to impose sanctions and to cut off air services to any country which harbors terrorists or harbors hijackers I should say. We are making progress with regard to an international convention on prohibiting the taking of hostages. And finally the federal government is very anxious and is working closely with the Congress to see that we indeed have the necessary legislative authority to deal with the various facets of the terrorist problem. Happily we have the authority to take the actions which are required under the Bonn Declaration going back to the 1974 Anti-Hijacking Act. And currently before the Senate and House of Representatives there is a bill sponsored by Senator Ribikoff by Congressman Anderson which will intensify our capability by imposing sanctions on those countries that show a pattern of support for terrorism, which will increase the security of our airports, which will add certain chemical substances to explosives so that they can be readily identified and tagged so that in the aftermath of a terrorist incident we can more rapidly find those who are the perpetrators. Although it's not certain that this legislation will pass in the few short weeks before the end of this session, it certainly will in the next session and the United States government will have as a whole a greater capability to deal with terrorism in all its aspects. And finally we are doing what is the most difficult of all, what we are beginning to do, to try and address the underlying causes of terrorism. I could not pretend that that is an easy matter. But clearly if terrorism in the Middle East, terrorism by the Palestinians is to be brought to an end, some resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute must be found, which will encompass the legitimate demands of the Palestinian people. And it is to that purpose that President Carter will be meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in just a week's time at Camp David. And similarly we are endeavoring with all the resources at our disposal to find a way to bring to an end the dangerous situations which exist in Rhodesia or in Namibia or in Southern Africa, which have engendered in recent months and years a whole network of terrorism on the African continent. I would like, in conclusion, because much of what I have said will be elaborated on by those who come after and who are indeed experts in this field. And I am someone who is trying to learn about the problem and look forward to the presentations as much as I know you do. But the one message I would leave with you coming from Washington for a few days to the island of Puerto Rico is that we see that your problem is our problem, that the federal government faces the same threat as the Commonwealth government does, that we are there to help you in any way that we can within the limits of our resources and within the limits of our legislative authority, that we welcome your suggestions. And I am confident that you will let us know in the course of this week what are your concerns so that the machinery for policymaking and coordination which exists can be turned more productively to helping Puerto Rico. Thank you. I would like to introduce Dr. Richard Cotterbuck, a distinguished soldier, lecturer and author, to discuss some of the questions raised by the subcommittee in their invitation to him. Dr. Cotterbuck. Will I be audible if I am talking like this? Can you hear me? Forgive me for not using the podium. There are two reasons for this. One is that I am hoping to project onto a screen. But the other is that I have never really trusted podiums because another British general lecturing in America had a rather nasty experience when he was talking on the podium with his elbow like that. And he was unaware that it was on the wrong button and that both he and the podium was slowly sinking into the floor. So I thought I would not risk that this morning. Now, as you've heard from Mr. Katz, there are dialect problems. I particularly apologize that I should launch you into the worst dialect problem of all with my English accent. I don't do it just to annoy. I can't help talking like this. I'm awfully sorry. Now, it's my honor to introduce the first workshop on international terrorism. And as you'll notice, all of us, all five of us, come from different countries. So at least we are being international in that respect. Our views may differ. Indeed, I hope they do. The aim of this workshop is discussion. And I'm very conscious that I'm not talking to an academic audience, an audience that deals in theory. I'm talking to an audience of professionals. And therefore, I shall try to make what I say as near the ground as possible with the maximum number of nuts and bolts. And the whole idea is, I hope, that you will come back and challenge and criticize from your professional experience what we have said. And it is from this discussion that the value will come. Now, shortly will come a moment of truth when I will try and make this machine work. I have studied the famous ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu. And some of you may know Sun Tzu's famous quotation, philosopher and general. He said, if you are short of troops, beat drums and put out more flags. So I suppose if you haven't got very much to say, then bring your slides with you. So perhaps that's a modern version of that. Well now comes this terrible moment of truth as to whether this is going to work and indeed whether, if it does, you will be able to see it. Now, is this going to help or hinder? Can you read the size of print? Now, is that going to help or hinder? Is it readable at the back? It's okay. Well, I will use this. If not, I can do without it, of course. But if it's readable, I'll leave it up. But perhaps a little far away. I can always push it up as we come to the end. Now, I thought by way of my nuts and bolts that I would try to draw some lessons from a number of very famous international terrorist incidents over the last five years, six years, with which you will be familiar because they were so well known, but from which I hope we may draw a few lessons. Now, the first was at Lod Airport in Israel where 27 people were killed, mainly Puerto Ricans, pilgrims to the Holy Land, by a remarkable mixture of international terrorists and supporters. They were actually killed by three Japanese who had been initially trained in North Korea who had then gone for specific training for the task and in their weapons to Lebanon where they joined the popular front for the liberation of Palestine. They then flew via France to Germany where they were equipped with false documents, papers as tourists, and they then went to Rome where they picked up weapons and those weapons were provided by the Czech Slovak Agency, Omnipole, and they then smuggled those into their baggage on board an Air France aircraft. Now, in at least six countries there were organizations willing to provide assistance, willing to provide those kind of services that I described and that kind of fraternal assistance all over the world, which the Palestinians and others enjoy, is one of the problems with which we have to deal. Now, in the same year I mentioned the Munich Olympics because I know that one of your prime concerns is the Paran-American Games coming up and we have, incidentally, people here on our panel who have had experience of the Montreal Olympics and have studied the subject in relation to other major gatherings of this type. Now, the thing that I want to stress here is that the aim of the primary aim of the kidnapping at the Munich Olympics was publicity and those eight Arabs who kidnapped and killed, I'm sorry I put the wrong figure, it's 11 Israelis, that's a slip of last night when I was drawing this out, it's eight Arabs, 11 Israelis, and the whole aim was publicity and this was watched on World Television, hooked up by satellite by an estimated 500 million people, 500 million people, most of whom will have been absolutely disgusted by all they saw, but some, some will have felt some sympathy, some will have learned of the Palestinian cause for the first time and some, maybe even 0.1% might have felt enough sympathy to begin to prefer the Palestinians cause. 1% of 500 million is half a million, 0.1% is still 50,000, an awful lot of people who could provide that kind of assistance even if it was a tiny percentage and the other point is that having seen what they saw on World Television other people will have had ideas which they will have been able to carry into their own terrorist activities. Now the next one I picked out is again a very, very famous one where Carlos who was a Venezuelan leading a team containing two Germans and three Arabs kidnapped 11 OPEC oil ministers and extorted a reputedly enormous ransom, the figure of 25 million dollars has been suggested, recorded by one estimate, for the oil minister Sheikh Yomani of Saudi Arabia and various others, the total of all of them I understand was 25 million dollars and Carlos himself received a million dollars for his pains from I understand the Algerians. Now the next one, when we begin to have a more encouraging picture, in 1976 when again an international team of Wilfrey Berzer of the Red Army fraction in Germany plus one other German and three Arabs hijacked an aircraft and the planning and organization on the ground was done by a Peruvian Bouvier and they hijacked a French aircraft carrying Jews, demanded the release of 53 prisoners from Israel of which most were Arabs, although two were Germans and that one as you all know ended with a successful Israeli commando raid which released all the hijackers and killed the terrorists. A similar picture but the other way round, the one that ended at Mogadishu in 1977, it was four Arabs who hijacked a German aircraft largely on behalf of the German Red Army fraction, although they also wished to get two of their own prisoners released but their main aim and their timing was to reinforce the kidnapping which was already taken place of Dr. Hans Martin Schleyer and again you got the Arabs assisting the Germans, the German Red Army fraction in this operation. Once again a triumphant raid by the German GSG9 squad ended this and I have visited the GSG9 squad and I do commend you most earnestly to study their organization and training and activities because they are extremely effective and highly professional. There is room for more forces of that type. The last one I've mentioned is one which is very much less known or a series in 1977, in December after the Mogadishu hijacking, those self-same Red Army fraction kidnapped for ransom three people in Austria and southern Germany, two in Vienna, one in Munich, Walter Palmer's, Lottie Berm and Richard Ötker and for those three they got 12 million dollars in ransom. I may be wrong with that figure and if I am, Mr. Herr Ruprecht will no doubt correct me but this was my information was that they got 12 million dollars for the Red Army fraction from those kidnaps. So their funds are pretty substantial. The reason I mentioned those other countries is that one of those who was picked up and arrested after that was Gabrielle Kröker-Tiedemann, a girl with a remarkable record, she had earlier been imprisoned for terrorist actions in the early days, was released in 1975 at the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, the candidate for mayor in West Berlin, she was released to save his life, she is known to have killed two other people with her own hand in the OPEC raid and took part in a number of others and was in fact arrested in Switzerland in possession of some of the notes from the Palmer's kidnapping which were identified on her way from Vienna through Southern Germany through Switzerland to Italy and she was arrested. So once again you get this ability to find a safe house, to find shelter in neighboring countries. I could give dozens more obviously examples but I picked those as ones of which the general background is well known to to try to drive home some of those lessons. But may I stress one point which I've underlined here? All the movements I've talked about, the Palestinians, the German Red Army fraction, etc. They are all generated internally. Those movements were not created by the Russians or by the Cubans or by anybody else. They were created by situations, forces inside their own countries and outside governments exploited them by doing such things as training, provision of arms, money, propaganda. Let's see where a bit off the edge has at. Also, as I pointed out, there were sympathetic groups in the target countries which provided things like a safe house from which to operate, things like stolen cars, local currency, false documents and so on. And perhaps most important is that the cooperation by fraternal movements provided these services on a worldwide basis and you will be able to think of many others like the hijacking of a ferry in Singapore by Japanese ending in Kuwait, you name it. So I would suggest, for those of you involved in law enforcement, the dangerous thing to do is to focus your eye too much on the international aspect and gaze too closely at Cuba or Germany or Lebanon or somewhere and not look at your own internal situation because unless there is a conflict to exploit, then those who wish to exploit it will have nothing on which to work. There has got to be an internal movement and an internal conflict to exploit before this kind of thing will work at all. Well now, I'm going to look next at two movements. Now I'm sorry, I'm going to look next at two aspects of the terrorist world because what I've been talking about so far is the purely political terrorists. That is to say those who commit crimes, crimes they are, assassination is a crime, bombing is a crime. But when crimes are committed for political purposes, as opposed to personal gain, I'll refer to them as political. If they're for personal gain, I'll refer to them as criminal. If you'll forgive that rather inaccurate terminology. Now the overlap between criminal and political terrorists is pretty tremendous. Now this has got the smallest print of all. Is it any use to you at the back? If not, you can't see that I imagine. The other is the print is larger. Well now what I'll do is don't worry, I will cover all the ground in this and for those of you who are near enough to see it, it may be helpful for the rest, I will cover the ground in words. Now the motivation of terrorists, in the case of purely criminal terrorism for personal gain, the motivation is usually and primarily ransom. But it may also be revenge, intimidation or to extract information. Now when the crime also has a political aim, you've got to subdivide that into wider and more immediate aims. And the wider aims need little explanation. The wider aims of nationalism, such as the popular front for the liberation of Palestine, of revolution and so on. But the more immediate aims, I suggest are ransom in the same way, but on this occasion for party funds, like the ransom of the three kidnappings in Vienna and South Germany that I mentioned just now, they were to make money for the party funds. And the biggest ransom recorded in the world that I've ever heard of was a political one by the Monteneros in Argentina and they got 60 million dollars, 60 million dollars for the born brothers from the chairman and founder, their father. And that money was largely distributed into foreign banks and a great deal of it is still available. Now the second aim is blackmail, the release of prisoners, coercing the government. The third, I mentioned already, publicity, enormous publicity. And the fourth is to discredit the government, to discredit its law enforcement agencies to make them unpopular, to make them overreact, et cetera. Now what is happening increasingly is that the political groups are finding it necessary to combine or finding it useful to combine with criminal gangs to provide the kind of infrastructure and the kind of professionalism they need. And there is also another advantage that if the political group is doing the kidnap for ransom for their party funds, there are many advantages in making it appear that it's a straightforward political kidnapping, I'm sorry, I beg your pardon, a straightforward criminal kidnapping with no political aims because the government is then less likely to intervene and put its reputation on the line unless it believes there are political implications. Thank you. This is the end of This Real. Please rewind cassette. I'm going to hear from Reinhard Ruprecht, who is the Vice President of the Bundeskriminalamt. Reinhard? First, a little bit about the development of German terrorism in accordance. I think the German terrorism is very similar to some terrorist groups in the United States and Japan and Italy, partially also in South America, but on the other side, very different to forms of terrorism in France, in Spain, the Basque terrorism in Northern Ireland and in Palestine with its separatistic, religious, and racial movements and motivations. As you know, the politically motivated German terrorism of the 17th of this century is its origin in the so-called extra-parliamentary opposition and the student protest movement in the last 60s. Most of the leaders of this movement march through the institutions, as we say. Some changed their role within the establishment and some only few, but some went in the underground. A date of symbolical significance for the subsequent rise of terrorism was the 2nd of June 1967 when a student in Berlin was killed in a demonstration that ended in violence. Then came the student protest on Easter 1968, especially against some publishing houses in Germany and revolutionary violence against dictatorship and terror from the top in the third world was used by the protesting young as an example and as justification of their violence against democratic society in Germany. We had an ideological school in Germany called the Frankfurter School, one of the arguments of this school especially of the philosophy of Herbert Marcuse for the use of violence by suppressed minorities was used predominantly to justify violence against property and so-called recessive institutions in the democratic society. This development also under the Vietnam motif and the motto, as you mentioned, rather set fire to a department store than run a department store thus led to a case of arson in which a Frankfurt department store was set ablaze on April, June 1968 and this marked the cornerstone laying for the so-called Red Army faction which soon began to play the part of strategic and intellectual leader of the developing terrorist groups. Then during 1972 most of the leading members of the Bader-Meinhof gang as the Red Army faction was called in the first phase after the leading people of this Red Army faction most of the leading people were arrested, 1972. But then in Berlin several anarchist groups combined to form another organization called the Movement of the 2nd June which is inferior to the so-called RAF as far as programmatic intentions were concerned but does not play a second fiddle when it comes to brutality in action. This group is responsible for the murder of a judge in Berlin van Drenkman the kidnapping of a politician in Berlin Peter Lawrence and the plan also to kidnapping a minister in Sweden Mrs. Leijon. Then in the following years besides these two dominant blocks some successor organizations and splitting groups were founded I will not bother you with this following organizations instead of contemplating these groups let us take a look at the present scene of terrorism in Germany. Nowadays there are three groups which are very dangerous. As I mentioned the Red Army faction the hardcore of which seems at these days to be more abroad than in the country after the brutal attacks of the last year where they murdered the attorney general of Germany together with two men who accompanied him where they kidnapped and then killed the industrial man Schleyer Mr. Klatterbeck mentioned also together with four men who accompanied him and were killed and where they murdered another man representative of a bank, Jürgen Ponto this was initiated by a relative of him coming in the house and giving him red rose and then he was they tried to kidnap him and they killed him during the kidnapping and beside this RAF so-called RAF group there is a movement of the 2nd June some of them are in these days before the court in Berlin Tillmeyer one of the men of this group was freed out of the prison and arrested in Bulgaria some months ago together with other people other members of this group and last but not least as the third form of organization we have the so-called revolutionary cells since they attacked an establishment of the ITT ITT in Berlin in November 1973 until today more than 50 bombings and explosions are to be blamed on them including several bombings on US institutions in Germany so on the 5th course headquarters on June 1, 1976 on the Rhein-Main Air Base Officers Club on December 1, 1976 and on an army fuel tank at Gießen in January 1977 this revolutionary cells are partially different in their organization and in their strategy and tactics in comparison with the two other organizations they operate in groups who are partially in the underground partially in the legality and they have many very separated little groups of two or three or four men and this allows them to live very conspiratively and we don't have many access to these groups we know very little until now about these revolutionary cells they always search social conflicts for their attacks they always confess giving confessing letters after the operations but they don't go over the step the nation cries they mostly don't want to kill people but to punish and to demonstrate by violence and by the publicity they get by these attacks they are aimless and that makes them also very dangerous to build a bridge between the left wing extremists in Germany who wait for the revolution but refuse individual terror before the revolution before the time comes for revolution to build a bridge between these organizations and the RAF with their terror and they did not succeed until now to weapon to give weapon to the left wing extremists but that is their very dangerous strategy they have the first aim for terrorist groups in Germany is to bring the revolution to destroy the society without telling us which form of society shall follow after they have destroyed this democratic society in Germany and other countries their next aim is to press free the terrorists who are in custody who are arrested and in prison one of their aims is to punish representatives of the state, of the economic of the society and to punish also leading people of the police and justice and these representatives in the government but more important than to kill a single person is for the terrorists and that was said also by other men here today more important is for them the publicity and the reaction or the effect of the single action to the citizens, to the population the terrorist type of the new generation Mr. Klatterbeck told you that we have three generations since 1967 in comparison to this beginning terrorism we see in this third generation a lack of ideological declaration within the political conception of the first generation we had the contrary philosophies of anarchism and of Marxism combine in an ideological mixture of extreme reasons from anarchism the German terrorist takes the boundless intoxication with freedom the individuals revolting attitude against any compulsion the belief in a spontaneous uprise of the masses and the emphasis on action as a motor of history the revolutionaries' impatience and the recklessness in choosing his means and the disdainful and inhuman rigor of destruction stamp out what is stamping out you but not however the anarchism's original idea of extreme non-violence and its hostility to organization and from Marxism the terrorist borrows absolute dialectical logic the belief in the predetermination of revolution and the claim that the power structure of capitalism is the sole cause of social injustice nowadays as I said we generally find only monotonous repetitions of some verbal attacks against this society the present terrorist generation does not utter profound ideological and strategic ideas they compensate more and more ideology by action and brutality corresponding to a word of Ulrike Meinhof who was one of the first leaders of the Badermainhof Gang of the primacy of practice and another difference between this generation and former generations is they live more separated and conspiratively separated not only in their attitude to surroundings and the scene but also in the hardcore installing very small groups especially the revolutionary cells another point is that also the preparation work for a new action is made by the hardcore we had a very good example in these days three men of the hardcore Wally Peter Stoll and Adelheid Schultz and Christian Klar three men who killed also the attorney general and Schleyer these three men made their self preparations for the next attack we are waiting for they rented a helicopter and made several helicopter flies in Germany to find out some special things they for himself not by supporters or this preparation made and unfortunately these men who were observed by the police were not recognized you can ask me why this could happen but I will you give the pictures we had of these people and on the corner here you will find the pictures the observation group made and you will see how they are able to change their performance so that is very very hard to recognize them please there are two of them now international relations of the terrorists as I told you have no evidence I really have no evidence that there is an international center for all or the most terrorist movements in the world but there are with growing tendency international links or transnational links and relations in variant forms and kinds let me give you some examples in various steps the most frequent form of international links is the acceptance of the ideology and the strategy of another group for example the German terrorist groups accepted the strategy of Marighella and also the form for example of prisons people of people's prison I saw for example the people's prison in Montevideo where the ambassador Jackson was held as prisoner and they are very similar to the people's prisons for example in Berlin where Peter Lawrence was in the hands of terrorists and also the tactics of shooting in the knees for example the Red Brigades in Italy used where taken from German terrorist groups so the revolutionary cells shoot in the legs to legal defendants in consuls in Berlin in the Lawrence process some weeks ago the next step is that terrorists use the liberality of international traffic and tourism and the very open borders in the western hemisphere for fleeing, for finding regeneration rooms another country for buying weapons getting passports, other documents and other logistic assistance in the last month for example German terrorists of the hardcore of the RAF and of the second June movement were arrested in Sweden, in Switzerland in Netherlands, in France also in the eastern parts eastern countries, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which does not mean that we have evidence that the terrorists are directly supported by the governments of the Soviet Union or other countries in the eastern world one terrorist also was arrested crossing the border from Canada to the United States Christina Bersta which is not a terrorist of the present hardcore of our organizations and I learned that it is very difficult to get the extradition from the United States to Germany the next step of international links and relations of terrorism is that they get logistic support by other terrorist groups in another country logistic support, weapons documents and also training, you heard and read about training camps in the Near East for not only for the Palestinian terrorists but also for other terrorist organizations also from Germany I would say another form is to get support by the government of another state or at least which is nearly the same by an organization which is acknowledged by the government in another country we have examples although also for this form of transnational support and assistance another form is that the terrorists operate in another country attacking embassies, consulates or firms of the state they come from or the state they are fighting against I remember the attack of the German embassy in Stockholm by German terrorists or the attack on the Israeli team in 1972 at the Olympics in Munich by Palestinian terrorists or the IRA attacking the British army in Germany in the last weeks we had in one night five bombings against institutions buildings of the British army in Germany or the Croatian terrorists killing Yugoslavian people in other countries or the struggle between different Palestinian groups in other countries from France to Pakistan another form in the steps of international relations is that terrorist attack consulates representatives firms of another country in their own country for example 1976 Ulrike Meinhof killed herself in a German prison there was only a very weak reaction in Germany itself but there was a burning circle around Germany around the Federal Republic of Germany from Trieste, Milano, Rome, Barcelona, Bilbao, Lyon, Paris, Brussels bombings to German consulates and firms industrial settlements made not by German terrorists but by sympathizing terrorist groups in these countries the next and hardest form of international cooperation and the most dangerous form is the operation of a group with members of several countries and you got some very good examples by Mr. Klatterbeck these days I remember another time the attack on the OPEC conference under the command of the terrorist Carlos in Vienna or the hijacking of an Air France airplane to N-Tabbe or the kidnapping of Palma, the kidnapping of Ötker which is an industrial man in Munich we don't have any evidence that this was made by terrorists with political motivation but the kidnapping of Palma was made by terrorist international terrorist groups and we found money out of the ransom with many persons who were arrested in the last month or another form is of the international or transnational terrorism was the attack of a Croatian group on the German general consulate in Chicago some weeks before and in Germany also there operates an armée populaire des opprimés OSAIR their last action was the explosion of a bomb in the night train express Ratislava Paris during his stay in Cologne the international terrorism will only be finally defeated if there is no country in the world to support them and to refuse punishment or extradition after terrorist actions and there are many examples that the international cooperation and the combat against terrorism is growing better and better the appropriate the German terrorists no I have to tell the ministers of interior within the European community decided for example to cooperate very closely and installed several committees with periodical meetings they arranged especially for the exchange of experience in the fight against terrorism or a system of permanent contacts and information and the bilateral support by experts in concrete cases the European committee accepted an anti-terrorist convention that renders the extradition of arrested terrorists easier and the European parliament in April adopted an anti-terrorist resolution to intensify European cooperation against terrorism how difficult it is to adopt anti-terrorist agreements between states with quite different political systems is shown by the discussions of the anti-kidnapping convention in the UN initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany the borderline between criminal terrorism on the one side and liberation movements on the other side is for many states very hard for many governments very hard to find and as you know and Ambassador Quinton told you about this the delegation at the Bonn Economic Summit meeting in July published a statement on air hijacking that may be very effective and the governments of the United States of Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Germany will intensify their fight against international terrorism and if a country refuses extradition or punishment of hijackers the governments of the seven nations shall seize air flights to that country and refuse the landing of airplanes coming from that state or of its air company coming from another country but Ambassador Quinton could surely tell you how difficult it will be to come to a final decisions based on this declaration of the prime ministers of this seven states thank you very much for your attention the question that I was putting to Herr Ruprecht was related to his last remark the difficulty of getting what I believe are some of the third world nations to cooperate in their perspective of the individuals who perpetuate kidnapping and then flee to another nation I know there is a tradition in Latin America in Mexico as well where they feel that if there has been a political basis for a crime they will not extradite that individual do you see that continuing in the situation? thank you yes I see this difficulty also in the future and I think the discussion in the UN committee shows how difficult it will be to find the border I don't speak about the border between real criminal terrorism and political terrorism especially for us in Germany also political motivated terrorism is criminality one aim in the terroristic propaganda in Germany is that they are in the war against the government and that people who are arrested are prisoners of war and that the German law is not legal for them because that is war our standpoint is also political motivated terrorism is criminality I can't decide if and I am sure that there are situations in the world where violence is legal also our basic law, our constitution gives under certain circumstances right for violence against violence but for the terrorist movements especially in Europe I don't see any possibility that there is a legal violence but I see also in the future the difficulties to find this border to liberal movements to liberation movements are we observing a trend should we measure terrorism by the numbers killed or by examination of its impact but here's the thought will terrorism make an effective dent in our way of life will we have to bend substantially to accommodate it or will it burn itself out before that happens I think that terrorism in Europe as well in the United States has no chance to bring revolution to destroy the society, the democratic society but it has a chance to change our way of life and this is a danger beyond the harm they do personal to individuals that they force the state to change the political atmosphere and the laws and the volume of freedom given to all citizens and we always I think go on a very small way between these two dangers to have not enough legal weapons against terrorism and to get too many laws and take away too much freedom from the citizens I'd like to add a little bit to that I agree very much with it I think one's got to look at two aspects the international aspect you are bound to get people differentiating and it's no good any of our plans on the idea that Arab countries are going to hand over Arab prisoners to Israel for example whatever some international agreement may say so we've got to be realistic in predicting and understanding what governments are going to do but the fundamental question is within our own societies and within our own societies I think it is fundamental that there must be crime and crime alone when somebody is tried for the crime of murder or violence or bombing or kidnapping they should be tried for that crime now when it comes to sentence it is then a matter for the judge to decide what sentence to impose upon somebody and he may take account of his political the political motivation and possibly the justification for it if any that is one for the judge to take account of just as a judge will take account of whether a man was intensely emotionally disturbed by his wife having an affair with some other man this kind of thing a judge will take account of now one thing we must never do and we in Britain have done it very stupidly a few years ago and I will pass it on to you lest you make the same mistake in 1972 in a very praiseworthy attempt to pacify fairly moderate Catholic opinion in Northern Ireland the decision was taken to give special category to prisoners who were arrested for crimes committed on behalf of the IRA as a result we have in our prisons now a large number of people with or not very large number but quite a large number of people with what amounts to prisoner of war status they are not subject to normal prison discipline they live in huts with a platoon organization with an officer of the IRA in charge of them and that officer of the IRA is the only channel through which the prison authorities can deal with those prisoners because that is what they agreed to and the result is that those prisons are training organizations this is crazy now you might say let us wipe it out we agreed with it we accepted it but it is now wrong so we will go back on our agreement well already that is too late because although for the last three years nobody convicted of a crime in Northern Ireland has been given political status the IRA prisoners who are now being convicted a large number of them are now conducting a campaign to refuse to cooperate with the prison authorities you may have read about it they refuse to wear prison clothing they refuse to clean out their cells they foul their cells they will not slop out as the prison term is I don't know if you have the same one they make a mess all over their prison cells and they don't wash they don't clean themselves they do nothing and unbelievably a bishop the primate of all Ireland has come out in support of them in that activity now those people are every one of them convicted of a crime usually a murder if not of bombing or of some other crime and it is to me incomprehensible that we ever got ourselves on this hook so I do most earnestly commend both to people concerned with the law and judiciary and people concerned with the police and I know we have many of both here that you do not make that same mistake that we did treat crime as crime and the political motivation is a matter connected with the sentence only