 The Battle of Stalingrad is considered one of the most epic battles of World War II. Stalingrad is one of the largest land campaigns in human history, and when viewed through the lens of the U.S. Army's operational framework and doctrine on offense and defense, it provides rich opportunity for professional discourse at every level. At the strategic level, operations leading to, and including the fighting at Stalingrad, raise questions about whether the Germans identified and maintained the right objective. At the operational level, Stalingrad illustrates the challenges posed by the realities of a resource-constrained environment where requirements to supply shaping operations detracted from the decisive operation and how increasing lines of communication create sustainment challenges which impact operational reach and tempo. At the tactical level, Stalingrad demonstrates the extreme brutality of the urban environment during large-scale combat, the importance of decentralized execution and a premium on junior leader initiative, as well as rapid, small-unit innovation. Many predict future warfare will inevitably feature complex fighting in dense urban environments. If this is the case, the lessons learned from Stalingrad and current doctrine for urban combat provide warning, education, and guidance for those who order forces into cities, for the leaders who plan the operations, and for the soldiers who may pay the ultimate price. The Stalingrad Campaign Overview covers Case Blue in 1942. It will discuss the final advance to Stalingrad and how the city became the major German objective of the 1942 campaign. The overview will examine the struggle for Stalingrad itself, noting major combat actions across the city. Finally, this program briefly covers the major Soviet offensive, Operation Uranus, which encircled and destroyed the German 6th Army in Stalingrad. This film primarily focuses on planning, coordinating, and conducting large-scale combat operations in a high-intensity combat environment. It also provides an account of urban fighting within Stalingrad and focuses on the unique aspects of operating in a city. It will also highlight the insights gained from the German desire to maintain a swift advance despite the terrain difficulties and the Soviet defense measures which attempted to thwart the attackers. In the spring of 1942, following the failure of Operation Barbarossa the previous summer, Hitler and his commanders became less ambitious regarding their objectives for the upcoming campaign. Instead of major advances along the entire front, the plan focused on a single major advance in the south. He aimed more narrowly at an economic objective, the Caucasus oil fields, which would help him sustain the German industrial capacity. U.S. Joint and Army Doctrine advises commanders to adhere to the principle of objective and to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. Ultimately, however, Hitler's goals for the next campaign would not be achievable. Hitler and his military leaders' plan was called Case Blue. The operation was to begin with a powerful offensive by Army Group South, designed to destroy as much of the Red Army forces as possible without allowing them to withdraw. Then, the decisive operation. Army Group South would split into two groups, Army Group A and Army Group B. Army Group A would turn south and drive towards Baku to seize the oil fields in the Caucasus. Army Group B would simultaneously advance east and seize Stalingrad located on the Volga River. The capture of Stalingrad, though of some value for its factories, was mostly important for its geographic position. Seizing the city would allow Army Group B to control decisive terrain along a defensive line behind the Don and Volga Rivers. Army Group B would protect the flank and rear of Army Group A, giving it freedom to maneuver in the Caucasus. The German plan for the offense reflected three of the U.S. Army's four characteristics of the offense. It would achieve surprise by initially dispersing its forces in a deception operation. It would then concentrate its force at the right place and time, and it was most certainly audacious in its massive scale. Due to the extended distance of the offensive operation and massive sustainment and protection requirements, Hitler's commanding generals found it difficult to maintain tempo, which should characterize an effective offense. Stalin and the Soviet High Command, known by the Russian term Stavka, decided to transition to the defense. However, the Soviets made two major errors which left them vulnerable to the German offensive in the south. Stavka incorrectly predicted the German main effort would be in the center of the front towards Moscow. Thus, most of the Soviet reserves were located near the capital, and Stavka was reluctant to release these reserves to the south. Second, Stalin insisted on spoiling attacks in the center of the front near Rajev and in the south at Kharkov. Both offensives failed, and the Red Army suffered massive casualties with nothing to show for their efforts. For the Germans, Army Group South was the main effort, executing the decisive operation for Case Blue. The Army Group initially consisted of three German infantry armies, two Panzer armies, and one Hungarian army. It was assembled from more than one and a quarter million troops, 950,000 Germans and 300,000 Axis allies. It was also comprised of more than 1,600 tanks and 1,600 aircraft. The Army Group was initially commanded by Field Marshal Fedor Vambat, facing Army Group South where two Soviet fronts. Note that the Russian term front refers to an Army Group, with Soviet fronts being somewhat smaller than German Army Groups. The southwestern front was commanded by Field Marshal Semyon Timoshenko and consisted of four field armies. The southern front was commanded by Colonel General Rodion Malinowski and consisted of five field armies. The Soviet forces totaled almost one and three-quarters of a million troops, 3,000 tanks and 800 aircraft. Army Group South opened its offensive on 28 June and achieved some impressive advances. By 7 July, Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army had linked up with the 6th Army, Nivronage, on the Upper Don River. Two days later, Army Group South was redesignated Army Group B and Field Marshal Wilhelm List's Army Group A, consisting of the 1st Panzer and 17th Armies, was activated to begin its offensive into the Caucasus. The Russians believed this southern offensive in Ukraine was a supporting effort and the main German offensive would still be in the center toward Moscow. Thus, the Soviets poured reinforcements into the fight for Voronezh, but were hesitant to send reinforcements further south. On 11 July, Hitler ordered the 4th Panzer Army, which had been moving toward Stalingrad to change directions and move southeast to support List's Army Group A, which was struggling to secure crossings over the Don River. At the same time, the 8th Italian Army arrived as reinforcements to bolster Army Group B. After bitter fighting, Rostov fell on 23 July and Army Group A was now poised to advance into the Caucasus. With Rostov secure, Hitler transferred 24th Panzer Corps from the 4th Panzer Army to General Friedrich Paulus' 6th Army in order to reinforce the drive toward Stalingrad. Stalingrad now seemed to be developing into a more important objective. The offensive of List's Army Group A into the Caucasus region received its own codename, Operation Edelweiss. Its objectives were oil fields and refineries at Maikop, Grozny and Baku. This offensive faced significant challenges to include a long, tenuous supply line which stretched across more than 1,000 kilometers of a high-plane salt desert and the Caucasus' mountain range, with peaks above 5,600 meters. List faced many challenges with Operation Edelweiss, mainly of which would be the allocation of combat power across his incredibly long lines of communications. He needed to simultaneously secure his supply routes to thwart attacks by insurgents, allocate enough strength on his flanks to prevent Soviet counterattacks, all while still maintaining enough soldiers and machines for his main effort to seize the oil fields. Facing Army Group A was Marshal Simeon Budiones newly created North Caucasus Front. Army Group A's advance began on 25 July. By 30 July, Army Group A had crossed the dawn and was making good progress toward the Caucasus. That same day, Hitler detached the bulk of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army from List's Army Group and transferred it back to Army Group B under the command of Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs. Hoth's Panzer Army was to turn northeast toward Stalingrad and assist Paulus and his 6th Army in taking the city. With the detachment of Hoth's Army, List received the ill-equipped 4th Romanian Army as reinforcements. List tried to continue his exploitation with far less forces than he had hoped. He directed 1st Panzer and 17th Armies to advance south toward Maikop and Krasnodar. By 10 August, Army Group A had seized the Maikop oil fields, but the Soviets had burned most of the storage facilities and destroyed the well equipment. With supply lines stretched to the breaking point and units strewn across the Caucasus mountain range, Army Group A became bogged down. The German struggle to adequately allocate combat power illustrates the importance and difficulty in applying U.S. Army doctrine regarding operational reach and culmination point. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. Extending operational reach is a major concern for commanders throughout the duration of an operation. The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point. It was not until 10 September that the Soviet stronghold of Novorossiysk was captured. List also tried to reinvigorate his group's offensive further south, but the Germans were unable to take Grozny and they were never able to threaten the faraway Baku. Annoyed at the slow progress, Hitler fired List and took personal command of Army Group A. As Army Group A's offensive was culminating in the Caucasus, the capture of Stalingrad began to take on a greater importance as the new main German objective. There were certainly valid reasons for wanting to seize the city. As mentioned earlier, it had some economic value and a key location on the Volga. Perhaps even more critical, the psychological value of the city named after Stalin himself loomed as a major influence on German decisions which ultimately committed 6th Army to seizing the city. Also, as the Caucasus's goals became more unattainable, Stalingrad became an alternate way to achieve victory in the 1942 campaign. While Army Group A was fighting in the Caucasus, Viking's Army Group B fought its way towards Stalingrad. After pausing in mid-July to allow supplies to catch up and reconstitute his combat power, Viking renewed his offensive on 23 July. Paulus' 6th Army now spearheaded the advance. Opposing the 6th Army was the newly created Stalingrad Front under Lieutenant General Vasily Gordov. His command consisted of 7 armies manning a front along the Don River and south to the Chir River. 6th Army made significant early gains, breaking through the right flank of the Soviet 62nd Army. However, the German advance overburdened its sustainment capacity. The Soviets took advantage of this vulnerability through a series of counterattacks which slowed 6th Army's progress and forced Paulus to temporarily transition to the defense on 1 August. US Army Doctrine 3-90 describes a counterattack as an attack by a defending force with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy's purpose in attacking. Just as 6th Army's advance slowed, Halt's 4th Panzer Army began its offensive northeast towards Stalingrad from the south. After some initial success, the Soviets forced Halt's Army to Halt. During the German pause, Stalin and Stavka representative, Lieutenant General Alexander Vasilevsky, reorganized the Soviet forces defending Stalingrad. The large Stalingrad front was split, with Gordov retaining control of the new, reduced Stalingrad front, which now consisted of four armies. To the south, Colonel General Andrei Yermenko took command of the newly created southeastern front, consisting of three armies which had belonged to the old Stalingrad front. By 7 August, the German supply situation had somewhat improved and Paulus' 6th Army launched new attacks on the Soviet forces in the Don Bend. Late that night, a German double-envelopment met near Kalach and isolated a large part of the Soviet 62nd Army. Over the next three days, several Soviet divisions were destroyed. However, others survived and escaped to the east side of the Don. Paulus now faced a difficult choice. He could maintain the tempo of his offensive and advance directly east to Stalingrad, or he could continue fighting in the Don River Bend to destroy the remaining Soviet forces. By advancing, he could maintain his tempo and limit Soviet defensive preparation in Stalingrad. This, however, would leave significant Soviet forces available to attack his lines of communication. This army doctrine on risk provides insight into Paulus' decision. Field Manual 3-0 states, When commanders accept risk in large-scale ground combat operations, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Commanders balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting risks in order to achieve military objectives. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination with risk and uncertainty. Paulus chose to protect his supply lines and finish the destruction of Soviet forces on his northern flank. However, this pause gave the Soviet forces a chance to prepare their defense of the city. With Soviet forces cleared from the Don Bend, Vikes planned his next offensive to first isolate and then seize Stalingrad. Paulus' 6th army was to establish a bridgehead over the Don near Verdiace with 51st Corps. Then, 14th Panzer Corps would pass through the bridgehead and attack along the high ground north of the Arlovka and Machetka rivers to the west bank of the Volga, north of Stalingrad. Halt's 4th Panzer army was to attack towards the north and east with the aim of reaching the Volga through the southern suburbs of Stalingrad. By this time it was clear to the Soviet leadership that his southern offensive was the main German effort. Stavka now sent troops to reinforce both the Stalingrad Front and Southeastern Front, hoping to build a viable linear defense and even launch spoiling attacks. However, the German offensive was launched before the Soviets could mount any serious offensives. Halt's assault began on 20 August and Paulus' attack began the next day. By 22 August, Halt had forced the Soviets to retreat to the northeast to a new line and finally Paulus' troops had established a solid bridgehead across the Don River. At daybreak on 23 August, 6th army's spearhead, the 14th Panzer Corps, under Colonel General Hans Valentin Huba, initiated their advance from the Verdiace bridgehead and displaced the 62nd army. At the same time, the Luftwaffe began a series of massive airstrikes against the city. The lead elements of Huba's 14th Panzer Corps opted to move as rapidly as possible, assuming risk without protecting their flanks, and they reached the Volga north of the village of Rhinoch that evening. The 16th Panzer Division historian gave his account of seeing the Volga for the first time. And then the first tank stood at the high western bank of the Volga. The white dark river was flowing still and majestic, carrying barges and towed downriver. And on the other side, the Asian steppe spread out into infinity. Although the Germans had reached the Volga, 6th army's long northern flank was vulnerable. The Soviet Stalingrad Front saw this vulnerability and decided to exploit it by attacking the German northern flank over the next several days. The attacks were costly and did not penetrate the German line, but they prevented 6th army from diverting combat power to the main effort. The integration of counterattacks is one of the US army's characteristics of the defense. Defending forces seek to disrupt attacks by employing actions that desynchronize the enemy's forces' preparations. They counterattack to deny the enemy force the ability to exploit. Simultaneously, while the 6th army advanced to the Volga, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army resumed its offensive. But due to fierce Soviet resistance, it was forced to temporarily transition to the defense. On 29 August, Hoth renewed the attack and advanced almost 20 kilometers to the north. The Germans advanced for Soviet General Yermenko to order the 62nd and 64th armies to withdraw to new defensive lines near Stalingrad. Hoth now had a chance to cut off the Soviet retreat by driving due north, but instead, 24th Panzer Division turned east toward the southern suburbs. The Germans now faced a major struggle to capture the city of Stalingrad itself. From 3 to 12 September, the Germans tightened the cordon around the city and began clearing the suburbs to the west of the urban area. Weichs planned for Hube's 14th Panzer Corps to attack Stalingrad from the north, while 51st Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Walter von Silitz Kurzbach, was to advance into the city from the northwest and west. However, Soviet attacks in the Katluban region prevented Hube's 14th Panzer Corps from participating in the advance on Stalingrad. Therefore, Paulus reinforced Silitz's 51st Corps with a division from the German 8th Corps along the Don. 51st Corps then slowly fought its way into the western suburbs of the city. This reinforcement from the 8th Corps was the beginning of a continuing pattern. As the fight for the city ground down German units, Paulus and Weichs reallocated combat power from the flanks of the 6th Army to support the decisive operation. South of the city, both sides fought for the suburbs. On 9 September, 4th Panzer Army's 48th Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Werner Kempf made slow but steady gains. Later that day, 29th Motorized Division became the first German unit to reach the Volga on the southern side of the city. The 62nd and 64th Armies were now separated and the 62nd Army could only receive reinforcements and resupply by ferry boats crossing the Volga river. Although separated, the 62nd Army was not fully isolated and would continue to sustain its defensive operations for the duration of the campaign. This ability to sustain defensive operations created a massive and continuous German requirement for additional forces and supplies to resource the decisive operation in the city and contributed to their inability to balance combat power between their decisive and shaping operations. That same day, on 9 September, Hitler held a conference in his advance headquarters in Venetsk, Ukraine, which was attended by both Weichs and Paulus. During the meeting, Hitler believed that his commanders would quickly complete the seizure of the city. While Hitler held his conference in Ukraine, Stalin removed the commander of the 62nd Army. At Yermenko's urging, Stalin appointed Lieutenant General Vasily Choykov as the new commander. Choykov was unable to reach the 62nd Army headquarters on the summit of Mamayev Kurgan in the center of the city until three days later on the evening of 12 September. The night before, the first major German effort to take the city. As Paulus' 6th Army prepared to assault into Stalingrad, there were a number of important locations that would become crucial in the fight for the city. The suburbs north of the city, the factory district, each of the factories had workers' villages to their west. Immediately south of the factory district was the hill known as Mamayev Kurgan, which was the highest natural elevation in the city. Central Stalingrad was the most modern section of the city, a show place for Soviet progress. Southern Stalingrad, which contained the 35 meter tall grain elevator, and further south were more suburbs. Paulus' 6th Army assault force consisted of three corps. Hubba's 14th Panzer Corps, with one Panzer Division and two motorized divisions. Seidlitz's 51st Corps, initially consisting of three infantry divisions. And Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps, initially consisting of one Panzer Division, one motorized division, and one infantry division. The total German strength in the Stalingrad area was 170,000. However, this included forces defending and unavailable for the initial attack. The assault force was about 80,000 men. Paulus' plan to take the city focused on seizing the center and southern portions of Stalingrad first. Hubba's 14th Panzer Corps was to hold the northern face of the German penetration north of Stalingrad against continued Soviet attacks. Seidlitz's 51st Corps was to advance from the northwest to the southeast through the Red-October workers' villages and seize Mamayev Kurgan, and also advance to Stalingrad's city center with the goal of taking railroad station number one. Kempf's 48th Panzer Corps was instructed to advance east and northeast, clearing southern Stalingrad. On the Soviet side, Choykov's 62nd Army was an ad hoc force of untested reinforcements and several older units which had been decimated in earlier fighting. Choykov had no subordinate headquarters between his army and the 18 divisions, brigades, and regiments that were his subordinate commands. Prior to the initial assaults on the city, 62nd Army's strength was about 54,000 men on 13 September, and it had about 100 tanks distributed in small groups throughout the front. U.S. Army doctrine advises leaders to assess relative combat power during planning. This involves making a rough estimate of force ratios of maneuver units two levels below their echelon. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses and vice versa for each element of combat power. During the attack, the minimum historic planning ratio is 3 to 1. On 13 September, at 0645 hours, a German air and artillery bombardment opened the attack. Stuka squadrons, artillery, and mortars heavily engaged targets throughout the city. The Soviets in response, as they often did in previous engagements, opposed the German advance with heavy artillery and Katusha rocket strikes from across the river and counter-battery fire. As they had in prior urban operations, the Germans often began each day's assaults with heavy artillery and air barrages. The intention of these bombardments was to demoralize the defending troops and facilitate the rapid seizure of the city. However, the success of this heavy firepower was mixed in Stalingrad. Often, the best German advances were made after these bombardments. But due to the lengthy operation, the city turned into a mass of rubble, mangled steel, and debris. Rubble piles provide excellent covered and concealed positions for dismounted forces while hindering mounted movement and maneuver. At 0800, following the pre-assault fires, Sidelitz's 51st Corps launched its attack. The Corps made slight gains in the north. In the center, it captured two key hills and forced Soviet defenders to withdraw to the west. On the corps' southern flank, the Germans reached the heights above the center city and pushed the Soviets into a developing salient north of the Sarista River. Kemp's 48th Panzer Corps also began its attack at 0800. The Panzer Corps made only limited advances against the entrenched and stubborn defenders. The German 6th Army focused its attacks on southern and central Stalingrad for the next two weeks. The force responsible for clearing the south was initially Kemp's 48th Corps. His plan for clearing his sector was to advance with all three divisions online. Troikov's 62nd Army had several units defending the southern sector of Stalingrad. According to a 24th Panzer Division report on 14 September, German gains were limited and costly in the south. Despite the limited success in the last two days, the Germans planned for a major breakthrough in the southern sector on 15 September using specially organized task forces called Kumpf Groups for the urban fighting. These groups were combined arms forces with added firepower, attached engineers and flamethrower units. As in Army Techniques publication 3-06, commanders select the right subordinate force for the mission and balance it with appropriate attachments. High commanders do not direct how to organize the small tactical combined arms teams but ensure that subordinates have the proper balance of forces from which to form these teams. The attack began at 0-3-30 hours and by mid-afternoon the Germans had reached the area just west of Railroad Station No. 2. After a quick but harsh fight, the Germans captured the railway station later that afternoon. The group then left a small force behind to defend the station while the main body resumed its northern advance. During their advance, the German Kumpf Group could not help but notice the massive towering structure of the grain elevator and were amazed at how the building dominated the terrain in this area. From 16-17 September, part of the 48th Panzer Corps turned its attention to reducing the pocket of Soviet troops west of the railroad line while other divisions focused on the fight for the grain elevator. The Germans broke Soviet resistance in southern Stalingrad from 19-21 September, finally clearing the grain elevator. By 23 September, the Germans cleared the last Soviet resistance south of the Sarista River. While fighting raged in southern Stalingrad, Paulus' 6th Army simultaneously battled Troikov's 62nd Army in the center city and at Mamievkirgen. The German 51st Corps renewed its assaults on 14 September. At midday, the Germans took Mamievkirgen. The loss of Mamievkirgen caused a panic in some Soviet units in center city. When the Germans renewed their advance in the afternoon, they were able to seize railroad station No. 1. Later that day, Troikov committed his last reserves to hold the landing stage. This enabled the Soviet 13th Guards Rifle Division under Major General Alexander Rodimtsev to ferry across the Volga in the remaining hours of daylight starting at about 1700 hours. Crossing while it was still light and thus subject to German air attack was a risk that Troikov felt he must take. The arrival of the 13th Guards Rifle Division certainly saved Troikov's 62nd Army in Stalingrad in September. It consisted of 10,000 men but not all of them could come over in one night. It took several days and they can bring any of their heavy equipment. They had to leave the artillery on the other side of the Volga also. Now they did enter the city, retake the railroad station for a while and hold some other buildings. This is crucial and this pattern of reinforcement repeated itself throughout the campaign. For the next two weeks, fighting raged back and forth in three major areas. Near Red Square in the center city, the railroad station changed hands twice while the Soviets desperately held on to the nail factory and the department store. By 24 September, the remnants of the 13th Guards Rifle Division were surrounded near Red Square. With better knowledge of the city layout, the remaining soldiers of the 13th Guards escaped through the German lines. Just to the north, the Germans pressed home attacks with the intent of clearing the rest of the city center. However, the Soviets held several enclaves and one of those gained fame for holding out throughout the remainder of the battle for the city. This location was Pavlov's house in the 9th January Square area. The building was named after Sergeant Jacob Pavlov, who led a group of Soviet soldiers who took the building by surprise on 25 September. Further north on 16 September, Soviet troops forced the Germans off of the summit of Mamayev Kurgan shortly after dawn. Later, a German counterattack pushed the Soviets back from the summit. The foes shared the hill, with the summit usually being an artillery and air ravaged no man's land for much of the rest of the battle. Towards the end of September, the German 6th Army had cleared all Soviet resistance from southern Stalingrad. The Germans had also cleared much of the center of the city, although a few enclaves like Pavlov's house and the critical eastern slope of Mamayev Kurgan remained in the hands of the Soviet 62nd Army. Nonetheless, the 6th Army commander believed it was time to shift forces to the northern half of the city and transition to an offensive in that region. In shifting forces, the Germans illustrate one of the four components of the U.S. Army operational framework described in Field Manual 3-0. Commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting and prioritization of resources. The 6th Army planned for its offensive on the northern sector of Stalingrad to begin on 27 September. Pavlovs believed that 6th Army needed to clear the workers' villages to the west of the factories before moving on to the three main factory complexes. Pavlovs assigned Silas's 51st Corps as the 6th Army's main effort for clearing the workers' villages and later the factories themselves. At 10.30 on 27 September, following two hours of artillery and aerial bombardment, 51st Corps began its advance on the workers' village. In the north, elements of Silas's corps pushed the Soviets back on the south side of the Machetka River and entered into the area north of the Upper Berikotty Workers' Village. To the south, task-organized conf groups captured part of the Upper Red October Workers' Village. However, German units even further south encountered heavy resistance and were stopped after minimal gains near Mamayev Kurgan. The Germans paused in the Workers' Village area. While there, forces cleared the Soviet resistance in the Orlovka Salient. Then, the Germans reopened their offensive on the villages on 3 October. Elements of the German 51st Corps advanced through the Berikotty Workers' Village and captured the Silicott Factory. Other corps units advanced just west of the Traktor Factory Village and in the other village districts making small gains. However, Troikov received a fresh division from the east side of the Volga and the Red troops halted the German advance the next day. The Germans had cleared much of the workers' villages, but on the evening of 4 October, Silas informed Paulists that due to overwhelming losses of men and equipment, his corps could no longer engage in offensive operations. The Germans entered into a pause in offensive operations for a full 10 days until 14 October in order to regroup and resupply. US Army Field Manual 3-90-1 describes what the Germans experienced. Usually, offensive actions lose momentum when friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that cannot be bypassed. They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures. Soldiers become physically exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and replacements do not keep pace with damage and losses. In some cases, the unit can regain its momentum, but this only happens after difficult fighting or an operational pause. During the lull, Vikes reinforced the 6th Army at Stalingrad, with two divisions from units outside of the city. Even with these reinforcements, Paulists was attacking with units which had suffered devastating losses in the overall campaign, and in particular in the fight for the city. The divisions of 51st Corps, which had already been engaged in the city fight, were only able to field 1,700 to 2,100 soldiers out of an authorized strength of 4,500 to 6,300. 24th Panzer Division was down to 20 to 30 tanks out of 103 authorized. The reinforcing infantry division was only slightly better off with just over 4,000 men, while the newly assigned Panzer Division added 35 to 45 tanks. Choykov's 62nd Army had also suffered enormous losses. For the upcoming factory fight, his divisions averaged about 3,000 men each out of an authorized strength of 10,500. He had about 40 tanks to use in the factory defense, almost all of which were light tanks. Counting on his reinforcements, Paulists was ready to enter what he hoped would be the final phase of his attack on Stalingrad. Once again, the 51st Corps was the main effort. It was to attack northeast through the Lower Tractor Factory Village into the factory and to the Machetka and Volga Rivers. The German offensive began on 14 October at 07.30 hours. By early afternoon, the Germans had advanced deep into the Tractor Factory complex. Fighting continued throughout the night and into the morning hours of 15 October, with the Germans clearing the remainder of the factory complex by the end of 15 October. On the evening of 15 October, Paulists ordered Silits to regroup his forces and reorient south to attack the Barracotti factory the next day. At 0800 on 16 October, 51st Corps offensive in the Barracotti factory district began. Initially, well-placed, dug-in Soviet tanks halted the German advance. However, by 1600, the German panzers had destroyed many of the Soviet tanks and advanced into the north end of the Barracotti factory. By nightfall, almost half of the Barracotti factory was in Silits' hands. The Germans continued their assaults on the Barracotti factory on 17 October. Over the next two days, the Germans slowly cleared most of the buildings in the Barracotti complex. Silits planned for new assaults, but heavy rains slowed the movement of German supplies and prevented the launch of new attacks for the next four days. During this time, Paulists received a fresh division to use in his assaults and make up for the devastating losses that his other divisions had suffered. While 62nd Army continued to draw German forces into the battle at Stalingrad, Stavka planned for Operation Uranus, a vast double-envelopment designed to trap and destroy 6th Army in the city. Paulists renewed the German attack in the factory region on 23 October. In the Barracotti area, one German division made little progress against the Soviets defending the southern halls of the Barracotti complex. In the Red-October factory complex, Silits' fresh division made good initial gains. Over the next two days, the Germans continued to press their attacks on both factories. They succeeded in clearing almost all the buildings in the Barracotti area.