 Well, thanks very much Terry and thanks Heidi. I've always wanted to speak at the Naval War College So this was a great opportunity for me, and you've arranged great weather too, so I can't complain Well as Terry described I've spent most of my career in the US government working on what we call the hard proliferation cases Pakistan, India, Iraq, North Korea, Iran And in particular over the last 20 years I've spent more time than is probably healthy working on North Korea and Iran So I'd like to focus my I'd like to focus my remarks on looking at those two cases similarities and differences and It's important because those are probably the two countries that we focus most on in the nuclear non-proliferation of business Now in many ways North Korea and Iran are quite similar in both cases They began their nuclear weapons programs many years ago in the 1980s In both cases their nuclear weapons programs pose a direct threat to US allies in the region Japan and Korea in the case of North Korea and Israel and Saudi and others in the case of Iran and Ultimately their programs pose a direct threat to the United States as these countries seek to develop a long-range missile delivery capability along with nuclear weapons Furthermore in both of these cases the nuclear issue is bound up in a broader hostile relationship that the US has with Both countries which means that to some extent their motivation for developing nuclear weapons is caused in part by Their perceived security threat from the United States and the nuclear issue from the US standpoint is part of a broader range of potential conflicts including potential conventional conflict as well as disagreement over political issues and Finally the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea Represent the greatest threat now of further proliferation the risk that the North Korean Program could drive Japan or Korea to reconsider Whether they need to have a nuclear deterrent and in the case of the Middle East the danger that Iran's program could drive other Countries in the region like Saudi or Turkey or Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons So there are lots of similarities But there are also I think some very significant differences in terms of the motivations the capabilities The political systems and the international circumstances of these two countries And that has really affected the tools that we have available To deal with their nuclear programs, and I think that helps to explain the difference in our success or lack thereof So let me go over some of the key differences between North Korea and Iran And first in terms of motivation I've always thought that the North Koreans view nuclear weapons as an existential requirement for survival They see themselves as a very small weak Country surrounded by much more powerful enemies that want to destroy them US Japan they don't trust the Chinese the Koreans pose a big threat because they're so much more successful and I think that that the North Korean leadership thinks it needs to have nuclear weapons in order to fend off its enemies. I Think Iran's motivations are much more complex and ambivalent Certainly some Iranian leaders, I think the supreme leader Believes that Iran needs nuclear weapons for defensive purposes against enemies like the United States and Also sees nuclear weapons as an important instrument of national prestige and status to dominate other countries in the region but other Iranians see the risk of acquiring nuclear weapons in terms of Creating instability in the region and also antagonizing Iran's neighbors So in other words Iran it seems to me North Korea's motives are very pure and simple They must have nuclear weapons to survive While Iran I think sees nuclear weapons more as a desirable instrument of power rather than an absolute necessity and They can afford therefore they can afford to take their time and weigh the acquisition of nuclear weapons against other considerations So the Iranians really haven't pursued the same kind of crash nuclear weapons program that I think the North Koreans did Now these differences in motivation mean the perceived Use of nuclear weapons Also interacts with with some very significant differences in the two political systems In North Korea, which is a very peculiar state. It's the only communist one-party dynasty in history As you all know political power is very highly concentrated in the leadership and the military and security sectors and Obviously public opinion is not an important constraint on what the government does So as a result North Korean leaders starting with Kim Il-sung and then his son Kim Jong-il and now his son Kim Jong-un have been very efficient in mobilizing people and resources for their nuclear weapons program And this has been a high priority for the government and they've made sure that it has Money and people and resources in order to achieve the objective In contrast to North Korea Iran's political system is relatively fragmented Power is diffused among many competing factions within the leadership the famous hardliners versus moderates There's a relatively independent legislative and judicial branch of government and there's a private business sector Now although the supreme leader Hameini may have the final word He has to balance these various factions and institutions And he has to pay more attention to public opinion and the result is that Iran's nuclear program has often been a bit Under-resourced and relatively disorganized and inefficient certainly in the early years of the program They could have made more progress if they had put more resources toward toward their nuclear program Now these differences in motivation and government structure are also magnified by differences in basic capability Although North Korea is obviously a very poor country It emerged from World War two with a relatively well-developed heavy Industrial base because the Japanese when they occupied Korea they located most of the heavy industry in the north While Iran emerged from World War two is basically an undeveloped third-world country with virtually no heavy industry So as a result North Korea's had a much more independent capacity To develop an indigenous nuclear program while Iran has been relatively more dependent on Access to foreign expertise and assistance as well as equipment and materials So think of this North Korea built its first plutonium production reactor and the facilities to produce fuel and Separate plutonium more than 25 years ago while Iran is still working to complete its first indigenous Its first indigenous research reactor So all of these differences in motivation and capability Have Influence the tools that we have available and I'm going to just talk about some of the differences in terms of Instruments that the US can use to deal with the threat first intelligence As I'm sure you all know our ability to collect intelligent to collect intelligence against North Korea has always been very limited and even now we have huge gaps in understanding some of the Most basic elements of North Korea's nuclear program including the extent of its secret enrichment program and What its capabilities are to weaponize in terms of missile delivery in contrast We've been relatively successful in penetrating Iran's nuclear program over the years Including for example exposing their secret nuclear Plants at Natanz and at Fordow while they were still in very early stages of construction and gaining tremendous insight into their weaponization program before 2003 and Those differences as I said reflect differences in the nature of the society and the political system the North Koreans much more difficult target because they have a much more effective counter intelligence Program and much more brutal in terms of finding and killing spies than the Iranians ever were a Second big area of difference is export controls Because the North Korean program as I said has been largely indigenous We have many fewer opportunities to block procurement and to interdeck shipments and very often Our knowledge of the North Korean procurement system is quite weak because many of it takes place in China And we have limited ability To gain information about that in contrast our ability to block external nuclear assistance to Iran both In terms of official nuclear cooperation and in terms of black market procurement has been very efficient especially because Iran Early in the program and still they do a lot of shopping in Europe where obviously we're in a very strong position Not only to learn about what they're doing, but also to work with With our European allies to block those shipments and at different points We've been able to limit or completely cut off Nuclear assistance to Iran from countries like Russia China India and many others So that slowed the program down since the Iranians need to have external assistance a third area of difference is That of economic sanctions and obviously Iran's economy, which is heavily dependent on oil exports and access to the international financial system Is much more vulnerable to economic sanctions than North Korea's impoverished and isolated economy Furthermore because the Iranian government is much more sensitive to pressure from public discontent With the hardships caused by economic sanctions That's been a much more effective tool for us as we've seen in the recent election of President Rouhani and so we've been able to use economic sanctions currently against Iran to To pressure them to freeze key aspects of their nuclear program and to engage in negotiations A fourth area is diplomacy in both cases the US has tried to organize an international coalition of big powers to support our diplomatic efforts The p5 plus one talks in the case of Iran the six-party talks in the case of North Korea and when then those coalitions Russia has been the key party in our Efforts with Iran and China has been the key party in our efforts with North Korea I would say in both cases the willingness of China and Russia to cooperate with the US to support our Non-proliferation policies has been limited Both because of their own bilateral Relationship with the countries in question their own national interests and their overall relationship with the US But on balance I would say we've been more successful in getting Russia to support our efforts against Iran Then convincing Beijing to support our efforts against Pyongyang And that's really because China has a much stronger geo-strategic interest in the survival of North Korea And much greater sensitivity to any instability or conflict on their border In other words the Chinese have much more at stake than the Russians do and I think that's Let our diplomacy with Iran to be more effective in terms of mobilizing international coalitions And finally the military option Our ability to threaten or use military force against North Korea has always been restricted By the fear or by the risk of causing a general conflict on the peninsula and in particular Given the vulnerability of Seoul to artillery and rocket attack from the DMZ It's made the military option in my view almost unusable except in a except in a very extreme Circumstances in contrast we have a much more credible military option against Iran Because we can destroy their nuclear facilities. We have much better knowledge of where they're located and We have much stronger ability to counter any Iranian response given our conventional military superiority in the Persian Gulf in the broader region and If you think about the regional players Israel has a much more credible option to attack Iran than South Korea does To attack North Korea just given the potential vulnerability to counter-attack And I believe that the implicit threat of force in the case of Iran has been effective in blocking and slowing Iran's nuclear program for example after the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003 Tehran agreed to halt its weaponization program. It accepted more international inspectors and at least for a time It froze some of its key nuclear activities Although it reversed all these restraints in 2005 after it calculated that the US military threat had faded So all of these differences that I've talked about in motivation and capability have affected the tools that the US has Available and in turn that's affected the outcome in the case of North Korea with three nuclear tests and a very robust Set of facilities for producing fissile material North Korea is obviously already acquired a nuclear weapons arsenal Although we don't know much about the size and its deliverability in contrast I would say Iran's nuclear capabilities are much more limited and its options to produce nuclear weapons In the near term are much more constrained So let me conclude with some thoughts about the future and then I'd be very happy to To take questions and respond to your comments So on North Korea. Well, you won't be surprised I see very little prospect for disarming North Korea at least as long as the Kim dynasty survives And unfortunately, there's very little evidence that the regime is in danger of collapse The North Koreans have demonstrated over and over again that diplomacy is not an effective tool Because they've cheated or reneged on every nuclear agreement. They've reached with us Including most recently the February 2012 leap day agreement And having been burned several times the Obama administration has very little appetite for resuming negotiations with North Korea and We're currently demanding conditions from the North Koreans that I think they're very unlikely to meet as a basis for resuming talks Instead we're pursuing a policy that's called strategic patience Which mainly means trying to focus on economic and political pressure on put on a Pyongyang But I think that's very unlikely to be effective both because the North Korean Both because North Korea is relatively impervious to economic sanctions and because China continues to protect North Korea from the worst pressure and Obviously, we don't have a any Obviously we don't have an attractive military option So at this point I think the best we can probably do is limit and delay North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities And in particular try to delay the next round of nuclear and missile tests Because without missile tests in particular the North Koreans don't have a credible threat against the United States now currently Washington is counting on Japanese and South Korean overtures to North Korea and the threat of Chinese support for additional sanctions In order to deter Kim Jong-un from carrying out any further tests and this may work for the next couple of years But I doubt it will work indefinitely So I would expect at some point in the future the North Koreans will carry out additional tests And in the meantime, I think our best response is to defensive is to strengthen defensive cooperation with Japan and Korea and in particular to improve both homeland and regional missile defense capabilities and and strengthening defense ties with Seoul and Tokyo is also Probably the best policy for reducing pressures in those countries to reverse their nuclear policies and obviously we have an interest in Stopping even our friends from developing nuclear weapons because that would change the balance of power in East Asia and Create potential sources of conflict so on Iran I'm Relatively more optimistic at least in the near term As you all know the p5 plus one a nuclear talks with Iran or facing a deadline at the end of November I doubt an agreement can be reached because the Supreme Leader Hamed E Does not seem willing to accept the kind of constraints that we're demanding on Iran's enrichment program in terms of the number and type of centrifuges and And the length of time that these That these limits would be in place Nonetheless, I think Tehran has already signaled it would like to see an extension of the status quo Mainly because they're getting a respite from additional sanctions and that's allowed them to stabilize their economy Without having to give up their nuclear program and the US and the other p5 plus one will probably Favor an extension because we've achieved a freeze on the key elements of Iran's nuclear program There by slowing down their move toward the production of fissile material Without having to sacrifice the overall sanctions regime which has continued to be effective So my guess at this point is there'll be an extension of some kind at the end of November Maybe just a short extension until the end of January, which was the original one-year time frame Of the joint plan of action, but I wouldn't be surprised if it gets extended after that as well Now at best an extension is just buying time, but buying time is probably the best we can do at this point through diplomacy The longer term with Iran is obviously much harder to predict I'm convinced that the current leadership and especially Supreme Leader harmony is not going to abandon his desire for nuclear weapons This is something he's pursued for more than 20 years, and I think it's deeply embedded in his worldview And he'll continue to look for opportunities to creep forward to creep toward that objective But I also think we continue to have policy tools that can delay and limit Iran's options Ultimately a new government may emerge in Iran that has different priorities and might be willing to accept long-term limits on the nuclear program If not, we will ultimately have to face the choice that we've been trying to avoid Which is either to bomb Iran or to accept Iran with a bomb But I don't think that's a choice that we face in the near term certainly not for the rest of President Obama's presidency So I'd like to stop there, and I'd be very happy to take your questions and listen to your comments Obviously anything you want to ask on Iran in North Korea if you want to ask about broader broader issues of arms control And nuclear security. I'm happy to talk about that as well Thank you Let me begin with the Sponsors prerogative here and ask the first question Do you think North Korea was ever willing to give up its nuclear program? Or was that a goal that was never really possible? I was always skeptical that the agreement that I was part of the 1994 grid framework I was always skeptical that the North Koreans would agree to give up their nuclear weapons And if you I don't know if anybody studied that but the way that agreement was structured is That the North Koreans agreed to freeze their production of plutonium under IAEA inspection we agreed with the Japanese and Koreans to begin a nuclear power project inside North Korea and that at a certain point in the construction of the project it was It was going to halt and the North Koreans would have to satisfy the IAEA About what we suspected was undeclared stocks of plutonium a small amount The CIA said enough for one or two nuclear weapons So you know eight to ten kilograms of plutonium and then only when the North Koreans had satisfied the IAEA with the With this power project resumed so this was I mean basically the agreed framework was structured to Cap the amount of plutonium that they had and therefore to limit the size of their nuclear arsenal over some period of years and then at some point to Give them a choice you know whether to declare all of that material and put it under inspection or to You know lose the benefit of this light-water reactor program. Well, we never reached that Magic point where they had to make that choice because in the meantime the North Koreans acquired centrifuge technology from Pakistan At some point in the mid 1990s so not too long after The agreement was finished the North Koreans had an opportunity from Pakistan to acquire centrifuges and centrifuge technology and so in the Even at the end of the Clinton administration in 2000. We were beginning to see some procurement activity that indicated a small-scale enrichment program and then in the early 2000s well 2003 the Bush administration saw much larger procurement activity and concluded that North Korea was you know pursuing an extensive secret enrichment program and Accused the North Koreans of cheating which they were and that led to a collapse of the agreed framework So I mean my experience with North Korea is That they as I said they've cheated and reneged on every agreement they've ever reached So my conclusion is that they're not willing to Give up their nuclear weapons, and I don't think we're in a position to Bring enough pressure to bear on them to face the choice between survival of the regime and giving up their nuclear arsenal Because the Chinese are not prepared to put the put the North Koreans to the test to put them to the to the place Where they'd have to make that choice Yeah Yes You know sure you know first on Ukraine I mean in the p5 plus one talks The Russians have continued to be supportive of the you know position that we're taking in terms of demanding Very strict constraints on Iran's enrichment program even though we know that the Russians would settle for much less I mean the Russians you know frankly don't have the same kind of demands We do in terms of limiting Iran's nuclear program, but so far the Russians have continued to support the joint position But at the same time I do think the Ukraine crisis has very severely weakened our bargaining position because the Supreme Leader Hemeny believes that The that the p5 plus one are divided and distracted and He the fact that we're sanctioning Russia at the same time that we're sanctioning Iran Leads him to believe that if the talks break down You know the Russians may break ranks with the US and in fact the Russians and the Iranians have negotiated this oil for goods Deal which isn't in place yet, but I think it sends a signal to Washington and a Tehran that if the negotiations end You know the Iranians would have some option to escape some of the new sanctions that we would try to impose on them So I think it I think the Ukraine crisis has weakened our bargaining position At least in the eyes of the Iranians, which is all it counts and therefore makes it less likely The Hemeny would agree to the kinds of demands we're making and that's one of the reasons why I think We're not likely to come to a deal and why I think the talks will be extended Because from Russia's standpoint the status quo is very desirable The Russians actually don't want an agreement on the nuclear issue because that would both Lead to greater Iranian oil exports, which of course were hurt Iran would hurt Russia directly But also lead to better relations between the US and Iran and Russia has always been nervous That we will replace Russia as the primary energy and arms partner You know to Russia at the same time the Russians don't want the talks to break down because that would lead to more sanctions and greater risk of military conflict So Russia of all the p5 plus one they're happiest with the status quo And I think that will the Russians will be pushing very hard behind the scenes to extend the current arrangements Now on China and and and North Korea I mean I think you know that Chinese are genuinely conflicted on one hand. They Don't trust the North Koreans They clearly the Chinese leadership clearly doesn't like Kim Jong-un Who they kind of mock as the young general and you know He's acted in a way that they considered to be quite irresponsible and not following China's big brotherly advice about how to behave and I think the Chinese recognize that the more North Korea pushes its nuclear and missile program The more it creates opportunities for the US to strengthen its political and military position in East Asia For example providing a justification for missile defense, which the Chinese don't like so, you know on one hand the Chinese would certainly Favor a deal that would limit or disarm North Korea on the other hand the Chinese have a much bigger geo strategic concern Which is that pressure on North Korea? Could lead to instability and conflict and the last thing that Chinese want is to have the Korean War start again Because of the instability that would create in the region and ultimately if the US and our allies won that war It would take away what the Chinese see as a bargaining chip I mean the traditional Chinese view of North Korea is that it ties down US forces and distracts the US On the Korean Peninsula and therefore weakens our ability to defend Taiwan if there was a war over Taiwan And I think that traditional view is still the dominant view in Beijing, but you're right There's a younger generation of Chinese analysts and maybe officials who argue that this crazy North Korean regime It's no longer in our interest to be protecting them and we'd be much better off if we tried to have closer ties with Korea and the Chinese have certainly Tried to improve relations with Korea at a time especially when Seoul and Tokyo are Having very serious tensions over history issues So I would say up to now despite the tension in Chinese policy and despite some Indications that a younger generation of Chinese experts may wish to shift strategy I still think the dominant Chinese view is a very conservative view of protecting North Korea and I think I mean I think in particular the North Koreans have been very effective in scaring the Chinese I mean the Chinese are genuinely worried that if there's too much pressure on North Korea They'll do something crazy. They'll you know You know launch artillery attacks against South Korean positions like they did with the Waipido Islands Or they'll you know be some limited excursion over the DMZ But they'll do something that could trigger a conflict on the Korean Peninsula And I think the Chinese their top priority is to maintain stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and so therefore they're not enthusiastic about Pressuring North Korea Yes, sir From a non-proliferation standpoint of North Korea's technology some countries invented from that Effectiveness of the UN and the international community and Enforcing existing sentience or should they be even strength? Yeah, well, it's a very good question I think it's I mean it's hard to answer In the abstract because I think you have to look at you know very particular cases and You know the irony here is that I would say are This is the US and the UN system and our allies I would think I Think we've been quite effective overall in terms of limiting transfers of nuclear materials equipment and technology That have you know weapons uses except for one big exception and that big exception was the decision by the Pakistani government to sell Enrichment and nuclear weapons technology to both Iran and North Korea And you know unfortunately that big exception even though we were you know 99% successful that one Failure because we just didn't know about it at the time that it took place that one big failure has really I mean in a way Created the problem that we face now because the enrichment program in both Iran and North Korea is Completely a product of Pakistani technology and it's based entirely on the on the You know on the technology that that Pakistan transferred Starting in the mid 1980s in the case of Iran and then in the mid 90s in the case of North Korea So the I think it's one of the sort of the ironies of the whole export control System is that if you can be you know very very effective in most of what you do but if there's one big failure then that can undercut the whole system and And and I think as a general matter export controls They're really more a tool of delay than being able to solve the problem because sooner or later if countries are You know really committed and they have reasonable resources and are reasonable scientific and industrial base They're going to be able to master that technology themselves and certainly that's Largely the case in Iran now And certainly true in the case of North Korea So, you know the effectiveness of export controls fades over time Right Iran Yeah But they've got a neighbor who's got several hundred of them in the track record of proliferating and Particularly nasty bunch at least in the ISS right Seems like they should be getting at least as much attention Right Yes, I agree sure No, that's fine So those are all great questions, I mean my interpretation of You know how many these motives as obviously my interpretation, right? I can't prove it but I've studied him a long time and I think I understand his worldview which is that he deeply believes that the US is the great Satan and is determined to destroy the Islamic Republic and he interprets everything we do from that standpoint and Therefore I believe he thinks that having nuclear weapons is a good way to deter the United States from threatening the survival of the regime Although as I said, I think he's cautious and careful in pursuing nuclear weapons because he certainly doesn't want to provoke a war with the US He understands Iran would lose that and that could threaten the survival of the Islamic Republic I've always been skeptical that the fat why is anything more than than just a political gesture You know for one thing nobody's ever produced the fat why I mean the Iranian officials claim there is such a fat why but As far as I know There's never been anything in writing You know and in any event these fat was can be easily changed I've heard some people say the fat why is Possession of nuclear weapons is on is you know, not Islamic I've heard other people say use of nuclear weapons is on Islamic So it's a little unclear exactly what it all means I think you know the US government has seen the fat why as Potentially a useful diplomatic device if the Iranians want to claim that as a reason for accepting limits on their enrichment program but that really hasn't worked because You know the Iranians claim their enrichment program is purely for peaceful purposes And that they have to have a massive program to produce fuel for their nuclear power program so I mean to the extent that we had hoped that the fat why might provide a You know diplomatic opening for the Iranian leadership to explain to the public why they've accepted limits that really hasn't hasn't worked out for us on Pakistan look I agree that Pakistan is a Very very worrisome both in terms of nuclear security because of the potential threat to their own arsenal and In terms of nuclear war because you could imagine a conventional conflict between India and Pakistan Escalating to a nuclear conflict and in terms of nuclear proliferation given as I said earlier Pakistan is really The government of Pakistan is really responsible for the threat we face now from both Iran and North Korea I think the extent to which we can do much about it is very very limited. I mean, I'm happy to go into more detail We have starting in the Bush administration and continued by Obama We have worked directly with the Pakistanis on nuclear security I mean protection of their of their nuclear weapons and facilities and I think they I think the Pakistanis see that there's a risk and they've devoted a Fair amount of resources to making sure that they can protect and control their nuclear weapons because that's in their interests So I'm not that concerned about the Pakistani Taliban You know attacking a nuclear base and seizing nuclear weapons. I think that's pretty unlikely I'm much more concerned about the insider threat from within the Pakistani military and that's very hard for the US to help Pakistan deal with that problem But I do think they're trying I mean Pakistan has sort of a personal reliability program And I know of a couple of cases where people have been transferred out of Sensitive positions because they were considered to be unreliable. So Pakistan's making an effort But if something happens, we probably won't know about it until after the fact You know in terms of nuclear proliferation. I think the You know, certainly the embarrassment of the revelations that took place about a Q Khan led President Musharraf to make some changes and certainly put a Q Khan out of business and supposedly strengthen Pakistan's export controls The big question is whether at some point in the future was Lama but you know might reverse that policy and everybody obviously Top of the list of concerns is whether Pakistan would transfer nuclear weapons Are nuclear material to Saudi and certainly the Saudis? Talk as though they believe they have a understanding with Pakistan You know should they ask I Personally, I've been a bit skeptical that Pakistan would deliver on that commitment if there is such a promise Because it couldn't be hidden. I think it would you know be discovered quite quickly and it would you know Jeopardize Pakistan's access to international finance and other things it'd be a risky thing to do I think it's much more likely that Pakistan would offer to send its own troops to Saudi and those troops would control nuclear weapons Just like we have nuclear weapons, you know in Europe under NATO That way the Pakistanis would be hard for us to criticize the Pakistanis since we do the same thing with our allies and Pakistan would continue to have control over the nuclear weapons I'm actually more concerned about North Korea Transferring nuclear, you know nuclear material or nuclear, you know technology as we know they did in the case of Syria I mean they were building a full production reactor in Syria before the Israelis destroyed it in 2007 and I worry in the future if other countries in the Middle East decide they need to pursue a secret nuclear weapons program because of Iran I Think they're much more likely to turn to Pyongyang than than to turn to Islamabad And I worry that North Korea will be willing as they have in the past to sell You know nuclear technology and you know again That's another the Syrian reactors another very good example of how poor our intelligence has been I mean that reactor was fairly close to Operation before the Israelis told us about it and I understand from my Israeli friends. They discovered it almost by accident So, you know, I mean think what the Syrian situation would look like now in the middle of the Civil War If they'd been able to operate that reactor for a couple of years and produce enough plutonium for a few nuclear weapons So I I really think that North Korea is a bigger threat of Right now, but we obviously need to keep our eyes on Pakistan. Yes Yes, it's nice to see you again In the region, I mean I'm just interested from a diplomatic perspective sure of course huge allies But also extremely difficult to work with right and just want to talk more about that. Sure. I'm happy to do that so I think that I Mean in my experience in the White House this last time around It was a very sharp contrast between the working relationship between the governments and by that I mean the military and the diplomats and the and the intelligence people and the officers I mean that was extraordinarily close at the working level on the Iran, you know nuclear threat which included You know sharing intelligence and assessments and you know operations in a way that's quite extraordinary and Coordinating diplomacy and export controls and so forth that worked very very well, but at the top Obviously the personal relationship between President Obama and And Prime Minister Netanyahu was not close and there was not You know very much trust, you know or affection there and that particularly became an issue because I think at around 2012 I think Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Mr.. Barak wanted to Some kind of us acquiescence to attack Iran and And they tried very hard to get the US to be prepared to Give them a yellow light or at least, you know, except that they could do it if they wanted to And the US pushed pushed back very very hard Arguing that we didn't think it that it was necessary because we thought we still had time and that it would be counterproductive Because it would likely lead the Iranians not only to launch some counterattack Which could affect Israel and Saudi and other countries But also would could lead the Iranians to to leave the non-proliferation treaty and therefore they would be able to pursue Their nuclear program without any international inspection and without any legal limits on what they could do And of course, you know at the end of the day the Israelis accepted I think grudgingly accepted that that you know, they really You know couldn't carry out an attack without some kind of support or at least acquiescence from the US So in terms of the broader sort of Israeli role, I mean obviously from our standpoint Our position in the region would be much easier to coordinate between Israel and the moderate Arab countries who have a lot of common interests including Both are opposed to Iran both are opposed to ISIS If we could solve the Palestinian issue, but I'm afraid that I mean, you know how pessimistic I am about some of these about these proliferation issues I'm even more pessimistic about solving the Palestinian issue So I think that's sort of a handicap that is just baked into US policy in the Middle East And it's going to be a point of friction not only with Israel But with the Arab countries as well because both of them think we're not doing enough So, you know the Arabs get angry at us because we're not doing more to stop Israel from you know Putting settlements in place and you know in the occupied territories and the Israelis are angry at us for you know Not doing more to oppose what the Palestinians are doing at the UN or whatever and I don't know any Way to solve that. I just think that's one of the sort of elements of US policy that we've had to deal with You know since the establishment of Israel in 1948, but I think that That tension in the relationship between the good working relationship at the government level and tension at the at the top I mean, that's that's very personal And so I don't think it's you know likely to continue after after President Obama's term in office I You know, I think the Israelis are serious about using military force If they you know feel that Iran is Making a direct effort to acquire nuclear weapons But for that matter, I think the US would use military force if the Iranians in an open way We're moving to produce nuclear weapons for example by producing highly enriched uranium But I think for that reason the Iranians are not likely to do it. I mean, you know as I look at Iranian behavior It's always been very calculated and cautious They make judgments about what do we think we can get away with now without provoking and a military attack or more sanctions and I Think I mean, I'm you know projecting here, but I believe that the Supreme Leader understands that the production of Weapons-grade uranium could be a causus belai and therefore I think it's very unlikely that he would do it at the declared facilities I think much more likely is that Iran will try once again to build a secret enrichment plant So they could do it without anybody detecting it And so far we've been Very good at detecting those facilities as I said before they're finished and we've been able to expose them and Force Iran to put them under safeguards You know in terms of the Israeli military option You know their officers are very confident that they could carry out an attack that would at least damage the program enough To set it back for a few years, but they recognize that the US military option is much more Credible and effective. I mean just given our forces in the Persian Gulf So from Israel's standpoint, they would much prefer that if anybody carries out an attack, it's the US and not them Yes, sir You're telling arguments about the different tools Yes, I would argue though there's some similarities between between the nations in terms of how they I guess my question is is it certainly on different timelines North Korea has been more than Iran. Iran has been learning from North Korea learning today from Iran in terms of the international community's interaction both From North Korea's perspective now Yeah, well, that's a really good question I Think that we're fortunate in that in almost Every part of the world. There's not any likely candidates I mean, there's no pressure for proliferation in Europe and Africa and Latin America Southeast Asia There's no country there That is a potential candidate. I thought Burma was at least a possibility But I think with the change in orientation in their foreign policy and our effort to lift sanctions And of course, they've accepted the additional protocol from the IAEA. I think that's probably not A worry even if it I'm not even sure it was serious to begin with but anyway that I think so To me the only regions of the world where there's a significant threat is East Asia and the Middle East Now in East Asia you have countries like Japan and Korea or Taiwan for that matter Which have tremendous technical capacity? I mean, obviously they could produce nuclear weapons very quickly especially Japan because it has such a large stockpile of fissile material But the constraint the political constraints. I think are pretty significant There are both domestic constraints especially in the case of Japan But there are constraints because of the alliance system and I do think that I mean in the past and I'm going back to the 60s and 70s and 80s The US has been very effective in persuading Taipei and Tokyo and Seoul You know to give up any consideration of nuclear weapons because of the strength of the alliance system And I think if we continue to maintain a strong position in Asia those political constraints will continue to be powerful Even though you know both Chinese modernization of their nuclear weapons and expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons does create pressure and So well Terry's an expert in this you certainly see some subtle shifts in both Sort of expert opinion and public opinion in Seoul and Tokyo that's moving in the direction of More acceptance or more support For developing nuclear weapons, but I don't see it at least in the you know in the foreseeable future as likely to become Overwhelming and I think we still have ways to tap it down. I don't know if you I don't know if you agree with that Some corners particularly in South Korea talking about a nuclear option But I'm very skeptical that they would actually go in that direction at this point Unless there was a severe change in the security environment or to the alliance that there was somehow some that's right That's weakening of the US South Korean alliance. Otherwise, I think that's fairly solid. Yeah, I'm I'm much more concerned I mean if anybody goes nuclear in East Asia, I think South Korea is much more likely than Japan because There aren't the same domestic constraints in South Korea. In fact, I there's been some public appalls where a majority of Koreans have said yes, we should have nuclear weapons. The North has nuclear weapons. They threaten us Why shouldn't we have nuclear weapons? But the Japanese because of World War two. There's still a very strong nuclear allergy And so therefore I think Korea's a you know greater risk You know in the Middle East you have the opposite situation you have countries that have very little political constraint I mean none of the countries Setting aside Israel which already has nuclear weapons, but none of the other countries Really feel that they have anything like the same kind of security relationship. I mean they don't trust us to protect them, frankly and So therefore they're not really and I mean it's just in terms of domestic opinion when I talk to your average Egyptian or Saudi or even Turk they all say of course we should have nuclear weapons the Israelis have nuclear weapons the Persians have nuclear weapons Why shouldn't the Arabs have nuclear weapons? So there's no domestic constraint in terms of politics But they're very significant technical constraints. I mean none of those countries have Anything like you know the kind of industrial or scientific base that would be necessary to indigenously produce Nuclear weapons in any reasonable time frame. I mean decades even Turkey, which is the most advanced would take decades So the only shortcut they have is very substantial external assistance And as we were talking about we have to watch both North Korea and Pakistan as a potential threat So I think that you know if the next country that produces nuclear weapons is likely to be either in East Asia Or in the Middle East, but I don't see any imminent risk I think we have time to try to work on it and slow it down and potentially prevent it Anybody else want to ask about something other than Iran? Let me ask you sure an Iran question Do you think Iran would be willing to go up to some certain line and Stop with some sort of existential capability right go beyond Yeah Well, this is what I Mean this is what the Iranian moderates say They say that you know, we live in a very dangerous neighborhood. We have countries that are armed with nuclear weapons all around us Including India Pakistan Israel Russia the US so we need to have some kind of an option and Therefore we need to have an industrial scale enrichment program so that in extremists We would have the ability to produce nuclear weapons and defend ourselves But they say don't worry We're we're too smart to want to actually build nuclear weapons because we know that could lead to a war And it would antagonize the neighbors So you and what the moderate, you know, Iranians say privately is you can trust us to be like Japan You can entrust us to have You know facilities to produce fissile material, but we won't actually go nuclear. I Don't believe that because I think in the Middle East Which is a very, you know militarized part of the world where you have you know constant conflict and violence And build up of military capabilities having a latent capacity is not worth very much I mean if the Iranians really think they have to deter their enemies and defend themselves against threats Having a breakout ability which is months away is not the same as having nuclear warheads on top of missiles Which can be fired immediately and this goes to the question that you asked about conventional I don't think the Iranians see conventional as a substitute for nuclear I think they see I mean those that favor nuclear weapons see nuclear weapons You know in their own right as a powerful deterrent I don't think the Iranians want nuclear weapons actually use them against somebody But because they see it as you know as a deterrent and you know the I mean it's unfortunate But it's true that if you look at You know the last 20 years. I mean the u.s. Has been pretty willing When necessary to attack and invade countries that don't have nuclear weapons But we haven't attacked and invaded any countries that have nuclear weapons So if you can't so anybody studying that when I think come to the conclusion that we're deterred by the presence of nuclear weapons We are Right Sure sure So let me say a couple things as I'm you know as I'm sure you all know from studying the issue China has been Engaged in a modernization program that goes back at least a couple of decades Basically to move away from the fixed silos to roadmobile ICBMs and a Class of nuclear submarines and I you know, I think that's Not very surprising in fact, I'm surprised how long China was willing to tolerate a situation where it's Strategic nuclear forces were so vulnerable because as you know that a very small number of you know liquid fueled ICBMs and fixed silos with the warheads not You know deployed they were very very I mean in sort of a classic, you know strategic theory They were very vulnerable to a preemptive strike from the United States And so I'm not surprised that they've moved in the direction of having forces that they will consider to be You know much more secure and that they'd be able to withstand a first strike and still have Enough forces left over to inflict very serious damage on the US and I think the Chinese unlike the Russians I think the Chinese when they do their calculation of how much is enough I don't think they think in terms of war fighting the Russians, you know We're still stuck in the old Cold War Calculation of whether they will have residual forces that can attack US nuclear targets and strategic targets the Chinese have a much simpler calculation, which is You know basically You know that a minimum deterrence if they if they can destroy some you know Reasonable number of American cities that should be sufficient to deter the United States from attacking their nuclear assets Which I think is a accurate calculation and so I don't see the Chinese at least You know for the foreseeable future. I don't see them Being interested in making a bid for parity. I mean if we reduced our forces unilaterally or with the Russians To the point where they were comparable with the Chinese so they'd be happy to accept it But I don't think that's their objective. I think their objective is to have a Reasonably secure second strike capability You know with forces that would be there would be enough forces left over to destroy some number of US cities and in some ways that's stabilizing right because it it it You know removes any temptation We would have to launch a first strike But I also think that the you can't look at the nuclear build-up without looking at the broader conventional To me the conventional modernization that the Chinese are doing in terms of you know area access denial is much more worrisome to us than their nuclear build-up because that they're clearly not in the near term But in the long term trying to try to create a keep capability that would make it impossible for us to project power Close to the shore. I don't worry. There's a you know a big debate I'm sure you know there's a big debate in academia about you know is war between the US and China inevitable and People look at historical examples of rising powers and status quo powers and so forth and Obviously, there's no question that China's a rising power and we're a status quo power in Asia But I my sense from talking to the Chinese is that they recognize that again for the foreseeable future Any mil that the military balance is still heavily against them because it's not just the US It's the US and all its allies in Asia including the Japanese which in many ways have a more capable Navy and you know Air force than the Chinese do so. I don't I I think the Chinese will be very careful in terms of doing things that they Worry may you know lead to conflict and if incidents take place As there have been I think they'll look for ways to de-escalate rather than to You know, you know rather than to escalate instead I think the Chinese see their economic power as a much more effective tool to weaken US influence In Asia and to strengthen their position and I think for the time being I think they'll focus much more on Investment and trade as a way to strengthen Chinese position. Although still modernize of course You know their military, but I don't I mean I'd be interested in your views But I think the likelihood of a you know big war between the US and China over the next decade I think it's very small But but obviously just add obviously we need to keep I mean as long as the Chinese believe that a war would be disastrous that they would lose a war I think they're not likely to seek one and obviously we need to continue to maintain the military balance So they believe that Yes I Right So what what is the general feeling sure Yeah Right, so I mean obviously during the Cold War the Dominant security threat we thought we faced was an existential one that if there was a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union It would destroy us so with the end of the Cold War. I think that Fear or worry has reduced and we're much more focused on these you know smaller I mean the the the nuclear threat has shifted to a focus on either non-state actors Like al-Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons Or on these much smaller countries that could pose a potential threat first to our allies and then to us like Iran and North Korea So the to me the centrality of nuclear weapons to US strategy and military policy It is you know clearly reduced and as a consequence. We've drawn down our nuclear forces But nuclear weapons are still good for one thing which is they're very good for deterrence and to the extent that the big powers I mean the US and Russia and China still are in a situation where Even the possibility of a major conflict and the use of nuclear weapons is still Not considered unthinkable then we're going to continue to maintain Nuclear forces which means they have to be effective incredible and and I don't see any near-term Likelihood that their relationship between the US and Russia and the US and China could change to the point where we would be so Comfortable Politically that we would just discount the possibility even though the possibility is incredibly small right? I don't stay up at night worrying about nuclear war between the US and Russia or the US and China But they still have you know forces that potentially could Threaten the United States and as long and they feel that we have forces that potentially threaten them So I think unfortunately we're going to continue to invest in keeping a very robust a nuclear capability And that doesn't mean huge in huge investment in the next couple of years Although some of the costs for the life extension programs like for the B61 bomb are quite expensive But the big bucks will of course be down the road when we have to you know deploy new delivery systems, especially the submarines Bombers and ICBMs less so and I you know, it's hard to predict at this point whether I Think there's room for at least one more round of nuclear reductions with the Russians And of course Obama's already said he'd be willing to come down one-third from the new start numbers So that would be a reduction from 1550 you know strategic A 1550 deployed strategic warheads to about a thousand the Russians aren't willing to do that because of their concerns about missile defense But they at least on paper they also have an interest in having somewhat smaller forces If only to save money because they're spending an awful lot on their nuclear modernization So it's possible in the next decade. We could have another round of reductions with the Russians And that would reduce somewhat Our expenses, but I think overall I think we're condemned for the foreseeable future to maintain a You know pretty substantial nuclear force. I mean even a thousand nuclear weapons Is you know much more than anything than anybody else has Including the Chinese. Yes, sir How do you or the president square that yeah, how do you get that last step? Yeah, of course I can't speak for the president, but for me I always saw the Zero as a distant goal as an aspiration and of course that's been a common element of you as policy I mean going back to Kennedy and Reagan have all espoused the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament, but as a realistic matter I Don't think it could possibly take place in the foreseeable future And in fact the sad thing is that as you say the trend has been in the opposite direction I mean in Europe the nuclear powers are basically just maintaining the status quo So the UK and France they're just maintaining their forces We and the Russians have reduced very much from the Cold War although we're modernizing delivery systems But in Asia there's a build-up. I mean Pakistan India China North Korea they're all building up and modernizing their nuclear forces, and I don't think there's anything we can do to stop that So I think I mean we may be able to prevent further proliferation But in terms of the the nine countries in the world that have nuclear weapons I don't think any of them are willing to give them up You know anytime soon, and they will and therefore in order to keep them they will keep maintaining them and modernizing them And that's just going to be a permanent feature of you know of international politics Although we should I mean we should look back with some You know happiness in history certainly in the days of President Kennedy The expectation was that there would be 20 or 30 nuclear-armed powers And if you look back many many countries in the 50s and 60s and 70s Thought about developing nuclear weapons. I mean Even in Europe Germany Italy Sweden Switzerland They all had Internal studies should we build nuclear weapons and in Asia Taiwan Japan Korea? I mean lots of countries have fought about developing nuclear weapons and decided they didn't need them So we're much better off than We thought we would be You know 40 years 50 years on but I I just think nuclear abolition is not a realistic policy objective It's an aspirational objective. Yes, sir Look I think there's a lot of You know legitimate questions about whether what the impact of nuclear zero would be I mean in my view You'll never reach nuclear zero until there's such a fundamental transformation in the international system So that not only nuclear weapons, but most weapons are no longer seen as being a you know legitimate instrument of National power and you know, this is the example I use suppose the only countries in the world that had nuclear weapons were the US and the UK could we go to zero of course because we're not worried about the UK nuclear using nuclear weapons against us Yeah, I mean you'd have to be confident that nobody would cheat Which is hard to imagine how you could achieve that and also everybody has the ability to reconstitute You know, I mean as I say nuclear zero was an aspirational objective Well, I think I I think there's a good practical reason I think as you know the NPT is built on this so-called bargain Where the countries that don't have nuclear weapons promise that they won't build them If they force where building them and the NPT has been very very successful and The nuclear weapons states promise to engage in a process of disarmament. So I think the keeping that general Bargain alive without actually trying to achieve zero. I think it's an effective diplomatic tool and you know, frankly, nobody Seriously thinks that nuclear disarmament mean nobody in in a responsible position in any government considers nuclear Disarmament to be a realistic objective Under current international conditions and current international conditions, which means that countries Still see military force as a legitimate instrument of state power. I is going to persist for many many centuries My guess is Sure Yeah Yeah, I mean, you know, I'll give you my opinion which is a little different than then I think the dominant view in the media I mean, I think Putin has acted Out of fear. I think Putin had a a concern which was I think quite legitimate from his standpoint That the revolution in Ukraine would shift Kiev out of the Russian orbit into a Western orbit Starting with, you know, closer economic ties joining the EU and ultimately joining NATO and I think in fact There's a very significant portion of the Western Ukrainian population and political elite that want to Be associated with the West that their view is toward Europe They want to be part of the EU. They want to be part of NATO to protect themselves against Russia And I think from Putin's standpoint, that's an intolerable threat to Russian security You know, not only because he's worried about the military threat of NATO moving east, but also because Putin really believes That the CIA is orchestrating these color revolutions Starting with Ukraine and then we'll use that as the springboard to, you know, first Maiden Square next the Red Square So I think that that Russian that that from the very beginning I was worried that We would help create a situation where Putin would feel compelled to use military force To prevent Ukraine from slipping out of Russia's grasp and I You know, I mean as I saw President Poroshenko, you know pursue a military victory I Was pretty confident that at some point I don't think Putin wanted to intervene in you know Eastern, you know Eastern Ukraine, but I think he just felt he had no choice when it was clear that the separatists were going to lose So, you know now Putin's won the war. I mean it was very clear You know, I think we looked we and the Europeans. I think looked You know a bit feckless that we could be accused of to some extent encouraging Poroshenko to You know be very aggressive and then in the end we didn't do a thing except some economic sanctions Which are probably not very effective so I didn't think that this had turned out very well for us and the you know big question is whether a Political settlement is possible Between Kiev and the rebels and whether Putin is prepared to Help mediate and endorse such a settlement which would include presumably some federalism some assurance that Ukraine would remain neutral would not join any military blocks You know there'd be protections for the Russian speaking minority and so forth I I mean the elections certainly have strengthened Poroshenko, which is a good thing But I'm not very confident that Putin at this point is interested in a political deal because I think he's You know just given his mindset I think he's genuinely concerned that if that any even if there was a political deal that neutralized You know Ukraine, I don't know that Putin would have much confidence that that would be permanent From his standpoint that might be the first step toward you know, you know toward Kiev joining the EU You know and then joining NATO because he doesn't Trust the US and the Europeans and he sees that there's you know genuine sentiment in You know parts of Ukraine for that so I'm afraid Putin will probably Prefer to see kind of a frozen conflict like scenario like in Moldova Where the east remains you know nominally part of Ukraine? But where the real political authority is is you know exercised by the separatists who will be completely under Russia's control and that way if Kiev pushes toward closer economic or political association with with the West Putin can always start the war again and And and I've heard some of my Ukrainian friends have said well, you know You know the winter is not very good season for fighting, but wait till the spring So I'm I'm somewhat concerned that will the war will flare up again in the spring and as I said, I think that that Russia has demonstrated that You know if push comes to shove they will use military force to protect their interests in Ukraine and The US and Europe are not prepared to use military force. So to me Under those circumstances, I don't think it's a very good idea for us to try to push the envelope Because we're gonna end up looking weak again. I think yes, sir Sure sure I'm happy to do that you know the the advocates of missile defense have always argued that missile defense will Persuade countries like Iran and North Korea that there's no value in developing ballistic missiles because they can be defeated I have to say I've seen zero evidence of that absolutely zero evidence that that is persuasive Now, I don't know why that is whether those countries calculate that they can come up with the means to overcome missile defense through You know decoys and penetration aids or large numbers of missiles, but I just see no evidence that that The you know missile defense has dampen has dampened down Their interest in developing long-range missiles that can strike the United States in the case of Russia and China I think that you know our missile. I mean there's an irony here, right Russia has You know hundreds of nuclear weapons Compared to China, but I think Russia is much more scared about missile defense than China is and the reason for that is the difference in What their nuclear doctrine is Russia as I said is still Views the nuclear balance in terms of the Cold War kind of warfighting calculation and the Russians I think are genuinely afraid that In some future scenario when we build out missile defense we would be able to launch a first strike and destroy the vast majority of Russian strategic forces and Still have enough missile defense left over to you know defeat any residual, you know capability they had Now that's a crazy scenario because under any reasonable You know calculation the Russians would still be able to destroy, you know a lot of American cities and no president would Would do that the Chinese on the other hand as I said they have a minimal You know sort of a minimal deterrent policy as opposed to a war fighting policy So they don't they're pretty confident. I think that they can overcome our missile defense with enough weapons So that we would never attack them in the first place But I do think you know to some extent I think missile defense is driving modernization in both Russia and China and You know as a practical matter. I think that both those countries have the capacity to overcome Come any missile defense we can reasonably deploy. I mean missile defense is just never going to be Effective in my view against a big country that has a lot of resources I do think missile defense has at least a chance of being effective against Small countries like North Korea and Iran especially in a you know in a preemption scenario. I mean it's not Something we want to think about but if there was a I mean just imagine if There was a you know a new conflict on the Korean Peninsula And we saw the North Koreans beginning to mobilize their nuclear forces there'd be tremendous pressure on the US and Japan and Korea to launch preemptive strikes and I mean the big danger of that of course is that the North Koreans if they saw their nuclear forces being destroyed They might feel they had to use them in a crisis And then the question would be whether missile defense would be effective against even a small You know even a minimal force and I think that's still a challenge for missile defense I think we're still having a lot of difficulty Making it work just because it's technically so difficult even against a primitive You know ICBM capability Right India Pakistan right, you know what what drivers that make push even if you know missile defense isn't perfectly effective right for countries to proliferate and share Penetration aids other counters. Yeah, I mean this this is very technical, but my impression is that some of the sort of first-generation penetration aids are not very challenging to do and so It may very well be I mean things like balloon So it may very well be that even countries like Iran and North Korea are going to be able if they ever Have a real ICBM force, which I don't now and they're many years away from They may feel that they can that they can deploy that and that may pose a big challenge for us If we're not able to overcome it. I think the sort of nuclear balance in South Asia is not likely to be Very affected by missile defense. I know the I don't know the exact status But I know the Indians if what we've been encouraging the end instead of out missile defense, but that you know the distances there are so short and the the You know, I think the likelihood to use target to use weapons against cities You know will be so great if there's ever a nuclear conflict that I am skeptical that missile defense will will have much of an Impact, but certainly the Pakistanis have said if the Indians deploy missile defense will have to increase our nuclear force so that we can Overcome it so in that sense. I think the dynamic would would be the same but between India and China and India and Pakistan I don't see much at this point impact of missile defense because I don't think those countries are likely to Really commit the resources for robust missile defense. I don't know. Have you seen any Backstines reacting Yeah, even if it's not yeah, they're even if it's long way off, right? It's one of a number of things Yeah, reacting right in terms of their perception Yeah, Indian threat particularly combined with potentially Yes, which I think is a real risk. I mean, I think I think the Pakistanis are very very sensitive to their perceived vulnerability to a Conventional strike and of course one of the big worries about them moving for battlefield weapons is that that'll lower the nuclear threshold even further You know, we didn't talk about you know much about India But India is a fascinating nuclear weapons program because it's the most slow motion Disorganized inefficient and under resourced nuclear weapons program of any big power But they seem to be very comfortable with that and I think it's because they don't see nuclear weapons as a Something that they need for their survival. It's more a hedge against You know China and deterrence against Pakistan and they can really afford to take their time Thank you