 Welcome back to the final panel of our Japan in 2018 event today. We're going to look at the international realm. There's always a little bit of overlap between domestic and international, as is the case these days. But we'll go to about 330, and we have a great chance to talk about a lot of different issues. When we tackled this topic last year, of course, we looked at it through the lens of a new administration coming in, a lot of uncertainty about how the foreign policy pledges and during the campaign would translate into policy and who would take over various positions. I think in many ways a lot of that potential anxiety and uncertainty has been addressed or answered to some extent. I think there's a little bit more predictability or understanding of where the Trump administration is going. But the world itself is, I would argue to some extent, seemingly more dangerous in 2018. That sense of unsettlement or uncertainty continues to persist and alarmingly so in the North Korean context in particular. Even as we look at record-breaking accomplishments for the Dao industrials and stock markets around the world and China's economy now just plugging in year on year above last year's growth rate first time that's happened for several years. So an interesting dichotomy that we're looking at, and this was a topic that was brought up in the first domestic panel, this idea that from a Japanese point of view, external risk is as much if not more of the concern or the focus or the key variable rather than on the domestic side. In the U.S.-Japan alliance or relationship itself, and we tend to lump a lot of the U.S.-Japan dynamics into the international panel, I'd argue a little bit more continuity than change than perhaps we thought from this time last year, but not without their own variables going forward. And some were brought up in the first panel regarding trade, but also in other areas as well. So we have three very experienced and capable guests, panelists to help us here, and I again want to express my appreciation. Their contributions really are what make this all very possible. Julie Chung is going to start us off today. She is the director of the Office of Japanese Affairs at the State Department, and she's been there now for five months or so, so a good realm, but it's great to have her here at Carnegie. She joined the State Department in 1996. She served throughout Asia, including Tokyo, Guangzhou, Bangkok, and most recently as DCM in our embassy in Cambodia. She's also worked on the Korea desk here in Washington, among other positions, so a great guest to help us on this front. Taizuke Mibai on the far left here is visiting senior fellow with the Asia Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He's a career Japanese diplomat with extensive experience on Korea issues in particular, where he covered those issues while minister in Japan's embassy in Beijing before coming to DC just a few months ago as well, and in Tokyo he also worked on Korea issues from the regional perspective, but also from the non-proliferation side of things, and you served in Washington in 2006, 2009, so it's great to have you back in Washington. And then on my right, we have Eric Sayers, a new adjunct fellow in Asian security at CSIS who just recently returned to Washington from a stint in Hawaii at Pacific Command where he was a consultant to Paycom. I feel like we've grabbed you now on your first inaugural trip back. You said you were still rummaging through suitcases to try to find a tie to wear today instead of an aloha shirt. Prior to his time out in Paycom, he was a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. He'll also be starting a new job here in town as vice president of Beacon Global Strategies in addition to his work at CSIS. So congratulations on that front. Right, right. Oh, it's wonderful here. You'll love it. So let me start with Julie. Everyone's going to start off with some opening comments and then we'll work through some of the themes of foreign policy challenges facing the U.S. and Japan in 2018. And Julie, take it away. Okay, thanks, Jim. And I know earlier you said we were going to be making predictions today at this conference, but as a government official, I will not be making any predictions. I can highlight some of the issues that are for you in the coming year that we should pay attention to, but no predictions from me. There's no doubt here our iron-clad alliance between the United States and Japan is stronger than ever for the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. This is apparent from the top down. President Trump and Prime Minister Abe has a very close relationship. They communicate repeatedly continuously by phone and through meetings. There's no doubt that the priorities that we place in the relationship are really coming from the top down. And just going back to last year, President Trump met at a three-day summit in February. Again, in July at the G20 summit, and President Trump's first historic trip to Asia, Tokyo was the first stop, and that was very significant. Vice President Pence also had two sessions of the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue, and as Vice President, he's returning to Tokyo for the second time in just a few weeks. So we're very busy preparing for his visit out to Tokyo. Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mattis, we've had two plus two meetings on the defense and state sides, and of course, beyond the bilateral, we've had multilateral engagements. That's something to watch in the next year, whether it's trilaterally with South Korea, with Australia, with India, the rebirth of the Quad, and so all these bilateral and multilateral engagements will continue to strengthen and expand in the coming year. So I just want to briefly touch on our Indo-Pacific shared interests, and then touch on security and economics. So first of all, in Indo-Pacific, President Trump said in his National Security Strategy last month, the U.S.'s strength is magnified by those who share our principles. And I can't think of a better country than Japan where our alliance and partnership really outlines and shows our shared values and security concerns. So in the 2018, a major area for enhancing U.S.-Japan cooperation will be in the Indo-Pacific region. Also during President Trump's visit to Asia in November, he outlined his vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Now, some of the main principles of this are sovereignty, dignity of every individual, rule of law, open markets, free fair and reciprocal trade frameworks, freedom of navigation, and private sector-led economic growth. Again, all of these are areas where Japan shares our values and similar vision. And of course, Prime Minister Abe has his own free and open Indo-Pacific strategy as well. But those are very closely melded in terms of our shared interests. And in the context of Indo-Pacific, we look to ASEAN, our Southeast Asian partners, to really be partners in this as well. They have continuously expressed their desire to maintain a rules-based order. And in my three tours abroad in Southeast Asia, they have approached us on this rules-based priority. And so as we develop, pursue development and growth goals in ASEAN and Southeast Asia, ASEAN's participation in input would be very, very important. As well as connectivity, I mean, we talk about quality infrastructure, responsible and sustainable financing practices in support of that. So again, the multilateral frameworks, you'll see more and more of, again, involving India, Australia, Republic of Korea, and ASEAN and APEC as well. In terms of our security, of course, our most pressing security challenge is DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programs just a few days ago in Vancouver. We had a meeting with 20 foreign ministers, and we had excellent discussions between Foreign Minister Kono and Secretary Tillerson bilaterally as well as trilaterally with Korea. And it was really an opportunity to once again reaffirm the maximum pressure campaign. And I would say we are locked up in our approach and in our positions that North Korea must change its course. And we're committed to doing that both bilaterally, multilaterally and trilaterally. Now I know there are historical legacy issues that affect the Korea-Japan relationship. We are keenly aware of that, and we have urged both Korea and Japan to look to a forward-looking way to build mutual trust and reconciliation in terms of that issue and build an area of healing. So when we also talk about defense and security, President Trump also emphasized during his trip to Tokyo that we would support Japan's readiness and effectiveness amidst the regional security makeup, and that means qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing the defense capabilities. And Prime Minister Abe pledged to buying more advanced defensive weapon systems, which we readily support. So these challenges go beyond North Korea, of course, when we look at security challenges in the coming year. The rise of a more assertive China, which continues to challenge the rules-based order, a more assertive Russia, which appears to seek a veto on political, economic and strategic decisions of countries around its periphery and threats in new domains such as cyberspace. So you'll see in 2018 more joint training, exercises, maritime security capacity building, defense equipment, technology transfers for maritime security, defense institution building, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, all in support of the security alliance. Touching on the trade and investment, this is an area where we've got a lot of work ahead in the new year. Following the momentum of the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue, we addressed three key areas, trade and investment rules, economic and structural policies, and sectoral cooperation. The President has made it very clear we do want a fair, free, and reciprocal trading relationship with Japan. The goods deficit is now to $70 billion. So we have to address that. And this is obviously a key priority for the administration. We did recognize that Japan's investment into the United States is increasing, and we certainly welcome that. We have over 24 manufacturing plants and 43 R&D facilities. And Japan from Japanese firms across all sectors employ more than 850,000 people. And that's all great news, but there's room for more. And we certainly look to more investment and more jobs. And we were very pleased last week with the $70 billion joint venture in Huntsville, Alabama. Again, looking not towards just R&D and manufacturing facilities, but we're working on workforce development, utilizing tools and resources from Japanese firms to help American workers to have the tools and resources to develop their workforce capacity. So finally, on the economic side and back to the end of Pacific strategy and our priorities there, we will be looking to do joint adventures, joint cooperation in third countries. And that's something that Max Horry mentioned earlier as well. In November, OPIC and JAPIC signed an MOU. The first time we had a framework MOU to offer high quality infrastructure investments in emerging markets. And so we'll be looking towards capacity building, identifying opportunities to build capacity and rules that help emerging countries make well informed decisions on infrastructure goals, but also promoting commercial collaboration doing a matchmaking of sorts between Japanese and American companies doing joint trade fairs, investment missions, and looking towards the areas where we have common interests in the Pacific region. So I would say in the coming year a lot more multilateral work, a lot more focus on the Indo-Pacific region working on third country infrastructure with Japan. A few weeks ago we had a great event at the Sasakawa Foundation with the trilateral symposium of youth from Japan, Korea, and the United States. And those kinds of activities and programs where you bring together the people-to-people ties, especially the young people. It did give me help in terms of moving forward and those students for future and the future become our policymakers and our leaders. So from the State Department's view we're forging stronger and broader relationships with Japan in many areas in the coming year. Thank you very much, Julie. I had a chance to speak to that group too and I, too, was came away very encouraged from that dialogue that they had. So I have a tough job today because I have two current government officials and one person here who just recently worked at Pacific Command. So I promise not to get too tough on them or put them on the spot too much. But quickly, Julie, I just wanted to ask you a question based on your comments before I turn to Nibaisan. In your comments you really emphasize the many and multilateral forums and initiatives and the third country collaboration. But we do have a president who at the UN and other speeches has really emphasized the America First concept and bilateral deals instead of multilateral deals. So from your perspective how do you balance this is it a form of networked bilateralism or are they not as contradictory as they seem from the outside? Actually I think it's complementary. The president does talk about bilateral deals in terms of trade deals. But in terms of looking towards our friends and allies and shared common interests and goals it goes much more beyond the bilateral framework. So again, I mean that's one example is the Vancouver event recently. We do have these discussions on facing North Korea's threats together bilaterally across many countries across the world but it takes all countries to really participate and put the pressure on and I think nobody thinks the United States can do this alone. So I think the more collaboration we have and the security and other fields the more that that does fit into the president's America First priority. Thank you. Dabai-san, let me ask you to offer some opening comments given your experience. Thank you. Thank you very much and it is a great honor to be here at this seminar organized by the Japan American Society and Cragony Endowment for International Peace. Actually for me this is a debut in a panelist at this kind of event so I'm really scared facing this much and not big audiences. Let me first say that I am original from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now hold diplomatic status with the Embassy of Japan in Washington while I speak today does not represent the idea or position of the government of the Embassy of Japan by any means although I would have a little bit more flexibility than Julie. So today based on the guidance given in advance by Jim, I first would like to present my thoughts on Japan's vision of foreign policy priorities in 2018. Here I will talk about the Indo-Pacific strategy, Korean Peninsula and others. Maybe everybody is aware that Japan has come up with a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and is now seriously promoting it. So this is a concept originated from Japan and shared by the United States which itself is very much amazing and I think the objectives of this strategy can be interpreted in three domains value, economy and security. As for value, the strategy aims at rule based international order in particular maritime order. So this is a part where collaboration with like-minded countries of course with including the United States is particularly expected. Regarding economy improving connectivity within the sub-regions and throughout the Indo-Pacific region will be pursued through infrastructure development as well as investment treaties and business environment improvement. Maybe the joint venture with the United States will be included in it. As for security, the focus will be on capacity, building and enhancement in such areas as maritime law enforcement humanitarian assistance disaster relief, antipiracy counter-terrorism and non-preferential. People always talk about the relationship between the Indo-Pacific strategy and China or China's bait and road initiative. The government of Japan says this strategy does not target any specific country and this point cannot be stressed anymore. At the same time, I do not think this means that this strategy has nothing to do with China. It has something to do with China or even much to do with China, which is one of the major factors that were considered in elaborating this strategy. When it comes to how this strategy is related to China, I think the basic idea is to deal with China by relativising China, by not making China everything. This is not to counter, not to confront, not to contain, not to compete with China, but to set a higher ground of a world-based, free and open regional and even global border, which may group and shape China. Not by begging China to join, but by letting China choose if it joins or not. Countries in the region, in particular those in Southeast Asia, are quite concerned about the situation where they have to choose between China on one side and Japan, the US or others on the other. China is keenly aware of this point and very careful in crafting and presenting the strategy not to impress that this strategy is something to force them to make a choice. Actually, therefore, the best assurance in this regard is a good Japan-China bilateral relations. As we assume in 2018, Japan will try to proceed with improvement and development of bilateral relations in tandem with the promotion of Indo-Pacific strategy as its important component. However, it is still uncertain what China's foreign policy after its 19th party congress would be. Although China positively responds to Japan's messages for improvement of the bilateral relations, but as you are aware recently, there are even some moves which could be seen as to test Japan by China. Meanwhile, I assume some points that should be addressed in pursuing this Indo-Pacific strategy. Here I just touch upon just one thing among them, which is how to materialize the strategy so that it appears in countries in the region, in particular developing ones in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia and East Africa. Every time there is a question about this sort of concept is, then what's good for us? And Japan needs to come up with specific answers to this question, but cannot finance everything in this regard. While demonstrating its initiative, therefore, Japan needs to get international consent about and cooperation toward this concept, particularly from advanced or like-minded nations. As for North Korea, I sense the Air Force Administration pursues its policy towards North Korea based on three propositions. First, North Korea comes to a desirable direction with positive actions only when they feel massive pressure including a possibility of military options and international cooperation is indispensable for the maximum pressure in this regard. Second, the country which has the most substantive leverage to press North Korea is China. And we need to demand and encourage China to use this leverage by various means. Third, the U.S. commitment to its allies including maintenance and enhancement of extended deterrence is critical. From the beginning of this year, we are seeing some development in the inter-Korean relations. But I think North Korea's positive posture is tactical, not strategic. And there we will launch a variety of games part of which we are already seeing. Even though we can open and end the game, we can play a game which I hope further hurdles are waiting such as North Korea's possible demand for assistance for resumption of inter-Korean projects as well as a suspension of U.S. ROK joint military exercise. We need to carefully watch how and if they address these actions in the months to come. At the same time I think dialogues and exchanges are multifunctional even though they do not quickly lead to denuclearization they could be used to manage the situation to reduce tension to convey direct messages and so on. So I do not think we have to be too much worried just because the South and North have dialogues and exchanges. What we need to do is to clearly share first what goals we are trying to achieve through these dialogues and exchanges. Second, what tools we can use to achieve these goals. And third what is our bottom line in other words what we should not do among the ROK, U.S. and Japan. As for bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea from the beginning of this year it is awkward and very bad because everybody knows. To deal with various challenges including North Korea managing bilateral difficulties is critical for both countries. And I think the 2015 agreement was risky but significant decision from this perspective for Japan as well. I think the way Moon Jae-in administration addressed the agreement this time has created a serious doubt among people in Tokyo about if Mr Moon is on the same page in this regard. I believe Russia should also be an important component of Japan's regional foreign policy priorities but let me just slightly touch upon it by saying Japan would pursue its bilateral relations with Russia while striking balance with international cooperation to check Russia's performance in the other part of the world. Lastly there is stress that Japan-US relationship is the foundation for every points I have raised today and is an infrastructure of Japan's diplomacy. Based on the good ties between the leaders the government of Japan will try to enhance the relationship at various levels. In 2018 I expect to see more working level of substantive and intensive talks on the various areas such as Indo-Pacific, nuclear posture including an extensive deterrence cyber security, etc. rather than some kind of a telegenic summit meeting. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Let me ask you to a quick follow-up question because first of all that was terrific covering all those different areas exactly what I was hoping for. You talked about an effort by Japan to improve Japan-China relations coming in 2018 but also this key policy goal and view which I agree with you vis-a-vis North Korea which is an emphasis on pressure that North Korea is not going to change its approach without extensive pressure and that the key to that pressure is China do you sense an element of trade-off in this regard that Tokyo might be forced to kind of consider do we get better relations with China or do we keep up the pressure and get some kind of deliverable pressure or are they not necessarily mutually exclusive in that regard? First of all I do not think that they are mutually exclusive but when it comes to how to deal with North Korea for China the problem is not North Korea but the United States so nowadays North Korea is a very very important component for China of their bilateral relations with the United States they need to serious about North Korea including adding massive pressure on North Korea because the United States is serious about that the trap is serious about that fortunately or unfortunately I do not think that in this regard Japan can make a significant difference in talking with China but of course maybe Mr Abe or other Japanese officials can assure in talking to China that it is not our hope that military options will be taken against North Korea and that is why we need massive pressure against North Korea so that North Korea can come to the desirable direction as quickly as possible Great well Eric let me turn to you we reached you now before the glow has worn off from Hawaii before we've recaptured you here into the Beltway and Washington cynicism so we'd love to hear your view kind of report from the perspective of your time in PAKOM on the coming year Yep thanks Jim and thanks for the invitation into the host yeah I think I'm in a bit of a difficult spot here I've been in government for seven years much like Julie was doing earlier I had that internal compass guiding me in what I said publicly and for the first time in seven years I feel the shackles are off but I can kind of say what I'd like to say so I turn it to you in the Q&A to test the bounds of that just very briefly as the last panelist the day I wanted to tick off a number of those items that I see for 2018 and the first is relationships and some of those relationships where we'll see continuity and somewhere we will see change and those changes will help define the alliance and where the alliance goes at the very top and Jim alluded to this it's clear that the Abe-Trump relationship is very strong and for that reason this alliance perhaps unlike some of the other relationships the United States has especially in Europe with NATO has been on a very good path a very opportunistic path achieving some of those objectives that it would have achieved under any administration over the past year and I think we can expect that same momentum to continue into this year where there are going to be some changes in 2018 I think there's two the first is evident in that is that we finally we didn't think it would take a full year but we finally have confirmed assistant secretary defense for Asia and Randy Shriver who is a friend to all of us here and is a friend to the alliance and to the Abe agenda the alliance agenda and I think that creates new opportunities as a confirmed assistant secretary going forward one of the changes we're going to see and that one related to my recent job is that Admiral Harris will be leaving Pacific Command in a number of months given his background and his fondness of the alliance that will lead to some change but most especially I think the Harris relationship with Admiral Kowano the chief of the self defense force was a very strong one the last three or four years many thought Admiral Kowano would leave four years ago but given the trust that Prime Minister Abe had in him and the strong relationship he had with Admiral Harris we've seen him stay on and be re-upped a number of times I saw that relationship from up on the hill at Camp Smith where Admiral Harris and Admiral Kowano spoke monthly by video teleconference and we're really attached to the hip on the core defense issues facing the alliance and so we'll see both the new PAKOM commander and the new chief of the self defense force their personalities and how they get along we'd be lucky to see if it's anywhere close to the great relationship Harris and Kowano have had in the past three years over to some of the challenges I think we'll face it was just discussed a moment ago but that balance in the alliance between dealing with the pressure campaign and Korea very much the 10 meter challenge and then trying to balance the competition that we see the national security strategy said that the United States faces with China now and over the long term a long term peacetime competition or strategic competition that will be a challenge in 2018 we will face a number of those perhaps as an alliance or just as the United States makes its own individual decisions a constant pressure to balance those two the irony here is that we have a new national security strategy we'll have a new national defense strategy this week that places great power competition in the center of U.S. strategy but the 2018 agenda seems to very much be focusing on rogue regimes in North Korea and kind of more of a second tier when we talk about great power competition issue and so how do we effectively carry forward an NSS and an NDS and what is now the national defense program guideline the NDPG being written in Japan which will also give priority to China and the alliance giving priority to China over the long term there's a lot of potential tensions there as well tensions in the trilateral relationship with Korea we saw great progress on this trilaterally from a political perspective but also from a military perspective where a lot of that opportunity was achieved in the past year given the Korea threat the joint threat we faced if we make predictions that's an area where I am concerned we may take a step back given the politics of the interrelationship right now despite the unifying threat that we see on the peninsula great momentum in 2017 almost unexpected momentum and a lot of the different exercises that we did what we'll have to see in 2018 if we can carry that forward a number of other pieces I think in terms of opportunities it hasn't been said yet on this panel but the Indo-Pacific free and open Indo-Pacific is a nice concept how we translate that into a strategy and operationalize that is really the question there is a big tree a beautiful tree that we just put up a month before Christmas but we haven't yet chosen kind of all the lights and the ornaments and everything we're going to place on that tree and what it's going to look like there's certainly many continuities in our alliance and things that we're going to already do already had plans to do but what can we add to that what's different about this how do we carry it forward the answer to that and the real success I think of the administration's strategy in Asia thus far is the resuscitation of the Quad that's a little cue not big cue it's not going to be a formal event a formal conference of states it's going to be an informal grouping of these four countries that share the same maritime political diplomatic outlook of the region and so for 2018 the open question for me is how do we operationalize the Quad there was a great meeting in Manila in November there's certainly some opportunities that the United States and Japan and the other two partners have discussed of course this will only move as quickly as the slowest partner wants it to and we've seen challenges you know going back a decade but there are some great opportunities I think to continue these sets of meetings just at Rosina a dialogue in India this morning Emeril Harris and Emeril Kawano parts from Australia and India did a panel together to talk about you know where this might head I think in the near term another sort of projection for 2018 it's going to be easiest not for us not to create any new constructs but to sort of plug that third or fourth partner into existing exercises like Malabar and RIMPAC and Balikatan and Talisman Saver of course I'll just jump ahead as I don't want to take too much time the final issue and I'll get to a couple of these other pieces in Q&A one thing that I think will need an increasing level of attention from a military security perspective and the State Department is not going to like this but that's the INF Treaty and how the INF Treaty applies in Asia this agreement was signed 30 years ago just last month it was negotiated by a Republican administration over six or seven years it was very much with the encouragement or the prodding of then Japanese Prime Minister in 1986-87 that it was a global treaty in its scope and INF ballistic missile ranges were limited not just to the European theater but globally so the problem in Europe couldn't just become Asia's problem but from a as we see the national defense strategy come out tomorrow the ability of the United States in a sequestered environment in an environment where the rest are rising just as quickly to develop and deliver conventional military fires has become very expensive whether from a bomber or a submarine or a destroyer to deliver a Tomahawk missile for instance or just hold assets at risk you have to pay a premium for that a destroyer costs almost $2 billion and carries 30 Tomahawk weapons it would be a fraction of that price if those Tomahawks were ashore because of the range of the Tomahawk it can't be ashore because of the INF tree and so Admiral Harris did allude to this publicly in testimony last year and I think it's going to be an issue that the United States has to look at internally as well as bilaterally within the alliance for how we expect to maintain our military posture and security commitments in the Pacific not just in the next couple of years that our NDS's and our NDPG's look but in the next 10 and 20 and 30 years as we face a military geographic problem that just can't be overcome by spending dollars so I'll leave a couple of other issues I wanted to address for the Q&A that's terrific Eric thank you for that raised a number of questions in my mind one quick one I want to follow up with you right now is another of these longer term issues that you alluded to but if we just look at the coming year are there any particular military strategic developments on the horizon in the region that we need to be on the lookout for or be ready to react to as an alliance I mean obviously we have what North Korea did in the past year from the January 1, 2017 till the end of last year remarkable improvement in range and testing various missiles etc we've seen changes in the South China Sea reclaimed islands by China and the configuration of certain capabilities there so it's not necessarily a calendar year thing for the sake of a calendar year are there any particular things that you're worried about or on the lookout for in the coming year that drive requirements or may drive some of our thinking about what we need to be prepared for a long term? Two things I think the first isn't military technical it's again where I started with personalities the dual challenge that the US Navy has faced in the past couple of years both from the fat Leonard scandals which knocked off many senior Navy officials that have served in the Pacific in the last decade and then the very tragic 7 fleet mishaps and the ramifications of that that we're still seeing now have left our military, potential military leadership in joint jobs like paycom but also other senior jobs like 7th fleet commander and Pacific fleet commander have left us with a dearth of leadership a lack of leadership going forward the next five, six, seven years many of those senior echelon people have been wiped out in their careers as a result of these two different issues and so I worry personally about how we as a military will deal with that challenge going forward having to rely on other great senior officers who haven't spent the same amount of time in the Pacific theater in the last 5 and 10 years from a military technical standpoint I think we're in a very good position vis-a-vis Korea or vis-a-vis China at least in the near term that's a testament to the good work the last 10, 20 years and investments not just in the military hardware like missile defense and our alliance's investment in missile defense but also kind of our foresight for looking at how we're going to posture ourselves in Northeast Asia traditionally where many of those changes are ongoing and we haven't mentioned the alliance F word yet Fatenma which continues to be and will continue to be a challenge lingering in the background that brings to mind one of the things I did want to say and that we're coming to a point in 2018 you know probably there'll be some ribbons cut but no one will ever hear about it because it's a good news story and that's the progress that we've made as an alliance at Iwakuni Iwakuni as a joint Navy and Marine Corps base where there's a fence line shared with the self-defense force and there's a commercial airport there with the local prefecture we've seen for the last 4 or 5 years running almost a million dollars a day executed in construction where we now have the Marines and the F-35B there with the air wing at Atsugi that's connected to the Ronald Reagan strike group will be moving there this year and there's a good relationship with the local government and there's a good relationship with the SDF just across the fence line and that's a good example of where we looked out 20 years ago and kind of saw where we needed to be politically with the alliance if you look at a map Iwakuni's only a 20 minute jet flight from the Korean peninsula it's very far west out near Hoshima and so that's something again I guess I give us credit for and kind of looking out 20 years like we did back in the mid 90s to try to lay some of that groundwork despite you know Fatema usually getting the negative press there's some of those other positive stories very good points to bring up thank you well let me ask a couple of general questions here before we turn it over to the audience I have to start with North Korea and I want to ask it in kind of an open-ended way and my question I guess I'll frame it this way in 2018 over the course of this coming year what do you want to see by the end of 2018 what's a reasonable good news kind of outcome over the coming year and what do you expect to actually happen in terms of kind of where we'll be or what situation we'll face related to that is by December will the North-South Korea relationship look similar to way it looks right now as very few people would expect or predict or will look more like six months ago if we took a snapshot in December I open that up generally in terms of I'm not going to make predictions but I think in terms of our objectives and our goals and what we would like to see remains the same verifiable and yeah that's right completely irreversible denuclearized Korean Peninsula and that is our ultimate goal and we've had these recent North-South for the safety and security of the Olympics which we have welcomed but I think we have to keep an eye on the bigger issue here which is the denuclearized Korean Peninsula and I think that's something that are okay and we and Japan are all our allies recognize so I think continuing and even expanding the maximum pressure campaign enforcing the end scours going to look at maritime interdictions that's another area that we are looking to other countries to also play a role and I think on that path is really what we would like to see in North Korea make the right choices I have to ask you because he was quoting the CVID from his six-party days when he was working on that front so you have a history with this issue yeah from speaking of this I cannot be very optimistic about this scenario waiting for us and any kind of prediction is meaningful only when it helps us to consider what we do you can come up with some possible scenarios including very positive ones very negative ones but in any case we need to seriously consider then what we need to do then how we need to respond to the situation where we can predict and particularly we need to have very clear images of the situation where we face a dilemma actually in the morning session Ambassador Zuma mentioned about the situation where either Japan or the United States comes up with a dialogue direction you know this is although the situation is positive but this is the case where we have to face a dilemma so in fact speaking as long as North Korea is going towards the negative direction it is not very much annoying it is annoying but we do not have to face a dilemma we just drive things to the tougher direction of course when it comes to whether or not we actually take a military option this is another dilemma we have to face which is we need to seriously elaborate in advance but anyway anything whatever we predict in the course to come I believe that this exercise we need to respond to another possible situation and this is a thing we need to thoroughly elaborate in the bilateral or even in the trilateral talks I think at a more general level it would be a successful year if North Korea does not choose perhaps by way of the pressure campaign to do an atmospheric test which would be another big milestone in its step forward in this process at the same time I guess my hope is that the United States and Japan our alliance does not approach the North Korea problem as just a peninsula problem and take a maximalist approach to addressing that core issue we have to think of this in the context of broader Northeast Asia and our broader strategy in the Pacific as a whole I worry about the opportunity cost in North Korea and what that would mean not just in the costs to the alliance in lives and treasure but what that would mean in terms of the distraction it would have for us as an alliance from the larger challenge the larger long term challenge of the PRC going forward related to this I mean I can't help but think a little bit about the issue of a potential US military action in North Korea I think it comes either by one of two reasons either in response to something that North Korea does or because there's this theoretical line that we simply cannot tolerate North Korea to go beyond on that second piece I don't think that's personally speaking I don't think 2018 is where that line gets crossed but but the debate will sharpen but in a recent discussion with a Japanese scholar who was visiting Washington you know he asked the rhetorical question a little bit US and President Trump keeps talking about all options on the table and raising the specter of military pressure in the context of the North Korean issue and his question to the Americans was really are all options really on the table and it was an interesting discussion about how much is posturing how much is real how much is imminent and in a way I wanted to ask the return question which is Japan has generally been supportive of we haven't gotten into specifics obviously but everything I've heard from Japanese friends is that if there was some US action vis-a-vis North Korea that Japan would be supportive of that that Japan would understand and would support it and my question to them was really would Japan really be happy about that in that context and I wonder this is a difficult question for the panel to answer but in the context of alliance solidarity and let's say a US military action in response to something that North Korea does as a more likely scenario in 2018 what's your estimation of how in sync we are between the United States and Japan in terms of political and public support for an aggressive response vis-a-vis North Korea I'm not going to start with you If it is the scenario you're discussing and it is an alliance response or a trilateral response to a DPRK provocation then that's something I think is very much aligned on given the history especially the 2010 history with the United States and South Korea if it is that different scenario that has been on everyone's lips in the discussion of a preventive war or a bloody nose strike as the term has been used that's the kind of thing that more likely comes about in some scenario where there isn't much collaboration or discussion with alliance partners or UN resolutions or things like that that's a scenario where there probably is less support especially because that bloody nose or that preventive strike against perhaps ICBM targets that threaten the United States would leave not only the South vulnerable to some type of calculated military response but would leave Japan susceptible to that as well I just say that this is a if Japan can support any particular military options taken by the United States ultimate political question even that people in Tokyo have already prepared the answer to that question now and of course it depends on actual situation where we are actually forced to make that decision so it's a tough but maybe responsible and high ranking policy makers in Tokyo have already started other mental activities on how Japan actually should when the United States Mr. Trump really says actually says that this is what I want to do in one year support something to keep an eye on we've already seen in 2017 two well no I guess one was still in January but two trilateral meetings in San Francisco between essentially the National Security Council or National Security Advisors of US Japan and South Korea and I'm not exactly sure the South Koreans have been very coy about who has attended on that front but to me that suggests that at least the channels of communication are quite strong and we're prepared for all all situations but let me begin to involve the audience we have a lot of people with experience here in the audience and I'd like to give them a chance to ask some questions I may jump in again later and we'll start in the back there and then we'll work our way way back up here. Thank you, my name is Patrick Mikako my question is for Eric regarding the Quad I think Mubaisan was right that the intellectual basis of this idea has been floating around in Tokyo for a number of years but the US endorsed it in a high level way this fall and I'm wondering whether or not you think that the Quad is the right grouping of states in particular I note that a US treaty ally that's a liberal democracy with a larger population economy and arguably even military potential has been excluded in that South Korea so I wonder if you think it's appropriate in defining US strategy for the region to exclude them. Thank you and just for anybody who's not familiar with the Quad US, Japan, Australia India is generally what that refers to Eric I'll give you a chance to respond but Julie by all means because you've been working on this in the context of you mentioned the OPIC JBIC agreement there's some interesting things going on on that front Yeah it's a good question I think that's the beauty of the informality of a little small Q Quad where we don't have a secretariat or some sort of conference center in Tokyo or Delhi where we just get together informally and therefore this grouping of states can be defined as four it can be defined as six if others in Southeast Asia want to take part the Singaporeans or the Filipinos or the Vietnamese or even in Europe if the French or the British or others want to take part as well I think you can kind of plug and play it with the concept as it goes along whether that's in the economic domain and the challenges we face jointly BRI or it's in the security domain and it's a Korean Peninsula question or it's a maritime Indo-Pacific question and so the extent that we can keep it informal is really to our benefit I'll just add the Quad is not new of course there's been the Quad construct for quite some time and the main point is to use all the tools in your toolbox whether it's again the Quad or the Trilat or the Biolats or whatever formulation again the ultimate goal is to get together with our allies and partners who have these shared interests and values in the Pacific and do what we can in the various areas that we had outlined earlier so again I think there's a lot of value in Prime Minister Abed's close relationship with Prime Minister Modi and of course we already have Trilat talks in terms of US, Australia, Japan so it's again bringing together whatever elements we have at our disposal to continue to implement the Indo-Pacific programs and policies that we would like to see in the new year I had a question here Stanley Kober William Faulkner once famously wrote, the past is never dead, it's not even past one of the things that's affecting policy in Asia today including security policy is the history issue we try to cobble together alliances but we're running into problems the history which is now affecting domestic politics and I would just ask the panel to address that what do we do if the past is never dead not an easy question to address but you have some room to play with history is very much alive and it's very much used as a discussion tool for how that affects current policy sometime it's used as a tool of governments to direct a different focus on policy what's always stuck out for me though in that history question is the way that this is a touchy topic and I'll be very careful on how I approach it and of course the destruction wrought by the empire of Japan in northeast Asia was very much different than what happened in southeast Asia but where I'm optimistic is the way that Japan has been able to rebuild the relationships it has in southeast Asia and many of the places that did occupy during the Second World War and a lot of the polling data that comes out of those places now from Singapore to Malaysia to the Philippines to even Taiwan today the island of Formosa that was occupied during the war as well and you see upwards of 90 95% approval rating of Japan and so very much it's very much a fact that those countries and their relationship with Japan have been able to escape that challenge of history where it still exists perhaps where it exists and matters the most and of course is in northeast Asia and it comes and goes with the times we were quite optimistic a couple years ago about this comfort women agreement that was signed just two years ago and now it seems to be very much in limbo as governments have changed in Seoul and where it will go from there it's a long separate panel of itself but there's places to be optimistic I'd say and there's other places that still need work I guess I would just add a little bit that to some extent a symbolic efforts or symbolic acts of reconciliation have have happened and made some progress we've seen also symbolic acts of kind of defiance or trying to keep certain memories alive but I'm thinking a little bit of Obama's visit to Hiroshima Abe's visit to Pearl Harbor Abe's speech before the joint meeting of Congress a variety of anniversaries and these were all kind of dealt with and in some ways there was there was elements of progress less so on the Japan-Korea front but you did have the comfort women agreement but the substance has not kept up with the symbolism in some ways and I don't think the symbolic acts by themselves mean that the industry problem is over there are some in Japan that have argued that the comfort women agreement should be the end of it clearly it's not the end of it if it's still an issue where there are widely different interpretations and memories about what happened and who did what to whom and so that's not going to be the end of it but it's also not a situation where simply some new agreement or some new symbolic act is going to fix it either I think it's a much longer term much broader based issue that said I would like to see Prime Minister Abe go to the Olympics in Korea I think that would be a great gesture of this idea of at least meeting Moon halfway on the idea of a dual track we complained when when President Park would kind of stop everything because she felt that Korea was not getting satisfied on the the history front and but the reality is there's so many other issues that require cooperation and deepening those relationships as we've seen in the United States with much more investment by Japan and closer personal personal ties among people of all ages around all over the country in Midwest and West and Southeast to me it's time and it's deepening relationships like that that eventually help overcome these things but they're no easy to not take my own advice and jump off this issue but just a two finger on this there's history and the civic purposes it has for society and there's history and kind of the political purposes unfortunately sometimes the various political purposes it can have I went to to China in the fall of 2013 to northeast China which was long occupied from the early 30s onward by the Japanese and we went to four different cities in Shenyang and Dalyan and Dandong and each city we were taken by our Chinese hosts to a brand new museum the paint was just drying very elaborate which explained the Japanese occupation and there's nothing wrong with that I mean history is important and local societies understand what occurred in those places but it was very clear that this was less about the past and more about the future and understanding and justifying how China views Japan and how China has concerns about Japan and that was a message this was a group of congressional staffers but a message that was portrayed to us for political purposes as a means for explaining why China could never trust Japan and the Japanese were just on the horizon etc etc so for political purposes and that's very much often how it's used unfortunately that's where the challenges arrive thank you very much my question goes to Eric about teasing out a little bit more in INF the need to revisit INF painfully arrived at does that imply that because of the growing vulnerability of U.S. foreign forces that may need to reconsider or consider deploying intermediate range missiles in the ROK in Japan is that what we're talking about here and the second question is it true that PAKOM may go to the Air Force and what does that mean there's a prediction for you Eric let me turn to you on that but I may expand the question to my other panelists because I wanted to look at INF, NPR and some other things about whether we're having more divergent views between the U.S. and Japan of some defense issues or more convergent views I could make an argument kind of either way and I'm curious what other panelists think on that front too so in INF this is not something that Asia hands usually think about it's something that folks who focus on Europe think about or the non-proliferation and a crowd in this town in our government it's very much an issue that's been restricted and it's restricted us from a military perspective but we haven't had to deal with and think about yet until we've kind of arrived at the situation the confluence of PLA investments and military investments and our own kind of military budgetary challenges I think yes to answer your question it is the geographic challenge we face and the budgetary challenge we face we're having us to take a second look at this in the European context and from a UCOM perspective I get it it's still very much matters but at the same time it is a global treaty that was negotiated 30 years ago for a bilateral world it's out of date it's not consistent with when it's tying our hands unilaterally in another theater where we face just as much if not a greater geopolitical challenge or competition what munitions will be based if they were ballistic Japan and Korea are much too close that's probably the benefit of this you could base them as far east as Alaska or Guam or Northern Australia if our Australian friends will let us host them from a cruise missile perspective which is a much shorter range which is kind of on the low end of the INF range that would be something that you would want to if it was mobile you could deploy across the Japanese archipelago and that's the beauty of this it's mobile it doesn't need to be there permanently it can be rolled out to send the right signal at the right time it just gives us another way to complicate planning what was the second I think you sit outside Admiral Harris' office as I did the last year and there are photos of every commander since 1947 and all of them are Navy including the chairman of the military in the late 1960s John McCain Sr so that has become somewhat of a tradition there was a circumstance in 2004 where Speedy Martin was nominated and knocked out but not because I think he had the wrong uniform on where it was related to the Boeing tanker issues of the day there are a number of qualified Air Force candidates including General Shaughnessy from PACAF just as there is a number of qualified Navy candidates and so that questions really rest with Secretary Mattis and the President ultimately and then just more broadly on this question because between now and I mean it's already the Alliance Conversation on Japan's National Defense Program guidelines has already started but it will really be reaching a fever pitch as we head toward December and the midterm defense plan in Japan to decide what is next kind of a shopping list for defense items do we see in some ways these issues of where the US is going on nuclear posture on maybe some other areas of defense policy seem to be running in a slightly different direction than Japan's traditional views but on many other issues we have been seeing almost more convergent defense views how do you see the Alliance defense debate I think there's really no debate in terms of the government to government in terms of deterrence and defensive capabilities I think we are locked up with the government of Japan the bigger question is for the Prime Minister and the public of Japanese public I think there is ongoing debate about constitution reform, revision and those issues and that's something that I think Japan internally has to really decide and determine the move forward but in terms of our defense posture and our alliance support that has not changed and we are fully supportive of Japan for years Japanese side has been very keen to engage with a very serious bilateral cooperation arrangement how to deal with particularly the nuclear and traditionally the US focus is more on China you know even when I was stationed in Washington particularly when we sold the launch of the Obama administration my colleagues at the University of Japan were very much serious to work on how to engage the next US administration fashion so now we have you know further equipped as China and the North Korean situation so maybe it's time for us to come into that dialogue about this new nuclear situation where we both China and North Korea countries in a way that is not interpreted as recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state but it's certainly going to drive a lot of tough questions coming up this year as the United States and Japan have a lot of measures to strengthen deterrence and really deal with North Korea's rising capability that's going to we've already seen Russia complain about some missile defense investments by Japan and I'm sure China will have their complaints so it's going to take a lot of tough diplomacy to help smooth out some of these rough edges of the emerging security dilemma we have time for another question or two I'm curious as to what you panelists seem to mean by maximum pressure on North Korea you already have Russia and China supplying oil covertly you're going to cut off Jimmy Chu's shoes or something to them to really bring them to the table I don't understand what that term actually means okay and let me collect the other question too also about the North Korean issues I think there are some opinions that the unexpected passion of North Korea into this Olympics I mean the participation of them is actually to conceal their nuclear development or to continue on their nuclear development so do you think this is a possible scenario and if this becomes real do you have any expo factor measures for this one I'm sorry can you just clarify that the Olympic content or negotiation is just to protect the nuclear I mean the unexpected passion of North Korea into this Olympics it might be based on their kind of belief that they want to conceal their nuclear development or to continue on the development under the Olympic situation thank you so in a way we have a couple of related questions the question about what constitutes maximum pressure and then to some extent I think you're asking to what extent is North Korea using North-South relations and the Olympic moment as a way to deflect maximum pressure such as it is so let me ask our panel may by some let me start my personal interpretation of the maximum pressure mentioned by Mr. Abe or any other officials in Japan is that it includes the both the substantive material how can I say the shortage of the things that North Korea needs particularly the oil is the thing we want to see so for months or the government insist that that should be a part of the sanctions against and last the latest United Nations Security Council resolution and the other thing but not such a material substantive not only the substantive stuff but also the kind of isolation North Korea needs to fear as long as they pursue the nuclear development they are isolating themselves in this international community and that this is what we want North Korea to fear and it is right that when it comes to Olympic year North Korea is now I don't know if we can call it charm offensive but they show us kind of a positive gesture and frankly speaking this is not necessary compatible with the notion to isolate North Korea as much as possible but while looking at as I discussed what is the bottom line we need a very careful and a thorough consultation among the three countries Japan is and are okay on how we can make use of this opportunity to guide North Korea to a desirable direction and at least we should not so that we do not give them what we should not the Olympics we are in supporting ROK having a successful and safe Olympics so I think to that degree we had welcomed that North-South discussion on the Olympics but I think we are very clear-eyed again on North Korea's intentions and actions and they have not been a credible negotiator they have not been incredibly explaining why they are taking the decisions to starve its people while continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile program so I think those are completely separate and we are maintaining that pressure campaign turning to the pressure campaign I think in the past when we talked about North Korea and pressure in North Korea it was really relegated to the Korean Peninsula and nearby countries what the maximum pressure campaign did in the past year is to really expand that globally we went to countries in South America and Africa and to use every range of possibility and factors and ways to pressure North Korea to cutting off economic ties removing their ambassadors reducing their embassy size whatever it could again to put that pressure on so it's an all out campaign not going just beyond ROK and Japan but seeking countries and partners across the globe to do this with us Eric, do you have anything to add? Yeah, no I think on this pressure campaign issue it's the one area of Trump administration foreign policy that I actually think has been well thought through and pretty well executed just a couple days ago as a result of the September UN Security Council resolution essentially North Korean joint ventures or businesses abroad are illegal in the eyes of the United Nations or at least the UN has signed up to to shut them down we'll still see that doesn't mean there's 100% compliance and there's reports of North Korean restaurants and businesses in China for example that it's simply switch names or menus to get around this but foreign laborers will begin coming home North Korean laborers will begin coming home from other countries all of this may not change Kim Jong-un's behavior frankly I'm skeptical on that front so I think we're in for a long haul but it will weaken the regime and limit its sense of confidence I think in the context of creating trouble either in the non-proliferation realm or in this kind of provocation and this all remains to be seen but the banshee of military of economic pressure seems to me preferable than trying to go to the military route and for a long time if you I had a chart in one of my talks where if the pain is the up axis and benefit to North Korea of its testing is the lower axis I think North Korea has been gaining benefit without crossing a real threshold of pain over the course of how sanctions have been imposed over the years the goal is to try to push that arrow up above that threshold and a lot of complicated moving parts to make that happen and in the process a lot of questions about whether North Korea has already gained the benefit that it needs or whether it begins to bargain with some of that capability vis-a-vis further economic pressure so I think this is going to be one of the dominant foreign policy issues for the challenges for the United States and Japan going forward China's role is particularly important as is Russia's which is all part of this mosaic foreign policy and we haven't talked as much about Southeast Asia today although that's a critical part of the mix as well on this and somewhat related to INF Republicans were very critical of arms control agreements in the Cold War and the dead taunt period but ultimately it was Republicans who pursued the zero option in Europe and as you said very carefully over six or seven years pursued the ultimate and successful outcome of the INF negotiations INF tree the interesting thing is kind of a third party observer now will be Republicans who have been very critical of the Iran agreement which was naturally an imperfect agreement will now are now in a position to pursue this pressure campaign whose ultimate objective is the only culmination of it short of pursuing the other track of a preventive war is to also negotiate naturally be an imperfect agreement with another and rogue regime and that will be a challenge for this administration and they'll have to find the right figure maybe that person doesn't exist yet someone that will empower who can be that Richard Nixon and negotiate with China who can pursue that imperfect agreement if this diplomatic track is ultimately going to be successful and that's what I'll as a third party observer be interested to watch the next couple of years well we're glad to have you as a third party observer back in Washington here well ladies and gentlemen we've run out of time and I just want to take this quick moment to thank again our supporters and collaborators Japan America Society for really bringing this to us and making it possible with the KZI Coho Center with Najas and I want to thank the Tsuyan company and Tsurugi-san for coming all this way and for their contributions and to my panelists for helping us explore these issues we hope you enjoyed today's event and please thank you for joining us and please join me in thanking our panel today