 Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I want to congratulate Thierry Montréal on the 10th anniversary of the World Policy Conference and say wholeheartedly what a privilege it is to be on a panel of this distinction. The political trends in the United States and the West have a direct impact on the Middle East. The upsurge of nationalist, populist, protectionist, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiments. And the weakening of the political center are the thread that connects Brexit, the Trump election, the rise of right-wing anti-EU parties and attitudes in the Netherlands and Sweden and Germany and Austria, Poland and Hungary. And the U.S. Trump's America first doctrine is, and I cannot emphasize this enough, a dramatic departure from the bipartisan consensus that Republicans and Democrats have had since the end of World War II. A consensus that helped build an international order based on international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization, and a whole body of free trade agreements both bilateral and multilateral. What we are seeing is a marked departure with neo-isolationism, a suspicion of alliances and multilateral agreements. The withdrawal from the long-negotiated 11-country trans-specific partnership, which was to be our answer to countering Chinese influence in Asia done unilaterally after three years of negotiation, the threat to withdraw from NAFTA and the Iran nuclear agreement, the effective withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement are examples of this new attitude. There's a direct opposition to nation-building in the Middle East, whether it's Iraq or Afghanistan, and the President only reluctantly agreed to a modest increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. With respect to the Middle East, it seems to me there are very positive news in a number of areas, mostly interestingly in the countries with monarchies. Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision by King Salomon recognizes the need to diversify an oil-based economy, to empower women, and to encourage for the first time more private and foreign investment. The same is true in the United Arab Emirates, which are booming. Under King Hussein, Jordan is staying above water, which is saying something when you consider a country of 10 million has had to accept 700,000 refugees with few natural resources. Morocco is doing fairly well under a reformist King Hussein. An ISIS has been defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, although it remains a persistent problem for terrorism. These are very positive developments and shouldn't be neglected. At the same time, they tend to be overwhelmed by three negative trends. The first is the rise of non-state forces of disintegration, many, although not all, radical, threatening traditional unitary states. The Kurds in Iraq, for example, with their referendum of independence, clearly overplayed their hand and the central government in Iraq quashed their movement. But it was an example of this effort at disintegration, of taking unitary states and dividing them. The Syrian Civil War, while Assad is now likely to prevail, it is hard to imagine a unitary state emerging after this conflict, in any time in the near future. Hezbollah in Lebanon has created a mini-state within a state, and the Taliban in Afghanistan remains a very dangerous threat to the unity of that country. And this, by the way, is the longest-standing U.S. war in American history. Longer than the Civil War, longer than World War II, longer than World War I, longer than the Korean War, longer than the Vietnam War. Ten years now, inconclusive still. In Egypt, after defeating the Muslim Brotherhood, a traditional lynchpin and largest country in the region is facing radical insurgent forces in northern Sinai, with sporadic violence that has decimated its economy, which is heavily dependent upon tourism. President Sisi has cracked down not only on the Muslim Brotherhood and on other radicals as he should, but unfortunately on moderate secular forces, a peaceful opposition and the press. A second negative force is the rise of political Islam. And Iran is the progenitor of that, marrying Islam to a radical terrorist agenda. I was unfortunately there at the creation, as President Carter's Chief Domestic Advisor lived through the whole revolution and the hostage crisis. Their nuclear ambitions are tied to medium-range missile development, their support for Hezbollah in Lebanon with 100,000 increasingly sophisticated missiles facing Israel, their deep engagement of their revolutionary guard and al-Quds forces in Syria, and their plan to have a permanent military base in that country. Their support for Hamas and Gaza is another example. Turkey is unfortunately also an example of a rise of political Islam. Mr. Erdogan is moving sharply in an anti-Western direction, increasingly autocratic, cracking down on the press and the opposition, and remarkably for two allied countries over decades. We now have today, this moment, a dual visa ban. You cannot get a visa for either country going to the other. That's how things have deteriorated. Even Morocco, which is an island and source of stability, an Islamic party won election and is part of the government, although one of the close supervision of the king. The third negative force, at least from my standpoint, is the resurgence of Russian influence at the expense of the United States, in a region in which they were expelled by President Sadat in 1973 as he turned to America. This resurgence is seen in a number of ways. In Syria, Russia picked, it appears, the right horse and Assad and is riding him to some kind of victory. And they did so when he was literally on his knees. And in return, they're securing a permanent naval base in Syria. They've sold missiles to Turkey, an unbelievable development for a country that is a NATO ally. The notion of introducing Soviet or Russian missiles into a country which is a NATO partner is almost unimaginable, but it's happening. And even with respect to Saudi Arabia, Russia is warming relations with them with arms sales, although they have been our traditional Arab partner. Now US policy under Trump has two priorities in this region. The first is the defeat of ISIS with modest help to pro-US forces in Syria and support of anti-radical forces in Yemen and Niger and in Nigeria as well. The second priority of the Trump administration in this region is to limit in every way possible, short of war, Iranian power. The President's recent decision to decertify the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA, while it does not mean immediate withdrawal, certainly sets the stage for that. Because he has laid out the following conditions, that in order to stay in the JCPOA, there has to be a permanent ban on Iran's nuclear development, a long-term ban on their missile development, and other conditions which will be very difficult if not impossible to meet by January 12th. And that date is important because that's the date on which the six-month rolling waiver of secondary sanctions will expire. And if those conditions aren't met and it's hard to see how they will be, then he would have great difficulty in waving the sanctions. And if he reimposes the secondary sanctions, which were a key part of the JCPOA, then in effect we will have withdrawn. And not only that, we will have engaged in a major trade war, Mr. Minister, with the EU, because those secondary sanctions will be targeted to any company that does business with Iran. In effect, we're saying either choose the US market or choose the Iranian market. And that's a choice that will be very difficult. The EU is already developing its blocking legislation to protect EU companies. And this will be a conflagration on the trade front. And let's remember that the only reason that Iran came to the bargaining table to begin with was not our unilateral sanctions. It's only when we got the European Union to join us in banking sanctions in terms of depriving the EU of 16% of their oil sources. That's why they came. So here we would be dividing ourselves from our allies in dealing with Iran, but that is the prospect that is likely. The Trump policy places the Middle East peace process between Israel and the Palestinians at best on a second order of priority, despite having his son-in-law's involvement. One son-in-law who he recently criticized, by the way. It is very difficult to see for someone who believes as I do in the two-state solution any likelihood of that being prodded forward in this administration, because the administration and the President has aligned himself with very conservative elements in a generally liberal American Jewish community and with a very conservative, indeed Itamar can correct me, perhaps the most right-wing government we've had in Israeli history, which is highly pro-settler. So the conditions on either side, the Palestinians agree to some acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state and giving up at least in significant part their quote-unquote right of return. And the Israeli side, it's very difficult to see and I can assure you that the President does not want to break any political China to resolve that impasse. Likewise, there'll be very little effort to break the Qatar-Saudi priorities. So we are left with a mixed picture. There are positive elements in the region. Those, in my opinion, are overwhelmed by many of the negatives that I've mentioned. But the traditional role of the U.S. as a fulcrum, as a lever is potentially going to leave an empty vacuum in which negative forces will enter. Thank you.