 Thank you all for being here, I'm Dan Rundy, I hold the Shrier Chair here at CSIS. We're going to be talking about non-kinetic power and the 2014 National Security Strategy, and I include in that everything that has nothing to do with battleships and planes and nuclear weapons and stuff that goes boom, which I'm all in favor of, don't get me wrong, but I do think there's obviously an incredible part of our power is not kinetic. It's about our influence, it's about our ideas, it's about our trade, it's about the strength of our economy, it's about our international development, it's our leverage of the multilateral system, it's about our public diplomacy, it's about our exchanges, our people-to-people exchanges, it's our connectivity through diasporas, it's through our private charitable giving, it's through faith community, it's through the NGO community, it's a whole network of stuff that doesn't have to do with the military and how we use it and how we leverage it is a big important part of our power and influence and how we shape the world that we want to live in and when our children do live in. There's a process that has gone on for quite some time and I suspect others are going to have a better sense of how long this has been going on, of every four years creating a national security strategy for the United States. And we're going to hear from various speakers that you have their biographies in front of them and I've asked my friend, Kath Hicks, who runs our international security program here who's also a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense to make some opening and framing remarks from a security standpoint. But before she does, I just want to point out a couple of things. In the 1998 national security strategy, the term climate change was mentioned six times and in the 2010 strategy the term climate change was used 24 times. The word partnerships was used zero times in the strategy in 1998 and the word partnerships was used 44 times in the 2010 strategy. The word extremism was used in the 1998 strategy zero times and the word extremism was used in 2010 14 times. The word terrorism was used in 1998 48 times and in the 2010 strategy it was used 23 times. So if you add up extremism and terrorism it kind of comes out in the wash and it's about the same. But the word HIV AIDS was used once in 1998 and in 2010 it was used once as well. The word trade was used 90 times in 1998 and trade was used 29 times in 2010. The word democracy was used in 1998 53 times and the word democracy was used in 2010 24 times. So there was a drop. The word China was used in 1998 48 times and in 2010 it was used 11 times and in 1998 the word Iran was used 20 times and the word Iran in 2010 was used 14 times. I'm going to put this all in a commentary and that was probably too hard to follow because I went through it quickly but some of it is more surprising than not but I think it's interesting it certainly the word like partnerships sort of jumps up or the word climate change is another one that's on people's minds. So I think I'm sure we could do all sorts of word cloud exercises around this and that might be an interesting exercise we can do beyond that. So without further ado I'm going to ask my friend Kathix to help frame up this conversation. Kath. Hello to everybody. I like Dan's sense of irony of having the kinetic person open the discussion of non-kinetic approaches on national security strategy. Like others in the room I've been engaged on the national security strategy development in different ways over time beginning from the mid early to mid 1990s and it's actually supposed to be annual but never has been. It was legislated under the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986 to have an annual national security strategy which we did for a little bit in the 90s and then stopped and did it less frequently. So you can look at back at a history of NSS's some things are always different. There are a few things that are I think themes that you can carry through. One is that in second terms NSS's really do start to reflect a little bit more desire than first term NSS's to institutionalize reforms. And so I think you can look to see whether this next NSS has that same sense of moving beyond just kind of fast turn initiatives to how you institutionalize the tools of national security strategy that the president wants to ensure exists beyond his time and tenure. NSS is of course the premier opportunity for the policymaking community to see in Washington and around the world to see how the president and the national security advisor really think about integrating the instruments of U.S. national power. And of course this administration which I was a part of has really highlighted particularly in the last several months the importance of the non-military instruments of power from the president's State of the Union address to statements that both Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel have made about the importance of diplomacy and trade. NSS is in theory the place in theory where you would see how all of those instruments are operationalized, prioritized, and a sense at least of relative resourcing. But of course that's a lot to lay on a document that at the end of the day is really a strategic communication tool and you have to think about the NSS that way. The difficulty for any public communication tool is you have a lot of audiences with different interests and sometimes their interests are actually contradictory to one another and you're trying to reach them. And I raise that now because I think what you'll see in this NSS which is consistent across NSS is a prioritization on assuring allies and deterring potential adversaries over and above responding to a domestic audience. That will become important particularly when you think about the resourcing challenges that we face today. You could have this year, of course, we have reduced dollars being dedicated or available for national security. So you in theory could have more prioritization laid out in the NSS. You could in theory have a harder line about what will be spent, what will not be spent. And agencies within the U.S. and certainly allies and partners will be looking to see if there's a reduction in appetite in terms of what the United States, how it intends to think of its role in the world and then how it intends to execute that. If you don't have that you're more likely to have a tone of do more with less. And I'm going to just tell you frankly I think you're going to hear the latter because there will be this emphasis on trying to make sure that folks feel reassured overseas or that they feel sufficiently deterred overseas. I don't think you're going to see much of a reduction in appetite. So let me just leave you four areas where from a security person's perspective we would want to see the NSS take on issues of non-military power. The first is the issue of stabilization in fragile states. As you all probably know, the Defense Department in 2012 and its Defense Strategic Guidance, which the President signed, indicated that it would no longer size its military, its ground forces in particular, but its military for the stabilization mission. And part of the explanation for what would happen in lieu of that kind of sizing in addition to DOD continuing to maintain its skillset was turning over more to the civilian sector, civilian instruments of power, their capabilities for stabilization and for reducing the security threats that fragile states pose. This NSS is the first one since that statement was made, since the administration made that choice about stabilization in fragile states. And this is the opportunity to see what it is that the civilian sector will be picking up and what its priorities will be in terms of dealing with fragile states. A second major area is the rebalance to Asia. The Defense Department has in its Defense Strategic Guidance come out and said generally speaking what it plans to do in terms of rebalancing itself and subsequent to that DSG for the last year or so, there have been a number of opportunities both in congressional testimony and in speeches to lay out the posture changes, the capability growth areas, etc., that the Department is taking on. This has led to some sense of disconnect within the community of interest around Asia issues to understand how that defense piece fits in with particularly trade and diplomacy and development to maybe to a lesser extent in Asia. So this NSS is a chance to look at rebalance overall, bring the pieces back into balance perhaps to show what the other parts of rebalance will look like. And I would just push that a little further and say specifically there's a lot of concern about what is the U.S. strategy toward China, the overall security strategy. This NSS is a good opportunity to articulate a whole of government strategy toward China and again from a defense perspective understand how defense fits in underneath that overall set of priorities. The third area I would highlight is the Arab Awakening. This is an area that was, it post-states the last national security strategy and it's an area where from the defense side there's a view that there's not a lot of leverage one can get from defense activity certainly not by use of force although sales and other things come into it that's more of a diplomatic approach about how you want to use military sales and training. So I think a big question will be how is this document going to deal with the Arab Awakening? What are in particular the diplomatic tools and approaches that the United States will use? And then fourth and finally related but a little bit different is what is the vision for the counter-terrorism mission going forward? There's a lot that's happened at the tactical and operational level leading to some successes but also leading to some criticism and I think this is the time really for, ideally for the President and the National Security Advisor to talk about what the overall U.S. strategy is on counter-terrorism. Are we in an Al Qaeda 3.0 iteration? Is there a global campaign? How do we think about it? Is it a war? Do we still need the authorization for the use of force? Or do we have some other construct that we ought to be pursuing as the President has indicated in the past? And finally, how are things globally prioritized? If this is still a global campaign, if in fact Al Qaeda has diffused around the globe, where are the areas of greatest interest that we ought to be going after and what are those non-military, non-intelligence community kinetic tools? What are the non-kinetic tools that are part of that campaign? So let me stop there and turn it over to Dan. Thanks. Thank you very much, Kath. I'm going to ask my panelists, colleagues to join me. Thank you. I think that's a very nice way for us to begin the conversation and I really appreciate Kath taking the time to do that. I've got Peter Fever, who is a professor of local science and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the director for the program in American Grand Strategy at Duke University. I thought I had a long title. That's great. That's good. The shorter you are, the longer your title works. Peter also was a colleague in the Bush administration, but also, and I remember him coming to USAID to speak about the 2006 strategy to AID senior staff, but also Peter, is it fair to say you're a curator of shadow government? Yes. What's the website for that? It's under formpolicy.com. Right. So many of you read shadow government. I write for it in a personal capacity, and I think many people read shadow government to see how Republicans are thinking about national security. So we have Peter Fever, who's with us, and I'm going to ask him to speak first, but I also have my friend and colleague, Matt Goodman, who's with us, who's the William E. Simon chair in political economy at CSIS, who works a number of different important issues here at CSIS. One is which is the G20, which he worked ably at the National Security Council under President Obama and also had some experience, I think, as a celestial punishment of some kind, working on the QDDR, but also has significant experience in Asia as well, both in the private sector and working on issues on Asia in government. And then my friend Diana Olbaum, who is currently a senior associate at CSIS, but is known to many and loved in the development community as someone who is a senior professional staff member at the House Foreign Affairs Committee under the leadership of Howard Berman, who ably led that committee and is really responsible for I think one of the most important attempts at trying to reform the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, and so really happy that you're here as well, Diana. So you've got folks who've thought about the National Security Strategy, folks who've been on the National Security Council, as well as thinking about use of a multilateral vehicles by which we express our power, as well as folks who've thought about American soft power in the form of development as well in this conversation. So I'm going to first ask my friend Peter to kick off the discussion and I'm going to ask Matt and then Diana to follow. Peter, the floor is yours. Thank you. Diana asked me to speak about how the NSS gets written and also how in particular the Bush Administration thought of soft power and how that was woven into the NSS. And I've got five points to make. The first one begins really with a story when we were sitting down preparing to start the process of the second term National Security Strategy. We went to all the various departments and agencies to get their input, what were they thinking about. And at AID, we met with senior leadership there and they said, it's vitally important to you that you include in the second, important to us, I should say, that you include in the second National Security Strategy the crucial sentence about the 3Ds, Defense, Diplomacy and Development, because we have based our entire marketing campaign and our entire political outreach to the Hill based on that sentence in the National Security Strategy and we want to make sure that stays, don't take it out by accident. So I thought, well, the development is no less important to the President now than it was in 2002, so sure. We'll do it. I went back, made a little note to myself, go find that sentence and save it for the 2006 one and I couldn't find it. And, you know, after looking a little while, I asked Will Imboden who was working with me, you could look, he couldn't find it. So I said, well, let me just call him over. I said, I call or send him an email saying, couldn't find it, just what is the sentence? Where is it? And we'll save it. Nothing. A couple of hours later, I call over and say, where is it? And they said, well, it's not in the 2002 NSS. It turns out the entire marketing campaign and political outreach campaign have been built around a sentence that they thought was in the NSS but wasn't in the NSS. And I said, well, it's going to be hard to keep it in the none of it has in it. We actually wrote a sentence that had defense, diplomacy and development in it, those three D's, although not exactly the way AID wanted us to do it, but we made sure there was such a sentence for them. But that story illustrates my first point, which is what's in the NSS is not necessarily as important as what people think is in the NSS. And so part of the challenge of the NSS is what do people think they see in there versus what is actually in there. And we discovered that in a back end way. As it turns out, what they saw in there was what was very close to the president's vision anyway. So it wasn't deeply problematic, but you can imagine other ways it would be. First point, what people think is in there is as important as what is actually in there. The second point I would make is what is in there is important, but how it got in there, how it's written is almost as important. National security strategies get written in very different ways along the spectrum from bottom up to top down. And I've had experience, firsthand experience with two. I helped coordinate President Clinton's national security strategy, the one he released in 94. So his 1.0. And then I helped with my office, had the lead for President Bush's second, so 2.0. And President Clinton's first was extremely bottom up process. Not everything was a bottom up review in the first Clinton administration, but this had multiple, really dozens of stakeholders. When we would send it for clearance to the JCS, it would go out to the all combatant commands. And we would get back helpful comments from Paycom about Asia strategy, but we also get their views on grammar and all this kind of thing. And that was just JCS and not counting dozens around the interagency. President Bush's 2.0, one, was extremely top down. It was two people, myself and Will Emboden, working directly for Steve Hadley. And there were not, it wasn't sent out to the interagency until very, very, very late. And only at the top level. And both of those models have strengths and weaknesses. So President Clinton's had the weakness of multiple leaks. So several versions leaked. They'd show up in the front page, or not the front page, but they'd show up in the Washington Post and then we'd have the problems dealing with the blowback on drafts. And it had a little bit of the committee feel to it, you know, the camel instead of the stallion in terms of prose. And I remember at one point, late in the process, a senior official on the NSC came to me and said, I could write a better NSS than this. I said any one of us could write a better NSS than this, but none of us could get a clear interagency. And that was the strength of the Clinton NSS. There was buy-in. It was clear interagency. And so it actually did reflect a broad constituent support. The strength of the President Bush's 2.0 was it was more coherent and much more of a single voice in the President's voice, I believe. Never leaked, never ever leaked, but then did not have as much buy-in because it was a smaller group of folks who had, you know, blood, sweat, and tears on it. Most people had not. And so there's a strength and weakness to both sides. What is Obama's? Well, Obama 1.0 was somewhere in between. It wasn't as top-down as President Bush's. But it wasn't as bottom-up as Clinton's. So the question was, was it the Goldilocks? Did it have the best of both worlds? Or was it the worst of both worlds? I guess it's in the eye of the beholder. My guess is that the 2.0 will be a little more top-down than what the 1.0 was. Third, my third point. Because the NSS has one author, the President, multiple ghost writers, and multiple audiences, it will not always be as clear as you might wish it to be. But all NSS's have an implicit theory of the case. They have a theme to the pudding if you look closely enough. And that's that underlying logic that makes sense of it. And I would say that President Obama's 1.0 had this as its theme. To restore our position globally, we have to rebuild ourself locally. And most of what was in there derived from that interpretation that we needed to restore ourselves, that we had a recovery challenge globally, and that the best way to do that was, it's time to do nation building at home kind of mantra. President Bush's was different and plays directly on to the theme of the panel. President Bush's theme was, the threats we face will require a hard power response, but they will be ultimately vanquished by soft power. Because what matters is not just the distribution of power, but the character of the regimes in those global powers. So it was very much a soft power document, which might be ironic, given that all the kinetic activity of the Bush term. But if you read the logic and look at it, it is a soft power theme. It shows up in diplomacy, in the sense that we will get, by leading, we will get others to follow. That soft power involves leading and thus persuading others to follow you. It shows up, of course, in development, where the political freedom and economic freedom go hand in hand and mutually reinforce each other. And that you can't get one without the other and you shouldn't, you should try to move them forward at the same time. By the way, that was the same theory behind President Clinton's 1994 National Security Strategy of enlargement and engagement, enlarging the sphere of market democracies. And at one point I sent little snippets of the draft Bush NSS and the old 94 Clinton NSS around to friends in the White House. I said, okay, guess which one was written by which president. There is more continuity across these documents than there is change sometimes. This is the third point. The fourth point goes directly to the question about President Bush. President Bush saw soft power, lines of action, partly as a means to an end. That is to say, we will enhance our security through the freedom agenda and better control of ungoverned areas. And so the expansion of development aid, expansion of political development democratization, all of this will serve a larger security end. So it's thought partly as a means to an end, but also as an end to itself. In fact, not just an end to itself, but the President Bush saw it as a moral duty deriving from a concept of stewardship. The idea that to whom much is given from him much is expected. America is a wealthy country. When he talked about PEPFAR, he would talk about it in this way. We have the resources, we have a stewardship obligation of those resources to address challenges as great as AIDS or malaria. And it's deep, this moral stewardship is deeply intertwined with, in the President Bush's mind, deeply intertwined with our founding principles, especially the founding principle of equality. There's a single DNA across President Bush's domestic policy and his foreign policy in this regard. It goes from no child left behind to PEPFAR to the freedom agenda. And it is the phrase that the President used, the soft bigotry of low expectations, right? Why should we say that some Americans are condemned to inferior education? Why should we say that some parts of the world should just live with HIV, AIDS? Why should we say that democracy is good for advanced industrial countries but not for others? It would be anathema to our founding fathers, our framers, I should say. And it turns American exceptionalism on its head. Yes, America views itself as exceptional precisely because America thinks its values are universal. That is, the things that it wants is distinctively what everybody wants. And so when America's being most true to its own self and own values and own interests, it advances our interests but it also benefits the world. And that is very much in the national security strategy but it's very much in President Bush's world view, which of course is what a national security strategy is supposed to do is reflect the President's world view. My fifth and final point is that the measure of a national security strategy is not just the elegance of its aspirations, it's also the diligence of its implementation. And this is a challenge for all administrations and every administration struggles with this. Certainly the Bush administration was no exception. Implementation is very, very difficult. And our critics would say, Bush administration critics would say that the Bush administration did not acknowledge the implementation difficulties publicly, didn't acknowledge it enough and didn't acknowledge it soon enough. We certainly acknowledged it privately and so we wrestled with this privately. And so that really ends with the question for the Obama administration. Do they realize just how big the gap between the rhetorical aspirations of the administration which are quite large and the reality of the implementation. It's a gap. Every administration has it. Does this administration know how big that gap is? From the outside, it's hard to tell. But maybe the next national security strategy will reveal what the internal thinking is on that question. Great. Thank you, Peter. I'm going to turn the floor over now to Matt Goodman. Okay. Thank you, Dan. Well, I am the economics guy. I'm the international economics person up here which typically means when I'm in a forum about national security, means that I'm the national security guys like Kath or the life and liberty people and I'm the pursuit of happiness. In fact, the mere word non-kinetic kind of gives a thrill up my leg. I mean, it's very exciting to be thought of as working on non-kinetic things. And slightly more seriously, I think those of us working on international economic policy often have a bit of a chip on our shoulder because economics is not always fully integrated into the conversation about national security. I think because economics is hard sometimes to understand and it is often visibly seen as kind of a commercial matter of selling US products around the world and so forth. That's sort of easier to visualize and take a picture of. And I would say that the kinetic stuff is lower probability but higher impact and therefore sort of a little more interesting. Economics is sort of lower impact but more frequent and therefore probably suffers from kind of devaluation of the currency by being around us at all times. When you wake up every morning, if you've got life and liberty, you're probably going to be thinking about economic issues, where to get breakfast, your job, your mortgage and so forth. Not quite as sexy stuff but important. And in fact, I would say that when you look at the, as we were sort of thinking about this framing this based on the 2010 national security strategy, I think it was much easier to see in that context why economics was important in national security. In fact, if you think about the people drafting this and I was not one of those, I was working in QDDR Hellas, as Dan said, over at State in a kind of parallel universe. But aware of this going on. Those folks were working in the middle of a still unfolding financial crisis, international financial crisis. And so I think that very much shaped the 2010 strategy. And if you look back at that, you'll see that recurring throughout. And as an economics person, when I look back at it, and one sentence sort of jumps out at me, which is the sentence, we will do so, which is meaning renewing American leadership. We will do so by building upon the sources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time. Now that's a broad statement, but I think it basically reflects the fact that we were in an economic crisis and we needed on the one hand to focus on rebuilding our economy at home. And on the other, we needed to work with others around the world to build sort of a cooperative framework for dealing with international economic challenges. And so in specific terms, the focus there was on balanced and sustainable growth, on building out bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, on accelerated investment and development, which Dana can speak to, and to reform of the governance of the international economy, in this case. And that was reflected really in the shift from a G7 to a G20 world. And I think because there was a recognition that a small group of advanced countries could not manage the challenges of the international economy and the broader challenges of international governance without a group like that. So if you think since then, on all those issues, I'd say there's been partial progress. You know, the economy has obviously stabilized and is growing again, but not quite as strong as we normally see coming out of recovery. So there's still work to be done there and there's obviously longer term and interest in investing in the kinds of foundational issues like infrastructure and education and so forth to build our strength at home. There's been some progress on trade with signing of some big agreements, including the Korea Agreement and so forth, but the Doha round of multilateral talks has stalled. We're in a very vocal debate right now about a big trade agreement with Asia, and I'll come back to Asia in a second, and about the authority for the administration to negotiate trade agreements. So that's still a work in progress. Development, again, I'll leave to Diana. And on institutional reform, the G20 was created, did some critical things in the first three or four summits and since then has kind of lost some momentum. So again, there's a need to revisit some of those issues in 2014. So I would expect all of those things to reappear in 2014. I think there'll be probably some shift of emphasis. So again, because our economic conditions are a bit better, but on the other hand, the long-term challenges are still there, so I think it'll be more focused longer term. There's some very good news in that regard, which is on the energy side, and I think that's the biggest, probably, single change, as I think of in my sort of world since 2010. If you look at the 2010 NSS, it's focused largely on clean energy, and that will continue to be a theme this time, but barely mentioned is unconventional energy, shale gas and so forth, which is, you know, in that period sort of exploded on the scene and has opened up the possibility of not only greater economic security for the United States, but major shifts in geostrategic positions. So I think that'll be a much higher focus this time. And then I suspect that immigration is also going to feature a little bit more as one of the foundational issues that was discussed last time. But trade is the one that I'm sort of most interested in in this context, and particularly because Kath mentioned the Asia rebalance, which I spend a lot of time on. I think, you know, as I mentioned, we are in the middle of a negotiation of a major trade agreement with our Asia-Pacific partners, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and also starting up an agreement, a negotiation with our European Union, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. It's very unfortunate to have these T's and P's in this world right now. And I would say that those things are intrinsically important because they get to the issues of economic strength, underlying strength of our economy, and to our international engagement, particularly in the TPP case with Asia. And they are critically important to the issue of shaping the rules of the international system. And clearly explicitly, TPP and TTIP are aimed at trying to update, uphold, champion the rules of the international trading system. And unstated in that, but I'll state it here, is dealing with a world in which there are emerging powers, including China coming onto the scene and trying to get those countries, not to exclude those countries from the international system, on the contrary, to pull them in more deeply and to subject them to the global rules-based system the way the United States is subject to those rules. So I think there will be quite an emphasis on that, and I would say that to me is the most interesting part. I mean, of those statistics you named, Dan, the one that surprised me was the drop in the reference to China. I don't know why that is. It may have been because in 1998, we were gearing up for the WTO accession for China, and there was a lot of energy and activity dealing with China, but why it dropped off so precipitously last time, because it's obviously very important on a lot of levels, but certainly in my world in economics, it's central. So I expect that to be central this time. So I think I'll sort of leave it with those thoughts and just say that the CSAS just have shamelessly advertised. The CSAS Asia program collectively does a lot of work on the Asia rebalance, whether it's our Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia chairs or my chair, which is really focused on Asian economics, and we also do a lot of work on economic governance and statecraft, and we will be following this with great interest to see what kinds of hooks the National Security Strategy gives us to further our work. So thanks. Thanks, Diana. Thank you so much. I think it's important to begin by acknowledging the gap between what the National Security Strategy actually is and what we might like it to be. And I think Kath called it a public communication tool, and I think particularly in recent years, instead of being a doctrine or a blueprint laying out specific guidelines or clear priorities and policy directions, it's really become a public relations document that's designed to make everyone happy and avoid attack. And I personally would like to see a much bolder document that actually puts a clear stamp on foreign policy and articulates a clear vision of our role in the world. So what I'd like to do is set out what I would like to see in this document if it were going to be a real strategy as opposed to just a public relations tool. So the first and most important thing I would like to see it say is why development is important to our national security. The National Security Strategy needs to give more than lip service to the 3Ds that we've been talking about and the concept of smart power. We hear all the talk about defense diplomacy and development, but if you look at the 2010 National Security Strategy, out of 52 pages, you'll find exactly five paragraphs devoted to sustainable development. And there really was no clear articulation of why sustainable development is important to U.S. national security and national interests. There's one sentence that addresses the link between sustainable development and national interests, which I would like to read to you. Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners that need to help us stop conflict and counter global criminal networks, build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity, advance democracy and human rights, and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges. So this is really an incredible statement when you think about it. It's not saying that development will create more markets for U.S. exports or level the playing field for American workers. It's not saying that development reduces the risk of pandemic diseases or environmental degradation. It doesn't say that good governance, transparency and accountability are effective antidotes to transnational crime or that they reduce the risk of violent conflict. And what it really does say in effect is development creates better partners who will do our bidding for us. And that may be a little harsh, but I think it reflects the reality of how we're looking at development as a tool of our foreign policy rather than as an end in itself. Which leads to my second point, development assistance is not a lever of American policy and influence. We have other types of aid that are designed to achieve political purposes, but development assistance is plain and simple an investment in a better, safer world. It ought to be designed to achieve the maximum development outcomes. We're finally starting to learn the lessons of 50 years of assistance on what makes development assistance effective. People talk about country ownership, about transparency and accountability, making it more data-driven, more strategic, harmonizing with other donors. Let's not abandon those lessons in an attempt to leverage aid for short-term diplomatic gains. The third point is that development isn't only about aid. I think it's really high time we started recognizing that aid is only a small drop in the bucket when you're talking about resources for development. Foreign direct investment, remittances and domestic resources are all quite a bit larger than official development assistance and private philanthropy is rapidly growing as well. Dan's project here at CSIS on prosperity and development has really done some great work on the role of private donors in development, private actors, not just donors. Now that doesn't mean aid isn't important. It just means that our development policy needs to be broader than just aid. And here I think there are really two elephants in the room. The first is the issue of our agricultural and trade policies. These were not touched on at all in the presidential policy directive on global development precisely because of their political sensitivity. But I think a case can be made that we are doing more damage to developing countries through our agricultural subsidies, our tariffs and our trade quotas than we're helping them with development aid. So if you don't deal with that, I wonder whether we're not offsetting our development aid. And the second is the issue of illicit financial flows. The total volume of aid going into the developing world pales in comparison to the amount of resources that are being siphoned out. Africa loses more each year through illicit outflows than it receives in external aid and foreign direct investment combined. The net outflows were about 1.4 trillion over the past 30 years. That's how much is coming out more than is going in. Some of this is due to plain old corruption, bribes, kickbacks, embezzlement, pure and simple. But the vast majority of this is due to tax evasion in essence, cheating countries out of their natural resources and their financial resources. It's estimated that developing countries lose between 120 and $160 billion each year in tax revenues on wealth that is hidden offshore. And the U.S. is directly complicit in that by allowing the registration of anonymous shell companies that are the primary vehicle for hiding these illicit resources for laundering money for tax evasion and for hiding the profits of transnational crime. I think this is something we really need to address if we want to advance development and our own national security. And finally the one thing, the last thing that I'd like to see the new national security strategy do is to strengthen the linkage between development, human rights and conflict prevention. Five and a half years ago Gail Smith put out what I think is an incredibly impressive document called In Search of Sustainable Security which was essentially a memo to the next president, it was before Obama was elected about what should be in the next national security strategy. And frankly I think it remains entirely relevant today, despite the fact that she's on the national security staff a lot of it remains to be done and I don't think I could really improve on it. One of the points she makes is that America must recalibrate its foreign policy to rely less on military power and more on other tools that can foster change and enhance our security. And I think that's a lot of what we're talking about here is how to rely on some of the quote-unquote non-kinetic elements of our national security. But in order to do this we can't just cut defense which I believe is important to do but doing that alone isn't going to fix the problem. We really need to seriously ramp up our civilian capacities to prevent violent conflict, to transform it both through direct prevention activities which are diplomacy, sanctions, dialogue and through structural prevention which in essence is development. It's the long-term interventions that are needed to transform socio-economic and political institutions. And Kath also mentioned this in her speech. If we're going to rely more on these things we need to develop them. I think both the last national security strategy and the QDR both talk about this. They mention how important it is. But frankly conflict prevention and transformation is still treated as something of a red-headed stepchild both at state and at USAID. It's something that's way outside the mainstream. It's unconnected and incidental to the rest of their work. In my view conflict prevention ought to be one of the main if not the main job of the State Department. It's not a special interest. It's not a sideshow. It's what all our diplomats ought to be trained and equipped to do. It's the only way that diplomacy and development are going to be able to take their rightful place alongside defense as part of our national security. Thank you. Thanks very much, Diana. I appreciate it. I think you've seen there's a spectrum of views on this panel. I want to put a couple of questions to this group and then I want to open it up. The first one is this issue of I think Kath talked about the purpose of a national security strategy is to assure allies. I see a number of folks from embassies here and to deter adversaries. I guess the question I put to this panel is do we expect that the current mix of our power, whether it's both kinetic and non-kinetic as it's sort of being projected out, is it assuring to allies and is it going to deter adversaries and is the current mix is one way to ask that question and another way to ask it might be are we asking our non-kinetic sources of power to sort of fill the gap whereas we pull back on some of our defense work, is that realistic? Maybe that's another way to answer it. So you can answer either way is is the current mix of non-kinetic and kinetic, is it assuring our allies and deterring adversaries and another way to ask it would be as I said, are we asking our non-kinetic power, sources of power to fill in gaps that were in essence maybe I can put it this way, leaving behind with some of the reductions in our defense budget. I'll start with you Peter and we'll just go down the panel. So I'll answer that but first I wanted to say that there's another very important audience for the NSS and that is the rest of the US government so part of the NSS as it explains the President's worldview in a comprehensive way that touches more elements of the National Security Apparatus, Foreign Policy National Security Apparatus than anything else the President does and that's an important message because how do people who are in the Obama Administration know what the President thinks about a topic because they're not in the meetings with him and the NSS is partly partly for that so it is a public relations document but precisely because it's public it has to be authoritative and reflect what the President is really thinking so you can't say things that the President doesn't really believe because if you do you're going to get called out on it and David Sanger will be the first one to call you out on it okay and answer your question I would say this that soft power which is the capacity to get other people to want to do what you want them to do as opposed to hard power which is the capacity to make them do what you want them to do can be undermined through two different ways you can undermine it if you develop the reputation for making lots of mistakes of commission and so they begin to view you as reckless so the other the rest of the world doesn't want to be around you because they're afraid that you're a calamity Jane you can also though lose influence if the world comes to view you as unreliable not credible well not can't be dependent on you don't have their back and so they're they're out there alone I think the dominant criticism of the Bush administration was along that first line of arguing that critics would say that President Bush was in danger of squandering soft power through acts of commission that that the rest of the world was worried about you know invading Iraq or what have you I think this administration the dominant critique on the soft power side would be in that second lane it would be sins of omission and creating vacuums and so the challenge for the administration is to convince the rest of the world both our friends but and our partners that that the United States is with them will not abandon them and has their back and President Obama has actually used that phrase several times and the I think that's to me that's a sign that the president realizes he's got that that's a that's a concern that he has to address and so I would say that is part of a soft power function is persuading other other people that you can be trustworthy you can be reliable Matt so I'm not in the deterrence business again I'm in the pursuit of a bank of happiness business it's broadly I'm obviously economics and trader used as tools of of dissuasion as well but that's not really what I think animates this discussion I think when I look at this question in the context of Asia it's an interesting dynamic because And the Defense Department is actually explicitly increasing the balance of its, you know, posture in Asia. And so that, at least, you know, again, I defer to the defense folks, but it seems to me that that isn't certainly intended to both reassure and deter in that context. But the, and certainly Asians want the U.S. to play that role in the region and want to be reassured and have the appropriate deterrence capability. They don't want to talk, they want that hard power to be soft. They don't want it to be too much talked about or too visible. And importantly, they want it very much balanced with economic engagement because the business of Asia is business, and what they're interested in is our economic, you know, they sort of implicitly want our hard power, but they really want to talk about our economic engagement in the region. And this is why TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is the current manifestation of our economic strategy in Asia, I mean, as a former Treasury guy, I actually don't start with trade normally. I usually start with, you know, macroeconomic and financial engagement. But I think right now, TPP and trade are the sharp end of the spear. And you know, it's seen in the region, and certainly among people who focus on the region is absolutely mission critical that we get this trade agreement done to both because of its intrinsic benefits and because it is very much wanted in the region as a source of reassurance and not necessarily deterrence, but in the sense that I described it earlier, of the U.S. continuing to play the role it's played for the last, you know, 60, 70 years of being the champion of the rules-based order. So it is absolutely, you know, it is absolutely essential. Thanks. Dan. Well, Dan, your question about whether it's reassuring to allies actually has me a little perplexed because, I mean, the truth is we spend more on defense than the next 10 countries in the world put together. And most of our allies are cutting what they're spending on defense. So I mean, frankly, they'd have a lot of nerve to say, you don't have our back. You know, there has to be some burden sharing if they're that concerned. I think, you know, my sense is most of the concern goes the other way, that we're intervening too much and we're relying too much on coercive solutions to things. And so I would hope that most of them would be reassured to see that we're investing more in multilateral cooperation and in soft power. Now, there may be some countries like China that are going to be reading the tea leaves on this to think, you know, what is our, you know, defensive posture going to be towards them. But frankly, a lot of the countries, I mean, terrorists aren't going to read this. I really don't think Assad looks at this and goes, oh, wow, that's going to tell me how they're going to, you know, react in Syria. So most of the places where these problems arise, I don't think they're going to look at the national security strategy. Fair enough, I think. I wanted to just comment on something that Deanna talked about, this issue of trade and the agricultural subsidies and in our trade. And I'm thinking about Mali, for example, where I think the President Mali at some point ten years ago went to the US government and said, you know what, I'd rather not take your foreign aid. What I'd really like is for you to buy my cotton, which was, I thought, an interesting, you know, frankly, makes a lot of sense to me. So I think could each of you talk a little bit about, and Matt has talked about this about sort of our economic or economic policies or trade policies, but Peter, maybe you could talk a little bit about how, how in the O, certainly if you reference this in looking at the 94 and the 06 strategies, you could compare and contrast the statements and they're very similar. Could you talk a little bit about how the trade and economics have kind of played into the, into the national security strategy in the past? Peter, start with you. Okay, I'll talk about Matt's area if you make him talk about Duke basketball. Yes, exactly. So the Clinton administration came in with the, what was revolutionary for, from a Democratic administration, with an embrace of economic globalization and economic freedom as the best model for building American economy at home and advancing American interests abroad. And that was maybe not where candidate Clinton was in 92, but that's where Clinton, President Clinton came down very clearly and embracing NAFTA, of course, a big achievement of the Clinton administration. So the, the recognition was that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the way the Cold War ended, that there was an opportunity to reinforce the two pistons of the American experiment, which was political freedom, democracy, and economic freedom, capitalism, and that the two pistons worked together and that you couldn't have one far outpace the other for very long. That a country that was trying to economically liberalize, but not politically liberalized, China being a good example, would find that that could, they couldn't ride the one piston that eventually the pressures of the middle class would force political. But if you want to sustain democratic freedoms, you need to have a growing pie to deliver on democracy. You have to do it. And that requires expanded resources, the kind of expanded resources that come from a growing economy, and that comes from a country that is willing to embrace economic globalization and rather than try to hide from it in an autarkic way. And that was an insight from the Clinton administration that animated, I think, the Clinton White House, and frankly, the President Bush doubled down on it and took the rhetoric and the activities of democracy promotion, which were many of them Clinton programs and expanded, developed it more, took the emphasis on free trade and expanded it more, took the development budget and doubled it, which was remarkable. I mean, so yes, the defense budget increased, but the development budget doubled. And that was quite, that was directly reflecting the President Bush's view that these pistons work together and reinforce and build on each other. And that if you try to do just one without the other, you were not going to make enough progress. So I think that the President's, if we had President Clinton and President Bush here, they'd be in a violent agreement with the theme of this panel, which is that you can't ignore the non-Kinetic side and expect that you will deliver on American national security interests. You've got to pay attention to the non-Kinetic side and the Bush administration very much did. Let me actually put this to the panel. I'm thinking about, I've heard Matt talked about energy and the Shalegrass Revolution. Cath talked about a series of things that didn't factor into the 2010, the Arab Awakening, the Pivot to Asia, sort of okay, how do we feel about counter terrorism? Do we have, I guess we don't call it global war on terror anymore, but is there a something, I have a hard time reading sometimes where the administration is on that is another way of maybe perhaps putting it. But what would each of you like to see in the document that are sort of non, some of them are military, obviously the counter terrorism one is, but what, and as Matt talked about Shalegrass, but if you could talk about sort of things that you'd like to see either underlined or double underlined. And I think obviously Diana did a good job of sort of putting out where some of her wish lists are. But if I could maybe ask Peter and Matt and they, Diana, give you another opportunity just to listen to this conversation. There are other things you'd like to see in the document. What would you like to see in the next iteration in terms of, and as you say, Matt, you talked about Shalegrass, but for example, I'd like to see something about, you know, I actually would make the pitch for this might be something to talk about Ukraine and Eastern Europe or finishing the job there. I mean, if you said to me what is one of the biggest opportunities we have without having to fire a shot, my view would be is offering the mother of all aid packages to Ukraine right now and saying, why don't you, you know, if you do the following things, we're gonna take care of your bonds and we're gonna help you with your heating oil and we're gonna do this with our friends in the European Union and bilateral donors and we're gonna leverage the IMF and the World Bank and the EBRD and we're gonna, you know, and we're gonna make a humongous AID package and we're gonna look at the Germans and the French and other, and the Poles and say, okay, we're all gonna, we're gonna give you the mother of all packages and we're gonna get the Orange Revolution 2.0 right this time. I mean, maybe a little idealistic, but I think it, I don't think it's that far off. So it could be something like Ukraine. It could be something like the Arab Awakening. It could be making sure that we finish the job on TPP. What would be sort of, what would be sort of those aspirational things that changes the landscape for us from a strategic standpoint. We're not invading the full to get through the full to gap, if you will, right? We're not using kinetic power to get there. So Matt, why don't we start with you? Yeah, I mean, I think, I mean, I don't think the National Security Strategy is able to address something as granular as the Ukraine situation per se. I mean, the other thing about that is, I guess we're all, the premise of what you're asking is, you know, can we get all this stuff to Ukraine before the Russian tanks roll in? Yes. And, you know, we'll see. But I would say more broadly, to me, the issue is highlighting the strategic use of economics to support real, you know, to support underlying change in all those areas you talked about. So when you talk about the Arab Spring, for example, I was in the White House when that was unfolding and in fact, it became a major, an organizing principle of the G8 Summit in France in 2011 right after the Arab Spring. And it turned out the G8, rather, found a new kind of raise on debt because those were a bunch of countries that had, you know, historical and present stakes of one kind or another in that part of the world. So they actually organized to discuss this. And when we looked at the, I wasn't directly working on this, I was working on the G8, but not specifically the Middle East agenda, but the focus was very much on economics and it was on the basic underpinnings of job creation, of economic governance, of trade integration, and trying to promote those things. Now, whether it's work or not is another question, whether it's been implemented fully, whether other things have intervened is another question. But I think that was the right sort of package of things to be focused on in that situation as the Arab Spring was unfolding. So I think generally the emphasis here should be on how we can use our economic power and our economic tools and our economic thinking, because it's not just about money. In fact, it's very much not about big money dollars that we're throwing at us because we don't have them and it's not going to solve a lot of these problems. It's about, you know, encouraging and incentivizing change within these countries that help produce, you know, longer-term growth and job creation. Before Peter, before you jump in, I want to just respond to that, Matt. I agree with you. I have a dream, and my dream is to double or triple the number of members of the OECD, for example. I actually think, I know this sounds silly, but the OECD is the real country club, if I can put it that way. If you join the OECD, you're assigned a whole series of norms about taxes, a whole series of norms, and this I think speaks to Diana's point about sort of following a set of rules about corruption, about trade, about sort of norms of good behavior. And so there are a number of countries that are knocking on the door of the OECD, so people are like, why is Dan getting, why is Dan enthusiastic about people joining the OECD? Well, so Columbia, Costa Rica, Chile, many of the Eastern European countries have all wanted to join. It doesn't have the same kind of carrots of assistance that the EU has, but it is a good housekeeping, civil approval. We want people in line with what Matt was talking about, about participating in international norms and joining those norms. The OECD in my mind is the gold standard of sort of good behavior and norm behavior. We want to have as many countries as possible, not cheating, not lying to get in, like we've had some problems with the EU on some of this stuff, but my view is, we want to encourage countries to join the OECD and other sorts of international system organizations like that, I think similar to what Matt you were saying earlier about. We don't have, it's not about, sometimes it's about money, it's about this economic thinking or certain kinds of systemic thinking. I mean, the country I think of when you talk about that is Korea, which is a country that moved from a position of sort of total destruction in the 50s to being now a firmly entrenched middle income and kind of middle-aged country. They're suffering a lot of the problems that more advanced countries are of demographics and social security challenges and inequality and so forth. But along the way, they joined the OECD and I've forgotten exactly when it was, but I'm guessing it was sort of early 90s and that both was a recognition of how far they had come, even at that point and I think was also an encouragement to them. And the thing about Korea is they've done most of the basic things at home that I was talking about, of building good systems of governance and good policy frameworks and trade integration and so forth. So I think that's, I think though that if that's, if the OECD is ultimately a load star that directs countries, then I think it is useful in that way. First, and actually before you do, I wanna just say, I thought your point about illicit financial flows is really quite telling and I think very interesting because the last national security strategy talked about the issue of corruption. I don't think that had come up before and maybe it's, you could argue perhaps it's granted there, but I actually think it's actually not granular. A, it's a total killer of things like successful democracies. It's a total, if you look at the polling and developing countries, this is one of the top three issues in most countries and I think 100 countries, it's the top three issues is corruption in their society, public corruption. So, and I do think if you look at all the foreign aid that goes into develop, all the ODA, which is the official foreign aid, it's $120 billion more or less every year. So your number of 120 to 160 billion a year leaving Africa, I mean, it's appalling. I mean, it's appalling number. So I do think, I actually do think these sorts of, these, and it relates to Matt's comment about economic issues. So you might want to either expand upon that or elaborate that because I know you've been working on those issues and then also if you can just react to the conversation. Sure, so on the corruption, I think corruption is one of the things that has been shown to have the strongest link to violent conflict. And if we're going to try to prevent and transform violent conflicts, both for our own direct national security but also because of its importance in reducing poverty and allowing development. I mean, USAID's been doing some really great work on the links between fragility and poverty and people who've been following the MDGs, the Millennium Development Goals. And I think until 2011, not a single MDG had been achieved in a single fragile country. A few have since made a few of those goals but really there's such a strong link between corruption, fragility, conflict that really, you know, there's no way to do a national security strategy without addressing it. But on the other question about what ought to be in it, I realized that this is probably too far for them to be able to go in this political environment. And like I said, this is a PR document, not a strategic thinking piece. But I think we have to start addressing what is national security versus human security. I mean, national security is really about the security of our political institutions, our economy, and our territorial integrity. And there aren't really a huge number of threats to those things in this world. But when you talk about human security, which is the safety and security of individual human beings, both in the United States and abroad, that's where you see a lot of the real threats. And terrorism really isn't the biggest one. I mean, I think it was eight American citizens had died in terrorist incidents in 2012, according to START, this organization that collects these statistics. But, you know, pandemic flu is huge. Air pollution is huge. You know, there's so many things that actually have the potential of hurting average Americans. And the economy is certainly, you know, the international, the global economy is a big part of that. Climate change is huge. We have to start thinking about how we protect individual Americans and not just, you know, the state apparatus. I want to just push a little bit further. Kath talked about the stabilization. Peter talked about ungoverned spaces. And as I'm listening to your comments, I'm thinking about the issue of sort of governance and the capability of states to actually function and work. I actually do think have, it's in line with development, but it's part of a, when we think about things like, okay, we need to be able to collect taxes and actually have governments that work. I keep thinking that if you look at the amount of taxes that are collected in Africa, for example, in the year 2000, it was something like $100 billion compared to all foreign aid in the year 2000, which is about $40 billion. By the year 2010, taxes collected in Africa, including oil, gas and mining revenues, companies in the formal economy, the middle class paying taxes was about $400 billion in 2010. It's probably a little bit bigger now, but foreign assistance are probably about 60. So what I'm trying to say is the resource, domestic resource mobilization is far larger, it's far bigger than foreign assistance. And it's in line with your earlier comments about sort of these other forces that are driving development. And so some of it's about, in my mind, is how do we have governments that work, because I do think it does impact our security, having governments that are weak or failing, I think is one of the points you're making, but also to really do a tracked investment and to actually deliver public goods. But I guess the question I have for you, Diana, is there instances where you made a statement early on about we shouldn't think about this just purely in our national interest? I would argue a lot of times there's a Venn diagram where there's a lot of the stuff we're doing is good for development, but a lot of it is in our national interest for a number of reasons, either just sort of the way I just described it to you. So should we be, isn't that how we've sold development up until now? Isn't that we've sold it as something that's in our national security interest? And isn't that how we've actually gotten the 150 account financed? Well, I think there's a distinction between saying that development is in the US national interest because it reduces the risk of conflict, because it creates better trading partners, because there's a whole list of reasons that inclusive development with responsive and accountable government institutions creates a safer and a better world. That's kind of different than saying we're pursuing development in order to achieve some other aim, we're gonna develop them so that they will vote with us in the UN or that they will, you know. I'm okay with that myself, but I hear, I actually think it's very difficult for us to actually buy votes, but I see your point, right? I mean, I think the point is that we're trying not to, but I think there are some instances like that, but I think they're actually fewer and far between or it's very hard to sort of justify spending development dollars in ways that aren't actually, you're actually getting something out of spending that money, I think is right. I mean, I think we have to be able to demonstrate to the taxpayer, especially in this day and age that there's actually something actually happening on the ground or there's, you know, is that? It's achieving development goals. It's not just to make people like us. And that's, you know, you can't go bombing countries and invading them and thinking that, oh, you do a nice, you know, development project, it'll all will be forgiven and it'll make up for it. That's not really the way it works. Would you like to see, what would you like to see emphasized or included in this next strategy? I'll answer that, but first I want to just build on what was said because I think that the, you're not, your line of questioning wasn't giving a soft power its proper due, which is that soft power is not getting other countries to like us. I think it's a mistake to use the Pew polls as the be all and end all measure of our soft power. They're relevant. They're not nothing, but they're not the whole thing. Soft power is getting other states to want what we want. And that's what development can properly done, can do. Get them to want the things of political freedom, openness, an open trading system, the rule of law, et cetera, et cetera, because when they want that and they're pursuing that, that benefits the United States because we play very well in that sandbox. And so it's wanting them to want that rather than getting them to vote with us in the UN Security Council. Now, the more they want what we want, the better partners they'll be. So I mean, I do think we do think, and the kind of problems we'll have will be more manageable. They'll be like France rather than like Russia. You know, the problems we have with France are much better problems to have than the problems we have with Russia or other countries that are more directly hostile to our interests. So that's where I would see soft power functioning. I would like to see in the next National Security Strategy, I'd like to see the president undo two stumbles, rhetorical stumbles. One is the it's time to start doing nation building at home. I understand why he did it politically that made sense perhaps, but I think it fed a neo-isolationist impulse on the left and there's a neo-isolationist impulse on the right and both of those are inimical to US larger interests properly understood. And I can just imagine my friends at AID grinding their teeth whenever the president will say it's time to stop doing, because the implication is let's cut the foreign aid budget and spend it in Brooklyn or whatever. And that, I don't think that's what the president meant, but it did sound like that. It did sound that way. And so there needs to be a full-throated explanation, not just of the development, but of American leadership and why American leadership matters. And I could cut and paste from a couple of the president's speeches where he did it well. And I'd like to see that section expanded in the NSS. The other rhetorical stumble is the lead from behind, which if the administration doesn't come up with a better epigram, that will be it for the administration. And I think it's a mistake. I understand what the concept was and I understand it's not official. The president didn't say it. I know the president doesn't like it, but it does capture a reality of the way some people see the administration conducting foreign policy. And it's ironic because the 2010 NSS uses the word lead or leading or leadership more than the Bush administration's one does. So that, there's the shock. Way more leading in the Obama NSS than in the Bush one. So he has a theory of leadership, but it's not well articulated and it's not nuanced. I don't think yet. He hasn't gotten the sweet spot. Maybe that's the best way to put it. And so I'd like to see them get that right because as the president has said on occasion, if what makes America different is that when other people are not acting, America will act and by acting will galvanize the actions of others. And that's a very important role for the United States. And I hope the president's national security strategy gives that due recognition. Let me, before, before I'm out of your jumping, I just want to push Peter on one issue, which is Diana raised something I thought was very interesting was around pandemics. I can remember in 05, there was a major collective action activity within the US government on avian flu. It's not gone away. If you asked Andrew Natsios, if he was here, he would say it's one of the most dangerous things. If there was actually a animal to human transmission, this is a DEF CON 5 extremely dangerous situation, I think is the point that Diana was raising. How did you deal with that issue in the 06 version? So the administration was quite seized with this, as you know, because in the fall of 05, as you said, there's a major effort. The most, in substantive terms, the biggest difference between the Bush 2002 NSS and the Bush 2006 NSS is the addition of a chapter that deals with these kind of challenges of globalization. And I gather I wasn't in the administration in 2001, but there was a allergic reflex to the term globalization, and that was Clinton speak. And there was a ABC anything but Clinton kind of allergy in the first term. But when we're looking at the threats confronting the United States in 2005, 2006, it was obvious that some of these threats were traditional threats. Some of these were fit the pattern of the war on terror, which wasn't traditional, but was well-established by 2005, and some of them were best understood as the challenges of globalization, the downsides, whether it's man-caused climate change, which is mentioned in the 2006 NSS, whether it's pandemics and so on. This was something that the administration flagged as a priority. And so this allows me to disagree one more little bit with Diane on this. Just because it's a public relations document, or maybe because it's a public document, these kinds of statements are actually very important. They're like Easter eggs for departments and sub-units that may not be getting the love they need inside the State Department or the Defense Department or whatever. But when you elevate their mission by having it listed in the NSS, especially if the NSS isn't a laundry list of absolutely everything the administration does, but some get mentioned and some don't, that's a way of the President signaling priorities for things that he wants to see the bureaucracy pay higher attention to. And so pandemics was one that we did in that regard. We did not mention shale gas. I reread that section and I thought, man, I could be really proud of myself if we had said that. We did not mention it. We did do climate, but we didn't do shale gas. That was something we didn't see at all. Can I just say, I think the 100 years from now when historians read the 2014 NSS, what I think they should see in there, again, not to flog a dead horse here, but I think the Asia rebalance needs to be prominently highlighted in America's position as an Asia Pacific country, because that's not something that I think is widely understood outside the Beltway or east of the Mojave Desert, let's say. I mean, people in California and Hawaii get it, but I think most of the rest of Americans don't understand that we are a Pacific power and that we have huge security, political, economic, cultural, other stakes in that part of the world. By the way, three times as much of our coastline is lapped by the Pacific as by the Atlantic, so we are a Pacific, we are a Pacific power, and so I would wanna see that prominently, a centerpiece of this, and I think President Obama in particular should have an interest in this as the first actual Pacific president born in the middle of that ocean, so. And assuming he wasn't born in Kenya. God. That was the Obama administration person saying that. That's a joke. Okay, you all. Just giving life to right, oh my word. This is, we've got a very thoughtful audience, and you all have been very, very patient. Thank you for bearing with me while we unpack some of these issues. I know there's some thoughtful people in the audience I'd like to hear from them. I wanna hear from my cast and the gentleman and the yellow tie, and we'll bunch these together and we'll get several of them. We'll start with Mike. Thanks, Dan, and thanks to the panel that's been very interesting, and Kathy, your introduction on the kinetic park was good too, but going back, Wayne Porter and Puck Mickelby were commissioned by a kinetic guy, Admiral Mullen, to rewrite the national security strategy published under an article, Mr. Y, which was very interesting, and they maintain in it that it's time to switch over from a national security strategy of containment, which we've been under, they say, presumably for the last 50 years, to one of sustainability, which talks to Diana's points and Matt's and even Peter's. And if this is not a PR document, if we wanted to actually express a vision and some leadership, given that these guys were kinetic, but they're really going for a soft power approach, is it time to do something radical like they did and really change the national security strategy? Gentlemen there. Thank you. I'm Leon Wynch of University of Wisconsin. In hearing the discussion about soft power, non-kinetic power, alternatives to hard power, I can't think of a more authoritative statement on that than former Defense Secretary Bob Gates when he said the very same thing. You're asking our defense people to do things that other people do much better, and they asked the Congress to shift strategies. If we look over the past 15 years when we've seen strong efforts in the theater of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a complex of U.S. activity, what would we have done differently? Well, what do you think, if we were following that advice and put the appropriate stress on soft power, non-kinetic power, what would we or should we have done differently in that whole Afghan-Pakistan theater of operations than what we have done? Let me ask, there's a woman up front here who you had your hand up, what else to call on this woman as well. Do you want to? Actually, okay, then why don't we, thank you, thanks for that. Well, I'll have these folks answer these and then what we'll do is we'll come back to you. Thank you. Okay, so why don't you respond to those two questions and we'll come back to this woman up in the front row. Yeah, Diane, why don't you start with you? All right, well, thanks, Mike. I totally agree with you. I would love to see them do something radical, but it's 2014, there's an election, control of the Senate is hanging in the balance and I don't think they want to do something that leaves them open to attack and anything really new is gonna do that. I hope I'm wrong, but anyway. In terms of the Iraq and Afghanistan, well, maybe we wouldn't have invaded Iraq, that would have changed it. But I think the essential problem is that the military argues we had to do this because the civilians didn't have the capacity to act and the problem is that they're kind of right. We haven't built a really strong civilian capacity and I would say particularly in the area of police training, police assistance and creation of security within a state that's for the average citizens. We really don't have any capacity to do that and the military is always gonna wanna step in if we haven't built our own capacity. It doesn't have to be within the US. I mean, it could be international. We could build these through international institutions or say, okay, the British will take care of police training and we'll take care of forensics or whatever it is, but we need to establish these capacities. It's not just a matter of more money. The State Department as it is and USAID as it is, if you pump in more money, it's not gonna fix the problem. There needs to be a real design around training and policy development, so. Makes me think about in heaven where the police are British and the Italian are cooks and maybe in hell, it's the State Department does police training and it said, I'll start writing, isn't it right? Well, I'm gonna call Matt out because it is striking that I'm gonna defend the Obama administration here. The Obama administration would say they have taken this seriously. It was called the QDDR, right? That was supposed to be the effort that did this. I know y'all are shaking your head and I wanna hear about what it was like to be in the trenches, but if that didn't work, the lessons learned from that, I think, would be useful guidance because that was a deliberate effort to do some of the things that have been talked about on this panel and if it didn't work, why didn't it work? So that's my first point. The second point, somewhat responsive to your question was that I think it's too late to fix the problem that you identified. If you did not fix that problem when you had gates and rice, Khande rice, who were very much of a mind in terms of rebalancing between state and DOD, from DOD to state. And then I thought you couldn't get a better partnership on this issue than those two. And then you had gates and Clinton, even more of a mind meld, plus a supermajority in the House and the Senate. If you didn't fix it during that two-year window, you're not gonna fix it. And the only rebalancing you're gonna get is the foe statistical rebalancing, whereby cutting defense, you will then rebalance it that way, but that's not what we're talking about. That's just weaker defense and weaker state. So I think the sweet moment to address this issue was 2009 through 2011, and that moment was passed. It's depressing me. The last, but you're in the research think tank business. Bad news is good news for you, yes, okay. You're not thinking like a grandson. Okay, the last point is, ironically, I read that Y document differently than you do. That is a public relations document. In fact, their essence of their argument was what we need is a strategic narrative. That wasn't a strategy. That was a search for a narrative, even for a label. And I think that's when this effort goes off the rails is when, this effort being trying to think about national security strategy, when you look for a word, preferably a word that rhymes with the aimment and then can replace containment, that's when the exercise devolves and isn't so fruitful. I think they're right that you need a strategic narrative. I think President Obama very much needs a strategic narrative. That was my point about what I'd like to see in the NSS. He needs a strategic narrative that works for the American leadership, rather than works in a political sense. He has one that has worked politically, but he doesn't have one that works for persuading the American people that it's worth shouldering some of these burdens globally because in the long run, that's a lot cheaper and less burdensome than a come home America response. And so he does need a strategic narrative that does that, but looking for the one word, the bumper sticker, I think that's not where you find it. But before we go to the next round of questions, I wanna come back to Diana just for a second. Are we gonna make Matt defend the QDDR? Okay, all right, so, all right. No, I'm giving Matt a pat, Matt, we did do that. We saw that, yes, episode seven, right? No, but Matt did actually, we did have a whole session onto the QDDR. And you're gonna have to buy him very expensive drinks, I think, to get the full story. But I do, Diana, I wanna come back to something on when I think about the Bush administration and sort of efforts to sort of put some of this capability, whether it was at state and when I was at aid, there was concerns about, well, should we give this to the State Department and what about us and what do we chop liver over here at AID? Could you talk a little, spam, spam? Could you talk about how the Congress, did the Congress basically buy into the view that only the Defense Department could do this and is that why it was so difficult to sort of give capabilities to the State Department in aid? Because there seemed as if there was some resistance in Congress to actually empowering either, this at least was in the Bush administration, maybe during that two-year window that changed and you were on the Hill at the time. Can you talk a little bit about how the Congress thought about this set of challenges, I think that were put to you all? Yeah, I think there's two issues. The first is that defense is just much more popular and has a lot more support on Capitol Hill so that sort of whatever budget they ask for, they get. It's not, you know, there's not the same sense of skepticism and if they, you know, you never see committees making enormous cuts in the President's request for defense, just purely out of, for political reasons. But on the State side, the SCRS, the, well it's not that anymore, the- The conflict reconstruction function at the State Department. Exactly, was kind of forced upon them in a sense. I mean, the State Department did create it but only after Senator Luger had made a big deal about it and pushed it for a very long time and then it was never adequately resourced and the State Department came, I think it started during the Bush administration, I don't know, it may have started in Clinton. Every year they come up with some plan, this big slush fund, which was gonna be to address conflict prevention. They never had any really good strategy for how this was gonna work or who was gonna do it and you know, it was never really thought through. It was just a big slush fund to give money to countries that were experiencing, you know, conflict or fragility. I don't think that the hard work has really been done to think about the structures and the training and the equipment and the whole bureaucratic way of working to make the State Department an active player in this. And you can, the last QDDR, what happened? They couldn't think of anything really major to do about this so the plan was to just steal OTI from USA to put it at the State Department. The big thing was gonna be okay now, State Department has OTI. So a bunch of us raised a big stink and OTI stayed where it was and then Rick Barton came and created the office at State which is doing great work but it's pretty similar to what OTI is doing at USA. So there hasn't been another big idea since Brian Atwood created OTI. Okay, yes please. I'm ready for you and I'd also like to hear from this gentleman in the blue shirt and the red tie. Thank you very much. My name is Chi Ninh Nguyen with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. Thank you for the opportunity. I would like to ask everyone to take into account what has been put on the table as background of what I'm going to present because I'm going to- You'll keep it short, right, medium short. I'm going to come back to the topic, National Security Strategy 2014, very short. So there's not adequate time for us to discuss long term. I agree totally with Dr. Obam about everything you said but that's long term. And I believe our founding father and especially President Wilson when he established the League of Nations has already had in mind that long term global development job that I am going to ask our panels to think about putting China into that role to help us out because they have extra money. 2014 talking about national that's including all Americans, our people. And I think President Obama made it very clear when he kept saying we the people and he said, I'm going to build the middle class of this nation. He made it very clear, national security. The strategy, he made it very clear that I'm going to pivot to Asia. Why? Because I'm going to bring jobs, more than 600,000 jobs back to America. We're going to ship jobs and manufacture back to America. That comes with the energy, the shell gas and everything. But then the strategy I'm having problems with the gap. You talk about the gap, but I haven't heard the right identification of the gap. We have not had the clarity. Who is our competitor? Who's our adversary? Who has for the last 10 years taken away 2.1 million jobs of Americans, middle class, manufacturers who has taken our steel industry away. You know that the steel industry was the core development of the middle class in the US for the last many decades. It sounds like the point you want to make is that we haven't had a lot of discussion up here about China. May I continue? Only just another minute and then I'm going to cut you off. Another minute. I come back to Dr. Matthew Goodman because he wanted you to talk and you haven't talked. So I'm going to talk about the currency. For the last 10 years, we lost a lot of leverage. Our deficit came in because the currency was. We're not talking about that. So then there's the TPP. I'm hoping that the TPP would work. And I believe that we need to address that. Now talking about Dr. Fever, Piston, you talk about the carrot and the sticks. I believe President Obama had done very well with the carrot and the sticks because we shift all the defense into Asia-Pacific. And we at the same time invited President Xi over to Sunnyland. This is the first time we had the highest level of talk between China and we continue to say that we embrace in China. So I would like to invite Dr. Goodman to talk more about the TPP and I would like to ask to please somehow ease Vietnam into the TPP. But also please demand Vietnam to honor the standards and also respect human rights. Very important. They need to show that they respect human rights. Thank you very much. This gentleman here with the red tie and the blue shirt. Thank you very much. Peter Michael Nielsen, Defense Counsel at the Danish Embassy here in D.C. My question takes off a little bit from some of the last comments on the role of Congress. It would seem, of course, both with sort of a kinetic and non-kinetic approach, you need to work with Congress, but maybe even more so with a non-kinetic approach for the appropriation, for instance, of more funds for development aid, but also in terms of ratifying treaties. What is sort of, how do you see the prospects and how much is, how strong do you see the president sort of working with Congress in order to maybe go towards a more non-kinetic approach? Okay. So comments and questions about the role of China, via, let's call it part of the conversation from pivot to Asia, economic power, economic security, human rights was sort of one bucket, another was around, let's call it presidential congressional relations and how that relates to national security and national security strategy. So any of, but maybe Diana, why don't I start with you? I'll take the what about working with Congress. And, you know, it's personally painful to me since I spent the better part of 30 years on Capitol Hill and I have a- You started as a child prodigy, Diana. Exactly, they took me right out of grade school. And I have a certain loyalty to the institution. And so I would have imagined that having a president, a vice president and a secretary of state, both secretaries of state who all came from the Senate, there would have been a much better working relationship between the executive and the legislative branch. But it's turned out that it's, and I hate to say this because I'm an ardent Democrat, but this is the worst relationship between Congress and the administration that I've ever seen. I was much better with, you know, even with Republican presidents and Democratic Congresses, there was just a much better working relationship. I don't know how much of this is due to the emergence of- Would you say that's also true D to D? And obviously D to R, that's true, but D to D? It was absolutely true, even when the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress and the presidency. It was just astonishing at how little consultation, cooperation, and I honestly don't know why. I will admit that Congress has been more harmful than helpful in just about anything that we're talking about here. And so I can completely understand why you'd want to go around Congress because we've made things worse in a lot of these areas, absolutely. But I'm not sure that ignoring Congress makes that any better. And, you know, there are people who want to do serious things and who try, you know, maybe my own effort at, or Congressman Berman's effort at rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act was not something that was destined for success, but not being able to even talk to the administration about it. I mean, they, absolutely, I was blacklisted. Nobody was allowed to talk to me about it. I mean, I'm not sure how, I don't see how that really helped their case. If you're looking for someone to blame, I think it's the G20 Sherpa's office, is where the- I see that. So, we haven't talked a lot about China. I actually think it's very interesting. I mean, I mentioned at the beginning, but we haven't really discussed China in any, so maybe you just talk a little bit about this. I mean, I think I've tried to talk about it explicitly and certainly implicitly. Implicitly, yes. I mean, it is central to the Asia rebalance story. And, you know, I think it's been well articulated that the rise of China is something that the United States should and does welcome. It's a much better than the alternative. And there's no question about that. And I think this administration and the last seven administrations going back to President Nixon, I think agreed with that statement and have worked to try to encourage Chinese development and to encourage China's participation in the global rules-based order. And I think that is a central organizing principle of our, I mean, frankly, our foreign policy more broadly going back to Nixon, but certainly our Asia strategy. And I think that will continue and should continue, you know. Obviously, we don't agree with China about everything and I don't sense that Vietnam agrees with China about everything either. But, you know, but I think but it's a complicated relationship for both of us. I think, you know, it's a, as it's frequently said by the administration and others, you know, it's a relationship that involves elements of both cooperation and competition. And we need to try to maximize the areas of cooperation and manage the areas of competition. And I think broadly speaking, the last eight administrations have done that and it's been pretty successful overall. And I'm pretty optimistic, generally, about the direction of this as long as we all continue to work in that direction. You know, again, I do think the Asia rebalance ought to be central to this. I think TPP right now is central to the Asia rebalance. And so I would like to see it put in there. Vietnam is in TPP and that's a very good thing for both us and Vietnam. And I hope Vietnam will help the United States come to an agreement in literally the next few weeks on this deal, which is still a very desirable outcome. Okay, Peter. I want to say that as a general rule, national security strategy is not just the documents, but the exercise of thinking about national security strategy is better at identifying threats than opportunities. And so it's grand strategy is more often thread oriented. But what's interesting about Asia is that it is a place where the last several administrations have seen opportunities as much as threats. And certainly the Bush administration saw an opportunity in India, an opportunity for a deeper partnership building on some work that had been done in the Clinton administration and saw that as a big opportunity. And this administration has seen an opportunity in Myanmar where the last administration didn't see an opportunity there. And you could argue that the last three have flirted with an opportunity in Vietnam. But all three of those have been harder to land. I think it's not just harder to think about opportunities. It's also harder to deliver on them. And all three of those lines of opportunity have experienced hiccups. And so that would be another thing to look for in the 2014. How do they integrate those opportunities and stitch it into a larger strategy? Just to put a finer point on that, I mean the article from which the term Asia pivot came, which was Hillary Clinton's article in October, November of 2011 in foreign policy said we stand at a pivot point and she then went on to say, she cast this pivot in terms of moving from areas of the world where there are the greatest risks to a focus on areas of the world in which there are the greatest opportunities. And she specifically was thinking and maybe even said, Iraq, Afghanistan versus Asia. I mean that's what it's all about with seeking opportunity. Diana. I just wanna thank Peter for that because I think one of the very major shifts, positive shifts that the new national security strategy could do is instead of framing the world as a place of threats and dangers to start seeing it as a world of opportunities and interests and really putting it in that frame would make a very big difference. Well, absolutely China is both an opportunity and a challenge. Well, a challenge. And under the category of challenge, I would include a violation of copyrights, IP in an intellectual property, cyber war. These are all major concerns, currency manipulation. It's easier to say that when you're outside of government than when you're actually inside government. But so I don't think, actually as a partisan outsider, there was a brief moment in 2009 where it seemed like the administration was naive on the issue. But I don't think I've detected naivete since they see the challenges that come from it. It's challenge and opportunity. I'm just thinking about the time. You all have been very generous and very patient. You guys have a lot of stamina to sit through two hours of this. Thank you very, very much. I think we've captured a lot of lessons learned here. We're gonna put in a commentary that we're gonna share with the administration. Thank you all very much. Please join me in thanking the panelists.